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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this research has been to understand more about aviation accidents in which 
the actions of the flight crew members (hereafter FCMs) were the main cause. A new con-
struct has been developed known as substandard flight crew performance (hereafter SFP) to 
provide framework and context for this research. To support this construct, the most recurrent 
examples of SFP were identified from analysis of decades of investigations and reports. 
Based upon the frequency of occurrence, the potential contribution to aviation safety, and the 
feasibility of conducting meaningful research, three diverse but interconnected factors have 
been identified. The first of these related to the recurrent influence of verbal phenomena in 
aviation accidents, in particular, distracting conversations and unclear communications. The 
literature indicated that even those tasked with investigating accidents where these phenome-
na had been present understood very little about the underlying reasons for their occurrence. 
Furthermore, although these phenomena have been studied within more general research 
populations, as far as is known no previous research has examined their function in the avia-
tion context. A questionnaire and unstructured interviews with FCMs resulted in two taxon-
omies, both of which have been supported by ethnographic
1
 observations. The next strand of 
this research critically examined some of the reasons why some flight crews become unsure 
of their position or orientation whilst navigating both in flight and on the ground, a phenome-
non that has been associated with some of the most serious instances of SFP. This original 
contribution to aviation knowledge involved experiments utilising realistic navigation stimuli 
and measurement of cognitive load and spatial awareness. All human activity is embedded 
within a context, and this thesis contends that the influence of context is underspecified in 
existing knowledge of aviation human factors. As far as is known no previous research has 
                                               
1 Throughout this thesis, terms that are explained in the glossary are underlined. 
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examined how FCMs might be influenced to make errors as a result of aspects of their envi-
ronmental and situational context. The contextual cueing strand of this research consisted of a 
series of original experiments which examined the extent to which contextual cues might be 
implicated in instances of SFP. The three research strands outlined in this thesis are intended 
to demonstrate how the detailed study of specific categories of SFP such as loss of positional 
awareness or unclear communications can unearth contributory factors that might otherwise 
have been overlooked. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that each of the research strands 
addresses current issues at the forefront of aviation safety. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
  
ACARS Aircraft communications addressing and reporting 
system is a digital data link system for the transmis-
sion of messages between aircraft and ground sta-
tions. 
 
Allocentric orientation An allocentric reference frame locates points within a 
framework external to the holder of the representation 
and independent of his or her position. 
 
  
ASRS database An American database for confidential aviation inci-
dent reporting. 
 
ATC Air traffic control: the controllers who control aircraft 
on the ground and in the air. 
 
Autonomic nervous system 
 
Part of the nervous system that serves the internal 
organs. After the autonomic nervous system receives 
information about the body and external environment, 
it responds by stimulating body processes, usually 
through the sympathetic division, or inhibiting them, 
usually through the parasympathetic division. 
 
Avoidance-avoidance conflict Conflict whereby one must choose between two more 
or less equally undesirable or unattractive goals. 
 
Bald on record statement A bald on record statement is a direct way of saying 
things without any minimisation to the imposition on 
the addressee. 
 
Bank angle The angle between the vertical and the angle the air-
craft is inclined. 
 
BEA The French accident investigating authority. 
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Between-participants Design In experimental design, a between-participants de-
sign is an experiment that has two or more groups of 
participants each being tested by a different testing 
factor simultaneously. 
  
Bottom-up analysis In bottom-up analysis sensory inputs are built and 
interpreted by the brain to result in a perception. In 
psychology, it refers to a process of progression from 
individual research elements to the whole. 
 
Cardinal point  Each of the four main points of the compass (north, 
south, east, and west). 
 
CFIT Controlled flight into terrain. 
 
Challenge and response An interactive checklist procedure where one pilot 
challenges the other to make a response rather than 
just reading and doing the checklist. 
 
Cognitive economy The tendency for cognitive processes to minimize 
processing effort and resources. 
  
Cognitive load In cognitive psychology, cognitive load refers to the 
total amount of mental effort being used in the work-
ing memory.  
 
Cognitive load theory Cognitive load theory differentiates between three 
types of cognitive load, intrinsic, germane and extra-
neous. 
 
Cognitive Map A cognitive map is a mental image of the attributes of 
the environment. 
 
 
Cognitive dissonance Cognitive dissonance is a theory of human motivation 
that asserts that it is psychologically uncomfortable to 
hold contradictory cognitions. 
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Comment clause A comment clause is a short word group (such as 
"you see" and "I think") that adds a parenthetical 
remark to another word group. 
 
Concordancing Involves a search for keywords and an examination 
of the context in which they appear. 
 
Content validity In psychometrics, content validity refers to the extent 
to which a measure represents all the facets of a given 
construct. 
 
Conversation analysis In sociolinguistics, conversation analysis is the study 
of the talk produced in ordinary human interactions.  
 
Conversational turn Turn taking is a conversational structure where par-
ticipants speak one at a time in alternating turns. 
 
Co-operative-Principle A principle of conversation stating that conversation-
al contributions should be suitable for their intended 
purpose. 
 
Corrective Resolution Advisory (RA) A TCAS alert issued to avoid a collision. 
 
Critical discourse analysis Critical discourse analysis is a contemporary ap-
proach to the study of language and discourses in 
social institutions.  
 
CRM Crew resource management; a set of protocols for 
efficient and safe aviation operations. 
 
CVR Cockpit voice recorder. 
 
CVR Transcript A transcript of a cockpit voice recording. 
 
Decision speed The speed on takeoff above which the pilot is com-
mitted to takeoff otherwise the aircraft will overrun 
the runway. 
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Delayed execution A task that is deferred due to an environmental con-
straint. 
 
Discourse analysis Discourse analysis is a general term for a number of 
approaches to the analysis of written or vocal lan-
guage. 
 
Distance Measuring Equipment An electronic instrument that depicts the distance to a 
radio beacon. 
 
Downwind The part of a landing pattern where the aeroplane 
travels parallel to the runway on a reciprocal track in 
order to correctly position for landing. 
 
Ecological validity Ecological validity refers to the extent to which the 
findings of a research study are able to be generalized 
to real life settings. 
 
Electronic flight bag (EFB) 
 
Electronic flight bag is a computer which stores and 
presents navigation charts, performance information 
and manuals allowing the flight deck to be paperless. 
(See Appendix F)   
 
Egocentric orientation An egocentric reference frame represents locations 
with respect to the perspective of the observer. 
 
EGPWS Enhanced ground proximity warning system. An 
electronic system that depicts high terrain on the ND 
and issues escape instructions if a collision with ter-
rain is imminent. (See figure 8.4) 
 
Enforced change of orientation In this study, enforced change of orientation refers to 
any reorientation pilots need to achieve during navi-
gation. 
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Ethnographic Ethnographic research is widely accepted to refer to 
virtually any qualitative research project where the 
intent is to provide a detailed, in depth description of 
everyday life and practice. 
 
Eurocontrol The European organisation for the safety of air navi-
gation, commonly known as Eurocontrol, is 
an international organisation working to achieve safe 
and seamless air traffic management across Europe. 
 
Extraneous cognitive  load Extraneous cognitive load is caused by the way in-
formation or tasks are presented to a learner. 
 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration. The USA’s aviation 
regulator. 
 
Face threat avoidance A face threatening act (FTA) is an act which chal-
lenges the face-wants of an interlocutor. Face threat 
avoidance strategies avoid FTAs. 
 
Face-wants The desire to satisfy the needs of negative and posi-
tive face. 
 
Face-work Face-work refers to the way that people cooperate to 
promote others’ and their own sense of self-esteem, 
autonomy and solidarity in conversation. 
 
  
First officer A qualified pilot who is flying as second in command 
to a captain. 
 
 
Flapless takeoff Most airliners require some flap extension to takeoff 
safely; all the flapless takeoffs cited in this study 
were unintentional. Many airliners will be uncontrol-
lable if flaps are not extended for takeoff. 
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Flight dispatcher A licenced or unlicensed person who supports the 
flight crew during their preparations. In the USA 
flight dispatchers may share legal responsibility for 
some aspects of the safe operation of the flight. 
 
Flight management computer (FMC) A computer on the flight deck that processes route 
information and provides it to the displays. It also 
processes performance information. It is the nerve 
centre of the operation of the aircraft. See Appendix F 
for an illustration of an FMC. 
 
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging is a neuroim-
aging procedure that measures brain activity by de-
tecting changes in blood flow. 
 
Go around A procedure that pilots use to discontinue an        
approach to landing. 
 
GPS Global positioning system. A system that provides 
navigation information via satellites.  
 
GPWS Ground proximity warning system (See EGPWS). 
 
Gulfstream A type of business jet. 
 
Hard science Hard science refers to the natural sciences. 
 
Holding pattern A racetrack like pattern flown around a navigational 
fix with the intention of delaying the aircraft. 
 
Homeostatic process A process that maintains the body’s stability in the 
face of environmental changes. 
 
HRO High reliability organisations are those who have 
avoided catastrophes despite operating in a high risk 
environment. 
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Implicit learning Implicit learning is the learning of complex infor-
mation in an incidental manner, without awareness of 
what has been learned. 
 
Intercept heading A compass heading intended to converge upon the 
extended runway centreline. 
 
Linguistic hedging The use of a mitigating speech act to lessen the im-
pact of an utterance. 
 
LOC Loss of control. 
 
Magenta line A magenta coloured line on the ND represents the 
active route. (See Figure 1.2) 
 
Mental map See cognitive map. 
 
Mental rotation Mental rotation is the ability to rotate mental repre-
sentations of two dimensional and three dimension-
al objects as it is related to the visual representation 
of such rotation within the human mind. 
 
Missed approach A procedure that pilots use to discontinue an ap-
proach. 
 
Mitigated directive A mitigated directive softens an instruction. 
 
Modal verb An auxiliary verb that expresses necessity or possibil-
ity, such as shall, will, should, would, can or could. 
 
Navigation display (ND) An electronic moving map on the instrument panel.  
 
Negative-face Negative-face is the desire not to be imposed upon, 
intruded, or otherwise put upon. 
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North up A map or display that depicts north at the top. 
 
NPC A non-pertinent conversation; one that is prohibited 
by the sterile cockpit rule. 
 
NTSB National Transport Safety Board: the agency that 
investigates accidents in the USA. 
 
Observer centred An observer centred reference frame represents loca-
tions with respect to the perspective of the observer. 
Also known as egocentric orientation. 
 
One-tailed hypothesis A one-tailed hypothesis predicts the nature of the 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable. 
 
Operationalise/operationalising In psychology, to operationalise is to measure a phe-
nomenon and analyse those measurements. 
 
Organisational citizenship behaviour Organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB) is a term 
that encompasses anything positive and constructive 
that employees do of their own volition, which sup-
ports co-workers and benefits the organisation. 
 
PF The pilot flying the aircraft. 
 
PM The pilot monitoring the aircraft (i.e. not flying). 
 
Positive-face Positive-face is the desire to be liked, appreciated, 
approved of, etc. 
 
Positive predictive value The positive predictive value (PPV) is the degree of 
probability that a certain phenomenon will predict 
another one. 
 
Post-completion error A specific form of omission error occurring after 
some task or goal has been accomplished. 
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Power distance index Hofstede’s power distance index measures the extent 
to which the less powerful members of organisations 
and institutions accept and expect that power is dis-
tributed unequally. 
 
Practice effect Practice effects can be defined as influences on per-
formance that arise from a practicing a task (Heiman, 
2002). 
 
Pragmatic competence Pragmatic competence refers to the ability to use 
language appropriately in different social situations.  
 
Predictive validity Predictive validity is the extent to which the measure 
being used will allow you to make the predictions 
that should be possible with that measure. 
 
Preventive resolution advisory (RA) A TCAS alert issued to avoid a collision requiring no 
change to the aircraft's flight path. 
 
Primary flight display (PFD) An instrument that presents attitude, speed, heading 
and altitude information to the pilot. 
 
Prosocial behaviour Prosocial behavior refers to "voluntary actions that 
are intended to help or benefit another individual or 
group of individuals" (Eisenberg and Mussen 1989). 
 
Prospective memory Prospective memory is a form of memory that in-
volves remembering to perform a planned action or 
intention at some future point in time. 
 
Prototype In this study, Rosch's (1973) definition of prototype is 
used.  A prototype is a stimulus, which takes a salient 
position in the formation of a category as it is the first 
stimulus to be associated with that category. 
 
Pull up A speech act intended to convey that the pilot needs 
to climb immediately. 
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Radio altitude Radio altitude is derived from a radio beam projected 
downwards. It is used close to the ground and is more 
accurate than barometric altitude. 
  
Reciprocal In the aviation context this means the 180 degree 
opposite direction. 
 
Reference frame A conventional way to describe the position and ori-
entation is to attach a frame to it. For instance a north 
up chart adopts a northerly reference frame whereas a 
satnav in a car often adopts an observer centred refer-
ence frame. 
 
Rejected takeoff A manoeuvre involving discontinuing the takeoff and 
bringing the aircraft to a stop. 
 
Response time The length of time taken for a person or system to 
react to a given stimulus or event. 
 
Resumption error Error associated with resumption of a task after an 
interruption. 
  
 
Schema A mental structure of preconceived ideas, a frame-
work representing some aspect of the world, or a 
system of organizing and perceiving new infor-
mation. 
 
Slips Slips or action slips are unintentional behaviours 
resulting from a failure to pay due attention or absent 
mindedness. 
 
SME Subject matter expert. 
 
Soft science A colloquial term for the social sciences. 
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Speech act In linguistics, a speech act is an utterance defined in 
terms of a speaker's intentions and the effects it has 
on a listener. 
 
Stable approach An approach to landing that meets established criteria 
in terms of alignment, speed and a range of other 
factors that ensure a safe landing. 
 
Stall or stalling In the aviation context a stall refers to a situation 
where the angle between the wing and the relative 
airflow is too high to sustain the lift required to sup-
port the aircraft. 
 
Sterile cockpit rule The sterile cockpit rule is a regulation requiring pilots 
to refrain from non-essential activities during critical 
phases of flight, normally below 10,000 feet.  
 
Stick pusher A device that physically pushes the control column 
forward in order to assist the recovery from a stall. 
 
Stick shaker A device that shakes the control column to alert the 
pilot that a stall is being approached. 
 
TCAS A traffic collision avoidance system designed to re-
duce the incidence of mid-air collisions. 
 
TCAS manoeuvre A manoeuvre in response to a TCAS alert. 
 
Thematic analysis Thematic analysis examines and records patterns 
within data and identifies themes which are arranged 
into categories for analysis. 
 
Top-down Control In the context of this research, top–down control of 
physiology concerns the direct regulation by the brain 
of physiological functions via the autonomic nervous 
system. 
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Trim or trimming Trimming is a statistical process involving removing 
outlying data from a dataset. 
 
UK AAIB The UK’s Air Accident Investigation Bureau. 
 
UK CAA UK aviation's regulatory agency. 
 
Unstable Approach An approach to landing that does not meet estab-
lished criteria related to alignment, speed, height, rate 
of descent and thrust setting. 
 
Wayfinding In this research, wayfinding occurs when a pilot devi-
ates from a pre-planned route. 
 
Windshear Windshear is defined as a sudden change of wind 
velocity.  
 
Winsorize Winsorizing involves identifying outlying data and 
replacing it with the closest valid value in the dataset.  
  
Working memory Working memory is short term memory which holds 
information in various different stores. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1. BACKGROUND 
In recent years there has been a rapid increase in technology aimed at reducing the airline ac-
cident rate.  For instance, according to IATA (2015) the steady reduction in controlled flight 
into terrain (CFIT) accidents over several decades can be traced back to the introduction of 
ground proximity warning systems. However, accidents in which the flight crew’s actions are 
a causal or contributory factor are still overrepresented in the statistics; for this reason the 
current research focused upon recurrent human limitations and behaviours that have been ev-
ident in advance of safety occurrences in which technological safeguards have not been effec-
tive. The aviation occurrence literature acknowledges that there are likely to be variations in 
flight crew performance but when an unsafe level of performance is reached the term often 
used to describe such performance is “substandard”i. In line with the literature, the term sub-
standard flight crew performance was chosen to encompass the phenomena described and 
researched in this thesis. To improve readability of the thesis, the accidents referred to by ge-
ographic location (e.g. the Lexington accident) are listed in alphabetic order in Appendix A 
with a brief description of the occurrence. Where a report or cockpit voice recorder (CVR) 
transcript is referred to in the text, the terms report or transcript are used. Two specific acci-
dents provided the inspiration for this research, the first at Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) near New 
York involved a loss of control which occurred in a context including a distracting conversa-
tion conducted by the flight crew when they should have been attending to the aircraft. The 
second was a runway overrun on takeoff at Lexington, Kentucky (NTSB, 2007a) which 
claimed 49 lives and also involved a flight crew who had been chatting whilst they should 
have been attending to the positioning of the aircraft. This was not the only trend evident in 
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these two accidents; both flight crews had lost awareness of their spatial position, the former 
in terms of how close they were to the airport, and the latter in terms of the direction they 
were headed. Furthermore, each of these accidents occurred in contextual conditions that had 
been present in similar occurrences in the past. A serious concern is that since these two sem-
inal accidents there have been further safety occurrences that have involved similar behav-
ioural traits, human limitations and contextual conditions
ii
. The research outlined in this the-
sis examined three recurrent strands. The first was the influence of verbal phenomena upon 
flight safety. On the basis of commentary in the reports relating to the two accidents above, it 
was clear that although non-pertinent conversation on the flight deck was a known phenome-
non there was very little understanding of the reasons it occurs with such frequency. As the 
research broadened from these two accidents it was also evident that many safety occurrences 
resulted from unclear communication or misinterpretation of a critical piece of information. 
The verbal strand of this research identified and explained a range of verbal phenomena that 
as far as is known, have not been considered in such depth in previous research. It was also 
evident from occurrence reports that the loss of spatial awareness evident at Buffalo and Lex-
ington was a recurrent phenomenon in many of the documented safety occurrences. The oc-
currence literature also indicated that when flight crews became spatially disoriented, some of 
their core skills deteriorated to an unacceptable level very rapidly. The spatial awareness 
strand of the current research examined how cognitive load might be influenced by naviga-
tion tasks of the types evident the Jakarta accident, the Cali accident and others cited in this 
research. More specifically, this research examined how cognitive load is influenced by the 
requirement to mentally reorient from an observer-centred display to a map with a different 
reference-frame.  
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It was a natural progression for this research to examine why certain contexts appeared to 
promote substandard flight crew performance; this was the focus of the contextual cueing 
strand. At Lexington there were aspects of the airport lighting mentioned by the flight crew 
(NTSB, 2007a, p.65) before the accident that may have influenced their tolerance of the unu-
sual lighting configuration they commented upon in the seconds before they crashed. If it 
could be demonstrated that this aspect of their context influenced their decision making pro-
cesses then context becomes a major factor. Similarly at Buffalo the captain failed to perform 
the correct stall recovery. Instead of pushing forward on the control column he pulled back; 
although investigators were at a loss to understand why a trained pilot would do this, they 
underestimated the influence of context. This aircraft was on final approach when the stall 
warning occurred; in almost every conceivable situation that a pilot would need to discontin-
ue an approach in the prevailing contextual conditions he would pull up rather than push the 
control column forward. By operationalising the role of context in aviation safety occurrences 
this research sought to explain how context might have been a factor in a wide range of safety 
occurrences. 
 
THESIS OUTLINE 
Part l consists of Chapters l to 4. Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the background of the 
research outlined in this thesis. The aims and objectives are outlined along with the research 
scope. Chapter 2 outlines the types of aviation safety occurrences that have been occurring in 
recent years. The chapter contends that a problem exists in relation to aviation safety that is 
not being fully addressed at present. This theme is developed by highlighting some of the 
limitations of both the way that human error is conceptualised in the aviation context and 
how the data derived from reports and investigations is presented for analysis. Chapter 2 con-
cludes that a construct that placed more emphasis upon human limitations and behaviour 
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would complement existing models of human error causation. Chapter 3 introduces the sub-
standard flight crew performance (SFP) construct and identifies what is and is not SFP for the 
purposes of this research. An explanation of the rationale behind the choice of the three re-
search strands is followed by an example of an SFP-related accident from the literature. 
Chapter 4 outlines the ethnographic orientation of the research by introducing institutional 
features of the airline context that will feature in greater detail later in the thesis. This is fol-
lowed by a description of the conceptual model used in the development of this research 
highlighting some of the differences between a system-world and a real-world perspective on 
aviation safety. The reasons for adopting this conceptual model are explained by a detailed 
examination of aviation’s stakeholders and their motivations. This section outlines the 
worldview of the aviation system that is scrutinised in this study. The chapter concludes with 
a description of some of the transformations that could flow from a better understanding of 
substandard flight crew performance. Part II starts with Chapter 5 which describes in detail 
the basis for a mixed methods approach employed in this research and introduces the litera-
ture and research upon which this study was founded. Chapter 6 outlines the research meth-
ods used for each strand and then outlines in detail how the research was conducted.  Part III 
describes in detail the research that underlies the methods outlined in Chapter 6. The rationale 
behind the experiments is described and then the results and analysis are presented. Part IV 
discusses the conclusions that can be drawn from the research, its contribution to the field and 
its implications for the future of flight safety. Figure 1.1 illustrates the thesis layout. 
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Figure 1.1: THESIS LAYOUT 
 
 
1.1 RESEARCH AIMS 
 The primary aim of this research was to propose a new construct called substandard flight 
crew performance (SFP) and to demonstrate how it could be used as a repository for 
knowledge relating to specific categories of safety occurrences which have been underspeci-
fied in the past. A further aim of this thesis was to demonstrate how by categorising safety 
occurrences on the basis of recurrent instances of a particular human limitation or type of be-
haviour it would be possible to identify causal links that might otherwise be overlooked. The 
verbal strand of this research examined non-pertinent conversation and unclear communica-
tions. The first aim of the non-pertinent conversation study was to determine whether the 
phenomenon of the non-pertinent conversation was researchable because despite its presence 
in the aviation occurrence literature for over forty years, the aviation regulators and investiga-
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tors remain unable to understand why these distracting conversations are such a recurrent fea-
ture of a very diverse range of aviation accidents. Another important aim was to identify the 
underlying reasons that these distracting conversations take place, with a view to mitigating 
their effect. 
 
Decades of accident reports also indicate that failure to communicate effectively is a persis-
tent feature of SFP related airline accidents involving fully serviceable aircraft but despite 
investigators and regulators being able to recognise unclear communication when they en-
counter it, investigations into serious incidents such as occurred at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 
2010a) indicate that even they struggle to understand why it occurs. Unclear communication 
on the flight deck follows repetitive patterns, with a reluctance to speak up, particularly 
among subordinate FCMs, being among one of the most recurrent characteristics. The aim of 
this research was to identify some of the recurrent instances of unclear communication in the 
aviation occurrence literature and propose some reasons for their occurrence so that its effects 
might be mitigated. 
 
In accidents spanning several decades it was clear that the flight crew had lost either spatial 
or situational awareness despite the availability of a moving map navigation display (ND) 
similar to the one in Figure 1.2 below. 
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Figure 1.2: A navigation display. The magenta coloured line is the programmed route and the 
green numbers show the speed and position at which the flaps should be extended. 
 
The aim of the spatial awareness strand research was to examine how flight crews’ cognitive 
load is affected when they face a spatial-awareness task involving reorientation from an ob-
server-centred display to a map with a different reference-frame. 
 
Throughout this research it emerged that particular categories of accident often occurred 
within a contextual environment that had prevailed in a previous similar accident. The obser-
vation that on occasions contextual information appeared to have adversely influenced 
FCMs’ actions led to an examination of the influence of contextual cueing in SFP. This is a 
concept that has received almost no previous attention in the aviation literature despite being 
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described in the reports into seminal accidents at Tenerife in 1977 (Ministerio de Transportes 
y Communicaciones Subsecretaria de Aviacion Civil, 1978), in Cali, Colombia in 1995 
(Flight Safety Foundation, 1998) and more recently in Miami in 2015 (QCAA, 2015).  
In addition to elaborating on the concept of contextual cueing, which has largely been associ-
ated with visual stimuli, an important aim of this research was to operationalise contextual 
cueing in the aviation context and propose and test three aviation-specific hypotheses. 
 
In combination, the three strands of this research (verbal communication, spatial awareness 
and contextual cueing) addressed human limitations that were implicated to a varying extent 
in many of the most serious aviation accidents documented in recent history. 
 
1.2   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
THE VERBAL STRAND CONVERSATION RESEARCH 
The objective of the conversation research was to develop taxonomies of the most recurrent 
flight deck conversation topics and their underpinnings validated by surveying current pilots, 
and to propose explanations for their occurrence based upon peer-reviewed research. This 
objective addressed a deficit in existing knowledge of the phenomenon of the non-pertinent 
conversation highlighted in both the Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) and Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) 
reports. This research asked questions relating to the types of conversations that take place 
and why they occur. 
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THE UNCLEAR COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 
Recent safety occurrences at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 2010a) and Birmingham, Alabama (NTSB, 
2014b) indicate that some aviation practitioners do not understand what constitutes clear and 
unequivocal communication. The objective of this research was to conduct a textual analysis 
of several accident CVR transcripts to identify recurrent instances of unclear communication. 
With reference to the linguistic literature, explanations for some of the most recurrent in-
stances of unclear flight deck communications are proposed. As far as is known, this is the 
first research to develop a taxonomy of aviation-related unclear communication based upon 
the linguistics literature. It is also believed that some of the explanations are original to this 
research. 
THE SPATIAL AWARENESS STRAND RESEARCH 
The objective of the spatial awareness strand research was to conduct experiments to examine 
the rapid decrease in flight crew performance that sometimes accompanies a sudden unex-
pected spatial awareness task. If it can be demonstrated experimentally that cognitive load 
varies with the type of spatial awareness task required then such tasks could be implicated in 
documented instances of substandard flight crew performance. The necessity for a better un-
derstanding of the link between spatial-awareness tasks and deficits in flight crew perfor-
mance was evident in the reports into accidents at Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) and Jakarta 
(KNKT, 2012), neither of which mentioned the influence of the spatial awareness challenges 
faced by the pilot involved. The two spatial awareness experiments posed questions relating 
to real life orientation tasks and their effect upon cognitive load.  
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THE CONTEXTUAL CUEING STRAND 
The objective of the contextual cueing strand experiments and research was to establish a 
new and original construct that has been described in the aviation literature but as far as is 
known has not previously been operationalised. Experiments were used to examine two of the 
three hypotheses proposed. A third hypothesis was examined with reference to the occurrence 
literature. Aspects of contextual cueing are evident in many of the safety occurrences outlined 
in this thesis.  
In combination the aims and objectives outlined above are intended to illustrate how SFP-
related research is conducted and how the SFP construct can provide a repository for such 
knowledge. 
WHY IS THE SFP CONSTRUCT NEEDED? 
A premise of the research outlined in this thesis is that by categorising safety occurrences on 
the basis of human behavioural traits and limitations rather than by their technical character-
istics it will be possible to collate knowledge from a wide range of occurrences, some of 
which might appear to be unconnected. To illustrate the point being made, there is a current 
and emergent threat related to flight crews who lose control of their aircraft whilst climbing 
out after a takeoff or missed approach; these instances are almost always categorised as loss 
of control (LOC) occurrences, and although human error is rarely explicitly cited as the 
cause, it is clear that the actions of the pilots are implicated. However, a detailed reading of 
the occurrence literature indicated that in several cases the LOC had occurred shortly after a 
confusing or ill-timed communication from air traffic control. This phenomenon is not unique 
to the takeoff/missed approach situation, having been a factor in runway safety, and CFIT 
occurrences as well. The SFP construct contends that a factor such as unclear communica-
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tion, whether it occurs during a missed approach, at the parking gate, whilst taxing or at any 
other time, possesses recurrent characteristics which on the basis of the literature are un-
known to some pilots and support workers. It is not being suggested that there is no value in 
categorising the occurrences above as LOC instances, this already happens. What is being 
proposed is that by having a category such as unclear communication  containing all that is 
known about the subject, explanations emerge that  would have otherwise been missed. An 
example is found in the Buffalo and Lexington accidents, which had no similarities whatso-
ever in technical terms but were closely linked in terms of the verbal behaviours exhibited by 
the pilots. Support for the approach outlined in this thesis is found in the fact that the report 
into the Buffalo accident (NTSB, 2010a, p. 100) referred its readers to the Lexington (NTSB, 
2007a) accident report as a reference for the similarities between the verbal behaviour of the 
two flight crews; had the SFP construct been available to the investigation there would have 
been far more information and theory-based explanations available.              
 
The three diverse strands of this research are not based simply upon intuition; each was cho-
sen in direct response to unanswered questions in the aviation safety literature. For instance, 
the two very dissimilar accidents cited above occurred in a context which featured unauthor-
ised and distracting conversations. The reasons why pilots who were aware that their conver-
sations carried the risk of distraction and that they were unauthorised, behaved in the way 
they did remained unresolved at the conclusion of the respective formal investigations. Non-
pertinent conversations (NPCs) have persistently defied explanation even by senior investiga-
tors such as Deborah Hersman, who is a former chairman of the NTSB (See NTSB, 2010a. p. 
110).  
 Two recent accidents, one at Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) and one at Jakarta (KNKT, 2012) 
prompted the spatial awareness strand of this research. Although both of these accidents were 
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attributed to the actions of the pilots, there are similarities that suggest that a secondary task 
such as manipulating autopilot controls (as was the case in both of these accidents) can be-
come degraded during a period when a cognitive map of the spatial environment needs to be 
constructed. If this is the case, neither of the two reports just cited provided any insight into 
the cognitive processes that might have been involved. Research into wayfinding provided 
several of the ideas outlined in the spatial awareness strand of this research. Several themes 
emerged from a detailed study of related accidents. Pilots appear to fly and navigate unchar-
acteristically badly when they are involved in sudden unexpected changes to their planned 
route, and the deterioration can be very rapid indeed. It was also clear that in many such acci-
dents the flight crew, for a number of reasons, did not make use of the egocentrically-oriented 
navigation display. The pilots at Jakarta were flying the most modern airliner available at the 
time, but they still resorted to mental arithmetic to derive their heading to their destination in 
the minute before they flew into terrain. Although the focus of this study was on modern air-
craft with electronic navigation displays, an instance at Tenerife in 1979 involving a Boeing 
727 (UK AIB, 1981) with analogue instrumentation bore several similarities with contempo-
rary accidents. The accident literature indicates that pilots of modern aircraft equipped with 
egocentrically-oriented navigation displays (NDs) may gain little advantage from such tech-
nology when navigating off their programmed route. In fact studies involving other research 
populations suggest flight crews of ND equipped aircraft may even be less well prepared for 
navigating off their planned route than those who are accustomed to maintaining a mental 
map of their spatial environment. Whilst it is understandable that flight crews may be tempo-
rarily unsure of their position during such unplanned changes, less is understood about why 
they sometimes lose control of the aircraft or fail to perform even well-rehearsed actions such 
as turning the heading selector or responding to an alert. An important aim of this research 
was examine how certain spatial tasks might influence flight crews’ cognitive load and to re-
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late this to their performance of concurrent tasks. This research examined two types of spatial 
task that the literature indicates have been part of the context that has preceded an accident. 
The first involved measurement of cognitive load when transitioning from an egocentric ori-
entation to a northerly oriented map; this task was being undertaken shortly before an acci-
dent at Cali in Columbia (See Flight Safety Foundation, 1998, p. 23). The second task exam-
ines perspective-taking; flight crews need to be able to imagine scenes that they are not cur-
rently experiencing, such as when they make decisions relating to parallel runways before 
they are aligned with them.  An accident in the Comoros Islands (Union des Comores, 2013) 
involved a flight crew stalling a completely serviceable Airbus into the sea whilst performing 
a circling approach which would probably have involved this type of spatial task. The official 
report commented on the mental resources needed to fly such an approach. This was a de-
manding approach in which the pilot flying in the left hand seat would need to have visual-
ised a runway on his right and its surrounding terrain whilst flying on a reciprocal heading; 
this is the type of scenario that this study contends results in increased cognitive load. The 
report did not elaborate on the reasons why the Comoros flight crew may have exceeded their 
mental capacity when this was actually one of the most important questions that required an 
answer. This is the type of question the SFP construct is intended to address. 
 
Because aviation boasts a highly developed store of human factors knowledge, proposing a 
new aviation related human factor construct is not embarked upon lightly, but based upon the 
researcher’s experience of four decades of airline flying, coupled with an academic ground-
ing in psychology, it was considered that the increased focus upon recurrent human limita-
tions and behaviour of the SFP construct outlined in this thesis would represent a significant 
contribution to aviation safety. The current research set out to demonstrate how disparate oc-
currences, sometimes separated by decades, often share similar human factors related charac-
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teristics that can be researched and explained. Notably, the Buffalo accident report (NTSB, 
2010a, pp. 100-101) pre-empted the SFP construct when an emerging narrative surrounding 
pilot professionalism informally drew parallels between the behaviour seen in the Lexington 
runway crash and the Buffalo loss of control, and it was this narrative that inspired the verbal 
strand of this research. The current study elaborated upon the notion that an accident repre-
sents the outcome of a chain of events that usually starts with a set of contextual conditions 
such as the flight crew chatting when they shouldn’t be, or a controller passing an incompre-
hensible or ill-timed instruction, or simply because the situational context has a trap of which 
the FCMs are unaware. The SFP construct shifts the focus from categorising safety occur-
rences on the basis of their outcome to a categorisation based upon the behavioural, situation-
al and contextual factors that facilitated the occurrence.  
 
An SFP-related examination of the Lexington and Buffalo accidents would access SFP’s non-
pertinent conversation category of instances, whilst more traditional examination of the tech-
nical characteristics of the occurrence could occur in parallel. SFP- related explanations 
would reduce the need for reports to cross refer to previous accident reports for explanations, 
which is frequently the approach adopted at present. The  SFP construct is intended to pro-
vide a repository for knowledge relating to specific occurrence precursors such as unclear 
communication or loss of spatial awareness so that members of the aviation safety system at 
all levels can identify them and mitigate their effects. This thesis describes a worked example 
of how the SFP construct could be used as a means of identifying and explaining human be-
haviour related to some of the most recurrent phenomena in aviation safety occurrences. 
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1.3 RESEARCH SCOPE 
The scope of investigation related to any aviation accident or incident involving any of the 
following factors: 
 Evidence of a non-pertinent conversation (NPC). 
It was extremely important to identify CVR transcripts in which an NPC had not only been 
present but was likely to have been a contributory factor. There were several instances were a 
report highlighted that an NPC had taken place but upon careful reading it had not been a fac-
tor in the occurrence. There are also instances such as the Hudson River Airbus ditching 
where an NPC was evident in the transcript (NTSB, 2010b, p.146) but was not even men-
tioned in the report. This research only considered four transcripts to be suitably complete 
and relevant to form the foundation of the NPC research. Transcripts which had been edited 
were treated with caution although some contained useful data. There was no limit upon the 
age of the transcript as long as it was relevant. The conversation section of the verbal strand 
research was not concerned with linguistic features of conversation but the interactional func-
tions of conversation. 
 
 Evidence of unclear communications. 
Deciding what is clear or unclear is likely to be subjective but often the outcome of an occur-
rence indicated how effectively a message had been communicated. This study was not con-
cerned with language comprehension problems although some useful insights were gained 
from transcripts which involved translations from a foreign language, suggesting the phe-
nomena under examination may be generalizable across cultures. Neither was it concerned 
with the rate of speech or the influence of accent; all of these phenomena have been studied 
elsewhere (e.g. CAA, 2017). This research differed from conversation analysis (CA) of the 
type conducted by Nevile & Walker (2005) inasmuch as they had access to actual recordings 
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so they were able to draw inferences based upon pauses and intonations that were not possi-
ble from transcripts alone. Whilst CA research might be able to determine what a speech act 
such as okay was intended to mean, this research could only present the alternative meanings 
for the reader to make a judgement.  The data for this study were distinct from Nevile and 
Walker’s data consisting of phenomena such as nuances, hedges and mitigated directives, the 
functions of which were already well-documented in more general linguistic research and 
were able to be adapted to the aviation context. 
 
 Evidence that the flight crew performance deteriorated after they lost track of their 
position, orientation or aircraft state. 
 
This was not a situational awareness study; this has been more than adequately described in a 
body of work by Mica Endsley (See Wickens, 2008 for a review). This research was also not 
primarily concerned with pilots who lose positional awareness but continue to fly the aircraft 
competently. The focus of attention was upon those few pilots who become so confused dur-
ing a period of spatial awareness challenge that they become unable to perform tasks that 
they would normally be able to. So whilst the previously cited accident flight crew at Cali 
would qualify for inclusion because they lost control of their aircraft, the flight crew involved 
in a CFIT accident at Arkansas (NTSB, 1974) who lost positional awareness to the extent 
they hardly knew which state they were in would not, because they were under control when 
they hit the terrain. Notably, the Cali accident report outlined by the Flight Safety Foundation 
(1998) did not consider the influence of spatial reorientation upon the flight crew’s perfor-
mance and this is the case with many similar reports, so careful analysis and interpretation of 
the reports was necessary. For instance in two LOC instances reviewed for this research, alt-
hough the pilot faced spatial awareness challenges there were concurrent distractions that 
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may have been a more influential factor so these accidents were excluded from analysis on 
the basis of spatial awareness.  
 
 Evidence that the flight crew appeared to have been had adversely influenced by their 
contextual situation. 
This includes any instance where a flight crew performs or omits an action that they would 
not have performed or omitted if not for the prevailing contextual cues. Because this is be-
lieved to be a new construct in the aviation context it is difficult to exclude any specific types 
of occurrence. It is however, possible to outline some of the occurrences that appear to be un-
duly affected by contextual cues. Wrong runway takeoffs, landing gear retracted approaches, 
and flapless takeoffs are all example of serious errors that, according to the reports, could 
have been influenced by contextual factors. Despite being a new construct, contextual cueing 
emerged as a prolific feature of SFP related occurrences; for instance the most recent serious 
incident report issued by the UK AAIB (2016) describes a LOC occurrence where a captain 
had built up a false expectation that a lightning strike would result in the autopilot discon-
necting, based partly upon a simulated scenario he had experienced during recurrent training. 
In the absence of witnessing that scenario it is debatable whether the error that nearly resulted 
in the loss of the aircraft would have occurred.  
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CHAPTER 2  
EVIDENCE OF A PROBLEM REQUIRING A SOLUTION 
OVERVIEW  
HUMAN ERROR AND AVIATION SAFETY: THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
UK CAA statistics indicate that commercial flying is one of the safest modes of transport, 
and the UK has an excellent aviation safety record. In terms of large commercially operated 
aeroplanes the UK’s fatal accident rate is amongst the lowest in Europe, which at 17% is 
amongst the lowest worldwide (CAA, 2014, p. 16). However, as technological advances and 
mechanical reliability have improved, an unfortunate consequence is that an increasing pro-
portion of those accidents that still occur result not from mechanical failures but from human 
error. Aviation comprises multiple complex systems and there is evidence that, at times the 
level of human performance that these systems demand is simply higher than can be reasona-
bly expected. Even the most professional and competent human beings will occasionally vary 
performance or do something they did not intend. If people cannot perform their safety crit i-
cal tasks to the level required, then circumstances must change to allow them to perform bet-
ter or the system must change to reduce the reliance on their correct performance and so en-
sure safety is maintained. During the decade between 2002 and 2011, 7148 people were 
killed in 250 fatal airline accidents worldwide (CAA, 2014, p. 84) but only 38% of these in-
volved a factor affecting the airworthiness of the aircraft, meaning that the remainder in-
volved fully serviceable aircraft. Substandard aircraft handling by the pilot was one of the 
most frequently allocated causal or contributory factors, as was the performance of an inap-
propriate action. Omissions such as failing to observe safe altitudes or forgetting to configure 
the aircraft for takeoff were also recurrent causes. The current study was motivated by the 
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fact that according to the CAA (2014, p. 84) over 60% worldwide fatal accidents involved 
serviceable aircraft with qualified crews. 
  
2.1 THE TYPES OF FLIGHT CREW INITIATED AIRLINE ACCIDENTS WHICH  
OCCURRED IN THE DECADE BETWEEN 2002 AND 2011 
According to the latest CAA statistics (2014) among the most frequently occurring fatal acci-
dents between 2002 and 2011 involving serviceable aircraft were from the categories con-
trolled flight into terrain (CFIT) and loss of control (LOC). Although there was only one fatal 
runway accident in the period (the Lexington accident) this thesis will cite several runway 
related occurrences that could have easily resulted in runway safety (RS) occupying a far 
higher ranking in the statistics. Runway safety (RS) encompasses accidents and incidents 
where a flight crew enter the runway at an incorrect position or line up on the wrong runway 
or in some cases on a taxiway. Incorrect configuration take offs (such as using an incorrect 
power, flap or trim setting) have also qualified as RS events in the past. Fully developed RS 
accidents such as the one at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) are very costly in terms of loss of life 
but the majority of serious RS events do not result in an accident and therefore are not re-
flected in the accident statistics. There is however, a comprehensive literature (See Flight 
Safety Foundation, 2009:  ICAO, 2007) relating to RS incidents suggesting that RS is among 
the most serious risks to aviation safety at present. 
 
Loss of control (LOC) occurs when a pilot flies outside the normal flight envelope resulting 
in the aircraft becoming uncontrollable. Although documented instances of LOC such as the 
Trident accident at Staines, UK (UK AIB, 1973) date back to the 1970s and earlier, recent 
history indicates that LOC remains a persistent threat to aviation safety. There is a current 
initiative to focus upon airline pilots’ ability to recover from LOC occurrences but modern 
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high performance airliners can become uncontrollable in seconds if timely recovery is not 
initiated. According to the CAA research cited above, nearly 40% of all fatal accidents in-
volved some kind of loss of control, making this the most frequent type of accident during the 
decade to 2011. Non-technical failures (for example flight crew failing to correctly respond to 
a warning) were the predominant cause of LOC accidents. Mirroring the comments above 
about RS, it is important to emphasise that for every LOC fatal accident there are multiple 
lucky escapes that appear in the incident literature but are not reflected in fatal accident statis-
tics. By way of illustration, since 2007 there have been three reportable LOC incidents 
iii
in 
the UK alone that were serious enough to be investigated by the UK AAIB and many more 
worldwide. In terms of hull losses, the worldwide accident rate has been steadily decreasing 
in recent years (See Figure 2.1). However, these statistics are not sensitive enough for the 
purposes of this research. For instance although according to IATA statistics (2015) collision 
with terrain (CFIT) accidents have steadily declined since the advent of terrain warning sys-
tems in the late 1970s, several recent CFIT accidents, one in Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) one in 
Jakarta (KNKT, 2012) and one in Birmingham, Alabama (NTSB, 2014) indicate how the data 
can become skewed by very few occurrences.  
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Figure 2.1: Yearly accident rate per million flights 
(Source: Boeing Commercial Airplanes 2016) 
 
2.2 THE LIMITATIONS OF STATISTICAL DATA RELATING TO AVIATION SAFETY 
Although the CAA data summarised above represent an example of reporting and analysis at 
its highest level, its limitations demonstrate the difficulty that researchers encounter when 
basing this type of research upon statistics from around the world. The CAA report notes that 
accident reporting criteria are not consistent throughout the world, so the number of factors 
assigned to fatal accidents may vary widely amongst the different operator regions. The CAA 
analysis is complex, with the possibility of assigning any number of 132 causal factors to 
each accident. Despite the completeness of the CAA data, unfortunately anomalies are evi-
dent. For instance, the runway accident at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) is categorised as a run-
way incursion; although this is technically correct, this categorisation disguises the fact that 
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this was far more than a runway incursion. More precisely, the Lexington accident was an 
instance of a wrong runway takeoff, a category which rarely results in fatalities or indeed any 
negative outcomes whatsoever. However, each flight crew that takes off or lands on the 
wrong runway or a taxiway has avoided a catastrophe purely due to luck. Although the Lex-
ington accident was a rare event, very similar events are documented but they are not neces-
sarily reflected in the accident statistics. In defence of the CAA statistics it is important to 
emphasise that prior to the Lexington accident the incidence of fatal accidents involving a 
wrong runway takeoff was very low but it does illustrate how even high quality statistical re-
search can fail to reveal emerging trends. An example of a very serious incident that could 
easily have been an accident, involved a Scandinavian Boeing 737 flight crew who took off 
in fog at Lulea, Sweden on the reciprocal runway to the one they had been cleared to take off 
from. Despite the similarity to the Lexington accident, the report into this serious incident 
(Statens Haverikomission, 2009) considered this occurrence to be a wrong runway takeoff 
rather than a runway incursion; furthermore, as there was no negative outcome, this occur-
rence does not feature in the accidents statistics despite its seriousness. This example high-
lights one of the problems of searching the literature based upon even the most respected 
sources. A further problem arises when attempting to cross reference similar instances that 
have been categorised in different ways. Although the accident at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) 
involved very similar human limitations to those evident at Lulea there was no reference 
whatsoever in the Lulea report to the accident at Lexington despite the fact that it was the 
most serious similar instance in recent history and was high in the consciousness of the avia-
tion community in general at the time. This absence of cross referencing may be no more 
than lack of vision on the part of the investigators or it may represent a reluctance to 
acknowledge that the only reason a catastrophe was averted was good luck. There was con-
siderable evidence in the reports examined for this research of under reporting and of failing 
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to acknowledge similarities between fatal accidents and incidents, which by good fortune had 
not resulted in an accident. There was also a noticeable tendency in some reports to provide 
incomplete data in relation to flight crew related factors
iv
. This phenomenon was also noticed 
by the CAA (2014), who commented that this may be due to the factors either not being ap-
parent to the investigators or not being thought to be worthy of inclusion in a summary re-
port. If the former reason is correct, it implies a gap in knowledge at a high level; if the latter 
is correct then this research provides evidence to the contrary. Another important explanation 
for the tendency to shy away from human factor based explanations may be associated with 
the mission statements of many investigating agencies, which explicitly avoid the apportion-
ing of blame. For this reason they might find it problematic to delve too deeply into human 
factors, which by definition attach some blame to the individual. Notably, the NTSB in the 
USA and the BEA in France are not constrained in this way and if a human factor attaches to 
an individual they go ahead and highlight it. Although this is a refreshingly candid approach 
to investigation it makes comparison of instances very challenging. The current research 
would have been facilitated by a database that included for instance, all loss of control safety 
occurrences during an unexpected go around (of which there are many, the most recent at 
Rostov, Russia: See Interstate Aviation Committee, 2016) but the literature review conducted 
for this research indicated that this would be impracticable because of the multiple sources 
that would need to be accessed. Some of the most useful leads to relevant incidents came 
from internet chat forums which alluded to an incident in some far corner of the globe that 
led to a report that would never have been located otherwise. Notably, several plausible re-
ports on such forums resulted in no official report being located, which cast further doubt on 
the reliability of incident statistics. The suggestion that some serious incidents go unreported 
is not just based upon anecdotal evidence, there were several reports citing instances of a se-
rious incident that had only been discovered after considerable investigation following a seri-
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ous accident
v
. Furthermore, some trusted major airlines are permitted to conduct their own 
investigations into incidents, which sometimes do not reach the public domain for a variety of 
reasons. It would be naïve to dismiss the possibility that various stakeholders might have an 
interest in not publicising incidents that might reflect negatively on them. None of these limi-
tations invalidate the use of accident and incident statistics but they do call for the exercise of 
caution when reaching conclusions. The NASA ASRS database contains a useful caveat re-
garding the use of their influential data (See Appendix C) which highlights that quantitative 
analysis might not be the most effective way of analysing their data but if it is necessary, the 
number of reports of a particular type of event should be considered a “lower measure” of the 
number of such events occurring. The message from the CAA analysis was loud and clear; 
approximately 60% of fatal airline accidents that occurred between 2002 and 2011 were 
caused by pilots who flew to a substandard level of performance. Whilst having access to 132 
causal factors, as was the case in the CAA analysis, is likely to increase the statistical power 
of any conclusions drawn, it tends to conceal the fact that each of these instances was due to 
the pilots’ substandard performance. This phenomenon has traditionally been known as hu-
man error or pilot error; in section 2.3 some of the limitations of this traditional view are out-
lined and in section 3.1, a new way of conceptualising the substandard flight crew perfor-
mance described in this study, is proposed. 
 
2.3 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE HUMAN ERROR CAUSATION WHEN APPLIED TO 
AVIATION 
Although the term pilot error is not widely used within the aviation industry its use is com-
monplace in wider society. An illustrative example is found in some of the press reports of a 
taxiing accident involving a British Airways 747 at Johannesburg (Kithching, 2015) which 
were quick to attribute the accident to pilot error despite the fact that the official report 
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(SACAA, 2014) had not used the term. However, investigations and the reports they produce 
are intended for a variety of audiences so it is understandable if on occasions  there is a ten-
dency to report findings in such a way that the readership is likely to understand. In fact, in 
the accident just cited the flight crew did make some errors but they were far from the root 
cause of the accident. Human error has been conceptualised in various ways; writing in the 
British Medical Journal, James Reason (2000) provided a useful distinction between the per-
son approach and the system approach. In the former, unsafe acts, errors and procedural vio-
lations enacted by people at the sharp end, such as nurses, physicians, surgeons and pilots 
arise primarily from aberrant mental processes such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor moti-
vation, carelessness, negligence, and recklessness. Careful reading of the Johannesburg acci-
dent report cited above provided little evidence of these phenomena. Reason’s conclusion 
that the person approach usually results in countermeasures directed at reducing unwanted 
variability in human behaviour illustrates the inadequacy of thinking about many aviation ac-
cidents in this way because as is often the case, this flight crew’s behaviour was not as varia-
ble as the person approach suggests. In fact, the pilots at Johannesburg behaved, according to 
the report, in a very similar way to a previous flight crew who were faced with exactly the 
same contextual conditions a few years earlier, so the behaviour was far from variable it was 
to some extent predictable.  According to the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2004), 
before each major accident they investigate they often find a series of similar accidents, near 
misses and other failures had occurred previously. A completely original accident or incident, 
whilst uncommon, can happen. The wrong runway takeoff at Lulea was a very uncommon 
occurrence, and this poses a problem for those devising mitigations. The report into this seri-
ous incident (Statens Haverikomission, 2009) found that it was caused by deviations from the 
crew resource management (CRM) concept, mainly in respect of internal and external com-
munication, thereby placing much of the blame on the flight crew. However, none of the five 
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recommendations concerned mitigations related to the flight crew’s actions and the report 
proposed no changes to flight crew procedures, which suggests that the investigators either 
did not know what to suggest or that they considered human behaviour unchangeable. The 
difficulty of defining the role of human error in high reliability organisations (HROs) such as 
aviation has a long history; in the 1980s Charles Perrow (1984) highlighted the influence of 
the system in what he called “normal accidents”. These accidents were almost preordained by 
the precise nature of the system. His notion of the influence of tight coupling between inter-
actions seems particularly relevant to the aviation context. According to Perrow, tightly cou-
pled interactions are those that do not tolerate delay, they have invariant sequences and negli-
gible slack. Loosely coupled interactions have the opposite characteristics. Probably inad-
vertently, airline operations are littered with tight couplings, the consequences of which even 
those afflicted by them may be unaware. For instance, the previously cited Boeing 747 flight 
crew who taxied into a building at Johannesburg had briefed their taxi route for in excess of 
seven minutes whilst they sat at the parking gate, during which time there would likely have 
been loose coupled interactions between the various activities they needed to complete. In 
contrast, once the aircraft had left the gate, most of the required activities are tightly coupled; 
ATC will not expect their taxiways to be blocked by a 747 whilst the FCMs discuss a revised 
taxying route. Other documented accidents have featured tight couplings related to deteriorat-
ing weather at Taipei (ASC, 2002), impending airport closure at Aspen (NTSB, 2002), flight 
duty time limitations at Tenerife (Netherlands Aviation Safety Board, 1978), commercial 
pressure at Jakarta (KNKT, 2012), pressure from ATC at Dallas (NTSB, 1989), time limita-
tions due to deicing at Birmingham, UK (UK AAIB, 2009) among others. Tight couplings 
often require actions to be completed in a preset order and most pilots and some insightful 
outsiders will likely identify with the uncomfortable feeling of having to make decisions and 
reorganize duties in tightly coupled situations. What they may not appreciate is the increased 
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potential for error associated with tight coupling that Perrow highlighted with several exam-
ples from a wide range of high reliability settings. The important point being made here is 
whether we are to consider the previously cited Johannesburg 747 flight crew’s failure to 
amend their briefing in response to new information during a period of tight coupling as a 
human error or a system error. The dilemma here is that when the flight crew briefed in a 
loosely coupled situation their performance was satisfactory but when they were in a tightly 
coupled situation their performance was substandard so it would not be difficult to argue that 
the tight coupling resulted in their substandard performance. The relationship between cou-
pling and error as defined up to now is too vague, and essentially subjective, so in the current 
research some of the specific contexts that give rise to tight coupling are placed under scruti-
ny. For example, there is some evidence that a significant number of pilots erroneously be-
lieve that a takeoff clearance is only ever received when close to the runway in use for take-
off.  Serious safety occurrences at Oslo (AIBN, 2010), Singapore (ASC, 2002) and elsewhere 
have featured this false assumption. There is also evidence from accidents at Charleston 
(NTSB, 2010c), Bedford, (NTSB, 2015a) and elsewhere, to suggest that some pilots make 
substandard decisions if they experience an ambiguous situation during the early stages of a 
takeoff despite there being a prescribed procedure for rejecting a takeoff even at quite high 
speed. Although these instances may appear at first to be overly specific, this highlights the 
major distinction between human error causation and the substandard flight crew perfor-
mance (SFP) causation proposed and explained in this thesis. Whilst human error discourse 
encompasses a wide range of situations and contexts, SFP is intended to identify and catego-
rize specific contexts and situations with a documented link to recurrent accidents and inci-
dents. So whilst the categories traditionally associated with human error in general, such as 
slips, lapses, mistakes and violations, provide a reasonable framework for human error in 
general, they are not specific enough for the aviation context. For instance the slip made by 
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flight crews at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) and Lulea (Statens Haverikomission, 2009) was not 
just any slip; it was a failure to check their heading prior to starting the takeoff. Any focus 
upon slips in general would divert attention from this specific phenomenon to the detriment 
of a complete understanding. Fortunately, despite the complexity associated with aviation, the 
same phenomena recur in many safety occurrences so it is possible to be very specific about 
the human limitations being examined. Similarly with violations, there was little evidence in 
the literature that flight crews violate rules on a regular basis but they do appear to violate the 
sterile cockpit rule with ease. In her summary of the Lexington accident (NTSB, 2007a, p. 
100), the presiding NTSB chairman, Deborah Hersman wrote that “neither pilot seemed hesi-
tant to engage in non-pertinent conversation or demonstrated correcting behavior when the 
other pilot deviated from sterile cockpit procedures”, concluding that “these facts suggest that 
non-pertinent conversation among company pilots during critical phases of flight was not un-
usual”.  In this case understanding the nature of violations in general is far less useful than 
understanding why this specific rule appears to be so readily violated. In a similar vein, to 
understand why flight crews sometimes forget to configure the aircraft for takeoff, it is not 
necessary to review everything that has been written about lapses and mistakes but 
knowledge of prospective memory, delayed execution and resumption errors is essential. One 
of the strengths of the SFP construct is its focus upon recurrent phenomena with a proven 
connection to aviation safety occurrences. 
On the basis of the contents of Chapter 2 the following analysis can be made. Commercial 
aviation is safe but not as safe as it should be given the recent technical advances. It is com-
plex and highly regulated whereas human behaviour can be disorderly and unpredictable. 
Much of the accident literature is not intended to apportion blame so some factors evade 
analysis.  Statistics relating to aviation safety occurrences do not provide a complete picture 
of aviation’s most serious risks because they do not consider near catastrophes. There are ra-
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tional reasons why some of these risks may not be highlighted by those with a vested interest. 
It is not straightforward to understand the vested interests influencing aviation safety. This 
brief analysis goes some way towards explaining why an accident such as the one at Buffalo 
(NTSB, 2010a) could occur in the future. One of the aims of the SFP construct is to provide a 
repository for knowledge that might assist in mitigating the risk of such an occurrence. 
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CHAPTER 3  
SUBSTANDARD FLIGHT CREW PERFORMANCE (SFP) 
3.1 CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE SFP CONSTRUCT 
The purpose of this section is to introduce and describe the new construct which forms the 
premise of this thesis, SFP. Introducing a new construct into the aviation lexicon is not em-
barked upon lightly but the intention was to develop a construct that included human behav-
iour spanning a very diverse range of accidents which shared one feature, the substandard 
performance of the flight crew. The need to conceptualise SFP was based upon evidence 
from the reports that often the same human limitation had afflicted flight crews performing 
quite dissimilar tasks. For instance, two seminal accidents, one a wrong runway takeoff at 
Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) and the other, a loss of control at Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) had very 
little to link them except that both flight crews had performed in a substandard fashion by 
conducting an unauthorised conversation unrelated to the flight at an inappropriate time. Alt-
hough both reports emphasised the distraction caused by the non-pertinent conversations 
(NPCs), neither investigation determined a reason for this seemingly mundane but highly 
substandard behaviour. This study contends that if these two accidents and the numerous oth-
er NPC related accidents had, for instance, been categorised as SFP related accidents from the 
verbal factors basic category and the subordinate category non-pertinent conversation (See 
Figure 3.1 below) the investigations might have had access to more data relating to the under-
lying reasons for the phenomenon and be better able to identify characteristics of the aviation 
system that might have contributed to the accidents. The rationale for this contention is that 
although the two accidents under discussion could hardly have been less similar, the content 
of the NPCs conducted was remarkably similar, with comments about changing jobs, career 
progression, family life, other airlines and industrial matters. This pattern of behaviour and its 
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correlation with accidents is an example of what the SFP construct is intended to illustrate. 
Although the superordinate category SFP may seem unnecessarily vague it is intended to en-
compass approximately 60% of all fatal airline accidents worldwide according to the CAA 
statistics so it cannot be too specific about what constitutes SFP. It is when the basic concepts 
are introduced that the model becomes more focused. As the SFP construct is still in its de-
velopment only three basic categories have been chosen for experimental research in this 
study (spatial, contextual and verbal) although it is likely that all levels of the hierarchical 
structure could grow with time. It can be seen from Figure 3.1 that each basic conceptual cat-
egory has subordinate conceptual categories, for instance the subordinate verbal factors ex-
amined in this research are non-pertinent conversation and unclear communications.  
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Figure 3.1: A conceptual model of the SFP construct illustrating the research outlined in this 
thesis. 
Once fully developed, the SFP construct is intended to act as a repository for knowledge re-
lating to specific categories of SFP related events. In order for this to happen there needs to 
be a clear understanding of what constitutes SFP and what does not. The list below outlines 
what constitutes SFP based upon accounts from the literature: 
  
SFP 
Spatial factors 
Mental rotation 
Spatial awareness 
Contextual factors 
System-status 
contextual-cueing 
Situational 
contextual-cueing 
Alert/Indication 
contextual-cueing  
Verbal factors 
Non-pertinent 
 conversation 
Unclear 
communications 
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 SFP occurs when a flight crew performs at a level inconsistent with their training 
and qualifications 
 
The aviation occurrence literature indicates that regulators, operators, air traffic controllers 
and a range of other members of the safety system have an expectation of how flight crews 
should perform. Accident investigations have found that flight crews who meet or exceed 
regulatory standards during regular recurrent checks have at the time of the accident per-
formed below an acceptable standard. This was the case in accidents at Buffalo (NTSB, 
2010a) and Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) and indicates that satisfactory performance in recurrent 
checks is not an assurance of satisfactory everyday performance. 
  
 SFP can occur during both normal and non-normal situations but is rarely     
caused by a malfunction 
The definition of normal is problematic because what is normal is a matter of degree. In an 
accident at Cali in Columbia (ACRC, 1996) the flight crew received a change to their route 
which although unexpected, they were at liberty to decline. The judgment about whether to 
accept such a clearance is one that any competent flight crew is expected to be able to make 
without compromising safety. The NASA ASRS database indicates that unexpected or late 
changes to the route can cause problems for flight crews due to the distraction caused by up-
dating their flight management computers and accessing charts. There is a persistent narrative 
in such reports along the lines that air traffic controllers should be more aware of the work-
load increase that occurs as a consequence of short notice changes. Although the flight crew 
invariably bear much of the blame when a CFIT accident such as the one at Cali occurs, the 
SFP construct examines the role of other parties involved such as air traffic controllers. 
Whilst the pilots retain overall responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight it would be 
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misleading not to consider in some detail the role of the controller in the FCMs’ performance. 
In a very similar accident a British flight crew approaching Tenerife (UK AIB, 1981) re-
ceived an ambiguous holding instruction at very short notice at a radio beacon with no pub-
lished holding pattern. Multiple factors can influence how normal a situation can be consid-
ered. The context in which the Cali accident occurred is one which any flight crew would be 
expected to handle, whereas although the Tenerife accident was very similar, the air traffic 
controller’s actions were far more instrumental in the accident due to the extraneous cogni-
tive load imposed by the unreasonable time constraint and the absence of any published pro-
cedure. Thus the definition of normal is open to interpretation but on balance, both these ac-
cidents fall into the SFP category because it would be reasonable to expect a competent crew 
to deal with such matters.  
 
Just because an aircraft experiences a malfunction it is unsound to necessarily assign the 
cause of an accident to the malfunction. In 1995 the report into a CFIT accident involving a 
Dash Eight commuter aircraft in Palmerston North, New Zealand (TAIC, 1995) concluded 
that despite the flight crew having experienced a problem with the landing gear extension, 
four of the five causal factors were attributed to the flight crew’s actions and none to the mal-
functioning landing gear. It must be emphasised that most conceivable malfunctions are re-
currently trained to proficiency in the airlines so it is completely reasonable to expect flight 
crews to perform at a standard consistent with their training and qualification in such circum-
stances. 
 Weather conditions influence SFP but do not cause it 
Adverse weather should not cause airliners to crash. The reason for this assertion is that if the 
weather is so bad that it poses a safety risk, a competent pilot should not be attempting to fly 
there. Airports and their related procedures vary considerably in the risks associated with 
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them. Certain airports require special qualification in order to mitigate the associated risks. 
The objective of such procedures is to maintain the risks at an acceptable level although they 
are never as safe as more straightforward airports. Although airlines do expect their qualified 
flight crews to operate to high risk airports, there is little evidence that operators encourage 
rule breaking. An accident at Aspen was an example of a flight crew failing to comply with 
the procedures required for safe operation at a challenging airport. Notably the associated re-
port (NTSB, 2002) cited the weather as a contributory factor. Given that operators’ special 
procedures are intended to mitigate the risks associated with the weather it is misleading to 
cite weather as even a contributing factor. Even if the weather is reported as being suitable, 
every pilot should know that it remains the decision of the FCMs to decide whether a safe 
landing can be achieved. If they disregard the procedures, the weather is no more than a side 
issue, with SFP the main cause. In general, the use of extreme weather as causation for acci-
dents is misleading because a trained and licenced flight crew is expected to exercise skill 
commensurate with their role when deciding whether to operate in given weather conditions.  
 
 External factors influence SFP but do not cause it 
The accident at Aspen, SFP partly resulted from external pressure. According to the NTSB 
report (NTSB, 2002, p. 41) a contributing factor was “the pressure on the captain to land 
from the charter customer and the airport’s night time landing restriction”. This accident 
was a charter but elsewhere in this thesis there is a discussion about how airline flight crews 
are subject to similar pressures due to the commercial climate and the sense of feeling re-
sponsible for disruption resulting from factors often outside their control. An important les-
son from the Aspen accident is that even those on the periphery of the aviation system can be 
implicated in instances of SFP without any knowledge of the adverse effect their actions in-
voke. It has been successfully argued in court that the actions of an outside agency can be re-
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sponsible for an accident that at face value appears to be SFP. This was the case in a sightsee-
ing accident near Mount Erebus, Antarctica (TAIC, 1979) where the airline navigation de-
partment provided incorrect navigation data contributing to CFIT. It is notable that this acci-
dent was initially attributed to pilot error, a decision reversed in the high court. This accident 
highlights the difficulty of being dogmatic when apportioning blame because the Erebus tran-
script clearly indicates that the FCMs were uncomfortable with the actions they were taking 
in advance of the crash. In most conceivable cases a flight crew who crashed into terrain after 
expressing doubt about their terrain clearance would be considered to have performed at a 
substandard level of skill despite any extenuating circumstances prevailing. There is scope in 
the SFP construct to include an abstract factor such as the ambiguity of a particular type of 
operation as a category for research. For instance, the literature indicates that flights of an 
ambiguous nature such as sightseeing flights at Mount Erebus, Antarctica (TAIC, 1979) and 
Ketchikan, Alaska (NTSB, 2015b), demonstration flights at Basle (BEA, 1990) and Jakarta 
(KNKT, 2012) and VIP flights at Smolensk (Interstate Aviation Committee, 2011), and Du-
brovnik (Flight Safety Foundation, 1996) all carry an increased risk of SFP which, as far as is 
known, is not made explicit anywhere in the literature and is almost certainly not known by 
stakeholders such as the passengers. Although each of the foregoing accidents was an in-
stance of CFIT they each possessed ambiguous characteristics that distinguished them from 
CFIT accidents in general. The SFP construct has potential to home in on the factors that in-
fluence very specific types of accident and to identify and examine any recurrent factors. 
 
 Industrial relations factors can encourage SFP and may be part of its cause 
SFP and professionalism are closely linked; recently the focus on pilot professionalism has 
become sharpened due mainly to the two seminal accidents cited at the start of this section. 
This study found evidence of career dissatisfaction among certain flight crews and this, to 
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some extent, encouraged SFP. Whilst citing industrial matters as a serious factor in the occur-
rence of SFP may seem an abstract concept, there is considerable cross-cultural research sug-
gesting a link between working conditions and quality of work performance from a range of 
occupations, such as doctors (Baldwin et al., 1997) and teachers (Hakanen et al., 2006). Each 
of the pilots involved in accidents at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) and Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) 
were considered to be competent by their employer and their peers so their substandard per-
formance was uncharacteristic; later in this thesis a model is proposed in which SFP might 
occur without conscious awareness in response to poor working conditions. So whilst the 
overall tone of this explanation of SFP has been that the flight crews are normally expected to 
perform to a uniformly high standard regardless of external factors, the individuals involved 
are not robots so the interaction between prevailing working conditions and the individual 
must be subject to scrutiny. Influential bodies such as the NTSB have highlighted the need 
for a focus on pilot professionalism by placing it on their “ten most wanted improvements” 
list in recent years but at present there appears to be no co-ordinated means of collating the 
emerging knowledge on the subject. In the future the SFP construct could incorporate basic 
categories such as professionalism or organisational influences so that accidents like those at 
Buffalo and Lexington are examined in terms of the wider influences that may have contrib-
uted to the SFP. This would also serve as a repository for such information accessible to 
managements and regulators so that they could not claim that the issue had not been docu-
mented. As the SFP construct is under development only three basic SFP categories were ex-
amined in this research, verbal factors, contextual factors and spatial factors.  
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3.2. RATIONALE FOR SELECTING THE THREE BASIC SFP CATEGORIES  
FOR EXAMINATION 
This research emerged in response to two airline accidents, one at Buffalo and the other at 
Lexington that appeared to encompass many of the features of contemporary airline acci-
dents. These emblematic accidents both occurred in the USA but the research conducted for 
this study indicated that remarkably similar accidents and incidents had occurred around the 
world. Airline flying has undergone rapid change in recent years, and although there is much 
continuity, it was a priority of this research to address issues that affect the aviation system 
today. The overarching issue that has been tiptoed around for decades is that on occasions 
pilots perform below an expected standard; the substandard flight crew performance (SFP) 
construct was conceived to better understand some of the reasons that this occurs. In both ac-
cidents referred to above, the flight crew members (FCMs) had been conducting an unauthor-
ised conversation which is likely to have distracted them and precipitated the accident. In the 
Lexington accident the FCMs had lost awareness of both their position on the airport and 
their orientation. In the Buffalo accident the FCMs lost track of their proximity to the airport 
during final approach and needed to decelerate quickly, which they had not adequately 
planned for. In both cases there was a breakdown in communication between FCMs. In the 
former, an expression of doubt voiced by one FCM was not made explicit, and in the latter a 
critical configuration change occurred without any communication between FCMs. A review 
of similar accidents and incidents revealed that certain types of error often occurred when 
several contextual factors came together, which prompted a focus on the influence of context 
in aviation safety. The Lexington and Buffalo accidents acted as a springboard to examine 
several aspects of human activity that in the researcher’s opinion were not adequately ex-
plained in the literature related to those accidents. Two important questions addressed in this 
research were actually posed by the NTSB in the wake of the Buffalo accident; why do pilots 
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break the sterile cockpit rule, and is this normal behaviour in the flight deck? In terms of un-
clear communication, the UK AAIB was also unable to explain why an air traffic controller at 
St Kitts (UK AAIB, 2010a) did not challenge an incorrect decision by a flight crew, stating 
that it was “possibly a result of insufficient human factors and resource management train-
ing”. The verbal strand of this SFP research has potential to provide more detailed explana-
tions than those in the report. 
Similarly, the NTSB report into the Lexington accident highlighted deficiencies in the flight 
crew’s compliance with the sterile cockpit rule and their briefing content but “could not de-
termine why the flight crew stopped the airplane at the wrong stop short line and then at-
tempted to take off from the incorrect runway” (NTSB, 2007a, p. 75). This comment effec-
tively asked two questions, firstly how the FCMs could not detect such a gross directional 
error and secondly, why they failed to comply with procedures intended to mitigate this risk? 
The spatial awareness strand of the current study examined the relationship between spatial 
awareness tasks and cognitive load and outlines some human limitations that may have re-
sulted in the flight crew’s substandard performance in this instance. Although briefly men-
tioned in the Lexington report, very little emphasis was placed upon the influence of the first 
officer’s previous experience of the airport’s lighting deficiencies. This represented a contex-
tual cue that would form part of a schema-based representation of what the runway would be 
expected to look like when lined up for takeoff. This type of expectation was also mentioned 
by the captain of the St Kitts flight crew (UK AAIB, 2010a, p. 23), so this research sought to 
operationalise the concept of contextual cueing as it relates to aviation safety. Section 3.3 us-
es the example of the Lexington accident to illustrate how the verbal, spatial awareness and 
contextual cueing research strands apply to a real life SFP-related accident. 
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3.3 THE ANATOMY OF AN SFP INSTANCE. 
This section uses the example of the Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) accident to demonstrate how 
the research questions outlined in the next chapter directly address a current SFP related oc-
currence.  Figure 3.2 below illustrates the sequence of events as the flight crew taxied to the 
runway in the dark (their route is marked by red arrows).  The FCMs were intending to use 
runway 22 but attempted to depart from runway 26 and impacted a mound killing 49 people. 
An explanation of the relevant factors at each position on Figure 3.2 appears below. 
 
Figure 3.2: Sequence of events at Lexington (image adapted from NTSB, 2007a). 
At position A the FCMs conducted a detailed conversation during the pre-flight preparations 
that continued whilst taxiing to the runway. According to the NTSB  (2007a) this non-
pertinent conversation more than any other factor distracted the flight crew from lining up 
and taking off from the correct runway. At position B the FCMs thought they were at the hold 
 
 
 
 
A 
B 
C D 
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short line for runway 22 when they were in fact at the hold short line for runway 26. The loss 
of positional awareness was in part due to inadequate briefing but the flight crew had clearly 
lost directional awareness at this stage because there is an angular disparity of 90˚ between 
the two holding positions. It is not known whether they had started to detect their disorienta-
tion as they lined up on the runway but their performance deteriorated inasmuch as they omit-
ted to check the runway direction or to respond to cues present on their displays that would 
have alerted them to their error. The NTSB (2007a) commented on this omission but offered 
no explanation for these lapses. At position C the FCMs missed several cues that they were at 
the wrong position. The NTSB report commented on several contextual cues that may have 
been relevant. The presence of runway markings and a white centreline and side stripes ahead 
of the airplane would have facilitated the captain’s perception that the airplane had arrived at 
the hold-short line for runway 22, even though the airplane was actually at the hold short line 
for runway 26. In addition, the angle from the runway 26 hold short line on taxiway A to 
runway 26 was the same as the angle from the runway 22 hold short line on former taxiway A 
(north of runway 8/26) to runway 22. The investigators also commented that both lighting 
and painted markings present in the visual scene could have supported the captain’s percep-
tion that the airplane had arrived at the departure runway. Furthermore, the first officer had 
previously commented upon aspects of the lighting that might have supported the unusual 
lighting configuration the FCMs encountered as they attempted to depart from the wrong 
runway. The captain of an Aeroflot Airbus which took off on a taxiway at Oslo airport 
(AIBN, 2010) also reported that he may have been similarly influenced by aspects of the 
runway markings he had experienced earlier when he landed. At position D the first com-
ments that signified all was not well were made but they were unclear. The Lexington acci-
dent could have been prevented if either pilot had clearly communicated their doubts about 
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the takeoff. The extract below is a comment relating to the lighting at the commencement of 
the takeoff. 
“The first officer stated, “[that] is weird with no lights,” and the captain responded, 
“yeah,” 2 seconds later” (NTSB, 2007a p. 6).  
Where comments are made that would not normally be expected at a critical phase of flight it 
usually means something is wrong because if everything was right it would not be necessary 
to speak. The Lexington captain did not identify the doubt expressed by his colleague be-
cause it was attenuated in nature. The current research operationalises this type of unclear 
communication by identifying recurrent instances from the occurrence literature and propos-
ing explanations for their occurrence. Accidents at Tenerife in 1977 (Netherlands Aviation 
Safety Board, 1978), Washington in 1982 (NTSB, 1982) and St Kitts in 2009 (UK AAIB, 
2010a) all involved unclear communication. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE METHOD OF ENQUIRY EMPLOYED IN THIS RESEARCH 
The method of enquiry was firmly ethnographic; the qualitative data used for each of the 
research strands was derived from official accident and incident reports. These reports were 
chosen on the basis of the researcher’s subjective assessment of their suitability as examples 
of SFP. The conversation questionnaire and its associated unstructured interviews generated 
qualitative and quantitative data which would have been meaningless without the contextual 
insights gained from the narrative in the reports.  Although the spatial awareness strand used 
experimental methods and produced quantitative data for statistical analysis, the study also 
considered convention and practices unique to aviation. For instance, whilst a human 
cognitive limitation may have resulted in the Buffalo accident flight crew losing positional 
awareness, this study’s ethnographic orientation provided explanations relating to the 
institutional practices that facilitated the cognitive limitation. The contextual cueing 
experiments were designed in response to qualitative data in the reports but could only be 
adequately researched by conducting experiments and generating quantitative data. However, 
the institutional procedures and how they are enacted by the pilots is often mentioned in 
reports so the institutional procedures of the airline context were always at the forefront of 
enquiry in this research. In the runway accident at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a), factors as 
disparate as a distracting conversation, loss of positional awareness, loss of directional 
awareness, unclear communication and misleading environmental cues, among others were 
evident. The reader could be forgiven for finding it difficult to reconcile a link between such 
diverse topics but that is exactly what was necessary in order to achieve this research’s aim of 
developing a comprehensive repository for SFP related knowledge. During this research it 
became clear that on occasions, what appeared to be a robust safety system was breaking 
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down because of an unrealistic expectation of uniform human performance. Evidence of this 
was found in cases where both operators and regulators expressed surprise that a pilot who 
had passed recurrent checks could nonetheless perform below an acceptable standard on a 
given day (NTSB, 2010a, pp. 110-113). Similarly, there was an unrealistic expectation that 
because a rule was in place, pilots would always comply with it (NTSB, 2010a, p. 45). In the 
face of evidence from the reports indicating that an expectation of uniform human 
performance was unrealistic, the question of how to reduce flight crew-initiated accidents and 
incidents became a complex one where many of the assumptions that formed the foundation 
of the aviation safety system appeared unsound. For instance, if NPCs are a persistent factor 
in airline accidents, the rule prohibiting them is ineffective and the reasons they occur need to 
be examined. The current perspective from the NTSB and FAA is to conflate NPCs with pilot 
professionalism
vi
 but this thesis will demonstrate that there may be aspects of the institutional 
context and their human make up that are unlikely to be unearthed by examining the pilots’ 
actions in isolation. Perhaps the reason that in the four decades since NPCs emerged as a 
contributory factor in airline accidents so little progress has been made in reducing their 
incidence is the failure to acknowledge the disorderly nature of human behaviour in what 
should be a highly regulated environment. The accident reports provide ample evidence of 
this disorderly behaviour; for this reason the current research adopted an ethnographic 
method of enquiry, which in contrast to many of the reports, took more account of the people 
involved, their interests and views, and the limitations imposed by the context within which 
they were working. For instance in the 1970s one flight crew at Charlotte (NTSB, 1975a) 
were discussing a fairground ride they thought they could see through the top of the cloud 
bank  just before they crashed, and more recently a Russian pilot (KNKT, 2012) was 
conducting a sales patter in the moments before a CFIT accident. Although both these 
accidents were directly caused by a failure to follow procedures, the associated reports 
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contained almost no analysis of the institutional and situational context that facilitated the 
infringement. This tendency to gloss over the underpinnings of behaviour was also evident in 
the report into the Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) accident, in which the assigned probable cause was 
the captain’s incorrect response to the stall warning which led to an aerodynamic stall. The 
view that the pilots’ actions were the root cause of this accident loses some of its force when 
we discover that several similar occurrences have afflicted other flight crews flying the same 
type of aircraft both before and since the Buffalo accident. The fact that pilots who appear to 
perform satisfactorily most of the time but in a context that has prevailed in previous similar 
incidents have performed in a substandard fashion, surely requires a detailed consideration of 
that context. In fact, several incidents very similar to the Buffalo accident have occurred in 
locations as diverse as the UK, Australia and the USA  so to suggest that the problem lies 
squarely with these pilots on that night at that location represents a reductionist perspective. 
The incidence of several stall related occurrences in the same type of airliner as was involved 
at Buffalo even prompted a review of all such incidents and accidents in Australia (ATSB, 
2013), of which there were several.  However, despite evidence that in two of the incidents 
(one in 2008 and one in 2011) that the FCMs were using the same non-standard procedure to 
decelerate as the FCMs at Buffalo in 2009 had used, and in one case had made an identical 
mistake in setting their speed reference switch, there was no attempt to cross refer the 
Australian experience to the fatal accident in Buffalo. Given that it is implausible that all 
operators of this type of aircraft would not have at least some knowledge of the Buffalo 
accident it is disquieting that the most significant accident was omitted from analysis in the 
review. This highlights how aviation’s stakeholders can act as an impediment to progress. 
The Buffalo accident was among the highest profile fatal accidents in recent history so it is 
perhaps understandable that interested stakeholders might seek to de-emphasise the 
similarities between their incidents and that accident. Airlines in general, place a very high 
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value upon their perceived safety record but this may be achieved at the expense of 
disseminating complete information to the wider community. Charles Perrow (1984) 
distinguished between normal accidents, those which were unpredictable and just a fact of 
life, and those that safety systems have a responsibility to address on the basis of previous 
experience. Whilst the uncommon nature of an airliner stalling on final approach, as was the 
case at Buffalo, might qualify the accident as a “normal accident”, similar near accidents that 
followed certainly do not and therefore should be reported in the most transparent fashion. 
The foregoing example highlights the need to understand who the interested parties are and 
what they have at stake. In a case such as just outlined, the manufacturer, the operator, the 
pilots, the procedure designer, the regulator and a host of other parties might be interested. 
Given that the largest airliner manufacturer in the USA employs almost 200,000 workers and 
its counterpart in Europe almost 140,000 it is easy to see how widely the influence of adverse 
publicity might be felt. This spreading influence sometimes makes it difficult to identify who 
has ownership of a problem.  In the hypothetical instance of a major manufacturer 
encountering difficulties resulting from bad publicity following an accident, the government 
has an interest in protecting the country’s economy so could conceivably be forced into 
becoming a stakeholder in protecting the company’s reputation.  In general, a tarnished safety 
record or stories of low pay and conditions for their pilots do not seem to discourage 
passengers from using an airline, which indicates they accept that they are in safe hands when 
they fly. This suggests that they do not expect to be the owners of their own safety when they 
board an airliner. Although this may appear to represent the travelling public as naïve, it 
highlights that whether one is a passenger, a CEO of an airline, a regulator or any other 
stakeholder there will be environmental constraints that limit the ability to achieve absolute 
safety. Aviation safety viewed from the perspective of the multiple reports reviewed for this 
study emerged as a complex system in which many of the influences were implied rather than 
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explicit which meant that before any progress could be made it was necessary to organise the 
safety system into a conceptual framework that reflected the disorderly nature of what has 
been described. It was essential to gain an understanding of how the system is viewed by 
those who are detached from the frontline but nonetheless have to make and implement 
policies. The reports provided valuable insights into how pilots and those who work with 
them view their responsibilities regarding aviation safety. A realistic worldview of aviation 
safety can be obtained from some of the discourse in the reports. It is possible to infer from 
some of this discourse what individuals’ motives might be and how their activities might be 
enabled or constrained. All of the worldviews expressed in this research were based upon 
narrative comments from the various reports, such as the persistent narrative relating to pilot 
fatigue evident from airline managements in the aftermath of an accident (See NTSB, 2010a, 
p. 49 for a comment related to fatigue from the Buffalo accident airline’s assigned regulator) 
or the surprise expressed when a pilot fails to perform to an expected standard. The narrative 
is often one of justification and distancing from responsibility along the lines that the flight 
crew should have known not to do what they did (See NTSB, 2010a, p. 50 para 1.17.6). The 
comment below was made by Delta Airlines’ chief pilot in response to criticism by the FAA 
relating to lack of organisational discipline in the wake of the Dallas accident. 
 
"Many elements of our procedures are left to the discretion of the captain."  
(NTSB (1989, p. 76). 
The comments and behaviours outlined in reports provide the best available insight into how 
those within the aviation safety system view the world and it is not always as one would 
expect. We find air traffic controllers who are satisfied with passing an instruction but 
apparently not concerned with whether it has been understood (UK AAIB, 2010a, p. 21). We 
find pilots who think that they can apply their own interpretation to rules (See ANSV, 2004, 
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p, 112), and airport authorities who fail to implement rules and recommendations despite 
evidence of a continuing risk to safety (See ANSV, 2004, pp. 162-3). In the wake of the 
Buffalo accident (NTSB, 2010a) accident there was a debate about pilot professionalism 
centred on the young first officer’s decision to fly when she was unwell and to commute a 
long distance before the flight. The method of enquiry adopted by this research prompted the 
researcher to take an objective view relating to who owns such problems. Is it the young 
inexperienced pilot who needs a job, the airline who sees an opportunity for a cheap, 
compliant pilot, or the regulator, who must be able to see the potential for the compromises in 
professionalism that were evident in the way the Buffalo accident flight crew flouted the rules 
related to fatigue management? The foregoing examples are all from the literature and they 
are intended to illustrate how this study was able to elevate the worldview of aviation from 
intuition to a researchable phenomenon. Once the various stakeholders and their interests 
have been identified it becomes easier to propose transformations to the system but they must 
be feasible within the prevailing constraints. It helps no one if the airline is forced to increase 
salaries and ceases to trade as a consequence, but if it cannot pay sufficient to ensure a safe 
operation perhaps it should not be operating in the first place.  
 
4.1 THE MODEL OF SFP RELATED ACCIDENT CAUSATION UTILISED IN THIS 
STUDY 
This study identified the following problem in relation to aviation safety: 
PROBLEM STATEMENT:  
The occurrence literature indicates that a significant proportion of aviation accidents feature 
elements of SFP. 
The literature also indicates that many of these accidents involve: 
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 Loss of spatial or positional awareness 
 Confusion or distraction related to verbal communication 
 Flawed decision making based upon contextual cues 
The literature indicates that these occurrences are characterised by the factors illustrated in 
Figure 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1 The main characteristics of the most recurrent instances of SFP in the literature. 
 
 
Main characteristics of 
the most recurrent 
instances of SFP in the 
literature 
FCMs LOSE 
SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS 
FCMs lose track of their 
aircraft's system status 
FCMs lose track of their 
position 
FCMs lose track of their 
orientation 
FCMs BECOME 
DISTRACTED OR 
CONFUSED 
FCMs' skills deteriorate 
under conditions of 
excessive cognitive-load 
FCMs misunderstand 
complex or unclear 
communications 
FCMs distract 
themselves by 
conducting non 
pertinent conversations 
FCMs MAKE FLAWED 
DECISIONS 
FCMs place over-
reliance upon repetitive 
systems-configurations 
FCMs place over reliance 
upon repetitive  
contextual cues from 
their environment 
FCMs misattribute the 
cause  of a warning or 
alert due to contextual 
influences  
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4.2 A WORLDVIEW OF AVIATION SAFETY 
This section outlines a worldview of aviation safety by comparing the systems-approach to 
aviation safety with the real world; it is important to explain what is meant by a systems-
world approach.  James Reason is among several experts who have examined aviation safety 
in terms of a systems-approach where the human causes of an accident are distributed very 
widely both within the system as a whole and often over several years prior to the actual 
event (Reason, 1995).  Although the current UK CAA Safety Plan (UK CAA, 2015) refers to 
aviation safety as a system and highlights current initiatives relating to pilot performance, this 
research was unable to locate any explicit reference to exactly what the regulator and the oth-
er influential stakeholders in aviation safety expect from their flight crews. The systems-
world used in this research is based upon narratives in the reports. For instance, the Buffalo 
report (NTSB 2010a, p. 89) concluded that “the captain’s response to stick shaker activation 
should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his 
training”. This narrative highlights that once training has been delivered there is an expecta-
tion of performance that was not met on this occasion. The Lexington accident report (NTSB, 
2007, p. 43) mentioned that there was an expectation that the flight crew would confirm their 
heading before commencing takeoff even though it was not an action required by the operator 
at the time. Neither the Buffalo nor Lexington reports could explain why the procedural non-
compliances evident in both accidents occurred. In the Buffalo report a manager stated that 
he did not know how many of his airline’s pilots were commuting but he did prohibit flight 
crews from sleeping in the crew room (Ibid, p. 50), which suggests he was aware of the pos-
sibility that such an infringement of rules was possible. These are the types of narrative that 
form the systems-world perspective that is compared with the real-world in Figures 4.2 and 
4.3. Each of these narratives originated from an interested party in aviation safety; in section 
4.3 all the interested parties and their possible motivations are outlined. 
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Based upon the literature review conducted for this research the worldview of aviation safety 
in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 is proposed.  
 
Figure 4.2 A systems-world perspective on aviation safety. 
 
Systems-World 
perspective on 
aviation safety 
Training 
FCMs meet regulatory 
requirements  and receive 
recurrent training  resulting 
in a uniformly safe standard 
Procedures 
Procedures meet minimum 
regulatory requirements and 
FCMs  always comply with 
them 
Responsibilities 
FCMs' duties  and 
responsibilities  are  
achievable  and clearly 
defined and they  comply 
with them at all times 
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Figure 4.3 a real world perspective on aviation safety. 
 
 
Once the problem had been defined and the prevailing worldview had been identified, the 
next step was to identify the consumers of aviation safety (the customers) and those who pro-
Real-World 
Perspective on 
aviation safety 
Training  
FCM Training does not 
always address real-world 
needs 
Training a pilot to 
proficiency may diguise 
ability deficits 
Meeting regulatory 
standards does not provide 
a complete guarantee of 
satisfactory everyday 
performance 
Procedures  
Despite meeting regulatory 
standards, some procedures 
impose excessive workload on 
FCMs  
FCMs cannot always be relied 
upon to comply with rules 
Minimum regulatory 
requirements can be met 
despite substandard flight crew 
performance at a first attempt 
during a recurrent check 
Responsibilities 
Some support workers 
do not understand 
their role in aviation 
safety 
Some FCMs do not 
fully understand their 
responsibilities 
Some FCMs consider 
certain rules to be 
flexible in their 
application 
FCMs find some rules 
difficult to comply 
with 
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vide aviation safety (the actors). Because in the aviation context customers and actors some-
times merge it was decided in section 4.3 to refer to them as stakeholders and examine their 
role both as customer and actor where appropriate. 
 
4.3 AN EXPLANATION OF THE VARIOUS STAKEHOLDERS IN AVIATION SAFETY 
An essential stage of this research involved defining the role of the stakeholders who influ-
ence the system. Unlike some systems, in the aviation safety system many of those involved 
are both customers and actors, for instance, pilots both provide safety and rely upon others to 
provide a safe environment for them to work in. Managers are customers of the flight crews 
but they are also actors who exercise influence over their activities. The occurrence literature 
suggests that actors sometimes fail to understand the role they play in aviation safety. Based 
upon the literature, this section and its subsections below identified who aviation’s stakehold-
ers are and what motivates their activities. 
 
4.3.1 THE TRAVELLING PUBLIC 
Qualitative research conducted by the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA, 2015) indicates 
that the travelling public is not excessively influenced by safety and security concerns. They 
also found that passengers were reluctant to engage with safety matters, mainly because such 
engagement might make them feel less secure when flying. The CAA’s quantitative research 
found that 36% of those passengers who had previous experience of flying said they didn’t 
think much about safety. 58% of those surveyed considered that air travel is safer than other 
modes of transport and 54% said that safety standards are as high as they can be. In general, 
the travelling public showed no strong desire for more information related to safety with only 
39% stating they were open to such initiatives and 21% stating they would not be interested 
in receiving such information. The fact that customer service ranked higher than safety con-
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cerns confirms that the travelling public assumes that safety is taken care of by someone else. 
There was also little interest in knowing which airlines were safest or least safe, with a ten-
dency to assume that someone must be ensuring that unsafe airlines were never encountered. 
Passengers also showed little concern relating to travelling on a “leased in” aircraft but nota-
bly, there was an assumption that regulatory oversight and professional standards could be 
assumed in such cases. Overall, the passengers surveyed were happy to devolve almost all 
aspects of remaining safe to others and to avoid engaging with safety issues in case they were 
put off flying. 
 
4.3.2 THE FLIGHT CREW 
Although accidents at Lexington (NTSB, 2007) and Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) among others 
have called pilot professionalism into question there is strong evidence that pilots have much 
to benefit from a safe operation. Their personal safety is an obvious factor given that in both 
the accidents above, the pilots lost their lives or were seriously injured. Where they do sur-
vive, they are likely to encounter difficulties obtaining work again even if they are fit. This 
can also be the case if no blame attaches to the pilot concerned as was the case with a captain 
involved in a British Airways Boeing 777 landing accident at Heathrow (UK AAIB, 2010c). 
The reports indicate that operators sometimes seek to distance themselves from responsibility 
for their pilots’ actions so an individual pilot may be legally liable. The psychological impact 
of even a serious incident can profoundly affect a pilot; in 1990 a British Airways Boeing 747 
captain was found guilty of   “negligently endangering an aircraft and its occupants” and re-
ceived a substantial fine in lieu of a prison sentence. The pilot concerned resigned shortly af-
ter the verdict and committed suicide in 1992 (Connett, 1992). There is much evidence that 
pilots engage with flight safety, as evidenced by the 715,000 voluntary reports received by 
the NASA ASRS in its 30 year history. Decades of reports show that pilots are proactive in 
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offering their opinions regarding procedures or systems that they perceive as being deficient. 
There are numerous documented instances of pilots reporting deficiencies in aircraft design in 
advance of an accident, as was the case with the 1973 Trident accident at Staines (UK AIB, 
1973). In some of the accidents examined for this research it was clear that had the pilots 
been aware of a previous similar occurrence they might have avoided an accident. Pilots are 
taught how to manage threats and errors but they must be made explicit by those who possess 
the relevant information. Pilots have every incentive to maintain high standards; the reports 
showed that career progression was a major topic of discussion among flight crews. During 
the investigation into the Buffalo accident (NTSB, 2010a, p. 116) the airline’s senior repre-
sentative said that had he been aware of the captain’s history of underperforming he would 
not have qualified for employment by the airline. Pilots are aware that any evidence of poor 
performance or noncompliance represents a serious impediment to future advancement. 
Nonetheless, much of the current research involves pilots who have broken one rule or anoth-
er. There was no evidence that pilots were habitual rule breakers so it is possible that the pi-
lots concerned simply did not recognise their behaviour as unacceptable or they felt able to 
interpret the rules according to a different standard than the operator. 
 
4.3.3 THE AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURER 
When an aircraft crashes, one of the most frequently posed questions involves the safety rec-
ord of the type of aircraft. The nightmare scenario for a manufacturer is that an accident oc-
curs during development. Sales of the innovative Comet airliner were seriously affected by 
accidents in the early days of service and this arguably led to its commercial failure. Shares in 
Airbus fell immediately after the recent crash of a new military variant in Seville (Spence, 
2015). Even when the aircraft is clearly not at fault as was the case in a recent accident in the 
Pyrenees the manufacturer’s share price is likely to fall in response to an accident. An acci-
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dent involving an aircraft in development can result in a loss of confidence in the aircraft with 
resultant cancelled orders as was the case in the immediate aftermath of an accident involving 
a Sukhoi Superjet at Jakarta (KNKT, 2012). In this case the reputation of the aircraft has re-
stored and few orders were lost. Because aircraft manufacturers are usually enormous finan-
cial undertakings it is to be expected that lawsuits tend to be directed towards them.  A recent 
accident involving a Boeing 777 at San Francisco (NTSB, 2014a) has resulted in some of the 
passengers attempting legal action against Boeing despite the fact that the aircraft performed 
in line with its technical specification. The manufacturer is often involved in almost every 
stage of an airline’s operation from providing training, to supplying manuals so it is difficult 
for them to avoid some fallout from an accident. Manufacturers can also benefit when a defi-
ciency is present in the safety system by devising mitigations. The Honeywell Corporation is 
estimated to have earned close to one billion dollars revenue through the development and 
sales of EGPWS technology. A similar revenue stream is likely to result from the introduc-
tion of electronic flight bag (EFB). 
 
4.3.4 THE AIRLINE OPERATOR 
An accident is quite likely to signal the end of an airline. A Cypriot operator failed within one 
year of an accident near Athens despite having renamed the airline. A famous case of an air-
line failing due to its safety record is that of Adam Air in Indonesia. Adam Air experienced 
no fewer than four serious accidents between 2006 and 2008 and was closed down by the 
regulatory agency in 2008. Such airlines are unlikely to be the employer of choice for the best 
pilots so there is likely to be a continuing issue concerning the calibre of pilots in such air-
lines. Adam Air provides a clear indication of what results when an airline fails to comply 
with regulations. Colganair, the airline involved in the Buffalo accident, was renamed one 
year later and subsequently lost most of its connections with major airlines. It ceased opera-
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tions two years later. The Buffalo accident resulted in multiple lawsuits against Colganair. 
Although much of the criticism in the Buffalo accident report was directed towards the pilots, 
the airline is usually considered to share the responsibility for their flight crews’ actions.  
 
4.3.5 SUPPORT WORKERS 
As far as is known, the role of support workers in securing flight safety has not been consid-
ered in any depth before. In a serious takeoff accident at Auckland (TAIC, 2003) the presence 
of the station manager in the flight deck during preparations was relevant: 
 
“The second first officer would normally cross check the bug card data and computations, 
but in this instance he stowed the Airport Analysis Charts without verifying the information 
recorded on the bug card. At the time he was occupied explaining the departure delay to the 
operator’s station manager”. (TAIC, 2003, p. 4) 
 
In interviews after an accident at Birmingham, Alabama (NTSB, 2014b, pp. 53-61.): 
 
“…the accident dispatcher stated that he did not want to “insult” the captain by informing 
him of what he viewed as an unavailable approach to the runway…” 
 
An air traffic controller at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 2010a, p. 21) rationalised his failure to inform 
a Boeing 777 flight crew that they were lining up for takeoff at the wrong position as follows: 
“…although it appeared to be a short takeoff run, pilots are aware of their own aircraft’s 
performance. Although he had seen many smaller local aircraft start their takeoff rolls from 
Intersection Bravo he had not seen a Boeing 777 do this. Additionally he said the misidentifi-
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cation of taxiway bravo for alpha was, on average, a weekly occurrence and it appeared to 
be happening mostly to overseas operators” 
Despite the above testimony the air traffic controller elected not to advise the pilots. 
At Kegworth in the UK the need for coordinated action between flight crew and cabin crew 
was highlighted: 
“Had some initiative been taken by one or more of the cabin crew who had seen the distress 
of the left engine, the accident could have been prevented” (UK AAIB, 1990, p. 106) 
 
At Dryden (Canadian Commission of Enquiry, 1992) both cabin attendants and positioning 
flight crew did not speak up when they saw an ice accumulation on the wing of the aircraft 
they were about to depart in. 
 
An accident at Aspen highlighted how even a customer who is allowed to get too involved in 
the operation of the aircraft can be implicated in an accident: 
 
“When told about the possibility that the flight might have to divert, his employer became 
irate…he was told to tell the operator that the airplane was not going to be redirected…he 
had flown into Aspen at night and was going to do it again (NTSB, 2002, p. 28) 
 
4.3.6 REGULATORY BODIES 
Accidents are also challenging for regulatory bodies. In the wake of a suspected suicide-
related crash in the Pyrenees in 2015 the regulatory authority had to rapidly institute new 
rules requiring at least two occupants on the flight deck at all times. Another issue attracting 
scrutiny at present is the arrangements commuting pilots make to avoid fatigue; until recently 
this issue has been left to their individual professionalism but in the wake of the Buffalo acci-
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dent the NTSB has been pressing the FAA to implement fatigue mitigation processes that 
have so far not been implemented. Regulators such as the USA’s FAA can be held accounta-
ble in the wake of an accident as was the case when a Delta Airlines Boeing 727 crashed at 
Dallas in 1988: 
 
“…the FAA was aware of certain deficiencies in Delta's check airman program as far back 
as 1985. Additionally, in 1987, the incidents involving Delta flight crews and the findings of 
the 1987 inspection team should have indicated to Delta and the FAA that immediate correc-
tive action was necessary…” (NTSB, 1989, p. 79) 
 
In the UK the CAA has also attracted criticism in the past in the wake of two serious occur-
rences involving the now defunct Emerald Airways: The AAIB said that the CAA’s oversight 
programme had already identified deficiencies in the crew resource management aspects of 
Emerald’s operations, but it concluded:  
 
 “The programme was ineffective in producing sufficient timely improvement. If it had been 
successful these incidents could have been prevented.” (Flight Global, 2000) 
This indicates that not even regulators are immune from fallout when safety is compromised. 
 
4.4 FEASIBLE TRANSFORMATIONS 
By understanding the human limitations outlined in this study it is feasible that the following 
transformations could be made: 
4.4.1 TRAINING 
Threat and error management (TEM) procedures could be devised on the basis of the new 
knowledge in this study. For instance, currently FCMs are never required to demonstrate their 
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ability to transition from egocentric to allocentric navigation displays at short notice; fur-
thermore they currently receive no simulated training in using an EFB in limited visibility. In 
the UK, FCMs only need to demonstrate low visibility taxiing at triennial intervals. To put 
this in perspective, they practice engine failures on takeoff during every proficiency check 
despite the fact that runway related incidents and accidents in poor visibility far exceed en-
gine failures on takeoff. Because flying with degraded navigational information is more cog-
nitively challenging than using a moving map display it is likely to reveal handling and man-
agement deficiencies in FCMs that would not be evident with access to normal instrumenta-
tion. In response to the Buffalo accident identifying low performing pilots and devising strat-
egies for their training has been identified as a safety priority by the NTSB. This study ident i-
fies some explanations for degraded pilot performance that, as far as is known, have not pre-
viously been documented. The verbal strand of this thesis outlines how ineffective communi-
cation can induce error. This study highlights that support staff such as dispatchers, air traffic 
controllers and managers have all been an influence in accidents in the past, which suggests 
that they would also benefit from an understanding of how the way they communicate can 
affect flight safety. The concept of contextual cueing is not widely documented in the avia-
tion literature despite clear evidence of its influence in reports spanning decades.  
 
4.4.2 OPERATIONS 
Accidents at Jakarta and Islamabad both involved pilots who probably underestimated the 
influence of spatial tasks upon working memory capacity. Working memory demand has 
been empirically and theoretically implicated in the production of errors by many researchers 
(e.g., Hitch, 1978, Anderson & Jeffries, 1985, Lebiere, Anderson, & Reder, 1994), although 
these studies have not examined systematic errors such as forgetting to extend the flaps be-
cause an interruption occurs at a critical moment. However, Byrne & Bovair (1997) have 
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provided experimental evidence of the influence of working memory load on this type of 
post-completion error. The connection between very high cognitive load and error rate in-
crease has also been demonstrated by Ayres (20001) and others. However, the exact nature of 
the relationship between problem complexity and increased error rates is unclear from the 
research. Sweller (2006) has emphasised the role of worked examples as a cognitive load re-
duction technique during skill acquisition and the reports indicate that flight crews can expe-
rience extreme cognitive load when they deviate from clearly defined problem solving rou-
tines. This was evident in a serious LOC incident at Newcastle in 2013 (UK AAIB, 2013) 
where the flight crew did not adopt a recommended procedure during a missed approach and 
subsequently made multiple serious errors. Whereas Sweller focused upon the process of 
problem solving, Ayres (2001) varied the intrinsic complexity of problems and observed the 
effect on cognitive load. Ayres found that as more brackets were added to an algebraic equa-
tion the error rate increased. He concluded that failures in working memory rather than poor-
ly learned rules accounted for the variation and that the varying cognitive load experienced 
by problem solvers on these tasks was the likely cause of the observed pattern of errors. 
These two perspectives suggest that not only the complexity of the task but the manner in 
which it is communicated is likely to influence the cognitive load invoked. This means that 
when a controller issues a missed approach instruction in an unfamiliar way (as was the case 
in an accident at Sochi outlined in section 7.25) cognitive load may be increased simply be-
cause the task was not learned in the sequential steps now being used. On the other hand it 
may be that just “too many brackets” were present in the equation the flight crew were being 
asked to solve (as was probably the case at Newcastle). The notion that controllers might 
benefit from an increased awareness of their influence on flight crew cognitive load is sup-
ported by data from the NASA ASRS database and safety occurrences such as the one at 
Tenerife in the 1970s (UK AIB, 1981), Providence in 1999 (NTSB, 1999) and more recently 
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at Newcastle (UK AAIB, 2013), all of which involved complex tasks which were made more 
difficult by the way in which an instruction was passed by a controller. This study also identi-
fied that those who support flight crews, including air traffic controllers, dispatchers and cab-
in crew are sometimes inhibited in their communications for a wide range of reasons. This 
study’s taxonomy of unclear speech acts and their explanations represents a starting point for 
transforming communications between all those involved in aviation safety. 
 
4.4.3 DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Designers can also benefit from this research because there has been evidence of design defi-
ciencies in some of the best aircraft in service. For instance in the 1970s the flap lever of the 
state-of-the-art Trident was modified in response to an accident and more recently the Boeing 
777 autopilot engagement criteria were modified after nine related human-errors incidents 
had occurred. This study indicates that in a world free from other constraints it would be 
preferable for EFB displays to adopt the same orientation as the ND; however, even the mod-
ern Boeing 787 EFB owes its positioning and orientation more to the ergonomic requirements 
of the flight deck than to the human limitations outlined in this research. Transformations 
aimed at making procedures safer are also conceivable on the basis of this study. There is ev-
idence that performing distracting tasks whilst taxiing, such as receiving load information and 
making cabin announcements has contributed to serious incidents at Hong Kong (Civil Avia-
tion Department Hong Kong , 2011, p 26), Seattle (NTSB, 2008) and elsewhere. The effect of 
concurrent tasks upon cognitive load is well-documented and has been shown to adversely 
affect individuals’ ability to retain orientation during locomotion (Lindberg & Garling, 1981). 
Research by Meilinger et al. (2008) measured the influence of secondary visual, spatial and 
verbal tasks performed whilst wayfinding and found that although the visual task interfered 
with wayfinding performance, it was concurrent spatial and verbal tasks that caused greatest 
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interference whilst wayfinding. This is an important consideration given the loss of orienta-
tion experienced by the Lexington flight crew who had been performing a concurrent verbal 
task in the form of a conversation and visual tasks both inside and outside the cockpit whilst 
taxing towards the runway. It is the unauthorised aspect of the verbal interference that attract-
ed most criticism in the Lexington accident report (NTSB, 2007a) but the human cognitive 
system cannot differentiate between an unauthorised conversation and a conversation that is 
encouraged by the operator such as a passenger announcement or a call to the cabin crew to 
sit down (one of the several concurrent tasks evident in the Hong Kong incident cited above) 
so it is evident that this human limitation is to some extent underestimated. There are numer-
ous possible reasons why such procedures are widespread but not all of them are enacted to 
enhance safety. Perhaps the commercial requirements require a weighing of risk versus safe-
ty; alternatively it may be that those who implement such decisions simply lack sufficient in-
sight of the flight deck environment to understand the distraction caused and its potential ef-
fect. Either explanation represents an impediment to change but by highlighting and docu-
menting such risks it becomes more difficult to deny their existence. There are however, 
some designs and procedures that are likely to prove very resistant to transformation, such as 
the complete redesign of a flight deck to accommodate an egocentrically oriented EFB or the 
prohibition of distracting activities like answering ACARS messages whilst taxiing. By high-
lighting the risks associated even with procedures and designs that are unlikely to be trans-
formed, FCM s will be better able to manage those risks themselves and remain safe. In a 
similar vein, some FCM activities such as violations of the sterile cockpit rule seem particu-
larly resistant to transformation. Operators should be aware that by requiring their FCMs to 
perform the distracting activities described above, they probably weaken the force of their 
pronouncements prohibiting activities such as NPCs, which could encourage noncompliance. 
This study highlights some of the interactions that might lead to NPCs, and cautiously sug-
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gests that an understanding of the reasons for this particular type of violation is more likely to 
result in the required transformation than simply reiterating the rule every time an accident is 
investigated. 
 
4.4.4 AWARENESS AND EMPATHY  
The examples cited earlier of a dispatcher at Birmingham, Alabama (NTSB, 2014b), an air 
traffic controller at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 2010a) and even a passenger (NTSB, 2002, p. 28) 
who were unaware of their influence upon the actions of a flight crew hints at a disturbing 
lack of awareness and empathy afflicting aviation safety. The occurrence literature suggests 
that even those on the frontline of aviation safety such as air traffic controllers and pilots un-
derestimate the importance of understanding one another’s role. For instance, it is clear from 
the literature that some air traffic controllers are unaware that if they issue a takeoff clearance 
whilst an aircraft still has a runway or taxiway to cross before reaching the active runway 
there is an increased risk of a wrong runway takeoff. None of the twenty pilots spoken to dur-
ing the development of this research knew about this human-limitation or were aware that it 
was a well-documented threat. This exact contextual condition has resulted in several very 
serious incidents in which the controller did not notice a takeoff commence at the wrong lo-
cation. Whilst the first instance could be considered a “normal accident” (Perrow, 1984), al-
most identical instances that followed suggest a systemic failure. A stated aim of the SFP 
construct was to act as a repository for knowledge relating to repetitive contexts that have 
been shown to be linked to substandard flight crew performance.  Access to such a store of 
knowledge could mitigate the risk of situations like the one at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 2010a) 
where the controller appeared to be unaware of the potential for a flight crew to make the er-
ror of lining up for takeoff half way down the runway, and a flight crew who probably ex-
pected him to warn them if they were making such a mistake. As far as is known, there is no 
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existing repository containing the accumulated knowledge relating to this category of occur-
rence and other recurrent categories such miscommunication or loss of positional awareness. 
The potential transformations to operational procedures outlined in this chapter all require 
that everyone involved in flight safety understands what the other’s problems are. This ability 
to perceive and react to another’s emotional state has been conceptualised in organisational 
research (Salovey and Mayer, 1990) as emotional intelligence (EI) and is now being recog-
nised as an emerging core skill for flight crews; however, there is no clear evidence that it is 
being embraced by others in the aviation safety system. Although this thesis unavoidably 
contains content of a technical nature, most of the general principles outlined are likely to be 
comprehensible to a wide readership within the aviation safety system, not just those on the 
frontline of aviation safety. 
 
4.4.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 
Chapter four has outlined the conceptual model used as a framework for this research. It has 
presented the characteristics of the aviation accidents that are occurring at present and identi-
fied a mismatch between the systems approach to aviation safety and what happens in the real 
world. Aviation safety’s stakeholders have been identified and a brief sketch of their respon-
sibilities, motivations and roles has been proposed. Finally, the feasible transformations that 
could flow from this research have been outlined. 
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PART II:  EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH AND RESEARCH 
METHODS 
OUTLINE OF PART II 
Chapter five begins by highlighting that although flight deck conversations have been identi-
fied as a threat to aviation safety, as far as is known no previous research of the type de-
scribed in this thesis has been undertaken. A description of how the talk heard in other insti-
tutional contexts has been the subject of meaningful research introduces the idea that similar 
processes might be effective in understanding the underpinnings of flight deck conversation. 
The chapter then outlines how unclear communication has contributed to a range of accidents 
in aviation and several other safety critical disciplines and how linguistic data from more 
general research populations can provide insights into the role of miscommunication in SFP. 
The research scope then widens out to consider the effect of context upon flight crew perfor-
mance. As far as is known, this strand is original with no previous relevant research to repli-
cate. The three contextual cueing hypotheses outlined in this thesis were derived from the 
qualitative data in the occurrence literature. Chapter five concludes with an explanation of the 
specific types of spatial awareness challenges that have formed part of the situational context 
in advance of an accident. The chapter then proposes a link between these challenges, cogni-
tive load and reduced human performance.   
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CHAPTER 5 
BASIS FOR A MIXED METHODS APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF SFP 
This chapter outlines the rationale behind the various different experimental methods used in 
this study. Section 5.1 and its subsections address the verbal strand. Section 5.2 and its sub-
sections address the contextual–cueing strand. Section 5.3 and its subsections address the spa-
tial-awareness strand. 
 
5.1. BASIS FOR AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO THE VERBAL STRAND 
 5.1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE VERBAL STRAND 
This section outlines the basis for the experimental approach to the verbal strand of this the-
sis. Section 5.1.2 outlines the role of concurrent tasks and distraction. Section 5.1.3 introduc-
es the concept of discourse analysis (DA) and explains how it has been used to research other 
similar contexts. Section 5.1.4 outlines how the literature related to institutional talk provided 
a framework for the study of a phenomenon which, as far as is known, had not been subjected 
to any previous research in the aviation context. Section 5.1.4 introduces the unclear commu-
nication research which also formed part of the verbal strand. Section 5.1.5 outlines how dis-
course analysis has featured in historic accident reports thereby providing a rationale for its 
use in this study of unclear communications. This research could locate no comparable re-
search into the specialised talk that is heard on the flight deck so it was necessary to identify 
and research similar unrelated contexts. The chapter ends with a methodological note related 
to the role of the lone researcher in this type of qualitative research. 
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5.1 2 CONCURRENT TASKS AND DISTRACTION 
Previous chapters have highlighted the role of non-pertinent conversation in SFP related ac-
cidents. In addition to an empirical relationship with accidents such as those at Lexington and 
Buffalo there is previously cited evidence from concurrent task research that NPCs are likely 
to be a source of distraction to flight crews. In addition, research using fMRI indicates that 
the response of the auditory cortex to task irrelevant sounds may result in its deactivation dur-
ing demanding auditory tasks with conflicting processing requirements (Rinne et al., 2009), 
which means that by conducting non-pertinent conversations flight crews expose themselves 
to an increased risk of omitting an important task. The distraction caused by a concurrent task 
such as conducting a conversation whilst taxiing the aircraft represents a particularly potent 
threat to safety because its precise effect varies depending on the degree of overlap between 
the types of information requiring processing. Research by Kim & Osterhout (2005) suggest 
whilst a pilot above may be able to conduct conversations both within the flight deck and to a 
controller without apparent distraction there may be considerable disruption of semantic pro-
cessing, with the consequential risk of losing situational awareness. Kim & Osterhout’s re-
search indicates that dual concurrent tasks affect information processing in a complex fashion 
related to how closely the sources of distraction are related semantically. The complexity of 
this concept suggests that individuals FCMs who do not possess a detailed understanding of 
cognitive limitations may not identify this as a threat. This potential lack of awareness may 
underpin the observed willingness of flight crews to contribute to their own distraction. The 
aim of the non-pertinent conversation section of the verbal strand research was to identify 
some of the most recurrent types of conversation that occur on the flight deck and to propose 
explanations for their occurrence. 
 
 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       71 
 
 
5.1.3 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
A detailed literature review indicated that much of the existing research into verbal behaviour 
on the flight deck tended to focus on the structure of language rather than the meanings of 
what was said.   This has resulted in several conversation-analysis (CA) studies but very few 
formal studies of the discursive features of what is heard. Nevile & Walker’s (2005) influen-
tial paper “a context for error” is an example of how the structural features of flight deck 
conversation can yield insights into the mood in the cockpit or the working relationship of the 
pilots, whereas one of the aims of this research was to identify the underlying reasons that 
flight deck conversations occur, with a view to mitigating their effect. As far as is known, this 
is the first research to ask pilots their opinions on a range of recurrent conversation types and 
to propose motives for their occurrence. Discourse analysis (DA) is the study of talk and 
texts; it is a set of methods and theories for investigating language in use and language in so-
cial contexts (Wetherell et al., 2001); this simplified definition, whilst adequate for much of 
the conversation evident in the transcripts, downplays the complexity of some of the institu-
tional talk heard in the transcripts examined in this research. Whilst Nevile & Walker’s 
(Ibid.) paper concentrated on the structural features of the talk that preceded an accident, in-
vestigators’ reports frequently go beyond this structural approach by assigning meanings to 
what has been said. In such cases the investigators are engaged in an informal kind of DA 
which almost always focuses upon the meanings that apply in the institutional context in 
which the speech took place. This is an example of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and 
much of the current research was based upon the ideas of CDA. Throughout this thesis the 
idea that the flight deck represents a unique context will be evident. In terms of discourse, 
this notion is evident in two separate reports where pilots use informal language (the terms at 
your leisure (NTSB, 2007a. p. 72 and just for a giggle ATSB, 1995, p. 24) that attract nega-
tive evaluations from investigators suggestive of a casual attitude, which would hardly apply 
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in a less formal setting. Tuen Van Dijk (2001) described how groups who share specialized 
knowledge, such as academic, scholarly, scientific, technical and other kinds of ‘expert’ 
knowledge tend to occupy what he calls “common ground”; that is they share a common 
sense belief generally accepted to be true by all competent members. The current research 
supports Van Dijk’s (2001) notion that in addition to specialist discourse centred upon tech-
nical terminology there is less formal discourse within such communities that can reveal the 
argumentation patterns, the dominant schemas, the preferred topics, the rhetorical and meta-
phorical devices that prevail within that specialised community. It is this informal flight deck 
discourse that is examined in the verbal strand of the current study. Because the discourse 
heard from pilots who have been involved in a safety occurrence is often the subject of criti-
cal analysis it is also important to consider how discourse about a particular group can be in-
fluenced by the meanings individuals attach to those groups; for instance one might have dif-
fering conceptions of the meaning of professional behaviour when applied to a footballer than 
when applied to an airline pilot. Although CDA’s undeniable focus upon power and domi-
nance was not an intended direction for this research, by a process of induction it emerged 
that a significant amount of the talk evident in the transcripts could be explained in those 
terms. As far as is known, no previous research has examined flight deck conversation from 
the CDA perspective and it should be emphasised that although this study was based upon the 
CDA related literature it was not formal CDA research. However, in light of the NPC re-
search outlined in this thesis it will be clear that any discussion that omitted these factors 
would be incomplete. Whilst the work of Van Dijk and his peers facilitated the analysis of 
many of the speech acts in the transcripts there were others that it was impossible to attribute 
to the exercise of power or dominance so it was necessary to look elsewhere. Because the 
flight deck was considered an institutional setting, a review of existing research into other 
such settings was undertaken.  Descriptions of discourse analysis studies involving analysis 
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of doctor/patient talk (Wodak, 2006), legal testament (Shuy, 1993), legal discourse (Wagner 
and Cheng, 2011), and a range of other specialised contexts demonstrates its wide acceptance 
for purposes as diverse as medical policy changes, legal defence and training. The range of 
methods that qualify as discourse analysis in the literature is quite wide, with examples of 
tape recorded extracts that sometimes appear to have been chosen primarily to support a giv-
en argument or in other cases just an extract from a book with almost no context except for 
the text within which it was embedded. The current research sought a more rigorous set of 
criteria for consideration of talk as an indicator of the philosophies and ideas that Van Dijk 
referred to. In order to be considered, a fragment of text would have to be transparently simi-
lar to those it would be categorised alongside; this was particularly important as this research 
was conducted by a lone researcher. Each fragment within a category would need to have 
been clearly evident in at least two accident report CVR transcripts. 
 
5.1.4 INSTITUTIONAL TALK 
Because the concept of an NPC was unknown outside aviation it was necessary to seek out 
more generalised research and adapt it to the aviation context with the help of aviation SMEs.  
A review led to the work of Jones and Pittman (1982) and an interpretation and review-based 
taxonomy by Bolino and Turnley (1999) which outlined and explained forty four types of 
verbal behaviour that had featured in institutional settings. The current study adapted Jones 
and Pittman’s research methodology which was based upon a six step procedure proposed by 
Hinkin (1998) for the development of measures. The procedure used in this study was a sim-
plified version of Hinkin’s procedure involving fewer steps: item generation, questionnaire 
administration, initial item reduction and replication. The absence of steps involving statisti-
cal tests was appropriate due to the low number of participants and the availability of alterna-
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tive means of establishing content validity. The resultant taxonomy was substantially similar 
to Bolino and Turnley’s. 
 
5.1.5 UNCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS 
Despite rarely being cited as a factor in accidents that exhibit substandard flight crew perfor-
mance, unclear communications are frequently in the background in such accidents.  For in-
stance, in 1997, the investigation into a CFIT accident at Guam (NTSB, 2000) found that in-
appropriate communications had been a contributory factor. The major causes of this accident 
were the captain’s failure to adequately brief and the first officer’s and flight engineer’s fail-
ure to cross check the captain’s execution of the approach. Similar patterns of failed commu-
nication have been documented in nuclear power plant personnel (Hirotsu, 2001) and railway 
maintenance workers (Murphy, 2001). The practice of developing taxonomies of inappropri-
ate communications is a well-established research method with examples from the nuclear 
industry (Berman and Gibson, 1994) and the railway maintenance industry (Gibson et al., 
2006) and others.  Much of the existing research into failed communication involving pilots 
relates to their verbal interactions with air traffic controllers. Whilst this is an important fac-
tor addressed in the current research, another major focus of this research was upon instances 
where intra-cockpit communication failed to prevent an accident. As far as is known, no ex-
isting taxonomy of unclear communication between flight crew members exists. This re-
search employed a process known as thematic-analysis, whereby codes were assigned to 
words or phrases in order to produce categories of speech acts (Boyatzis, 1998). Some of the 
categories were complex, requiring detailed explanation whereas others were simple and 
readily understood. Boyatzis explains that codes of varying complexity can be utilised in 
thematic analysis whilst still retaining the same rigour. Some of the codes in this research 
were theory driven and others are derived from a bottom-up analysis of what was heard and 
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the outcome that resulted. Qualitative-analysis is amenable to such a combination of ap-
proaches. Bottom-up analysis inevitably invokes some of the researcher’s subjective opinions 
regarding what is and isn’t unclear. This type of subjectivity is evident both in research pa-
pers and in investigation reports, where investigators frequently draw inferences that far ex-
ceed the literal meaning of what has been said. Thus a precedent exists whereby a third party 
researcher can offer interpretations of what has been said and invite scrutiny of those inter-
pretations. In many cases an interpretation is the only possible means of examining what was 
said because the speaker is not available to explain. To mitigate the effect of lone researcher 
subjectivity all of the examples of unclear communications included in the taxonomy of un-
clear communications that forms part of this thesis have been clearly identifiable in advance 
of more than one aviation accident or incident. Furthermore, each of the communication 
types in the taxonomy is explained with reference to peer-reviewed research. Finally, the po-
tential benefits of proposing even a subjective taxonomy of unclear communication types 
compare favourably with simply addressing unclear communications in the ad hoc fashion 
that is evident in some reports. 
 
In summary, a form of discourse-analysis is evident in accident reports, indicating that sub-
jective accounts provided by individuals who have not received formal training in linguistics 
are considered suitable for inclusion in influential literature. As far as is known, no previous 
research had attempted to organise some of the most recurrent instances of unclear language 
into categories so that they can be explained. Thematic-analysis was considered an appropri-
ate and effective means of categorisation. Multiple sources were accessed in order to develop 
the taxonomy of unclear communication outlined in this thesis.  
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5.2 THE BASIS FOR AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO THE  
CONTEXTUAL CUEING STRAND 
5.2.1 OVERVIEW 
This chapter outlines the basis for the experimental approach to the contextual cueing strand 
of this thesis. Section 5.2.2 provides examples of recurrent instances where flight crews ap-
pear to have been influenced by aspects of the prevailing context to make an error or omis-
sion. Section 5.2.3 introduces the concept of contextual cueing and describes how related re-
search has mainly concentrated upon its influence on visual processing. This is followed by 
an explanation of the rationale for adapting the contextual cueing paradigm (See Chun et al., 
2000 for a review) theory to a range of other perceptual modalities more fitting to the aviation 
context. Section 5.2.4 details the methods researchers have used to explore contextual cueing 
in existing research and explains how these needed to be modified for the experiments con-
ducted in this research. Because this study elaborated upon existing research, the methods did 
not replicate existing research but were adapted to the individual phenomenon being exam-
ined. For instance, in some of the experiments response time (RT) was considered a useful 
measure of cognitive processing whereas in others the accuracy or appropriateness of re-
sponse to a stimulus was more relevant than RT.  
 
5.2.2 THE EVIDENCE FOR CONTEXTUAL CUEING AS A FACTOR 
 INFLUENCING SFP 
Contextual cueing occurs when aspects of the prevailing context encourage a flight crew to 
behave in a way that has been appropriate when that context applied on previous occasions. 
This phenomenon can have a wide range of effects relevant to SFP. A seminal runway acci-
dent in Tenerife involved a captain whose training role meant that he spent much of his work-
ing life in a simulator, where he performed the role of instructor but crucially, issued clear-
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ances that are normally issued by an air traffic controller. It was hypothesised in the Spanish 
report (Ministerio de Transportes y Communicaciones Subsecretaria de Aviacion Civil, 1978, 
p. 109) that the foggy conditions, coupled with his experience as a simulator training pilot 
may have provided sufficient contextual cues to result in his incorrect belief that he had been 
cleared to takeoff.  Ethnographic observations conducted for this study found that less atten-
tion was paid to takeoff and landing clearances during simulator sessions than in real life op-
erations so the foregoing explanation is plausible. The literature indicates that flight crews 
become accustomed to receiving certain communications at certain times. This phenomenon 
is illustrated by the numerous documented instances of flight crews who incorrectly take off 
on the next runway like surface they encounter after they receive their take off clearance. 
This has resulted in numerous taxiway takeoffs and wrong runway use occurrences. The 
Norwegian accident investigation agency reports that one airport in Norway has experienced 
several serious incidents in the vicinity of a single runway holding point, including three at-
tempted taxiway takeoffs (AIBN, 2010, p. 22). In two of these instances the flight crew had 
received their takeoff clearance when they were some distance from the runway. This unex-
pected contextual influence is sufficiently well documented that some airports, such as Auck-
land in New Zealand, avoid passing a takeoff clearance until the aircraft is in the correct posi-
tion (AIBN, 2006, p. 8). There is also considerable evidence in the occurrence literature to 
suggest that contextual cueing has also played a part in omissions related to both landing gear 
and flap selection. The reports into several flapless takeoff accidents (e.g. NTSB, 1988 and 
CIAIC, 2008) suggest that particular phases of flight tend to be associated with certain tasks 
having been completed. For instance, once the aircraft is lined up on the runway for takeoff it 
is very unusual for the flaps not to be in the extended position, so in this flight phase there 
may be a tendency to be less diligent in checking them because the likelihood of them not 
being extended is so low. It will also be demonstrated how an existing technical aircraft de-
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fect has provided the context for a flight crew to misattribute a subsequent defect in a way 
that would be unlikely in the absence of the pre-existing defect. The next section describes 
how existing contextual cueing research was adapted to explain some instances of the SFP 
related phenomena just described. 
 
5.2.3 CONTEXTUAL CUEING, PERCEPTION AND THE PILOT 
Visual objects are contextually related if they tend to co-occur in our environment, and a sce-
ne is contextually coherent if it contains items that tend to appear together in similar configu-
rations (Bar, 2004). The contextual cueing research paradigms upon which this study is based 
typically involve the repetition of visual scenes with changing characteristics but which retain 
some invariant features. After repeated exposure, the position and configuration of features of 
the visual scene become associated with both local and global contextual information. The 
example above of the simulator instructor at Tenerife is one of many imaginable contextual 
situations where global context could influence a flight crew to believe a condition has been 
met when it has in fact been omitted. Although, as far as is known, this is the first research to 
operationalise the contextual-cueing paradigm in the aviation context, the phenomenon is 
recognisable in the occurrence literature. There are instances of flight crews entering runways 
without clearance, taking off from taxiways, omitting to extend the landing gear and incor-
rectly configuring the aircraft for takeoff, among other instances of SFP that hint at the influ-
ence of global context. Although the traditional understanding of global context refers to 
what individuals observe in their spatial environment, this study broadened the concept to 
include aspects such as one’s position in space, the status of systems and the meanings at-
tached to certain alerts. The premise of this study was that via a process known as implicit 
learning FCMs come to associate aspects of their global context with aspects of their local 
context such as the relationship between entering the runway for takeoff and having the flaps 
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in a takeoff position. Global contexts are also implicated in misattribution errors related to the 
weather as in a takeoff accident at Washington (NTSB, 1982), a pre-existing defect at Palm-
erston North (TAIC, 1995) and system status at Jakarta (KNKT, 2012). It should be empha-
sised that none of the associated accident reports cited contextual cueing as a factor but it is 
evident that had these factors not been present the accidents might have been avoided. Ex-
plicit acknowledgement of the existence of contextual cueing as a relevant phenomenon was 
found in analysis of a CFIT accident at Cali by the Flight Safety Foundation (1998, p. 13), 
where it was hypothesised that the captain may have incorrectly misattributed the confusing 
indications he was seeing on his navigation instruments to reports of sabotage of radio 
equipment that he had been aware of. Had this context not existed it is likely that he might 
have been more critical of his own actions rather than pursuing his false hypothesis. In addi-
tion to misattribution, context also plays a part in misidentification; our experience of the vis-
ual world dictates our predictions about what other objects to expect in a scene and their spa-
tial configuration. Evidence for the role of context in object memory comes primarily from 
research on object perception or object identification in humans, which has demonstrated the 
role of contextual information in enhancing object identification (Palmer, 1975; Biederman et 
al., 1982; Boyce and Pollatsek, 1992; Davenport and Potter, 2004, cited in Hayes et al., 
2007).  Although in everyday life it may confer a cognitive advantage to be able to predict the 
status of an aspect of one’s activity on the basis of what usually occurs in that context, in avi-
ation the pursuit of cognitive economy is less important than accuracy. Flight crews are 
taught from an early stage to check and double check the status of critical systems such as the 
flaps but the literature indicates that when flap extension before takeoff is omitted it usually 
occurs in familiar contextual conditions. A detailed review of this type of error found that it is 
often attributed to post completion error or a failure of prospective memory. Whilst these 
phenomena provide explanations for the original omission they provide little insight into why 
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the omission was not noticed despite, in many cases, a checklist being completed. Evidence 
from the investigation into the previously cited accident at Cali (ACRC, 1996) confirms that 
flight crews sometimes make assumptions (in the Cali case, relating to how waypoints were 
sequenced by the flight management computer) based upon a priori knowledge, but Bar 
(2004) suggests that even this may not represent the full potential for error, noting that such 
context driven predictions can allow individuals to choose not to attend to an object at all if 
none of the possible identities suggested by the context are of immediate interest. This means 
that if a pilot cannot conceive of a circumstance in which the flaps would not be extended 
when the aircraft is lined up for takeoff then the configuration is unlikely to attract his/her 
attention. There is also thought to be a difference between contextual relations and semantic 
relations that may be important in this context. Possessing a priori knowledge that the flaps 
are extended is likely to be driven by the knowledge that all takeoffs require some degree of 
flap extension, whereas knowing the exact configuration requires a deeper semantic under-
standing of the particular configuration. This proposal introduces the likelihood that different 
regions of the brain might be involved in quite similar contextual settings which raises the 
question how might this complex system be organised and activated? A recurrent model in-
volves the construction of mental scripts (known in psychology as schemas) that contain all 
the expectations formed from previous experiences. The potential problem with the applica-
tion of schemas is that on occasions the wrong schema will be activated or one may have no 
previous experience upon which to base one. It is also important to acknowledge research by 
Gottesman & Intraub (1999) which suggests that sometimes people extrapolate beyond the 
boundaries of their schema in a phenomenon known as boundary extension. Similarly, in 
false memory experiments participants have reported seeing something that was not present 
in the picture they viewed but was contextually related to a scene that did contain the object. 
These two limitations of schema-based processing would seem to be a potential factor in the 
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small but significant number of instances of flight crews who mistake a taxiway for a runway 
despite multiple visual cues that distinguish one from the other (e.g. ASC, 2002:  AIBN, 
2006: AIBN, 2010). There are also documented cases of pilots who report with some certain-
ty that they have observed the position of, for instance, the flaps despite retrospective evi-
dence to the contrary (NTSB 1989, p. 62). 
 
5.2.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH METHODS AND THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
From the foregoing section it can be seen that recalling a previously completed or omitted 
action is particularly relevant to the aviation context. Reinstatement effects are commonly 
researched and typically find evidence of better memory when the learning environment is 
reinstated at test than when testing occurs in a different environment. Whilst such experi-
ments usually seek to make the environments used as perceptually distinct from each other as 
is possible, the requirement in this research was to make them as realistic as possible even if 
the changes were subtle. Whilst more general research has performed manipulations such as 
moving items in a room setting, the current research made very specific manipulations such 
as introducing an alert that was either congruent or incongruent with the contextual situation. 
Other researchers have manipulated the geographic location in which learning took place; 
Godden and Baddeley (1975) manipulated context by having scuba divers learn and recall 
word lists on land or underwater, whilst Smith and Sinha (1987) used a flotation tank versus a 
lounge. The current study contended that the accuracy of FCMs’ recall of their aircraft’s con-
figuration may be similarly affected by a mismatch between contextual conditions that usual-
ly prevail during learning and those they experience at recall. Although Smith and Vela 
(2001) present considerable evidence challenging the influence of incidental environment 
changes it should be pointed out that in the experiments outlined in this research the manipu-
lations represented realistically plausible options albeit less likely ones than the norm. So de-
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spite the documented limitations of manipulating contextual environments and observing the 
effects it was considered an effective research method. As far as is known there is no existing 
research directly comparable to the current study in which the participants’ prior knowledge 
of system status is a dependent variable defining the context. There is however, experimental 
fMRI evidence (Summerfield et al., 2006) that information stored in long term memory can 
drive the orienting of spatial attention, indicating that prior knowledge represents a compo-
nent of context. Experimental research by Beesley et al. (2015) is among many studies to 
demonstrate an advantage in visual search when an individual has had previous exposure to 
the stimulus. The current study is novel in two respects; firstly it is not concerned with RT 
but accuracy; secondly, this study hypothesised that contextual effects found to be advanta-
geous in most studies may be implicated in the commission of errors in the aviation context 
where the accuracy of behaviour is more important than the speed with which it occurs. One 
area where the current study converges with existing studies is in the area of experimental 
control. Although the current research required an ethnographic approach involving real life 
scenarios it was possible to maintain a high degree of experimental control by using a simula-
tor. Ethnographic observation has been effectively applied to research into intravenous medi-
cation human errors (Taxis & Barber, 2003), the lifestyle of night freight pilots (Bennett, 
2010) and a range of high reliability organisational settings (Bourrier, 2011). In summary, 
this study elaborated upon the ideas contained in the contextual cueing literature but deviated 
considerably from the subject matter of much of the existing research. An extensive review of 
the aviation literature found very few explicit references to contextual cueing in relation to a 
serious incident; this was useful at two levels insofar as it established that the concept was not 
completely unknown in the aviation context and also that it was probably under researched. 
The aim of the current research was to operationalise contextual cueing and to test three hy-
potheses based upon realistic instances from the occurrence literature. 
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5.3 THE BASIS FOR AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO THE  
SPATIAL AWARENESS STRAND 
5.3.1 OVERVIEW 
This section outlines examples of accidents and incidents where there exists clear evidence 
that the flight crew were unaware of their heading, their position or both. Section 5.3.2 identi-
fies and describes recent relevant accidents. Section 5.3.3 describes the contextual conditions 
that have applied in these accidents and introduces the type of phenomena that will be exam-
ined in detail later in the thesis. Section 5.3.4 outlines research from more general popula-
tions that provided direction to the research outlined in this thesis. 
 
5.3.2 THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF LOSS OF SPATIAL AWARENESS AS  
A FACTOR INFLUENCING SFP 
A Sukhoi Superjet flight crew at Jakarta (KNKT, 2012) lost awareness of their aircraft’s cur-
rent heading and the heading they needed to fly to navigate safely to their intended destina-
tion. An Airbus flight crew at Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) lost control of their aircraft during 
confusion relating to both their heading and position. A Boeing 757 flight crew at Cali 
crashed into terrain after deviating from their planned route after their electronic map became 
confusing. These are just three examples of accidents involving fully serviceable aircraft 
flown by experienced flight crews with access to a computer generated ND with capability to 
display an egocentrically oriented representation of their spatial environment. Each of these 
accidents meets at least one of the criteria to be considered an instance of SFP. 
 
5.3.3 SPATIAL AWARENESS, COGNITIVE LOAD AND THE PILOT 
The magnitude of the errors involved in each of the instances above suggests that the FCMs 
had little or no idea where they were headed. In each of the accidents cited above, the flight 
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crew were deviating from their planned route. This study highlights the cognitive differences 
between navigating along a pre-planned route and navigating off the planned route. An im-
portant aim of this research concerned how airline pilots’ cognitive load is affected during 
reorientation tasks. If the process of mentally orienting can be shown to affect cognitive load, 
then what is the effect on decision making and flight crew performance?  
 
5.3.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH METHODS AND THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
The most relevant existing research comes within the category of wayfinding (See Darken & 
Petersen, 2001 for a review). None of this research directly relates to aviation operations but 
clear parallels were apparent. Individual differences in spatial ability have been examined 
using pointing experiments (Gramann et al., 2006). Memory for spatial layouts has also been 
examined by asking participants to rehearse a route and subsequently draw a line to a known 
position they are unable to see (Witmer, et al., 1995).  Pointing experiments by Frankenstein 
et al. (2012) indicate that even familiar spatial environments were more readily comprehend-
ed when a reference frame based upon north was adopted. Response time (RT) was used by 
Loftus (1978) as an indicator of the amount of effort required during comprehension of vary-
ing compass representations. There is also considerable research of the built environment that 
differentiates between environments that are readily understood and those with the potential 
to confuse. Research by Raubal & Egenhofer, (1998) used participant interviews during the 
development of a computational model of complexity in the built environment. Airports at-
tract considerable scrutiny in terms of being confusing to passengers. The structural features 
of an airport were found by Seidel (1982) to have a strong influence upon people’s wayfind-
ing behaviour, as was previous experience with similar layouts. The frequency of any previ-
ous visits was also found to be a considerable help in wayfinding. No comparable research 
could be found into how pilots navigate around an airport’s taxiways and runways, particular-
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ly if they have to perform large mental rotations. As with most navigation tasks previous ex-
perience increases familiarity and facilitates the task. Research by Shepard & Metzler (1971) 
has found that RT is an effective measure of how readily a particular configuration is recog-
nised and this is the measure used in the current research. The experimental component of the 
current research was exclusively concerned with how RT varied during two tasks indicative 
of spatial ability. On the basis of the experimental results and interviews with participants, the 
general spatial awareness literature was considered from the perspective of a pilot.  
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CHAPTER 6  
RESEARCH METHODS 
The three research strands outlined in this thesis employed a range of ethnomethods including 
a questionnaire, thematic analysis of texts, experimental simulation, ethnographic observa-
tions, interviews and statistical analysis. 
6.1 THE CONVERSATION RESEARCH 
The conversation section of the verbal strand used questionnaires and unstructured interviews 
with pilots to generate findings that were analysed from a critical discourse analysis perspec-
tive. The questionnaire was based upon a taxonomy of impression management strategies that 
has been deployed in other institutional settings, modified for the aviation context. The data 
sources used during questionnaire development were four carefully selected CVR transcripts 
from the NTSB accident database that were considered by the researcher, on the basis of an 
extensive literature review, to be representative of the type of conversations heard in advance 
of an accident. The CVR transcript from a seminal accident at Buffalo was instrumental in 
determining the orientation of the conversation research towards impression management.  
6.1.1 PARTICIPANTS 
In addition to the airline pilots involved in the piloting of this study (n=13), thirty seven cur-
rent airline pilots were recruited to complete an online survey relating to flight deck conver-
sation. In order to obtain a representative sample of airline crews it was decided to avoid re-
cruitment by social media, which would have been easier than the method used and would 
have probably resulted in a higher number of participants. By personally approaching suitable 
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individuals on an opportunity basis it was possible to achieve a very high response rate and a 
very diverse demographic. Although this was a labour intensive and time consuming process 
it ensured that the participant pool was representative of rank, culture and gender. There were 
pilots from low cost, charter, freight and scheduled operators. Instructors, examiners, as well 
as line pilots contributed. There were pilots in their first year of airline operations and others 
with decades of experience. Participants were of various nationalities including German, Brit-
ish, Canadian, Australian and American. This cultural diversity was considered essential giv-
en the dominance of data from NTSB database CVR transcripts originating in the USA in the 
development of many of the conversation types under consideration in this research. The re-
cruitment of suitable participants by personal approach took several months to complete. No 
payment was offered for participating.  Collection of personal data on participants was kept 
to a minimum consistent with the objectives of the research. 
6.1.2 MATERIALS 
A questionnaire (See Appendix B) detailing twenty eight conversation types and seven ex-
planation categories was developed for this research. Microsoft Excel and SPSS were used 
for analysis of quantitative data. 
6.1.3 PROCEDURE 
 The participants completed the survey online after a briefing conducted either face to face 
with the researcher or via the instructions on the website. The instructions and description of 
the survey provided to participants is shown at Appendix B. The instructions included an in-
ternet address where any questions or difficulties could be discussed with the researcher; 
none of the participants found it necessary to use this facility. The participants were advised 
that they could discontinue the survey at any time they chose but there was no indication that 
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anyone did so. The survey instructions encouraged participants to offer alternative explana-
tions if they thought it appropriate. The quantitative data were analysed and ranked in fre-
quency order. 
6.2 THE UNCLEAR COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 
 6.2.1 PROCEDURE  
The unclear communication research also made extensive use of the NTSB accident database, 
in this case to identify recurrent instances of failed communication. There were also im-
portant instances from the UK AAIB reports and from the TAIC in New Zealand as well as 
others. A corpus of nineteen aircraft accident report CVR transcripts was analysed for the 
presence of unclear communication exhibiting the characteristics associated with unclear 
communication in the linguistics literature. The nineteen transcripts were chosen from the 
larger corpus used for other sections of this research on the basis of their suitability for this 
study of unclear communications. Details of the transcripts used for this section appear in up-
per case in Appendix A. The requirements for inclusion were that the transcript should be 
from a reputable source such as an investigating authority and that there was no evidence of 
relevant sections being omitted. Electronic concordancing proved insufficiently sensitive to 
the fine detail of aviation related discourse to be useful so a manual concordancing was un-
dertaken by the researcher.  Figure 6.1 is a segment of a CVR transcript highlighting multiple 
instances of the phrases “autopilot” and references to the heading. By colour coding different 
phrases it was possible to identify recurrent verbal themes that preceded an accident. 
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Figure 6.1: A section of a CVR transcript after manual concordancing. 
As a lone researcher the potential for loss of objectivity was continuously monitored during 
the research by conducting unstructured interviews with current pilots. Database searches 
were not an effective means of identifying relevant accidents because unclear communication 
is rarely examined in detail in accident reports; for this reason a detailed examination of any 
potentially relevant accident reports was undertaken. This was facilitated by the researcher’s 
detailed knowledge of the accident literature spanning several decades. Although this corpus 
is unlikely to include all the instances of unclear communication in aviation accidents, each 
of the instances outlined in the research represented a recurrent example from the literature 
and the explanations proposed were based upon peer-reviewed research. From the textual 
analysis conducted for this study a preliminary taxonomy of unclear communications was 
developed for each of three dominant categories of SFP-related occurrences. It is important to 
emphasise that this was a preliminary treatment of a complex subject that ideally would in-
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volve professional conversation analysts, psychologists and a range of other experts to devel-
op its full potential. 
 
6.3 THE SPATIAL AWARENESS RESEARCH 
The spatial awareness research utilised the experimental method to examine the link between 
spatial tasks and cognitive load in order to understand the sudden onset of SFP in some doc-
umented safety occurrences. 
6.3.1 EXPERIMENTAL METHOD (EXPERIMENT ONE) 
 6.3.2 PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty current airline pilots all employed flying a variety of ND equipped aircraft were re-
cruited on an opportunity basis. All the participants had in excess of 5000 hours of airline ex-
perience so could be considered uniformly experienced. No payment was involved. 
6.3.3 APPARATUS 
A Lenovo laptop computer loaded with SuperLab 5 © software was utilised to provide ran-
domly presented stimuli and record RT with millisecond accuracy. Adobe Photoshop ™ 
software was utilised to prepare the stimuli. Modified approach charts of a type familiar to 
the participants were used. 
6.3.4 STIMULI 
Stimuli consisting of thirty six separate runway depictions on a realistic approach chart (See 
Figure 6.2) were loaded onto a Lenovo laptop computer. All the participants were familiar 
with the layout and format of the charts used. Excess detail was removed from each chart to 
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avoid distraction from the orientation task. In particular, all written reference to runway ori-
entation was removed from each chart. The rotation tool in Adobe Photoshop enabled the ac-
curate rotation of the runway depictions in ten degree stages resulting in thirty six separate 
charts, each with a different orientation. The experiment was compiled using Superlab 5© 
software. The depictions were randomised and the software was configured to capture re-
sponse time in milliseconds. 
 
Figure 6.2: The laptop computer used in experiment one with the runway direction stimulus 
shown 
6.3.5 DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
Each participant completed a single block consisting of thirty six trials. The complete process 
took less than ten minutes. Participants were briefed verbally before the experiment and this 
was followed by a screenshot on the laptop reiterating the verbal instructions, this was fol-
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lowed by a practice session consisting of one trial. The specific task was to type the direction 
in two digit format of thirty six randomly presented runways into a laptop keyboard as quick-
ly as possible after presentation. RT was measured from presentation to the first key press. 
On the second key press the next runway chart appeared. Even if an incorrect direction was 
typed the next runway appeared. SuperLab stored the RTs and identified incorrect responses 
although accuracy was not a variable under scrutiny. The independent variable was runway 
direction and the dependent variable was response time. All participants were debriefed and 
an informal interview was conducted during which they discussed their strategy for the task 
they had just completed. The data were transferred to SPSS 22 and Microsoft Excel for anal-
ysis. 
6.4 EXPERIMENTAL METHOD (EXPERIMENT TWO) 
6.4.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Twenty current airline pilots all currently flying moving map equipped aircraft were recruited 
on an opportunity basis. All the pilots had in excess of 5000 hours of airline experience, so 
could be considered uniformly experienced. No payment was involved. 
6.4.2 APPARATUS 
This experiment also utilised approach charts modified and presented to participants using the 
same protocol as experiment one. The same equipment and software were employed except 
that for methodological reasons a remote keypad was used rather than the laptop keyboard. 
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6.4.3 STIMULI 
Stimuli consisting of sixteen separate runway depictions on a realistic approach chart (See 
Figure 6.3) were loaded onto a laptop computer and presented in north up portrait orientation. 
The charts were of a format that the participants were very familiar with. The following mod-
ifications were performed using Adobe Photoshop software. The rotation tool in Adobe Pho-
toshop enabled the accurate rotation of the runway depictions in 45º stages. For each of these 
eight orientations, two separate charts were prepared, resulting in sixteen charts. A realistic 
depiction of terrain either left or right of the approach centreline as viewed from final ap-
proach was added to each chart such that for each orientation there were two charts, one de-
picting terrain on the left and one depicting it on the right. Excess detail was removed from 
each chart to avoid distraction from the spatial judgment task. The experiment was compiled 
using Superlab 5 software. The depictions were randomised and the software was configured 
to capture response time with millisecond accuracy. 
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Figure 6.3: The laptop computer and remote keypad used in experiment two showing the 
runway and terrain depiction stimuli. 
6.4.4 DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
Each participant completed a single block consisting of sixteen trials. The complete process 
took less than ten minutes. Participants were briefed verbally before the experiment and this 
was followed by a screenshot on the laptop reiterating the verbal instructions, this was fol-
lowed by a practice session consisting of one trial. The experimental task was to judge 
whether the terrain depicted on the chart was located to the left or right of the runway centre-
line from the perspective of a pilot aligned with the runway. Participants were required to re-
spond as quickly as possible by pressing either a left or right key on a remote keypad. The 
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left and right keys were arranged in the vertical plain to avoid any Stroop effect between the 
presented stimuli and the keyboard orientation. Response time was measured from stimulus 
presentation to the key press. After a short delay the next runway chart appeared even if the 
incorrect key was pressed. SuperLab stored the response times and identified incorrect re-
sponses. The independent variable was runway direction and the dependent variable was re-
sponse time. All participants were debriefed and a facilitative interview was conducted dur-
ing which they discussed their strategy for the task they had just completed. 
6.5 THE CONTEXTUAL CUEING RESEARCH 
6.5.1 EXPERIMENT THREE: THE ALERT/INDICATION HYPOTHESIS EXPERIMENT 
EXPERIMENTAL METHOD  
6.5.2 PARTICIPANTS 
The participants were forty current airline pilots from several airlines. Twenty participated in 
each condition. The participants were informed that their performance during the simulated 
session would be assessed and the results analysed. No personal information regarding indi-
vidual pilots was collected. It was a condition of participation that minimal personal data re-
garding individual pilots would be collected. 
6.5.3 APPARATUS 
Four full flight simulators were used for the experiment. A repeatable scenario fully repre-
sentative of a real flight was achievable. The visual system enabled instrument conditions to 
be simulated. The scenario was run in real time and took approximately five minutes to com-
plete. 
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6.5.4 PROCEDURE 
The experiment utilised a between-participants design with twenty pilots in each experi-
mental condition (n=40). This approach was adopted in order to control for practice effects. 
In the control condition each participant experienced a corrective TCAS RA requiring a 
climb or descent, whilst in the experimental condition the flight crew experienced a preven-
tive TCAS RA in level flight which required no change to the aircraft’s flightpath. A realistic 
and repeatable scenario was simulated for the experiment. Figure 6.4 shows an incorrectly 
flown TCAS preventive RA as indicated on the aircraft primary flight display. It can be seen 
from the vertical speed indicator on the right hand side of the instrument that a descent has 
been initiated, whilst the alert required the aircraft to remain at 7000 feet. The data collected 
related to the accuracy of the TCAS manoeuvre in each experimental condition. These data 
were transferred to an excel spreadsheet and analysed in SPSS. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: An incorrectly flown TCAS preventive RA 
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6.6.1 EXPERIMENT FOUR: 
 THE SYSTEM CONFIGURATION CONTEXT HYPOTHESIS EXPERIMENT 
 6.6.2 EXPERIMENTAL METHOD  
The participants were twenty four current airline flight crews from several airlines. Each par-
ticipant was informed that their performance during the simulated session would be assessed 
and the results analysed. No personal information regarding individual pilots was collected. 
6.6.3 APPARATUS 
Four full flight simulators were used for the experiment. A realistic visual scene was used. 
The visibility was good and the FCMs were oriented before the experiment started. The simu-
lators exactly replicated the system status conditions that would be experienced on an aircraft. 
6.6.4 PROCEDURE 
The experimental hypothesis was that in contextual conditions that include an unusual system 
configuration there would be a significant increase in instances of misattribution of unrelated 
alerts and warnings to the influence of the unusual system configuration when compared to a 
normal system configuration. To test the experimental hypothesis a comparison was made of 
the accuracy of attributions made by flight crews who were aware of an unusual system con-
figuration with those whose aircraft system configuration was normal before the alert. Some 
of the examples outlined in this thesis have included very serious misattribution errors such 
as omitting to extend the landing gear because there was a problem with the flaps but such 
scenarios are difficult to reproduce in a simulator. Given that the objective of experiment four 
was to examine the role of contexts involving unusual systems configurations in the 
misattribution of cause and consequential errors it was neither necessary nor desirable to use 
an overly complicated scenario. There are certain system configurations that, whilst not used 
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every day, still qualify as a normal procedure.  These less usual system configurations are 
usually accompanied by an indication to alert the flight crew to the altered system configura-
tion. One such unusual configuration involves taxiing to and from the runway with one en-
gine shut down in order to save fuel. Although this is both safe and approved by the regulator 
it is less than usual insofar as the system configuration generates alert/s that would otherwise 
not be present. Experiment four simulated this type of system configuration.  In the control 
condition the participants responded to a routine alert that there was no reason to expect, 
whilst in the experimental condition the aircraft was operating in a system configuration re-
sulting in related alert/s that the flight crew would be expecting to occur. In the control condi-
tion there was an expectation in this experiment that the checklist would be completed. The 
one-tailed hypothesis was that in the experimental context condition the flight crew would 
perform either no analysis of the alerts or less complete analysis than in the control condition 
where no alerts were expected. The criterion for deciding whether analysis had taken place 
was whether the flight crew completed the corresponding checklist or chose to omit it be-
cause they attributed the alert to the unusual system configuration. The experiment generated 
quantitative data that were analysed in SPSS.  
6.7 THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT RESEARCH 
6.7.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research chose the phenomenon of the “landing gear retracted approach” to examine the 
role of situational context in SFP occurrences. The research was literature review based, in-
volving the gathering of specific data from a wide range of sources. The occurrence literature 
was searched using multiple search terms to identify instances of airliners that had been 
flown to a late stage of the final approach with the landing gear retracted in error. Such an 
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occurrence meets the necessary criteria to be categorised as an instance of SFP. On the basis 
of the narrative reports, several recurrent features of the situational context that prevailed in 
advance and at the time of the occurrence were examined. Statistical analysis was performed 
and a preliminary taxonomy of the resultant situational features was developed. 
6.7.2 PROCEDURE 
An extensive review of the accident/incident literature revealed instances of landing gear re-
tracted landings involving public transport aircraft in countries including the UK, USA, Can-
ada, Australia, Russia, Spain and others, so this is a worldwide phenomenon. It emerged that 
in many of these instances, features of the situational context were similar. For this research, 
situational context was defined as the situational conditions prevailing at the time of the oc-
currence; this could include geographical position, air traffic environment, in fact almost any 
environmental condition not encompassed by the previous hypotheses. The diverse nature of 
the reporting protocols, the age of some of the reports and the different types of aircraft in-
volved meant that any dataset based upon worldwide data would be very difficult to analyse, 
although this was attempted. For this reason the NASA ASRS database was used as the pri-
mary source for the gathering of qualitative data. The rationale for this decision was that 
whereas the NASA ASRS yielded in excess of one hundred potential occurrences at a first 
pass, other sources only resulted in isolated instances. Nonetheless, in addition to the twenty 
three instances from ASRS, two quite recent significant reports from the Australian ATSB 
(ATSB, 2009b and ATSB, 2010a) were included in the dataset; these isolated instances were 
located by a detailed examination of all relevant instances in most of the accident databases 
worldwide. This research is confident that the majority of reported occurrences have been 
located. Although the dominance of the ASRS database may appear to present a USA centric 
bias, background, research indicated that the phenomenon being examined followed a similar 
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pattern whether it occurred in the USA, the UK, Australia, Russia, Spain or anywhere else. 
Furthermore, the ASRS data used included two instances that occurred in the UK, one from 
Mexico and one from Japan. Several potential instances were excluded from the dataset due 
to lack of relevant information. There were also a few instances where the flight crew report-
ed intentionally flying at a low height with the landing gear retracted; these were also exclud-
ed. Because instances where the aircraft actually lands with the landing gear retracted are 
very rare, this study examined the data relating to instances of flight crews who only avoided 
such an event because the aircraft’s warning system alerted them. To enable more detailed 
analysis it was also decided to consider only two of the most produced families of airliners, 
the Boeing and Airbus families, although there was clear evidence from the incidents cited 
earlier in this thesis that this phenomenon afflicted other types as well. Restricting the data in 
this way also assisted the researcher in identifying the technical aspects involved. Deciding 
on the search terms required the researcher’s insight into the language and phrases a pilot 
would use when reporting such an occurrence; a detailed understanding of the warnings gen-
erated by each type of aircraft in this context was also necessary to achieve this. For instance 
the term “too low gear” is a generic term whereas “config gear” is specific to certain Boeing 
aircraft. Table 6.1 is an Excel spreadsheet showing the final results of the ASRS search for 
reports for use in the situational context research. 
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ASRS REPORT DATE LOCATION TYPE 
500601 200102 Saint Louis B757 
521275 200108 Mexico City A320 
530057 200111 Dallas B767 
530272 200111 Dallas B757 
536528 200201 Providence A320 
598823 200311 Spokane A320 
612606 200404 Narita B777 
646532 200502 La Guardia A319 
677896 200511 Gatwick B767 
709648 200609 Atlanta B757  
741514 200706 Washington A320 
787444 200805 San Francisco A319 
793579 200807 Unspecified A320 
847845 200908 La Guardia A320 
897386 201007 Unspecified B767 
899943 201007 Los Angeles A319 
936266 201103 Heathrow B777 
1013802 201206 Calgary A319 
1145555 201401 Philadelphia A319 
1268264 201506 San Francisco A319 
1296951 201509 Unspecified A319 
1301258 201510 Philadelphia A320 
1416289 201701 Unspecified B737 
 
Table 6.1 The ASRS reports used in the situational context research 
Figure 6.5 is a screenshot of one of the ASRS database searches where terms such as “too 
low gear” or “config gear” were entered. This process was repeated several times with multi-
ple search criteria before all the relevant instances were identified. Because the narratives 
were the individual comments of the pilots involved it was necessary to read each report 
thoroughly to check for relevance. Although this process could not guarantee to locate every 
instance, given that over one hundred reports were examined, it is likely that the data set de-
rived for this research is representative of the phenomenon. 
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Figure 6.5: An ASRS database search illustrating some of the search items used in the situa-
tional context research 
Because it was not possible to obtain data from final approaches that had proceeded without 
incident it was not appropriate to conduct experiments to test this hypothesis because a con-
trol condition could not be examined. An alternative strategy was to identify situational con-
ditions that have prevailed in advance of a landing gear retracted approach and examine the 
reasons why the associated contextual features failed to alert the flight crew to their omission. 
This analysis would be incomplete if the underlying reasons that the flight crew reached a 
late stage in the approach with the landing gear retracted were not examined. Statistical test-
ing was conducted to understand the relationship between these occurrences and the context 
prevailing in advance of the occurrence.  
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6.8 ETHICAL CLEARANCE STATEMENT 
The research outlined in this thesis was conducted in accordance with the guidelines con-
tained in the Loughborough University ethics approval statement. 
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PART III:  THE RESEARCH AND RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND 
DISCUSSION 
OVERVIEW 
Chapters seven, eight and nine outline the research and experiments for the three research 
strands. Chapter seven explains how the conversation research became oriented towards insti-
tutional talk, in particular, impression management. The rationale for the research is ex-
plained with reference to the occurrence literature. The chapter proceeds to outline how the 
conversation-related data were obtained and how they were interpreted.  Unlike the conversa-
tion research, unclear communication research was less amenable to experimental research so 
the linguistics literature was a primary source for explanations in this section. Chapter eight 
begins with a detailed explanation of how a pilot flying an aircraft equipped with state of the 
art map displays might still lose spatial awareness. Although this explanation is lengthy, it is 
essential to an understanding of the rationale for the research. Interwoven into this explana-
tion is research that indicates that some of the spatial tasks undertaken by flight crews have 
complex neurobiological underpinnings that also need to be understood. Two experiments 
measured cognitive load and the results are discussed. Chapter nine examines the role of con-
text in SFP in response to several safety occurrences that have shared contextual features. 
The premise of the contextual cueing study and its experiments was that the prevailing con-
textual conditions may have facilitated the flight crew’s SFP. Three original hypotheses are 
outlined and tested and the results are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 7  
THE VERBAL STRAND RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTS 
This chapter outlines the non-pertinent conversation (NPC) and unclear communication re-
search. 
7.1 EXPLAINING FLIGHT DECK CONVERSATION: A SURVEY AND REPORT 
 
7.1.1 RESEARCH RATIONALE 
Non-pertinent conversation (NPC) on the flight deck has been cited as a contributory factor in 
some of the most serious aviation accidents. However, as far as is known, the theoretical lit-
erature relating to conversation has never previously been employed to help understand why 
pilots sometimes converse at inappropriate times. The importance of this aspect of aviation 
related human factors is highlighted by the admission by the NTSB that the reasons why pi-
lots sometimes behave in a too casual manner are unclear from their investigations (NTSB, 
2010a. p. 110). The research objective was to identify the types of conversation that have 
been present in advance of an instance of SFP and to propose explanations for their use. By 
drawing upon multiple resources including those relating to impression management, person-
ality and organisational behaviour, this study examined what might underlie some of the con-
versations that occur on routine flights. This focus upon routine non-accident flights was jus-
tified on the basis of evidence that routine flight deck conversations that are permitted by the 
regulations sometimes encroach into phases of flight where they are prohibited. It was em-
phasised in the Buffalo report (NTSB, 2010a) that today “for sterile cockpit violations to be 
cited in an accident’s probable cause crews do not have to be engaged in a conversation at the 
time the accident sequence commences, the conversation just has to be present at some point 
during the flight”. The current ethnographic study involved surveying current airline pilots 
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regarding their opinions on the underlying purpose of a range of conversation types that they 
have experienced on the flight deck. These conversation types were derived from a thematic 
analysis (TA) of several carefully chosen CVR transcripts of airline crews conversing in ad-
vance of an accident. For the purposes of this study TA can be considered as a qualitative an-
alytic method for: ‘identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data, which 
minimally organises, describes and interprets the dataset in respect of various aspects of the 
research topic (Braun & Clarke, 2006 p. 79). Pre-testing of the questionnaire developed for 
this study confirmed that routine flight deck conversations are similar to those heard in ad-
vance of the accidents considered in this study; furthermore such conversations share much in 
common with conversations in other institutional settings. Twenty eight recurrent conversa-
tion types were categorised using seven possible explanation categories. Because this re-
search was unable to locate any directly relevant literature relating to the airline context, it 
integrated existing insights from research related to impression management, organisational 
citizenship behaviour (OCB) and personality with expertise from individuals who have actu-
ally heard such conversations, in a preliminary attempt to understand why these recurrent 
conversation types occur. If it could be shown that patterns exist in the way flight deck con-
versations are interpreted it would support the notion that the NPC is a researchable phenom-
enon. Furthermore, given that the questionnaire conversation types and the motives for their 
use were based upon existing literature it should be possible to propose underlying reasons 
for their occurrence.  
 
7.1.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE FLIGHT DECK CONVERSATION STUDY 
This study emerged out of two fatal accidents that prompted the NTSB to include the avoid-
ance of distraction on their “Most Wanted List” of safety improvements in 2016 (NTSB, 
2016).The narrative surrounding these accidents indicated that the reasons why pilots inad-
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vertently distract themselves by conducting non-pertinent conversations were unclear. The 
necessary raw data are usually available in the wake of an accident because flight deck re-
cordings are made. Also the study of conversation is highly developed, albeit not in the avia-
tion context. These two factors indicated that it should be possible to propose some explana-
tions that might assist in mitigating the effects of this current and persistent threat to aviation 
safety. In recent years the topic of pilot professionalism has become the focus of critical at-
tention from both the industry and the travelling public alike. At the forefront of this focus 
have been instances where pilots have broken the rules relating to non-pertinent conversa-
tions (NPCs) at critical times. In the USA and most other countries, the sterile cockpit rule 
prohibits pilots from conducting any conversations not related to the operation of the aircraft 
at any time whilst it is moving on the ground and whilst airborne below ten thousand feet. 
The four accidents chosen as the basis of this study all involved pilots who infringed this rule, 
a factor that was considered by the investigators to have contributed to the accident. In two of 
the instances the aircraft were on the ground and the conversation occurred once the pilots 
erroneously believed they had completed all the necessary actions to operate safely. In one 
case the flaps had been incorrectly extended, and in the other the pilots failed to navigate ac-
curately to the correct runway.  The two other instances involved aircraft in flight and one 
report noted that the crew had “squandered time and attention, which were limited resources 
that should have been used for attending to operational tasks” (NTSB, 2010a, p. 93) a criti-
cism that could be applied to each of the accidents under consideration in this section of the 
thesis. In addition to investigating the distractions caused by conversation, investigators fre-
quently draw conclusions relating to the professionalism of the flight crew based on the con-
tent and tone of what was heard. In the transcript of the Lexington accident flight crew the 
captain is heard to use the phrase “at your leisure” several times during flight preparation, and 
in the transcript of a flight crew at St Louis the captain commented that he was “ambivalent” 
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due to his impending retirement (NTSB, 2009 p. 72). In each of these cases the investigation 
attached negative connotations to what was said but this study adopts the perspective that 
whilst only the speaker knows absolutely what was intended to be conveyed, the next best 
insight is likely to come from individuals who have experienced similar conversations in the 
same environment. Evidence from the transcripts indicated that running a relaxed flight deck 
is a highly valued group norm,
vii
 in which case the phrase “at your leisure” takes on a far 
more positive connotation. Nonetheless, no operations manual would encourage the use of 
such terminology so there is some evidence that group norms sometimes conflict with organi-
sational norms. In this case an examination of the interactions between institutional features 
of the airline context and aspects of personality that have been noted in airline pilots is essen-
tial. Research indicates that airline pilots tend to prefer to think of themselves as autonomous 
actors in their professional life (See Bennett 2010) but the reality is that they are quite re-
stricted in their actions. Bennett referred to this as the “paradox of control”. Gergen & Taylor 
(1969) suggest that presenting oneself in ways that are inconsistent with expected values can 
be an effective strategy for the maintenance of an individual’s sense of autonomy. Viewed 
from this perspective, presenting oneself as “ambivalent” as the captain at St Louis did, is 
less likely to be an “offhanded comment” as judged in the report (NTSB, 2009, p. 72), than a 
strategically motivated one with foundations in both group personality and organisational 
context. The importance of this proposal is that the former attribution defies either explana-
tion or solution whilst the latter can at least be explained (See Hill and Buss, 2008, p. 64) and 
defences devised.  This study’s aim of identifying the underlying reasons behind some of the 
most recurrent flight deck conversation topics has potential to address some of the questions 
posed in the report into the Lexington accident; firstly, whether the “too casual behaviour” 
exhibited by this flight crew is normal and is likely to be exhibited by other flight crews, and 
secondly, why the pilots behaved as they did (NTSB, 2010a, pp. 110-113).  Obtaining an-
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swers to these types of questions would be facilitated by this study’s aim of providing a re-
pository for all that is known about phenomena such as the NPC. 
 
7.1.3 COCKPIT VOICE RECORDING 
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) is a device that records flight deck noises from a range of 
sources including the pilots’ transmissions on the radio, talk between the pilots and general 
sounds within the cockpit. There are very few aspects of cockpit operations which are not 
captured by the CVR. For instance, flap and landing gear selection both make recognisable 
sounds.  All CVRs record on a loop which continually erases the recording after a specified 
time. The rationale behind erasing the tapes is controversial to some but it is an accepted pro-
tocol that pilots’ conversations on routine flights should not be scrutinised. When an accident 
occurs, the CVR stops and the tape can be retrieved. In cases where there is a serious incident 
but no accident, the CVR may not automatically stop; in these cases the pilot must deactivate 
the CVR manually by tripping a circuit breaker. Because assessment of the severity of an in-
cident can be subjective it is not uncommon for crews to omit to do this, causing the incident 
recoding to be overwritten and the data lost. The previously cited wrong runway incident at 
Lulea was an example of a very serious incident which was not reported until the CVR had 
been overwritten. Because CVR tapes are only accessible under the conditions just outlined 
they provide limited data relating to behaviour on normal flights except to the extent that an 
accident flight is normal until the accident. 
 
7.1.4 RATIONALE BEHIND THE CHOICE OF TRANSCRIPTS 
The NTSB accident database was the source for most of the accident data for this research for 
a number of reasons. Although the standard of aviation accident investigation worldwide is 
very high, there are features of the NTSB’s approach that outweigh the disadvantages of an 
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exclusively American perspective. NTSB reports are uncommon insofar as they assign each 
accident a “probable cause” whereas many investigating agencies specifically avoid doing 
this. Also the NTSB usually provides complete cockpit recordings, which is rarely the case 
elsewhere. For this research, all public transport accidents in which damage, injury or death 
had occurred for the ten year period preceding the start of 2013 were examined.  These acci-
dent reports were narrowed down to those in which the word “conversation” was present in 
the description of the event.  All of these reports were examined and a subjective assessment 
of whether the conversation was an important factor was made. This step was essential to 
capture accidents in which the investigation had mentioned a conversation but had not in-
cluded it as a contributory factor or a conversation had occurred but it played no part in the 
accident. Only four accident reports included CVR transcripts that were complete enough and 
contained enough detail to be useful for this research. Each of the related accident investiga-
tions considered that the presence of conversation had been a factor in the accident. These 
four transcripts were analysed and themes were identified. The themes from the four tran-
scripts provided the ideas necessary to develop the taxonomy of flight deck conversation ap-
plied to a range of transcripts examined in this research. Details of the four transcripts used 
are shown in Table 7.1 below. 
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Table 7.1: The four accident reports examined during theme development  
 
The Buffalo Accident (NTSB, 2010a) 
Colgan Air operating as Continental Connection 3407:      
Bombardier Dash 8 Q400, N200WQ Clarence Center, New 
York. February 12
th
 2009. 
 
 
 
Loss of control on final   
approach 
The Lexington Accident (NTSB, 2007a) 
Comair 5191: Bombardier CL 600, N431CA: Lexington.     
August 27
th
 2006. 
 
Wrong runway takeoff    
resulting in collision with 
terrain 
 
The Kirksville Accident (NTSB, 2006a) 
Corporate Airlines 5966: BAE Jetstream, N875JX: Kirksville, 
Missouri. October 19
th
 2004. 
 
 
Collision with terrain on 
final approach 
The Charleston Accident (NTSB, 2010c) 
PSA 2496: Bombardier CL600, Charleston, West Virginia. 
January 19
th
 2010. 
 
Incorrect takeoff            
configuration resulting in 
runway overrun 
 
 
 
7.1.5 RESEARCH INVOLVING FLIGHT CREWS AT WORK 
Clearly all the FCMs involved in the occurrences examined in this study were at work at the 
time so it is important to examine the strengths and limitations of research based upon such 
evidence. Firstly, it should be noted that almost all investigating agencies caution against 
drawing wider conclusions on the basis of such data. For this reason the investigation reports 
used extensively in this study have been used only to the extent necessary to provide ideas 
that have been elaborated upon by a range of experimental methods. Many of the extracts of 
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conversation have been modified slightly to make them more understandable, for instance if 
colloquial or unacceptable (#) language is used. Typical alterations were the replacement of 
“sorta” with “sort of” or insertion of punctuation. 
 
Opinion is divided upon the value of qualitative data obtained from the flight deck. Some 
consider the flight deck environment so complex that something important might be missed 
or an observer may simply be unaware that a particular behaviour is important (Brannick, 
Roach and Salas, 1993: 306, cited in Bennett, 2010), whilst others consider that meaningful 
data relating to work can only be obtained in the real work setting.  These conflicting argu-
ments were at the forefront of planning this research although since these arguments were 
first made, the scope for observing on the flight deck has diminished greatly. In addition to 
the impossibility of conducting observations on the flight deck due to security restrictions 
there are other methodological issues that arise when an observer is present on the flight 
deck. It was noted in the Buffalo accident report that professional observers conducting in-
flight safety audits have commented that the behaviour they see on such flights may not rep-
resent what occurs on unobserved flights (NTSB, 2010a: p. 101). Given that even these high-
ly trained observers express doubt regarding the reliability of flight deck observations, the 
data obtained by such studies would appear to be of limited use. One alternative to observing 
would be to ask a pilot’s opinion upon a particular phenomenon, but reliability issues occur 
here as well. Harvey and MacDonald (1993: p. 77) discuss how respondents are likely to con-
taminate the answers they give to researchers by responding in ways that they believe the re-
searcher wants to hear. In several of the reports examined for this research, peers were called 
upon to voice an opinion about a colleague who had been involved in an accident; comments 
were without exception positive, or if a criticism was offered it was always mitigated. This 
observed inclination to avoid criticising a colleague may be founded in the “reciprocity 
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norm”, or the tendency to avoid saying something negative about someone else lest someone 
say similar things about you. Evidence from this research indicated that pilots appeared to be 
constrained by the need to avoid conflict and avoid saying the wrong thing to the wrong per-
son, or in mixed company (See NTSB, 2010a, p. 194). The dominant strand seemed to in-
volve the avoidance of topics that might in some way be detrimental to one’s personal inter-
ests. These initial observations suggested that the flight deck context would be a strong can-
didate for socially desirable responding.  This meant that it was intuitively unsound to ask 
pilots to comment upon their own behaviour, so the novel approach adopted for this study 
was for the researcher to provide pilots with an example of someone else’s behaviour and ask 
their opinion about that.  The four transcripts proved to be a rich source of examples of recur-
rent verbal behaviours but the researcher was conscious of the ethical difficulties of attrib-
uting subjective meanings retrospectively to recorded transcripts; for this reason the tran-
scripts used for this study only acted as a springboard to provide ideas relevant to the general 
area of interest. The issue of subjectivity was also important because those best qualified to 
understand the airline context, including the researcher conducting this study, are also those 
likely to have the most strongly formed opinions on a given type of behaviour. During the 
detailed literature review it was concluded that even a non-pilot with extensive aviation expe-
rience would encounter difficulty interpreting some of the jargon used by pilots, so there was 
no alternative to conducting most of this research with airline pilots despite the possibility 
that objectivity might suffer. To control for this, wherever possible, survey data and experi-
mental results were validated or challenged by data from unstructured interviews where par-
ticipants provided their views on the phenomena under examination. 
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7.1.6 ACCESS TO FLIGHT CREWS 
This has become a particular challenge in recent years due to increased security measures. 
When flight crews report for work they are often in restricted areas with no public access. 
Furthermore, they are usually time pressured and unlikely to be willing to devote the neces-
sary time to requests to complete a survey. Some airlines prohibit their flight crews from dis-
cussing details of their work environment and even where this is not the case, flight crews 
might be wary of unintentionally divulging some sensitive information about that environ-
ment. Some pilots might also be suspicious of research into their human limitations. One of 
the overriding obstacles to overcome was to convince potential participants that there was 
some value to the research that warranted their participation. For this research, flight crews 
were approached on an opportunity basis as they reported at a training facility where they 
were undergoing either recurrent checks or conversion training. This venue had the advantage 
that the security restrictions were more relaxed and the pilots were under considerably less 
time pressure but they were still in role, an important aspect in relation to their professional 
identity discussed later. 
 
7.1.7 RECURRENT FEATURES OF VERBAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE FLIGHT DECK 
EVIDENT IN THE TRANSCRIPTS 
Detailed thematic analysis of the four subject transcripts indicated that pilots were sociable 
and interested in learning about their colleague(s). First officers spoke about career advance-
ment, including leaving the airline, without inhibition; captains also spoke of changing air-
lines but with less conviction. Sociability and politeness were hallmarks of conversation 
within the flight deck but there were several examples of direct and indirect criticism of out-
siders, including managers, other airlines and pilots from other bases, different cultures and 
nationalities. There was a high level of agreement between pilots, and disagreements were 
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usually trivial and easily rectified. Three of the transcripts made reference to aspects of the 
speakers’ home life; in some cases in considerable detail. None of the transcripts included 
any active attempt to discourage a conversation during sterile cockpit periods although pilots 
usually stopped conversing when the cognitive demands of the operation required. 
 
7.1.8 INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL OF FLIGHT DECK 
CONVERSATION USE 
 
7.1.8.1 ITEM CONSTRUCTION 
As an initial step in the process of identifying the dominant characteristics of flight deck con-
versations, a selected extract from the Buffalo accident transcript (NTSB, 2010a, pp. 199-
202) was chosen. This seminal accident was chosen because in addition to the distracting ef-
fect of the conversation experts have drawn inferences relating to professionalism, skill lev-
els, and even the truthfulness of some of its content. The six minute transcript extract, which 
gave no hint that it occurred in an aviation context, was presented by a third party to three 
psychologically naïve participants with no particular knowledge of aviation. Their task was to 
read the transcript and answer three questions: 
 How do you visualise these two individuals? 
 Where do you think this conversation is taking place? 
 What do you think the conversation is about? 
Unstructured interviews with the three assessors indicated that they thought the conversation 
was more detailed than usually heard in a casual setting so was likely to have occurred in a 
work related setting. When asked how they visualised the two individuals involved in the 
conversation, they all thought, on the basis of some of the phrases used, one of the speakers 
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was younger than the other speaker. They also noticed that the apparently junior speaker 
agreed quite a lot and seemed to be going along with the conversation out of politeness. The 
conversation was about a successful career that ended in redundancy. They all commented 
upon the one sided nature of the conversation but noted that it seemed friendly. What 
emerged was a picture of hierarchically ordered conversation dominated by a superior, likely 
to have been enacted in an institutional setting. Although this brief fragment of conversation 
was towards the extreme end of what has been heard in transcripts in terms of detail and 
length, its similarities with other flight deck conversations suggests that intentionally or not, 
an impression is conveyed during such conversation. Official investigations into the four ac-
cidents that provided the themes for this research concluded that the verbal behaviour on each 
of the transcripts constituted unprofessional behaviour so it is clear that investigators feel 
qualified to make subjective inferences based upon common sense judgments of flight deck 
conversation. This also implies that investigators and others (such as managers and regula-
tors) have a clear notion of what constitutes professional discourse and what does not. None 
of the pilots who behaved unprofessionally in these accidents had a reputation for being un-
professional so it appears that they somehow misinterpreted how language conveys profes-
sionalism. The aim of this study was to determine whether NPCs were researchable and if so, 
to identify the underlying reasons these distracting conversations take place with a view to 
mitigating their effect. 
 
A reasonable starting point for such a study is found in some common ground in each of the 
four transcripts; that is the sociability evident between the FCMs. In line with many institu-
tional contexts, sociability is not a requirement for operating an airliner; in fact if all pilots 
complied rigidly with the sterile cockpit rule the flight deck would not be a very sociable 
place at all. So being sociable is likely to be to some extent strategically deployed. Later in 
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this thesis some of the motivations that might underpin the need to establish and maintain a 
positive self-image in the interests of psychological well-being are outlined. Central to this 
need is the notion of “face” as defined by Erwing Goffman in the 1960s and elaborated upon 
many times since. According to Goffman, “face” is concerned with the positive social value a 
person seeks to claim for oneself during an interaction, achieved by acting in ways that por-
tray them in a positive light. This view of “image” as predominantly related to how one feels 
about oneself (one’s self-concept), although very relevant to this study, has been overshad-
owed in recent years by an increased interest in how individuals seek to control how others 
think of them. What is being described here is impression management (IM), which although 
having its origins in the psychology literature (Schlenker, 1980; Riess et al., 1981; Schneider, 
1981) is now widely researched in institutional settings. Given that the study of IM has been 
applied to occupations as diverse as dental surgeons (Evans et al., 2005) and American presi-
dents (Tetlock, 1981) among others, it is reasonable to speculate that researching IM in flight 
crews might be useful in explaining flight deck conversations. Research involving accountan-
cy firms has used the concept of IM to explain discretionary narrative disclosure in reporting 
of information strategically selected by managers to display and present…information in a 
manner intended to distort readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements (Godfrey et al., 
2003, p. 96:). Although IM has not been specifically cited as a factor in an airline accident, as 
long ago as 1991 the investigation into an accident at Detroit (NTSB, 1991b) identified an 
instance of a first officer exaggerating his previous experience in such a way that his captain 
could have been overly impressed by his capabilities. The report concluded that this behav-
iour was both unethical and unprofessional (Ibid., p 53). This was not an isolated instance of 
the phenomenon; the account provided in conversation with his first officer by the captain 
involved in the accident at Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a), whilst not an untrue account of his pro-
fessional history, gave no hint to his addressee of the multiple difficulties he had encountered 
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on his way to, and whilst occupying the captain’s seat. These and other examples from the 
aviation literature prompted a detailed review of the IM literature (e.g. Jones and Pittman, 
1982; Tedeschi and Melburg, 1984; Becker and Martin, 1995) in search of similar instances 
of IM to those evident in the transcripts. It was concluded that Bolino and Turnley’s (1999) 
44 items identified as IM tactics used in organisations were sufficiently similar to some of the 
verbal behaviour evident in many of the transcripts used in this research to provide the initial 
themes that would be searched for in the four transcripts. The initial 44 items and their as-
signed categories are shown Table 7.2 below.  
 
Table 7.2: 
Impression management: adapted from Bolino & Turnley, 1999. 
 SELF-PROMOTION (SP) 
Make people aware of your accomplishments 
Try to make a positive event that you are responsible for appear better than it actually is 
Try to take responsibility for positive events, even when you are not solely responsible 
Try to make a negative event that you are responsible for appear less severe than it  actually  
is               
Display your diplomas and/or awards that you have received 
Let others know that you have a reputation for being competent in a particular area 
Make public your talents or qualifications 
Declare that you have other opportunities outside your current job 
Talk about important people that you know 
Try to distance yourself from negative events that you were a part of 
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INGRATIATION 
Praise people for their accomplishments 
Do personal favours for people 
Offer to do something for someone that you are not required to do 
Compliment people on their dress or appearance 
Agree with a person’s major ideas or beliefs 
Take an interest in a co-worker’s or supervisor’s personal life 
Imitate others’ behavior or manner 
Spend time listening to people’s personal problems even if you have little interest in them 
 EXEMPLIFICATION 
Arrive at work early in order to look dedicated 
Work late at the office so that others see you 
Try to act like a model employee 
Volunteer to help whenever there is the opportunity 
Pretend to be busy even if you might not be 
Make sure you are never seen wasting time. 
Arrange things on your desk so that it looks like work is being done 
Let others know how much overtime you work 
 
INTIMIDATION 
Yell at people 
Have “showdowns” with co-workers or supervisors 
Threaten a co worker 
Make people aware that you can control things that matter to them 
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Punish people when they do not behave as you would like 
Insult or put down your co workers 
Try to embarrass people in front of their peers or supervisors 
Try to appear unapproachable or distant 
 
SUPPLICATION 
Intentionally do poorer quality work than you are capable of 
Advertise your incompetence in a particular area or about a particular issue 
Pretend to not understand something that you do understand 
Play “dumb.” 
Ask for help or assistance that you really do not need 
Try to appear helpless or needy 
Ask a lot of questions 
Downplay your accomplishments 
Let others win arguments 
Try to agree with people even when you might disagree 
 
 
The 44 items in Table 7.2 represent the initial item pool of conversation types used in this 
study of flight deck conversation. In a replication of Bolino and Turnley’s method, the cur-
rent research developed two taxonomies, one of flight deck conversation types and the other 
of the potential motives underlying them. Data from existing researcher outlined by Jones and 
Pittman (1982) were modified in response to interviews with subject matter experts (SMEs) 
to more accurately represent the aviation context. Although many of the behaviours sugges-
tive of IM in the transcripts were oriented towards the needs of the speaker, during the the-
matic analysis of the transcripts it became clear that some of the conversations related to 
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work could also fulfil an altruistic function such as setting a good example to subordinates or 
simply offering them support or encouragement in their professional life. Bolino and Turn-
ley’s work facilitated the examination of this idea by illustrating the overlap between IM and 
a construct known as organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB). They note that OCB, in 
common with other citizenship behaviours is believed to have its foundations in both person-
ality and attitude. OCB is thought to be characterised by a disposition towards co-operation 
and helpfulness coupled with a tendency to reciprocate the actions of the organisation. Alt-
hough due to the overlap with IM, the taxonomy developed for this research proposes no mo-
tives for strategic flight deck conversations that are exclusively founded in OCB research, 
OCB did provide a framework to propose more altruistic explanations than would have been 
possible if only IM had been considered. For instance, the example of a captain who loaned a 
manual to a colleague in the Buffalo transcript (NTSB, 2010a, p 194) could readily be cate-
gorised as an instance of ingratiatory behaviour from an IM perspective, whereas Organ 
(1988) provides a framework that extends beyond the individual’s need to the needs of the 
wider organisation as illustrated below: 
ALTRUISM: This concerns helping a colleague in completing his or her task under unusual 
circumstances. 
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS: This refers to an employee performing his or her job in a manner 
above that which is expected. 
CIVIC VIRTUE: This involves actively supporting the administrative functions of the organ-
isation. 
Viewed from an OCB perspective an explanation for loaning a manual that focused solely 
upon the ingratiatory value to the loaner would be likely to provide an incomplete explana-
tion.  
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Given that the majority of conversations in the transcripts were characterised by friendliness 
and cooperation at least between the two collocutors, it was important to establish a basis for 
this observation in personality research. NASA research by Fitzgibbons et al. (2004) indicates 
that pilots tend to score in the middle ranks in terms of extraversion and agreeableness (two 
dimensions of the widely used general personality inventory, NEO PI-R). From these limited 
data it was possible to propose a behaviour type which, for the purposes of this research, has 
been named “normal friendliness” and is proposed to account for any verbal behaviour that 
could only be understood as motivated by friendliness, cooperation or both. Although the 
normal friendliness category may seem ill-defined, the seemingly random remarks that have 
preceded aviation occurrences are among the most difficult to explain, and therefore repre-
sent an essential component of this study. In addition, during preliminary unstructured inter-
views, pilots repeatedly cited friendliness as a reason for flight deck conversations and com-
mented that it would be out of the ordinary for a colleague to remain silent for extended peri-
ods.  In summary, the initial lists of conversation types and possible explanations contained 
items based upon existing IM, OCB and personality research with some inevitable overlap 
between the three. In order to modify these initial lists to accurately reflect the airline context 
a modification of Hinkin’s (1998) procedure for development of this type of measure was 
used. 
 
7.1.8.2 ITEM REDUCTION PROCESS AND PRETESTING 
STEP 1: ITEM GENERATION 
The starting point for producing an item pool of flight deck conversation types was Bolino 
and Turnley’s (1999) list of 44 conversation types indicative of IM.  Because of the overlap 
between IM and OCB it was unnecessary to add any new items for the latter because several 
items suggestive of OCB were already included. No items for “normal friendliness” were 
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added because this was an original construct with no detailed information on what types of 
verbal behaviour it would attract, merely a description. 
 
STEPS 2 AND 3: QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION AND ITEM REDUCTION 
Hinkin (1998) suggests that a questionnaire be administered at this stage of the research but 
for a number of reasons it was decided to conduct face to face unstructured interviews with 
assessors with relevant experience for this stage. The rationale for this was that several of the 
44 items in Table 7.2 could immediately be discarded because they were not expressed ver-
bally. Other items were clearly irrelevant to the aviation context, but an overriding require-
ment was to address the issue of availability of high quality participants by making the best 
use of those available. Those participants involved in item reduction would not be available 
for the final questionnaire because of their involvement in its construction, so it was neces-
sary to gain the maximum amount of information from the minimum number of participants 
at this pretesting stage. At the end of this preliminary stage there were 36 conversation types 
in the item pool. These 36 items were presented to a group of three airline instructors each 
with a human factors qualification, with the instruction to identify any of the behaviours they 
had never encountered on the flight deck. At this stage they were not concerned with the mo-
tives behind the conversation types, simply whether they were recognisable. At the end of 
this process there was agreement about 30 items. Stone (1978) has commented upon the ab-
sence of any generally accepted quantitative index of content validity of psychological 
measures, noting that judgment should be exercised when validating a measure. The first step 
in establishing content validity was to randomise the list of 30 conversation types and present 
the list to an opportunity sample of five current airline pilots with the instruction to identify 
any of the behaviours which they had never encountered on the flight deck. This process re-
sulted in the removal of a further two items and some minor rewriting. A further opportunity 
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sample of pilots (n=5) assessed the list until there was unanimous agreement that all the 
items were recognisable in a flight deck context. To establish inter rater reliability, a sample 
of pilots  (n=4) involved in the item reduction process were asked how frequently they had 
observed each of the 28 conversation types, responding on a five point Likert scale with one 
representing “never observed this behaviour” and five representing “regularly observed this 
behaviour”. These data were collected on an Excel spread sheet and analysed in SPSS. Table 
7.3 indicates a Cronbach’s Alpha of .955 representing a very high level of interrater agree-
ment regarding the prevalence of the conversation types. 
 
Table 7.3: Inter-rater agreement related to content validity of the items 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized Items N of Items 
.955 .952 Reliability Statistics 
 
The responses to this final stage of pretesting confirmed that none of the twenty eight conver-
sation types attracted a score of one on the Likert scale, indicating that all the participants had 
observed each of the conversation types in the questionnaire on at least one occasion. Content 
validity was continually monitored during questionnaire administration by carefully examin-
ing whether any of the items in either taxonomy were considered ambiguous by respondents. 
There was no evidence that participants failed to recognise any particular conversation type 
or explanation of motive. Table 7.4 is the list of conversation types developed from the 
processes described above. 
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Table 7.4:  A list of flight deck conversation types 
 
Mentioning an occasion when a favour was done for a colleague or the organization 
Mentioning how a rule was stretched in the interests of the organization 
Ranting about a controversial subject 
Agreeing with your opinion despite initially appearing to disagree (back-pedalling) 
Mentioning impressive possessions such as boats, cars or houses 
Making random non-operational remarks (e.g. visibility, landmarks) 
Exaggerating the role they played in a positive event in which they were involved 
Mentioning important or influential people they know professionally or personally 
Sharing a confidence with you 
Mentioning higher status achieved in a previous occupation (e.g. military rank/management 
role) 
Offering flattery to you (e.g. saying they enjoy flying with you) 
Downplaying their reliance upon their current employer for employment 
Commenting positively or negatively on other pilots’ or airlines’ style or standards 
Sympathising or empathising with you 
Mentioning their professional accomplishments 
Offering an excessively detailed account of how they come to occupy their current profes-
sional role 
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Mentioning the early age or impressive timescale within which a qualification or promotion 
was achieved 
Expressing cynicism relating to the organisation 
Mentioning events that emphasise the importance of family life to them 
Mentioning their preference for a relaxed operating style, personally or in others 
Expressing opinions and attitudes that mirror your own 
Mentioning, even indirectly, their high remuneration or wealth 
Commenting on their lowly position in the organisation and its effect on them 
Mentioning that they turned down a seemingly attractive job elsewhere 
Displaying an interest in aspects of your personal life of which they have no knowledge 
Mentioning an occasion when they accepted unnecessary inconvenience in the interests of a 
colleague or the organisation 
Downplaying the importance of a negative event in which they were involved                 
Mentioning that they have professional opportunities outside their current job  
              
 
The next stage involved proposing potential motives behind the 28 flight deck conversation 
types in the list above. In a replication of Jones and Pittman (1982) a preliminary taxonomy 
based upon a wide variety of IM behaviours identified by earlier researchers was developed. 
Significant modification was undertaken in order to accurately represent the aviation context. 
Jones and Pittman’s (1982) taxonomy identified five theoretical groupings of IM strategies 
that individuals commonly use. These included: self-promotion, whereby individuals point 
out their abilities or accomplishments in order to be seen as competent by observers; ingratia-
tion, whereby individuals  use flattery or do favours to elicit an attribution of likeability from 
observers; exemplification, whereby people self-sacrifice or go above and beyond the call of 
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duty in order to gain the attribution of dedication from observers; intimidation, where people 
signal their power or potential to punish in order to be seen as dangerous by observers; and 
supplication, where individuals advertise their weaknesses or shortcomings in order to elicit 
an attribution of being needy from observers. The aviation context required a qualitatively 
different taxonomy of motives to the one developed by Jones and Pittman. The same oppor-
tunity sample of pilot assessors (n=5) who were involved in item reduction were asked to as-
sess Jones and Pittman’s five theoretical groupings in terms of their relevance to the aviation 
context. They considered that supplication was unrecognisable in the aviation context despite 
clear evidence of its presence in at least two of the transcripts. They also considered that 
Jones and Pittman’s description of intimidation was more extreme than they could envisage 
although they did recognise the potential for intimidation on the flight deck. It was decided 
that supplication would not be included as a potential motive and intimidation would be in-
cluded but with references to punishment or danger replaced by terms such as overawe or un-
settle. The next stage was to ensure the items were contextually plausible, which was 
achieved by modifying the items in the list to make them recognisable in the flight deck con-
text. For instance, there were no instances of pilots self-promoting by declaring how skilled 
they were, but there were many examples of discourse that would support that inference. Po-
tential examples from the transcripts include several accounts relating to a speaker’s ability to 
walk into another job with ease, their high level or diverse type of experience, the speed of 
their career progression and others. Not all accounts alluded to success; the pervasiveness in 
the transcripts of accounts of behaviour, often justifying a speaker’s actions meant that self-
justification (SJ) was considered an essential motivating strategy. According to Scott and 
Lyman (1968) justifications are accounts in which one accepts responsibility for the act in 
question, but denies the pejorative quality associated with it. Notably, they comment that ac-
counts are "situated" according to the statuses of the speakers and are standardized within 
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cultures so that certain accounts are routinely expected when activity falls outside the domain 
of expectations. This means that not only the nature of justifications is predictable within a 
certain culture but that their occurrence is probably a requirement of interaction within that 
culture. One further motivation category “crew cohesion” was developed to explain the prev-
alence of downward directed IM in the transcripts. The literature relating to charismatic lead-
ership (Gardner & Cleavenger, 1998; Leary, 1989) speculates that charismatic leaders may 
use IM to create a transformational image to their subordinates. In terms of assigning a mo-
tive, research by Rozell and Gundersen (2003) found that ingratiation and exemplification 
increased feelings of cohesiveness within the group. Attempting to present oneself as likeable 
would help team members be attracted to one another, thereby increasing cohesion. This ob-
servation coupled with Organ’s (1988) notion of OCB supported the idea that making an ef-
fort to appear likeable could be underpinned by the objective of maintaining a cohesive team. 
A final motive that could not be ignored was the pursuit of normal friendliness through con-
versation. Although this phenomenon is by far the most difficult to define and research, it 
was the single most frequently offered explanation for flight deck conversation given during 
unstructured interviews conducted in pre testing, so had to be included. In addition to the 
seven items just outlined, participants would be offered an option of providing an alternative 
explanation of their choice during the survey. Table 7.5 is the list of motives developed for 
this research including four of the strategies outlined by Jones and Pittman and three further 
strategies developed during pre-testing. 
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Table 7.5: A list of seven possible motives for flight deck conversations. 
 SELF-PROMOTION 
Where individuals point out or allude to their abilities or accomplishments in order to be seen 
as competent, successful and autonomous 
 
INGRATIATION 
Where individuals use flattery or excessive self-deprecation to appear likeable to colleagues 
 
EXEMPLIFICATION 
Where individuals describe self-sacrificing or going above and beyond the call of duty in or-
der to appear dedicated to their work 
 
CREW COHESION 
Where conversation is enacted to reinforce the impression that the speaker belongs to a like-
minded group to the listener 
 
SELF-JUSTIFICATION 
Where conversation is enacted to explain and justify some aspect of the speaker's situation or 
actions; this can involve selective omission or inclusion of relevant information 
 
INTIMIDATION 
Where conversation tends to overawe, unsettle or invoke a sense of inferiority or inadequa-
cy in you, either personally or professionally 
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NORMAL FRIENDLINESS 
Where conversation is enacted in the interests of normal social interaction, characterised by 
co-operation and agreeableness; speakers are neither excessively introverted nor extraverted 
in such interactions 
 
7.1.9 SURVEY RESULTS 
The survey results are shown in Table 7.6 below. The final number of pilots who responded 
to the survey was 37, made up of 15 first officers and 22 captains. 50 pilots were approached 
to participate representing a response rate of 74%. 70.3 % of respondents were aged 40 or 
over and 29.7% were under 40. This was a representative age demographic for major airlines 
but because pilots often progress from commuter airlines to major airlines, commuter airlines 
may tend towards a higher proportion of younger pilots. 
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Table 7.6: The flight deck conversation survey questionnaire results summary 
 
Survey overview: Number of respondents: 37. Expected number of respondents: 50   
 Response rate: 74.0% 
The results from the survey are presented below question by question.  
Section 1: About You 
1. Which age range applies to you? 
Under 40 years old: 29.7% 11 
40 years old and over: 70.3% 26 
 
2. Your rank is? 
First Officer: 59.5% 22 
Captain: 40.5% 15 
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Section 2: Flight deck Conversation Questionnaire. 
1. Mentioning an occasion when a favour was done for a colleague or the organisation    
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 45.9% 20.0% 32.95% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 8.6% 4.30% 
Exemplification: 32.4% 20.0% 26.20% 
Crew cohesion: 8.1% 11.4% 9.75% 
Self-justification: 2.7% 20.0% 11.35% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 10.8% 20.0% 15.40% 
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2. Mentioning how a rule was stretched in the interests of the organisation 
    Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 25.0% 20.6% 22.80% 
Ingratiation: 2.8% 5.9% 4.35% 
Exemplification: 33.3% 26.5% 29.90% 
Crew cohesion: 2.8% 11.8% 7.30% 
Self-justification: 36.1% 26.5% 31.30% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 8.8% 4.40% 
Normal Friendliness: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
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3. Ranting about a controversial subject (e.g. politics or industrial relations etc.) 
    Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 33.3% 17.2% 25.25% 
Ingratiation: 5.6% 3.4% 4.50% 
Exemplification: 2.8% 3.4% 3.10% 
Crew cohesion: 16.7% 24.1% 20.40% 
Self-justification: 5.6% 17.2% 11.40% 
Intimidation: 19.4% 27.6% 23.50% 
Normal Friendli-
ness: 
16.7% 3.4% 
10.05% 
Other explanation 
Possibly expressing an personal agenda relating to an indus-
trial issue 
3.4% 
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4. Agreeing with your opinion despite initially appearing to disagree (back-pedalling)    
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Ingratiation: 54.5% 22.6% 38.55% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Crew cohesion: 30.3% 38.7% 34.50% 
Self-justification: 6.1% 3.2% 4.65% 
Intimidation: 6.1% 0.0% 3.05% 
Normal Friendliness: 3.0% 35.5% 19.25% 
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5. Mentioning impressive possessions such as boats, cars or houses 
    Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 74.3% 15.6% 25.25% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 15.6% 4.50% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 0.0% 3.10% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 6.2% 20.40% 
Self-justification: 2.9% 0.0% 11.40% 
Intimidation: 8.6% 21.9% 23.50% 
Normal Friendliness: 14.3% 31.2% 10.05% 
Other explanations 
Participants thought this varied considerably  
with individual personality 
1.8% 
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6. Making random non-operational remarks (e.g. visibility or landmarks)  
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type Primary Explanation Secondary  Explanation Average 
Self-promotion: 5.7% 3.8% 4.75% 
Ingratiation: 2.9% 7.7% 5.30% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Crew cohesion: 8.6% 50.0% 29.30% 
Self-justification: 2.9% 7.7% 5.30% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 3.8% 1.90% 
Normal Friendliness: 77.1% 19.2% 48.15% 
Other explanations 
Seeking confirmation that a colleague is alert 
Sounding out a colleague’s ideas and opinions 
Thinking out loud 
5.3% 
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7. Exaggerating the role they played in a positive event in which they were involved    
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 79.4% 10.3% 44.85% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Exemplification: 5.9% 20.7% 13.30% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 10.3% 5.15% 
Self-justification: 8.8% 48.3% 28.55% 
Intimidation: 5.9% 6.9% 6.40% 
Normal Friendliness: 0.0% 3.4% 1.70% 
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8. Mentioning important or influential people they know professionally or personally    
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation Average 
Self-promotion: 68.6% 23.3% 45.95% 
Ingratiation: 5.7% 3.3% 4.50% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 3.3% 1.65% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 6.7% 3.35% 
Self-justification: 2.9% 16.7% 9.80% 
Intimidation: 20.0% 36.7% 28.35% 
Normal Friendliness: 2.9% 10.0% 6.45% 
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9. Sharing a confidence with you 
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 9.1% 3.0% 6.05% 
Ingratiation: 27.3% 24.2% 25.75% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 3.0% 1.50% 
Crew cohesion: 15.2% 24.2% 19.70% 
Self-justification: 9.1% 12.1% 10.60% 
Intimidation: 3.0% 0.0% 1.50% 
Normal Friendliness: 36.4% 27.3% 31.85% 
Other explanations 3% Advice seeking and expressing trust in the addressee 3.0% 
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10. Mentioning higher status achieved in a previous occupation  
(e.g. military rank or management role)    
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 79.4% 10.0% 44.70% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 3.3% 1.65% 
Exemplification: 2.9% 3.3% 3.10% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 6.7% 3.35% 
Self-justification: 8.8% 30.0% 19.40% 
Intimidation: 5.9% 33.3% 19.60% 
Normal Friendliness: 2.9% 10.0% 6.45% 
Other explanations: Seeking self-esteem 1.7% 
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11. Offering flattery to you (e.g. saying they enjoy flying with you)    
 Choose your primary explanation for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 2.9% 0.0% 1.45% 
Ingratiation: 50.0% 16.1% 33.05% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Crew cohesion: 17.6% 32.3% 24.95% 
Self-justification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 29.4% 51.6% 40.50% 
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12. Downplaying their reliance upon their current employer for employment 
   Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 57.6% 10.7% 34.15% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 7.1% 3.55% 
Crew cohesion: 6.1% 32.1% 19.10% 
Self-justification: 21.2% 17.9% 19.55% 
Intimidation: 12.1% 7.1% 9.60% 
Normal Friendliness: 3.0% 7.1% 5.05% 
Other explanations 
Previous experiences of unreliable employers 
Discomfort at being so reliant upon employer for  
financial security 
9.0% 
  
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       144 
 
 
13. Commenting positively or negatively on other pilots' or airlines' style or standards    
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 20.6% 11.5% 16.05% 
Ingratiation: 5.9% 7.7% 6.80% 
Exemplification: 8.8% 0.0% 4.40% 
Crew cohesion: 20.6% 38.5% 29.55% 
Self-justification: 20.6% 0.0% 10.30% 
Intimidation: 2.9% 7.7% 5.30% 
Normal Friendliness: 17.6% 34.6% 26.10% 
Other explanation 
Participant highlighted the difference between positive 
and negative comments. Also commented that this be-
haviour was often linked to the individual’s personality 
1.5% 
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14. Sympathising or empathising with you    
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Ingratiation: 34.4% 20.0% 27.20% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Crew cohesion: 25.0% 43.3% 34.15% 
Self-justification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 40.6% 33.3% 36.95% 
Other explanation Used as a means of encouraging a co worker 1.7% 
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15. Mentioning their professional accomplishments     
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary  Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 84.8% 0.0% 42.40% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 6.7% 3.35% 
Exemplification: 3.0% 10.0% 6.50% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 6.7% 3.35% 
Self-justification: 0.0% 26.7% 13.35% 
Intimidation: 3.0% 23.3% 13.15% 
Normal Friendli-
ness: 
9.1% 23.3% 
16.20% 
Other explanation 
Used as a means of rebalancing status when faced with a self-
promoting co worker 
1.7% 
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16. Offering an excessively detailed account of how they come to occupy their current 
 professional role    
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 66.7% 13.8% 40.25% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Exemplification: 9.1% 10.3% 9.70% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 10.3% 5.15% 
Self-justification: 18.2% 31.0% 24.60% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 17.2% 8.60% 
Normal Friendliness: 6.1% 17.2% 11.65% 
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17. Mentioning the early age or impressive timescale within which a qualification or  
promotion was achieved     
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 94.1% 6.9% 50.50% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 3.4% 1.70% 
Exemplification: 2.9% 10.3% 6.60% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 3.4% 1.70% 
Self-justification: 0.0% 24.1% 12.05% 
Intimidation: 2.9% 48.3% 25.60% 
Normal Friendliness: 0.0% 3.4% 1.70% 
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18. Expressing cynicism relating to the organisation or its management    
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 3.2% 18.5% 10.85% 
Ingratiation: 3.2% 0.0% 1.60% 
Exemplification: 3.2% 3.7% 3.45% 
Crew cohesion: 48.4% 3.7% 26.05% 
Self-justification: 16.1% 29.6% 22.85% 
Intimidation: 6.5% 18.5% 12.50% 
Normal Friendli-
ness: 
16.1% 18.5% 
17.30% 
Other explanations: 
Personal dissatisfaction 
Distrust of management due to previous employment experi-
ences 
5.4% 
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19. Mentioning events that emphasise the importance of family life to them 
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 20.6% 18.5% 19.55% 
Ingratiation: 2.9% 0.0% 1.45% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 11.1% 5.55% 
Crew cohesion: 14.7% 25.9% 20.30% 
Self-justification: 14.7% 11.1% 12.90% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 47.1% 33.3% 40.20% 
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20. Mentioning their preference for a relaxed operating style, personally or in others    
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 17.6% 6.7% 12.15% 
Ingratiation: 5.9% 16.7% 11.30% 
Exemplification: 5.9% 0.0% 2.95% 
Crew cohesion: 32.4% 36.7% 34.55% 
Self-justification: 20.6% 6.7% 13.65% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 14.7% 33.3% 24.00% 
Other explanations: 
Captains often do this on the first leg to set a re-
laxed tone for the flight/pairing 
1.4% 
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21. Expressing opinions and attitudes that mirror your own    
 Choose your primary and   secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 0.0% 3.3% 1.65% 
Ingratiation: 54.5% 16.7% 35.60% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Crew cohesion: 27.3% 36.7% 32.00% 
Self-justification: 0.0% 3.3% 1.65% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 18.2% 40.0% 29.10% 
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22. Mentioning, even indirectly, their high remuneration or wealth  
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 79.4% 12.5% 45.95% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Exemplification: 2.9% 3.1% 3.00% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 3.1% 1.55% 
Self-justification: 11.8% 18.8% 15.30% 
Intimidation: 5.9% 53.1% 29.50% 
Normal Friendliness: 0.0% 9.4% 4.70% 
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23. Commenting on their lowly position in the organisation and its effect on them    
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 6.2% 0.0% 3.10% 
Ingratiation: 25.0% 28.0% 26.50% 
Exemplification: 9.4% 4.0% 6.70% 
Crew cohesion: 12.5% 28.0% 20.25% 
Self-justification: 25.0% 20.0% 22.50% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 18.8% 12.0% 15.40% 
Other explanations: 
Looking for sympathy 
Expressing dissatisfaction with their lot 
5.55% 
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24. Mentioning that they turned down a seemingly attractive job elsewhere     
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 64.7% 18.5% 41.60% 
Ingratiation: 2.9% 3.7% 3.30% 
Exemplification: 2.9% 11.1% 7.00% 
Crew cohesion: 2.9% 7.4% 5.15% 
Self-justification: 23.5% 37.0% 30.25% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 11.1% 5.55% 
Normal Friendliness: 2.9% 11.1% 7.00% 
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25. Displaying an interest in aspects of your personal life of which they have no knowledge    
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 2.9% 0.0% 1.45% 
Ingratiation: 17.6% 14.3% 15.95% 
Exemplification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Crew cohesion: 26.5% 42.9% 34.70% 
Self-justification: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 52.9% 42.9% 47.90% 
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26. Mentioning an occasion when they accepted unnecessary inconvenience in the interests of 
a colleague or the organisation    
 Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 35.3% 28.6% 31.95% 
Ingratiation: 2.9% 7.1% 5.00% 
Exemplification: 50.0% 14.3% 32.15% 
Crew cohesion: 2.9% 14.3% 8.60% 
Self-justification: 0.0% 25.0% 12.50% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 3.6% 1.80% 
Normal Friendliness: 8.8% 7.1% 7.95% 
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27. Downplaying the importance of a negative event in which they were involved  
(e.g. interview, conversion course or examination)   
  Choose your primary explanation for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 8.8% 40.0% 24.40% 
Ingratiation: 8.8% 12.0% 10.40% 
Exemplification: 5.9% 4.0% 4.95% 
Crew cohesion: 2.9% 8.0% 5.45% 
Self-justification: 67.6% 20.0% 43.80% 
Intimidation: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Normal Friendliness: 5.9% 12.0% 8.95% 
Other explanation: Self-esteem maintenance 2.05% 
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28. Mentioning that they have professional opportunities outside their current job  
(e.g. different airline or profession)     
Choose your primary and secondary explanations for this behaviour. 
Conversation type 
 
Primary Explanation Secondary Explanation 
Average 
Self-promotion: 73.5% 11.1% 42.30% 
Ingratiation: 0.0% 7.4% 3.70% 
Exemplification: 2.9% 0.0% 1.45% 
Crew cohesion: 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 
Self-justification: 11.8% 37.0% 24.40% 
Intimidation: 2.9% 22.2% 12.55% 
Normal Friendliness: 8.8% 22.2% 15.50% 
 
Table 7.7 below outlines the two taxonomies developed for this research. The seven main 
categories are the motives for conversation derived from the explanations provided by the 
participants ranked in order of recognisability. For instance, 25% of the total dataset was rec-
ognisable as self-promotion. Figure 7.1 illustrates the percentage distribution of conversation 
motives graphically. The second taxonomy ranks each of the 28 conversation types within 
their motive category. For instance, “mentioning the early age or impressive timescale within 
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which a qualification or promotion was achieved” was the most recognisable manifestation of 
self-promotion in the dataset. 
 
Figure 7.1 
The percentage distribution of conversation motives derived from the questionnaire  
Table 7.7:  
Two taxonomies of strategic flight deck conversation ranked by recognisability of motive. 
 
 
1. SELF-PROMOTION 25% 
 
Mentioning the early age or impressive timescale within which a qualification or 
promotion was achieved 
 
50.50% 
Mentioning important or influential people they know professionally or person-
ally 
45.95% 
Mentioning, even indirectly, their high remuneration or wealth 45.95% 
25% 
Self-Promotion 
11% Ingratiation 
6% 
Exemplification 16% 
 Crew-Cohesion 
15%  
Self-Justification 
8%  
Intimidation 
19% 
 Normal Friendliness 
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Mentioning impressive possessions such as boats, cars or houses 44.95% 
Exaggerating the role they played in a positive event in which they were        
involved 
44.85% 
Mentioning higher status achieved in a previous occupation 
(e.g. military rank or management role) 
44.70% 
Mentioning their professional accomplishments 42.40% 
Mentioning that they have professional opportunities outside their current job 
(e.g. different airline or profession) 
42.30% 
Mentioning that they turned down a seemingly attractive job elsewhere 41.60% 
Offering an excessively detailed account of how they come to occupy their    
current professional role 
40.25% 
Downplaying their reliance upon their current employer for employment 37.75% 
Mentioning an occasion when a favour was done for a colleague or the           
organisation 
32.95% 
Mentioning an occasion when they accepted unnecessary inconvenience in the 
interests of a colleague or the organisation 
31.95% 
Ranting about a controversial subject (e.g. politics or industrial relations etc.) 25.25% 
 
2. NORMAL FRIENDLINESS 19% 
 
Making random non-operational remarks (e.g. visibility or landmarks) 
 
48.15% 
Displaying an interest in aspects of your personal life of which they have no 
knowledge 
47.90% 
Offering flattery to you (e.g. saying they enjoy flying with you) 40.50% 
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Mentioning events that emphasise the importance of family life to them 40.20% 
Sympathising or empathising with you 36.95% 
Sharing a confidence with you 31.85% 
Commenting positively or negatively on other pilots' or airlines' style or     
standards 
26.10% 
 
3. CREW COHESION 16% 
 
Displaying an interest in aspects of your personal life of which they have no 
knowledge 
 
34.70% 
Mentioning their preference for a relaxed operating style, personally or in others 34.55% 
Agreeing with your opinion despite initially appearing to disagree (back-
pedalling) 
34.50% 
Sympathising or empathising with you 34.15% 
Expressing opinions and attitudes that mirror your own 32.00% 
Commenting positively or negatively on other pilots' or airlines' style or     
standards 
29.55% 
Expressing cynicism relating to the organisation or its management 26.05% 
 
4. SELF-JUSTIFICATION 15% 
 
Downplaying the importance of a negative event in which they were involved 
(e.g. interview, conversion course or examination) 
 
43.80% 
Mentioning how a rule was stretched in the interests of the organisation 31.30% 
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5. INGRATIATION 11% 
 
Agreeing with your opinion despite initially appearing to disagree (back-
pedalling) 
 
38.55% 
Expressing opinions and attitudes that mirror your own 35.60% 
Offering flattery to you (e.g. saying they enjoy flying with you) 33.05% 
Commenting on their lowly position in the organisation and its effect on them 26.50% 
Sharing a confidence with you 25.75% 
 
 
6. INTIMIDATION 8% 
 
Ranting about a controversial subject (e.g. politics or industrial relations etc.) 23.50% 
 
7. EXEMPLIFICATION 6% 
 
Mentioning an occasion when they accepted unnecessary inconvenience in the 
interests of a colleague or the organisation 
 
32.15% 
Mentioning how a rule was stretched in the interests of the organisation 29.90% 
Mentioning an occasion when a favour was done for a colleague or the organisa-
tion 
_____________________________________________________________ 
26.20% 
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The results indicated that only in very few cases did participants describe a motive other than 
one of the seven conversation categories offered in the questionnaire, indicating that the sur-
vey reflected a realistic view of FCMs’ experience of flight deck conversation. The pie chart 
at Figure 7.1 indicates how recognisable each explanatory category was in the complete da-
taset. For instance, 16% of the complete dataset was recognisable as being motivated by crew 
cohesion. From these data the seven explanation categories were ranked in the taxonomy. 
The decision to report the mean of first and second choices was to provide a more complete 
picture of the participants’ assessments than was possible by only considering first choices. 
Although the second choice option was originally included so that participants would not feel 
pressured to choose a single explanation, upon analysis it was clear that some of the second 
choices produced only marginally lower percentages than the first choices. For instance, Cat-
egory 11 related to flattery was considered to be motivated by normal friendliness by 51.6% 
as a first choice whereas 50% thought it was motivated by ingratiation as a second choice. 
Although averaging the scores in this way could be seen as a limitation of this research it was 
considered that this approach provided more accurate findings. 
 
SELF-PROMOTION (SP) 
Self-promotion accounted for the largest mean percentage of explanations relating to the mo-
tive for flight deck conversations. Furthermore, in most cases where SP scored highest, no 
other explanation exceeded the 95% confidence level set for this study. Exceptions to this 
included “ranting about a controversial subject”, which although a low scorer in terms of SP, 
was an unexpected incumbent in this category given the apparent tendency towards conformi-
ty and attenuation of strong views that characterise flight deck interactions. The results indi-
cate that this type of conversation is almost equally associated with “intimidation,” a verbal 
phenomenon which despite being evident in some transcripts represented only 8% of the mo-
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tivation explanations from the survey. Mentioning a favour done for a colleague or the organ-
isation was thought to be motivated by “exemplification” as well as SP. There was some evi-
dence of a recurrent link between SP and exemplification evident in an almost identical score 
for the two explanations for the “acceptance of unnecessary inconvenience in the interests of 
a colleague or the organisation”. Another apparent link was evident between conversations 
that emphasised autonomy such as “downplaying one’s reliance upon a current employer for 
employment”, or “mentioning a turned down job”. In addition to SP, both these explanations 
were considered to be motivated by. Each of the remaining SP explanations of motive were 
alone in reaching the inclusion criterion, indicating that they were highly recognisable to the 
survey respondents. 
 
NORMAL FRIENDLINESS 
An important but frustrating finding was that over 48% of respondents considered that the 
random type of conversations that have preceded so many accidents are no more than the pi-
lots being friendly. Furthermore, only “crew cohesion” came close to meeting the statistical 
criterion for inclusion. This result is unsurprising given the documented failure to explain this 
type of conversation in the past. It did however, prompt this research to consider what might 
be achieved by the strategy of presenting as friendly; this is discussed later. Both confiding 
and flattering were also associated with ingratiation, and sympathising was considered to be 
motivated by crew cohesion as well as normal friendliness. Commenting on outsiders such as 
other airlines or pilot groups was also seen as friendliness although most of this type of con-
versation in the transcripts leaned towards the critical. There was however, one comment 
from a survey respondent who suggested that there was a considerable difference between the 
likely motive for a negative comment and a positive one. Whilst this is true, there were very 
few positive comments about out groups in the transcripts. Crew cohesion was the only other 
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explanation for this type of conversation that met the inclusion criterion and was also the 
highest scoring explanation.  
 
CREW COHESION 
Crew cohesion was characterised by a preference for agreement.  Although back-pedalling in 
a disagreement was attributed to this motive, ingratiation was a higher scorer. Expression of 
opinions that mirrored those of the listener attracted almost equal scores, divided between 
those who viewed it as cohesive and those who thought it was motivated by ingratiation. 
There was evidence that showing an interest in a colleague’s life was considered cohesive 
behaviour. Cohesion was also expressed by comments relating to other pilots and airlines, 
also by critique of outsiders such as managers. It was noted earlier that expressions that signal 
a preference for a relaxed operation have attracted negative assessments in the accident litera-
ture; however, from the FCM’s perspective they are mostly enacted in the interests of crew 
cohesion, with no close alternative explanation. This represents a conflict with the conven-
tional wisdom expressed by investigators that relaxed or casual operations tend to signal a 
casual professional attitude. The closest non-qualifying category for expressions related to 
being relaxed was normal friendliness, which also provides few insights into why some 
FCMs fail to strike an acceptable balance between being relaxed/casual and behaving profes-
sionally. 
 
SELF-JUSTIFICATION 
Instances of FCMs downplaying their role in a negative event, such as failing an exam, were 
clearly identified as cases of self-justification. Less intuitively understandable is why men-
tioning that a rule had been stretched in the interests of the organisation would need justifica-
tion. It is conceivable that avoiding appearing to be too closely allied to the management 
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could be a motive given some of the cynicism expressed in the transcripts towards out groups 
including the management. 
 
INGRATIATION 
Ingratiation was characterised by a preference for conversation that reinforced similarity be-
tween speaker and listener, and certainly avoided disagreement. As previously stated, both 
confiding and flattering were considered to be ingratiation but both these conversation types 
were more associated with normal friendliness. An important finding relates to the expression 
of one’s lowly position and its effect on the speaker. This was a category that respondents 
appeared not to recognise with much conviction despite at least two clear instances of acci-
dent flight crews commenting upon their lowly position in the organisation. One participant 
commented that such speakers might be seeking sympathy but overall the survey indicated 
that references to one’s lowly position in the organisation were motivated by ingratiation. 
 
INTIMIDATION 
Intimidation did not feature prominently in the transcripts but where it did, its influence was 
considerable (See PCAA, 2010, p. 29: ATSB, 1995: NTSB, 1994, p. 57). Although ranting 
about politics etc. was considered by respondents to be intimidating, this was a lower scoring 
explanation than self-promotion and only a slightly higher scorer than crew cohesion. Whilst 
feeling intimidated is an intuitively predictable response to witnessing a rant, it may be that 
those who express extreme views by derogating an out group reinforce the cohesion of the in 
group in a “them and us” fashion. 
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EXEMPLIFICATION 
The scores for exemplification were intuitively sound, with a bias towards recounting behav-
iour enacted in someone else’s interest. Explanations for accounts of rule stretching were al-
most equally distributed between self-justification and exemplification. Mentioning a favour 
done for a colleague or the organisation was predominantly associated with self-promotion 
although exemplification also met the inclusion criterion. 
 
7.1.10 DISCUSSION OF THE FLIGHT DECK CONVERSATION RESEARCH 
Whilst the four transcripts used for the initial construction of this research only provided lim-
ited evidence that self-promotion was prolific on the flight deck, the questionnaire responses 
and a more general review of other relevant transcripts confirmed this to be the case. Re-
spondents were almost unanimous in their belief that when a pilot spoke or alluded to a 
command achieved at an early age or an impressive job obtained at an unusually low experi-
ence level, they were hearing self-promotion. The exchange below took place between the 
Buffalo accident flight crew: 
 
Captain: “but uh as a matter of fact I got hired with about six hundred and twenty five hours 
here” (NTSB, 2010a, p. 277) 
First officer: “oh wow… that's not much for uh back when you got hired” (Ibid., p. 278) 
 
Whilst the majority of survey respondents reported being familiar with this type of conversa-
tion and interpreted it predominantly as self-promotion, there was also 26% who thought that 
such conversation was enacted with the intent to intimidate the listener. Emphasising one’s 
lack of experience at the time of achieving what is often the only promotion in a career may 
appear a counter intuitive self-promotion strategy to those unfamiliar with the airline context. 
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The media has a fascination with young airline pilots, with many instances of airline pilots 
claiming to be the youngest.  In fact even the vice-chairman of the NTSB in 2008 dropped 
into one of his speeches that he became an airline captain at 27 
viii
so it is more than just intui-
tion that this narrative exists. The accident literature clearly indicates that it is unwise to as-
sume that just because an individual is appointed or promoted with low experience they must 
have exhibited exceptional skill. The extract above described how the captain had been hired 
at very close to the minimum experience and this perhaps invited the addressee to draw what-
ever conclusions she might on the basis of that information. In fact the report from which the 
extract was taken indicated that the speaker was actually an underperforming pilot for much 
of his career (NTSB, 2010a, p. 115). Connotations of ability seem to attach to those who 
achieve high professional status in aviation at an early age or in record time. This may stem 
from the requirement to achieve certain professional objectives within a specified timescale 
in settings such as the military or when being sponsored by an airline. Christopher Hart, the 
current NTSB Chairman, in his concurring statement regarding the Buffalo accident report 
(Ibid.) commented that in recent years the pilot demographic has changed markedly, with 
fewer military pilots entering the airlines, and whilst he acknowledged that a military back-
ground was not the only means of acquiring the requisite skills there was currently no effec-
tive system for ensuring unsuitable pilots reached airline flight decks. Given this heightened 
focus upon professional standards it is predictable that an underperforming pilot might en-
gage in impression management. 
 
Another important reason why SP may be such a prominent feature of flight deck conversa-
tion is that pilots are often meeting for the first time when they fly together. This was the case 
at Buffalo and Lexington and several of the other accidents cited in this research. When pilots 
first meet they need to make a positive impression in a very limited time, possibly even be-
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fore they reach the aircraft. The investigation into the 1990 Detroit accident cited above 
(NTSB, 1991b) highlighted the dangers of pilots embellishing their experience with the ob-
jective of making a good impression at a first meeting, suggesting that assertive impression 
management has been identified as a risk in such contexts for a considerable time. Older first 
officers might consider it a priority to outline, sometimes indirectly, why they have not been 
promoted, whilst less experienced ones might embellish their experience to achieve better 
role congruity. Where a pilot has previously held a senior position in the military or else-
where and now occupies a subordinate role, it could be a priority to offer an explanation for 
this situation. Although 19% of survey respondents found this type of conversation intimidat-
ing, the only documented instance of this phenomenon (the Detroit Accident) was more likely 
an attempt at self-justification than intentional intimidation. The Detroit accident cited above 
is a compelling example of the potential consequences of assertive impression management, 
which in this case resulted in a serious breakdown in the chain of command which led to a 
fatal runway collision. It is a feature of the airline context that extremely able and experi-
enced pilots can find themselves occupying a subordinate role, sometimes for many years; as 
this situation is specific to the airline context, as far as is known there is no literature to di-
rectly support this explanation. Whilst not drawing a direct parallel, there is some similarity 
with Goffman’s (1955) explanation of how embarrassing events compel people to engage in 
impressional (sic) strategies designed to counter their damaged image. A belief that one’s so-
cial image is not what one would like it to be can prompt face saving strategies (Goffman 
called it “face work”) such as “excuse making” and “role distancing”.  The captain in the 
Buffalo accident commented that he had turned down a seemingly attractive job flying a jet 
because of the terms of employment (NTSB, 2010a, p 204), thereby distancing himself from 
reliance on his current job, implying that he had successfully secured such a position, and 
providing a rational excuse for his continued presence in his current position. It should be 
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pointed out that the transition from successfully operating a commuter turboprop aircraft like 
the one in the Buffalo accident, to operating a high performance jet is one that some pilots 
find challenging or impossible. This research indicated that FCMs identify this type of con-
versation primarily as self-promotion but to a lesser extent self-justification. The transcripts 
indicate that when pilots claim to have turned down jobs or downplay their reliance on their 
current job it is mostly interpreted as self-promotion. However, there are many rational rea-
sons for staying in a current job that are unlikely to represent a speaker’s chosen narrative. 
There are undoubtedly pilots who stay with their current airline as a risk avoidance tactic be-
cause they are aware that once incumbent in an airline, that organisation has an ongoing 
commitment to train them to proficiency in a way that would not necessarily be the case for a 
new hire who was not progressing normally. For obvious reasons, this represents an example 
of a type of explanation that a speaker is almost certain to avoid. In the extract below, the 
Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a, p. 205) captain describes how he represented himself at an interview: 
 
“I told them I've flown the nineteen hundred and it would be a pretty easy transition” 
 
Although this extract portrays him as confident and competent, his training records showed 
that, even though he completed all the necessary training, without a failure, the captain had 
experienced continuing difficulties with aircraft control, the aspect of his operation that was 
his downfall in the accident. Clearly a pilot with knowledge that he has a history of underper-
forming might seek to remain where he is but this poses a problem in a work environment 
where there is a recurrent narrative related to career progression, with both first officers and 
captains speaking of their ambitions to fly larger aircraft with major airlines. In two of the 
transcripts the pilots spoke of insurmountable obstacles to achieving those ambitions, thereby 
providing a plausible justification for staying where they were. The captain referred to above, 
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spoke of moving to a larger airline but also acknowledged that he would need to revert to a 
first officer to achieve that objective. Where a previously high ranking individual is required 
to occupy a subordinate position there is some evidence that conversation can be strategically 
deployed to distance the speaker from that role. In the Detroit accident transcript (NTSB, 
1991b) the first officer mentioned that he had been a high ranking officer in the military be-
fore joining his current airline employer (Ibid., p. 122). Furthermore there had been a number 
of job offers and this had not been his first choice (Ibid., p. 121). By enacting this conversa-
tion the speaker may have been asserting that although he was occupying the role of first of-
ficer, his colleague should not mistake him for someone who had only ever occupied the sub-
ordinate role. Such upsets of the normal flight deck hierarchy can have undesirable results as 
was the case in this accident. Although probably unintentionally, first officers tended to speak 
of gaining experience in their current commuter airline as a prerequisite step towards a career 
with a larger airline (NTSB, 2007a, p. 132; NTSB, 2010a, p. 251). From the perspective of a 
captain committed to remaining in a job that their subordinate considers just a stepping stone, 
this may represent a face threat. Both the captains at Lexington and Buffalo were faced with 
this type of conversation; the Lexington captain implied that as a captain he was not im-
pressed with the first officer’s salary he would have to accept if he were to move to the job 
proposed by the first officer. This is conceivably a type of defensive IM enacted to remind 
the first officer that what may be attractive for him could be seen as a retrograde step for a 
captain. In the Buffalo transcript the captain emphasised that as he started flying late in life, 
he would be faced with being a lifetime first officer if he went to a major airline. In reality, 
many captains would be reluctant to give up a command in order to move to a major airline 
but negative connotations can attach to individuals who appear too fond of being in charge 
and the transcripts indicate that such explanations are never heard. The status attached to be-
ing in command is almost a taboo subject but its influence is widespread. Being promoted to 
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captain is for most pilots the only promotion they achieve in the span of their career but in 
most cases their progress towards it is largely outside their control. The topic of career pro-
gression was highly recurrent in flight deck conversations with first officers showing no re-
luctance to voice their promotion ambitions. Where captains spoke in the transcripts of their 
role they often downplayed the importance they attached to being a captain. Although cap-
tains spoke of their willingness to accept a demotion in order to fly a better aircraft for a larg-
er airline, in reality these speakers were acknowledging that despite their powerful position as 
a captain they were relatively powerless in relation to the progress of their career. The topic 
of power and powerlessness is one that has interested psychologists for decades; as recently 
as 2014 researchers at Leiden University in the Netherlands provided evidence that when 
workers feel powerless they tend to go along with the very structures that reinforce their 
powerlessness for a range of reasons. In the Leiden research (Van der Toorn et al., 2015) 
considerable emphasis was placed upon legitimation due to workers’ financial dependence. A 
captain who has met the required standards at one airline  risks considerable financial risk if 
he goes to another airline and fails to meet their standards, so even if he would like to move, 
structural features of the way airlines recruit and retain pilots might make this impossible. 
Although there was plenty of resistance evident in the transcripts, most of the pilots who 
spoke of leaving had not done so. Resistance often seemed to take the form of denial; for in-
stance, one captain who was approaching retirement commented in advance of an accident 
that he was “ambivalent” about aspects of his job, which was quite lazily interpreted by in-
vestigators as an indication of a casual attitude to his work. This naïve and reductionist inter-
pretation of the comment ignores the influence that his powerlessness over his impending re-
tirement may have had. Many pilots would like to continue flying after their imposed retire-
ment age, as was demonstrated by a conversation that preceded an accident at Chicago 
(NTSB, 2007b, p. 189). Hill and Buss (2006) describe how the feigning of disinterest can be 
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used as a strategy to disguise the envy that individuals may experience in relation to other 
colleagues in the face of a situational variable such as impending retirement that is outside 
their control. This tendency to downplay their powerlessness by diminishing the role of their 
employer in the control of their actions was ubiquitous in the transcripts with several instanc-
es of pilots downplaying their reliance upon their current job or their role in that job
ix
. This 
feigning of disinterest was incompatible with much of the other discourse in the transcripts, 
which was often characterised by a strong interest in career progression. The next section de-
scribes how the strategic use of language that emphasises the powerfulness of the individual 
in a situation where in reality they are not very powerful may operate below the level of hu-
man consciousness and provide an explanation for much of what is heard on the flight deck. 
 
7.1.11 THE ROLE OF LOCUS OF CONTROL IN FLIGHT DECK CONVERSATION 
The airline context is characterised by unequal power relations. Aside from those within the 
flight deck, pilots of all ranks live with a number of situational variables which tend to locate 
power in the relationship in the hands of others, such as the regulator or their employer. Pilots 
need to be self-assured in appropriate measure and the research indicates that this is probably 
the case.  Joseph and Ganesh (2006) measured a construct known as “locus of control” which 
is a measure of the extent to which individuals believe they control the significant events in 
their lives. Individuals who believe they control the significant events in their lives possess a 
strong “internal locus of control” whilst those who believe such events are under external 
control have a strong “external locus of control”. The above research found that a sample of 
101 Indian pilots (51 civilian, 50 military) were significantly more “internal” than the general 
population. In addition, civilian pilots had significantly higher internal ASLOC (aviation 
safety locus of control) (Hunter, 2002) scores than military pilots. Given this finding, airline 
pilots are left with a dilemma because even an optimistic interpretation of reality indicates 
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that in their relations with their employer they occupy a relatively powerless position, an ob-
servation supported by the transcripts. Thus although they are expected to be in charge and 
make executive decisions on a routine basis, the conversations heard on the flight deck indi-
cate that they are aware of this unequal power relationship. Most of the time, pilots work re-
motely from such influences but when they are reminded that their powerful position really 
only extends to the confines of the aircraft this can pose a real challenge to the identity they 
associate with their professional role. Where incongruence exists between an individual’s 
sense of powerfulness (an accepted quantitative measure proposed by Osgood, May & Miron, 
1975) and the environmental conditions being experienced, social stress is predictable. As 
previously stated, these challenges to the power of the pilots’ role are not continuous but 
seem to be manifest in specific instances where they feel their ability to exercise the power 
they are accustomed to in their professional role is under threat. The transcripts indicate that 
pilots sometimes perceive such threats to their self-identity as coming from cabin attendants, 
engineers and schedulers among others. Mandler (1982) describes how interruptions to iden-
tity can result in autonomic activity in the form of stress, and Baddeley (1972) has described 
how stressors can cause the adaptive response of narrowing the attentional field to such cru-
cial events. This model of reaction to stress explains some of the disproportionate responses 
to minor challenges to the powerfulness that apparently attaches to flight crews’ identity 
when they are in role. One way of looking at the identity process is as a control system that 
defines the meanings attached to a given role (Burke, 1991). The transcripts indicate that pi-
lots, particularly captains, routinely exercise power when in their professional role and inevi-
tably this defines the standard or reference for who they feel they are when in role. Inputs 
from the environment are appraised and the appraisals are not always completely rational; for 
instance, the captain in the Kirksville accident appeared to view the inadvertent intrusion of a 
passenger’s foot into the cockpit as sufficient challenge to his authority to cause him to drop a 
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heavy manual on it (NTSB, 2006, p. 32). At the risk of overanalysing a seemingly trivial ex-
ample of behaviour it is noteworthy that the exercise of power enacted by the captain was not 
a legitimate response in terms of his professional role so any sense he may have gained that 
he was powerful in the interaction in question was illusory. Nonetheless, although he may 
have felt powerful for a short time, his actions had no influence on the likelihood of such an 
intrusion occurring in the future. What he has achieved in the telling of the story is a sense 
that passengers are subordinate to him, which is only the case in very clearly defined con-
texts. There was a considerable amount of discourse in the transcripts which appeared to 
overstate the power and control that flight crews can exercise. In fact there is some evidence 
in the transcripts that pilots sometimes communicate anecdotes that either didn’t actually 
happen (See NTSB, 1991a, pp. 52-53) or exaggerate their role with the objective of impres-
sion management. Although the Detroit report (Ibid., p. 53) considered such embellishment 
“inimical to flight safety”, as long as these instances do not intentionally mislead a colleague 
in relation to some operationally relevant factor they are probably predictable on the basis 
that flight crews are expected to be powerful and to control events in their professional role 
and when threats to that power and control present themselves it is understandable that they 
might seek to minimise them. Furthermore, there is experimental evidence from Geer et al. 
(1970) indicating that even an illusory perception of control is enough to reduce autonomic 
responses to stressful stimuli. Burke (1991) developed a model of identity feedback (See Fig-
ure 7.2 below) which commences with an individual in a situational context: if this context 
matches with the individual’s self-concept, all is well and no psychological discomfort is ex-
perienced. If, on the other hand, there is a mismatch between an individual’s sense of power-
fulness (identity standard in Figure 7.2) and the actual control they are able to exert in the 
current situation they are likely to experience psychological discomfort. Where this occurs in 
a situation that is unalterable it becomes necessary to adjust the way the situation is perceived 
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until an accommodation is reached where one’s self-concept and the situation can co-exist 
without psychological stress. Considerable evidence has now accumulated indicating a link 
between psychological stress and a range of autonomic responses such as cardiac sympathetic 
activation and elevated plasma catecholamine concentrations (Cacioppo et al., 1995). Effec-
tive stress coping is achieved when a stress response is activated on exposure to a stressful 
stimulus, but is quickly deactivated upon removal of the stimulus. Prolonged exposure or an 
inadequate response to stressful stimuli is thought to underlie most stress related mental dis-
orders, such as depression or anxiety. Given that such disorders are the exception, it seems 
likely that most individuals are able to remove themselves from their situational stressors. 
Burke’s model is illustrated in Figure 7.2. 
 
 
Figure 7.2: A self-identity feedback loop (Burke, 1991) 
An explanation of Burke’s (1991) feedback loop as applied to the NPC context: 
1 An addressee receives a verbal input relevant to how they perceive their self-identity. 
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2. What is expressed is subject to a process of comparison and represents a mismatch with 
their identity standard, resulting in psychological discomfort. 
3. To reduce this psychological discomfort the individual attempts to restore congruence be-
tween the identity standard they hold and the identity expressed at point B. If the environment 
is unchangeable then congruence will only be possible if she/he can modify their perception 
of the environment. This more congruent perception is represented by the output at Point A. 
The social situation at the bottom of the feedback loop represents the interactional environ-
ment. This is where the individual reassesses whether the attempts at congruence have been 
effective. If not, then psychological discomfort is likely to drive continued attempts to make 
the social environment and one’s identity standard achieve congruence, in other words a long 
and strategically motivated narrative. 
 
The transcripts provided many examples where something with the potential to be seen as a 
threat to the listener’s self-identity was expressed. Below are some extracts from conversa-
tion from the Buffalo accident where the older captain and a young first officer talk about 
progressing to a major airline (NTSB, 2010a, p. 254); the captain starts: 
 
“…at this point do I go to a major and you know not be able to be there for very long”… 
 
The first officer replies: 
 
“…yeah be a first officer the rest of your life….”  
 
This was what Goffman (1967) referred to as a “dispreferred response” because of its poten-
tial to cause embarrassment or threaten status. The response highlights a number of relevant 
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situational variables such as the recruitment and promotion limitations imposed by his age 
and his potential loss of status due to being a lifetime first officer. There were also unspoken 
issues related to his past performance that would have likely proved a barrier to both his se-
lection and progression if selected. In both the conceptual models above, the captain would 
likely perceive the tone of this conversation as potentially threatening to his self-concept, par-
ticularly as it was taking place in the flight deck so he was firmly “in role”. The powerless-
ness implied by this perception of the “self” would be subject to “comparison” in Burke’s 
model which would result in a mismatch between the desired self and the actual self, result-
ing in psychological stress that would either result in a change in behaviour or a change in the 
way the situation is perceived. In the event, it appears that the Buffalo captain chose to re 
perceive his potential revised status in a positive light but with a caveat: 
 
“…may not be a bad thing as long as I would be able to progress”… (Ibid., p. 254)  
 
He appears to have been saying that he was only interested if progression was part of the 
deal. The factors outlined above made it very unlikely that such progression would be possi-
ble, thus providing a potential moral rationale for not accepting such a job whilst at the same 
time reasserting that he retained power in the choice of staying or going. No mention whatso-
ever was made about the loss of status involved in being a permanent first officer, as previ-
ously stated, this is not usually discussed. Overall, the topic of career progression carries con-
siderable potential to challenge the captain’s self-concept which is likely to include the notion 
of being powerful in the work environment. If a speaker admitted that the increase in salary 
that accompanied such a job was needed, it would advertise that their future success was de-
termined by someone else, in this case the airline. Although this is usually the case, if being 
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powerful is an important part of one’s self-concept, advertising this powerless position would 
be psychologically uncomfortable. 
 
“I don't have to make two hundred thousand dollars a year” (Ibid., p. 255) 
 
Burke’s model proposes that an output to the environment that restores one’s role identity is 
likely. The general tone of the exchange suggested that the speaker had considered such a 
move but for rational reasons he was not interested. As was demonstrated earlier, “feigning of 
disinterest” is sometimes used as a tactic used to emphasise that whatever someone is offer-
ing they cannot influence your decisions; for this reason the type of verbal behaviour outlined 
here should not be seen as deceitful but as a subconscious response to the stress that results 
when powerful people are reminded of their powerlessness. Both these comments emphasise 
to his addressee that he is not powerless, in fact the environment is almost exactly as he 
would have chosen. He is not influenced by the prospect of a high salary because money is 
not an issue for him. In addition to the rational explanation for his actions there is a moral 
one, because he is not a greedy person. These tactics also serve a self-esteem maintenance 
function. 
 
Transcripts of the Buffalo and Kirksville accidents indicate that some pilots are quick to per-
ceive challenges to their authority even when they are not intended to be so. Where a speaker 
held legitimate power over the person perceived as a threat their identity (such as a subordi-
nate crew member) the exchange tended to be short whereas if the threat originated outside 
the hierarchical structure of flight operations, (such as from a manager), conversations tended 
to be more detailed and strategic in nature. Feigning of disinterest was a very recurrent verbal 
phenomenon in flight deck conversations and usually referred to not needing the incumbent 
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job because another one was waiting in the wings, which is rarely the case. In the conversa-
tion above, about changing jobs and potentially becoming a first officer again, the captain 
was able to reassert his powerful position in the space of a few conversational turns, probably 
because of the hierarchical structure of the flight deck which clearly placed him in a superior 
position in the interaction. Differences in perceived power appear to influence the length and 
complexity of conversations. Powerful speakers appeared to achieve a congruent role identity 
very quickly as indicated by this description of an interaction between the Buffalo accident 
captain and a cabin attendant who had asked for clarification about a safety matter which he 
apparently viewed as a challenge to his authority: 
 
“I just cut her off” (Ibid., p. 247) 
 
Notably one of the longest conversations came from the Buffalo first officer and exceeded six 
minutes, describing an interaction with an airline administrator relating to her vacation which 
she was unable to resolve: 
 
“I've left her voicemails she won't call me back. I've sent her emails she won't call me back… 
she won’t change my vacation… I think I've got like two more days before I'm within the forty 
five days and they can't change it… and I know she's going to screw me over and I'm going to 
be so freaking mad if they make me take my vacation in March”  (Ibid., p. 217) 
 
According to the survey results this rant would likely be enacted for the purpose of self-
promotion or to intimidate the listener. In this case there was an undertone of moral worthi-
ness in the extended extract emphasising how reasonable the requests were and how unrea-
sonable the response from the airline was. In fact, examples of ranting like this one are very 
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uncommon on the flight deck but where they do occur they usually contain privileged content 
that the speaker would not wish to express in public. Referring back to this study’s definition 
of self-promotion, it is conceivable that by ranting in such a forthright fashion she was at-
tempting to recast herself as autonomous and powerful whilst recounting a narrative that 
posed a strong challenge to that identity. It is also relevant that she was firmly situated in her 
professional role identity with its implied power, which may have made the reestablishment 
of autonomy more important. Being a homeostatic process, the feedback loop proposed by 
Burke above would tend to drive a conversation such as this as long as social stress persisted. 
In support of this contention, the conversation above was only concluded after it was sug-
gested by the captain that the speaker spoke to someone whose power probably trumped the 
person causing the identity challenge. Although this may sound like one-upmanship it is a 
realistic example of how conversation can be used as a vehicle for the homeostatic process of 
regaining power to maintain identity congruence. This example raises the question whether 
organisations have a responsibility to minimise the social stress experienced by employees 
involved in safety critical jobs. Research relating to high reliability organisations (HROs) in-
cluding airline operations is clear on the subject; safe organisations locate the responsibility 
for error within the organisation rather than with the individual (Weick, 1987, Weick and 
Roberts, 1993). If it can be shown that relations with the organisation are responsible for fre-
quent conversations on the flight deck, then according to the feedback loop proposed above, 
the work context needs to provide a more congruent self-identity for the pilots. 
 
7.1.12 THE ROLE OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE IN FLIGHT DECK CONVERSATION 
Based upon the few transcripts examined in this study it appears that cognitive dissonance 
(the conflict between what an individual knows is right and what circumstances dictate they 
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actually do) is an issue for flight crews. For instance, the Buffalo first officer acknowledged 
that she should probably have called in sick but for a number of reasons she flew anyway. 
“I’m ready to be in the hotel room” (NTSB, 2010a, p. 196) 
The transcript indicates that financial, professional and domestic pressures are likely to have 
influenced her decision to go to work. 
“…two hundred bucks to a first officer is a lot of money…” (Ibid., p. 214) 
Festinger (1957) proposed that individuals under this kind of conflict experience tension 
which they are motivated to reduce. The choices according to Festinger are clear; individuals 
reduce dissonance by “self-deception” or by reducing the aspects of their behaviour oriented 
towards “self-interest”. Where an individual feels there is no more scope to reduce their self-
interest such as when they already earn a low salary or experience poor terms of employment, 
they are likely to embark upon the type of self-deception Festinger described in order to justi-
fy their actions. Thus a complex conversation explaining the rationale for being at work when 
it appears one is unwell may well have its foundation in self-deception along the lines that the 
behaviour is acceptable because one has been pushed into it. Given that a human being who 
behaves in this way is just behaving the way human beings have been observed to behave for 
at least five decades it is surprising that organisations and regulators claim to be at a loss to 
explain such behaviour. The previous example was a junior first officer occupying a power-
less position in her relationship with the organisation; as pilots progress they gradually come 
to occupy a more powerful position but can still experience stress when they are affected by 
matters outside their control. The transcripts describe how pilots took pre-emptive actions to 
wrest control back. Such discourse was indicative of a need to stay one step ahead of the air-
line and conveyed the message that whatever the organisation intended to do, the speaker was 
smart and powerful enough to prevent it. 
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 The extract below is from the first officer of the St Louis accident aircraft: 
 
“I left before they announced the airplane was going to come out;  
I jumped ship real quick…” (NTSB, 2009, p. 92) 
 
Another way that pilots appeared to attempt to restore their power in the relationship with 
their employer was to downplay their reliance upon their current job for their future success. 
The Buffalo first officer hinted that she had ambitions beyond her current job: 
 
“I’ve got very very good connections at Alaska” (NTSB, 2010a, p. 251)   
 
The transcripts included direct claims that a job was turned down and more indirect sugges-
tions that the speaker was in control of whether they took a promotion or conversion to a par-
ticular type of aircraft, which is rarely the case. In the extract below, the captain describes 
how he turned down a job flying a jet: 
 
“… I turned down the job because at that time they weren't they weren't paying anything for 
training”. (Ibid., p. 204) 
 
And how the choice of aircraft he flew was his for the asking: 
 
“They gave me the choice of going on the 1900 or the Saab” (Ibid., p. 205) 
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 The first officer also appeared to have the upper hand in terms of when she would be pro-
moted: 
 
“Yeah I don’t know what to do about the upgrade. I’m not entirely in like a big rush to up-
grade” (Ibid., p. 250) 
 
First officers appeared to occupy a particularly powerless position in the airlines with talk 
dominated by disruptive base moves and the intention to move on to better things. Where pi-
lots spoke of moving to other airlines there were also carefully constructed reasons why they 
had decided not to go. The following extract was from the Lexington flight crew talking 
about moving to the United Arab Emirates: 
 
“They fly you if they can up to a hundred hours … the apartments don't allow any animals 
and I have four dogs and I'm not about to give up…  if I fly overseas, I wanna start and finish 
here in the States”. (NTSB, 2007a, p. 129) 
 
Although these might seem fruitless and misleading conversations they perform the function 
of illustrating to anyone listening that the speaker could go if they chose to do so. This asser-
tion invokes the connotation that the speaker is competent enough to walk into another better 
job with ease and on their terms, which is rarely a realistic claim. Locus of control also pro-
vides a potential explanation for talk related to high wealth and valuable possessions which 
imply wealth as was evident in the Buffalo accident transcript: 
 
“I don't have to make two hundred thousand dollars a year…  
I can certainly be comfortable on a hundred thousand”… (NTSB, 2010a, p. 255) 
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 The Charleston flight crew conducted a detailed conversation about expensive cars before 
their accident: 
 
“…it’s a 2004 fiftieth anniversary Corvette Convertible…”   
…her dad drove us in his own Rolls Royce… 
...the barn was filled with Corvettes, Jaguars… the Rolls was in there…. 
(NTSB, 2010c) 
 
The ability to decide just how much control an individual allows one’s employer to exert over 
their life is certain to be influenced by the ability to support oneself independently of em-
ployment. The survey respondents were clear that when they heard this type of conversation 
it was identified as self-promotion. However, it is important to emphasise that such conversa-
tions are probably not primarily intended to be boastful or to deceive the audience; rather 
they perform the essential function of self-esteem maintenance by reinforcing the self-
evaluation that one is self-governing and not unduly affected by outside influences beyond 
one’s control. The Buffalo accident captain emphasised that he had already had a successful 
career: 
 
“It’s like it’s a second career for me basically…because I was able to take that package” 
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 254) 
 
It is important to emphasise that the veracity of claims of wealth, which are usually difficult 
to substantiate, are of less importance than the face work performed by appearing to oneself 
and others to control one’s own destiny. Needless to say, cultural differences in locus of con-
trol exist (See Dyal,1983 for a review) but even individualist societies such as the USA have 
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seen a tendency over the last two decades towards a more external locus of control (Twenge 
et al., 2004), meaning people feel more constrained by outside influences than they did in the 
past. This incongruence between an identity that relies upon being in control and the reality 
where increasingly more aspects of their operational decision making are controlled else-
where is likely to be a continuing source of discourse on the flight deck. 
 
7.1.13. SELF-PROMOTION ON THE FLIGHT DECK 
An important observation about self-promotion on the flight deck is that it rarely co exists 
with any other explanation, indicating firstly that it is easily detected and secondly that its 
objectives are likely to be transparent to the audience.  A further observation is that all the 
behaviours participants identified as self-promotion either directly or indirectly carry conno-
tations of competence. Whether it is the ability to achieve promotion quickly, express a forth-
right opinion, acquire wealth or possessions or simply to put the interests of others first, com-
petence would seem to be connoted. IM theory assumes that a basic human motive, both in-
side or outside organizations, is to be seen by others in a favourable manner and to avoid be-
ing viewed negatively (Goffman, 1959). Self-promotion includes exaggerating or highlight-
ing one’s accomplishments and abilities in order to be viewed as competent (Rosenfeld, et al., 
1995)  and is common, especially when involving influential audiences or circumstances and 
when the self-promotional claims are  unlikely to be challenged or discredited (Ibid., p. 51). 
Pilots also need to establish role congruence; for instance the connotations of responsibility 
and stability attached to family life represent an effective way of conveying a variety of very 
influential impressions in a very short time, which may explain why such conversations are 
so common in the transcripts. Excesses of self-promotion are likely to be mitigated by the 
modesty norm, which dictates that people are perceived as more likeable when they slightly 
underplay their accomplishments (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Arguably more important than 
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the need to appear competent is the requirement to avoid looking incompetent, particularly to 
the few who may believe they fit that description. Speakers who feel it necessary to prepare 
an audience for substandard performance may adopt a process of “self-handicapping” where 
reference is made in advance to an external factor that provides a plausible explanation for 
their future  performance. Transcript examples are difficult to find, but the fragment of con-
versation below was presented by the 59 year old captain of the Chicago accident aircraft as a 
justification for his reluctance to try a new procedure. 
 
“…it's the old guy’s fear of… I don't know if I'm comfortable using the autobrakes this situa-
tion. First time…you know…having not even seen them operate before”  
(NTSB, 2007b, p. 141) 
 
In the St Louis accident report, the captain’s comment regarding his impending retirement 
was interpreted by investigators as a marker of a casual attitude: 
 
“I’m ambivalent right now. I got six months to go” (NTSB, 2009, p. 72) 
  
Although this captain had no previous history of substandard performance, it is important to 
note that the professional history of an underperforming pilot is unlikely to be known to other 
FCMs; in such cases it is possible that the pilot concerned might employ “anticipatory im-
pression management” tactics such as exaggerating their skills, downplaying their ability or 
experience limitations or intentionally avoiding topics that might reveal those limitations.  
 
This was the Buffalo captain: (NTSB, 2010a, p. 198) 
“I’d been in the airline industry for a while…I was in a management position” 
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And this was the Detroit first officer: 
 
“I’ve flown three line checks with three different captains” (NTSB, 1991b, p. 118) 
“I retired as a lieutenant Colonel” (Ibid., p. 122) 
 
In addition to mentioning one’s own achievements, there was also evidence in the transcripts 
of friends and contacts in high places. Mentioning, even indirectly, that one was well con-
nected was clearly recognised as SP but also had the potential to intimidate the listener. Both 
of the pilots of the Buffalo accident aircraft alluded to influential contacts in other companies, 
which implied that they would enjoy preferential status if they applied for a job. 
 
“I even had an interview with Pinnacle to go fly the Regional Jets because they had a prefer-
ential interview process” (NTSB, 2010a, p. 204) 
“I’ve got very very good connections at Alaska Airlines” (Ibid., p. 251) 
 
The idea that an individual can self-promote by association with someone else may seem 
counterintuitive, but Manis, Cornell and Moore (1974) have provided experimental evidence 
that human beings tend to look similarly on things that are connected even in relatively trivial 
ways. Such research findings suggest that listeners sometimes conclude that if an individual 
appears to be closely associated with others who wield influence they might be of a type that 
share other desirable skills and attributes. For this reason it is not unusual for speakers to drop 
a hint implying that they are well connected without the need to risk explicitly claiming such 
a connection. There were no clear instances of an influential affiliation being mentioned as a 
means of intimidating a listener but the survey results indicate that at least some of the re-
spondents could envisage such a situation. 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       190 
 
 
 
“… I was in a management position… well I was temporarily in a management position”. 
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 198) 
 
The extract above from the Buffalo accident captain implies that the speaker possesses the 
skills and attributes of an airline manager without actually saying so. In this case not only had 
he been temporarily involved with the management of a relatively small airline but he men-
tioned that it had merged with a much more influential airline, which may have given the im-
pression that he had been involved with the management of that company as well: 
 
“I worked for the original Piedmont Airlines merged with US Airways” (Ibid., p. 197) 
 
Clearly this vague type of discourse leaves open the possibility that a hearer might attach at-
tributes associated with others who have reached high office in the airlines to the speaker. 
This type of basking in reflected glory (referred to as BIRGing by Cialdini et al., 1976) is al-
so found where a speaker emphasises the positivity of something with which they are known 
to be associated; this study found multiple examples of crews extolling the virtues of having 
fun on the flight deck, which they appeared to believe they embodied in their operation. This 
was evident in the Kirksville accident transcript: 
 
“Gotta have fun” 
“That's truth man... gotta have fun” (NTSB, 2006a, p. 68) 
And at Buffalo: 
“Guys that have fun and enjoy their jobs are so much more pleasant to work with” … 
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 265) 
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The converse situation to basking is known as blasting and involves deriding those whose 
values one does not wish to be associated with. Transcripts from Kirksville and Lexington 
contained examples that could be interpreted as blasting with a recurrent theme of referring to 
other pilots being “uptight, taking themselves too seriously” and needing to “lighten up”. 
(NTSB, 2006a, p. 68) 
 
“Yeah, but you gotta deal with a lot of Brits and Australians”.  
“You know it some of these Brits are a little up tight”. (NTSB, 2007a, p. 131) 
 
Two examples in the Kirksville transcript conveyed sufficient force to be considered a rant 
and in both cases there was an element of blasting involved. 
 
“Too many of these [#] take themselves way too serious in this job” 
“I hate it, I've flown with them and it sucks…a month of [#] agony” (NTSB, 2006a, p. 68) 
 
7.1.14 INGRATIATION ON THE FLIGHT DECK 
Tedeschi and Melburg (1984) provide a definition of ingratiation that is reflected in the air-
line context, defining the concept as “a set of assertive tactics which have the purpose of 
gaining the approbation of an audience that controls significant rewards for the actor”.  Much 
of the literature relating to ingratiation in wider organisational settings is about getting ahead 
whereas in the flight deck it seems to be more about getting along. Kelley (1973) notes that 
initial impressions can be difficult to dislodge even in the face of contradictory new evidence 
so it is important for crews to appear to be likeable as soon as possible. Six primary ingratia-
tory strategies have been identified in other organisational settings: attitudinal conformity, 
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behavioural conformity, court and counsel, favour rendering, other enhancement, and self 
presentation (Strutton, Pelton, and Tanner, 1996). 
 
ATTITUDINAL CONFORMITY 
Attitudinal conformity occurs when an actor expresses opinions or attitudes that closely con-
form to those of a target individual. In the airline context this can entail agreeing with some-
thing that, whilst not wholly in agreement with, one holds no strong objection to. In the ex-
tract below from the Buffalo flight crew, the captain expresses attitudinal conformity with 
behaviour that he would have known was an infringement of the rules: 
First officer: …”if I felt like this when I was at home there’s no way I would have come all 
the way out here…but now that I’m out here…” 
Captain: “…you might as well…” (NTSB, 2010a, p. 196) 
 
Depending upon the force with which a target appears to hold a particular view, a speaker 
may choose to exaggerate their support for their target’s view. One can also signal agreement 
by the use of imitation: in at least two of the transcripts (Chicago and Kirksville) there was 
some evidence of imitation of a colleague’s verbal behaviour. 
 
First officer: “The weather outside is frightful (in a sing voice)” 
 Captain: “The weather outside is rosey” (NTSB, 2007b, p. 122) 
 
Captain: “Gotta have fun.”   First officer: “That’s the truth man; gotta have fun”  
(NTSB, 2006a, p. 68) 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       193 
 
 
This type of imitation is likely to invoke the similarity attraction paradigm, which suggests 
that perceived similarity among dyadic “partners” increases their mutual attractiveness to one 
another (Byrne, 1971). 
 
COURT AND COUNSEL 
“Court and Counsel” describes the tactic of asking an influential target for their opinion or 
advice on a subject, thereby emphasising how much their opinion is valued. Enquiring of a 
manager what they thought of your interview technique represents quite a blunt instrument in 
terms of court and counsel but there was a description of such an event, where the Buffalo 
accident captain described a discussion he had with his interviewer after interviewing for his 
current job: 
 
“I interviewed with …and I asked him after the interview…I said you know that was an hon-
est answer; I’d be more challenged in the Saab. He said no man that was a perfect answer” 
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 206) 
 
A more identifiable manifestation of this on the flight deck would be the act of resisting the 
temptation to explain that one already knows some technical detail or procedure that is being 
carefully explained. In the example below, the same captain is explaining how to fill in the 
technical log, which the first officer, who had been qualified on the type for eleven months, 
probably knew anyway. 
 
Captain: “you don't write it in until you land there”  
First officer: “right that makes sense” (Ibid., p. 238)  
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FAVOUR-RENDERING 
Rendering a favour to a colleague by verbal means in the flight deck context was uncommon 
in the transcripts. However, Strutton & Pelton (1998) provide a sense of the abstract nature of 
favour rendering possible in organisational settings by suggesting that even the type of feign-
ing of interest shown above represents a favour rendered. In this case the favour may be as 
abstract as avoiding the speaker’s embarrassment by not mentioning that he is teaching you 
something you already know. Favour-rendering involves the actor’s conveyance of some kind 
act or special consideration to a target; both sharing a confidence and offering sympathy or 
empathy to a colleague fit into this description, as do face-saving or enhancing measures. In 
the first example below, the Buffalo accident captain renders the favour of sympathy, whilst 
the second represents the favour of sharing a confidence. 
 
“I feel…bad for you as far as feeling #”. (Ibid., p. 196) 
 
“I was gonna tell you something. I didn't want to really say it…uh in front of the ramp guys” 
(Ibid., p. 194) 
 
All forms of favour-rendering have potential to be motivated by the reciprocity norm; the ex-
pectation that an addressee might behave in a similar fashion to you in the future. The storing 
of favours may be particularly useful for the underperforming pilot. Applebaum and Hughes 
(1998) comment that individuals with low productivity but high ingratiation skills can 
achieve career success despite limitations in the way they do their job. This however, does 
not explain why so much indirect favour rendering from pilots who were considered compe-
tent was heard in the transcripts. Both captains and first officers agreed to infringe rules, 
gloss over errors, and feign agreement and interest. The fragment below was the Lexington 
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captain’s response to his first officer asking for an already complete checklist, which would 
probably have been a source of mild embarrassment for the first officer: 
 
“Hey man, we already did that one” (NTSB, 2007a, p. 143) 
 
Research with interdisciplinary surgical teams (Edmondson, 2003) indicated that under react-
ing to an error in the way indicated above, was an effective strategy for leaders to mitigate the 
effects of power differences within the team. Furthermore effective team leaders sometimes 
made a point of acting upon others’ inputs thereby emphasising the importance of the team. 
Such transformational leadership was not always evident from the transcripts, some of the 
exchanges in these examples of SFP being more akin to the transactional leadership de-
scribed by Burns (1978) which entail an exchange between leader and follower, where fol-
lowers receive certain valued outcomes on condition that they act according to their leader's 
wishes. The pilot who disagrees with a colleague over an operational matter has a number of 
factors at stake. Firstly the loss of face implied by having an opinion dismissed is likely to 
invoke the need to remedy the situation in the interests of self-image maintenance. In such 
cases the feigning of either agreement or ambivalence is predictable, as was the case in this 
exchange between the two FCMs who crashed on takeoff at Washington in 1982.  
 
First officer: “do you want me to do anything special for this or just go for it” 
Captain: “unless you got anything special you'd like to do”…  (NTSB, 1982, pp. 126 127) 
 
In this case the first officer did have a plan regarding how he would fly the takeoff but he on-
ly voiced it once he had sounded out his captain’s opinion, thereby avoiding the possibility 
that his suggestion would be rejected. The captain’s vagueness was highly inappropriate giv-
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en the poor weather conditions that existed. A second explanation evident in the transcripts is 
an apparent reluctance of FCMs to be viewed as being excessively rigid in their outlook in 
case they attract negative evaluations from colleagues; this phenomenon was evident in the 
Kirksville and Lexington transcripts. In fact what is being described is a transaction or deal 
between the two pilots in which both have a stake. The fragment below was the Chicago ac-
cident first officer’s response to his captain’s reluctance to comply with a prescribed proce-
dure: 
“…I would be cool with whatever your decision is” (NTSB, 2007b, p. 141) 
 
In addition to the “valued outcomes” for the individual that Burns (1978) believed character-
ised such transactions, it is also conceivable that such behaviour is enacted for the benefit of 
the organisation, particularly when organisational and personal needs coincide. The type of 
helping behaviour above has been identified as an important form of citizenship behaviour by 
virtually everyone who has worked in this area (cf. Borman & Motowidlo, 1993, 1997; 
George & Brief, 1992; George & Jones, 1997; Graham, 1989; Organ, 1988, 1990a, 1990b; 
Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983; Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996; Williams & Anderson, 1991). 
The notion of voluntarily helping a colleague thereby avoiding work-related problems is intu-
itively understandable and has been conceptualised by Organ (1990a) as the construct peace-
making in his model of Organisational Citizenship Behaviour. Organ’s peacemaking con-
struct emphasised the importance of resolving or mitigating unconstructive interpersonal con-
flicts in the interest of the organisation’s needs. This begins to explain why so much of the 
cooperative conversation heard in the transcripts has an undercurrent of non-compliance with 
organisational norms. The first officer at Chicago cited above, who said he would agree with 
“whatever his captain decided” was not in a position to make that decision at the time of 
speaking because he could not predict what those decisions might be. In fact the captain’s 
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decision was found by the investigation to have infringed a rule in relation to the amount of 
tailwind accepted for the accident landing (NTSB, 2007b, p. 67), so it is clear that such a 
blanket statement of intent to agree was not appropriate. However, the first officer had noth-
ing to gain personally by adopting that stance so it is conceivable that his behaviour, although 
errant, was enacted in the organisation’s interest. An explanation for this type of non-
compliance is found in the conflict between Organ’s peacemaking within the flight deck and 
complying with organisational norms. In such cases there may be considerable pressure to 
conform to the needs of the immediate group because if team performance is eroded then the 
interests of the organisation are likely to suffer (Podsakoff et al., 1997). In the flight deck 
context, the successful outcome of a flight is dependent on the combined performance of the 
flight crew, thus it could be argued that when one is likely to be judged upon the team’s effort 
rather than individually, there is an incentive to help one’s direct colleagues to achieve suc-
cessful outcomes regardless of their methods. Thus in some cases complying with group 
norms rather than organisational norms could be seen as beneficial to the organisation. In 
wider organisational settings the incidence of ingratiatory behaviour is higher in the upper 
levels of management (Allen et al., 1979, p. 80); furthermore, in such contexts most ingratia-
tory behaviour is observed from subordinate to superior. Thus in most organisational settings 
ingratiation tends to be used more as an upward influence process than as a downward influ-
ence processes. The flight deck context emerged as qualitatively different insofar as although 
the rest of the crewmembers are subordinate to the captain, she/he has very little scope to re-
turn any material favour such as career advancement, which suggests that there must be other 
motivations at work. The transcripts and expert opinion expressed by Deborah Hersman in 
the Lexington accident report suggest that for some flight crews, behaviours such as infring-
ing the sterile cockpit rule might represent the norms of the group (NTSB, 2007a, p. 113).  
The ingratiatory effect of ignoring that a colleague is breaking a rule is intuitively under-
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standable but it is also conceivable that such rule breaking is an example of prosocial behav-
iour. A well-documented characteristic of prosocial behaviour is that it is strongly influenced 
by the models of behaviour that represent the target individual or group. This means that in-
dividuals may feel compelled to behave in line with the group norms out of a belief that they 
would not be being a good team member if they refused to do so. Although it is impossible to 
generalise from the small sample of transcripts used for this research, there is an indication 
that for some crews, a model of sociability expressed via conversation is a dominant proso-
cial behaviour in the flight deck context. This is not surprising given the considerable evi-
dence linking sociability to concepts such as transformational leadership (Bass, 1988) and 
charismatic leadership (House, 1977) and the negative connotations attached to being unso-
ciable. Krebs (1970) reviewed more than two dozen modelling studies and concluded that so 
long as a given behaviour appears salient, and expectations and consequences are clear, group 
members are likely to consider participation in such behaviour as a prosocial act. Further-
more, at some point a pattern of social exchange is initiated (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 
1975) which becomes subject to broader norms of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Put simply 
this means that if the behaviour appears reasonable it is likely to be adopted, and once that 
has happened, group members will feel uncomfortable not complying. Existing research 
(Barling, Weber & Kelloway, 1996) indicates that the level of commitment a leader demon-
strates to an organisational norm influences the likelihood of followers behaving similarly. 
The transcripts support the notion that if a captain appears to support a group norm such as 
sterile cockpit rule infringement there is a strong possibility that a subordinate might behave 
in a similar way. If the group norm conflicts with the organisational norms the subordinate is 
faced with a problem of cognitive dissonance where self-concept may be threatened by the 
choice between breaking a rule or appearing to be anti-social, neither of which are likely to 
represent their desired-self. It was proposed earlier that the maintenance of self-concept may 
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be under control of the autonomic nervous system, in which case the reduction of psycholog-
ical discomfort might provide the subconscious motivation to view a rule infringement such 
as conducting a non-pertinent conversation as desirable rather than aberrant behaviour. In-
stances of both upward and downward ingratiation were evident in the transcripts, and whilst 
the research outlined above mainly addresses upward ingratiation very little has been written 
about ingratiation from superior to subordinate. In addition to the simple rational explanation 
that it costs nothing to offer a compliment and it may improve crew cohesion there may be 
organisational objectives that are served by downward ingratiation. The transcripts indicate 
that subordinates often view the captain as a link to the wider organisation, which suggests 
that as a superior they need to be sensitive to both group and organisational needs. Sympa-
thising or empathising with a colleague could well qualify as an OCB if it is enacted with the 
intention of defusing a situation that was affecting their work. In one transcript extract in-
volving a co-pilot who was in dispute with the organisation regarding her leave allocation 
(NTSB, 2010a, pp. 217-222) the captain commented that he understood her problem, sug-
gested who to contact but stopped short of agreeing with the organisational shortcomings ex-
pressed. It is conceivable that faced with a co-pilot who appeared stressed the captain may 
have considered it a higher priority to express agreement than to voice a potentially conflict-
ing view. This is an example of how ingratiation can be used as an OCB by appearing to 
agree even if in reality one takes an opposing position.  Research by Bavelas (1985) has 
found that speakers who are faced with a situation like the one above, where to fully support 
the criticism of the organisation would probably not conform to their professional responsi-
bilities or actual opinion, whereas to disagree would alienate their colleague, are in a bind 
known as avoidance/avoidance conflict (AAC). Bavelas observed that in such situations 
speakers use a variety of strategies to avoid revealing their true opinion, of which ingratiation 
may be one. One of the most convincing explanations for downward favour rendering relates 
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to the mutual reliance required by the flight deck role. Specifically, task groups characterized 
by reciprocal interdependence are expected to display more citizenship behaviour than groups 
in which independence or sequential dependence is the rule. According to Thompson 
(1967: 54-55) reciprocal interdependence requires frequent instances of spontaneous mutual 
adjustment in order to effect coordination of the type evident at Lexington: 
“…run the checklist at your leisure…” 
“…keep me out of trouble. I'll do the same for you” (NTSB, 2007a: p. 139) 
 
One favour that captains regularly offer to first officers is the opportunity to choose which leg 
of a trip they fly. This very common practice involving flying alternating legs of a trip was 
evident in the Lexington transcript (Ibid., p. 136). This type of favour, although seemingly 
unremarkable, carries some symbolic relevance inasmuch as it signifies that the captain trusts 
the first officer to make a decision that he/she would normally make. Gillespie (2003) has 
identified the type of “reliance” described above as a salient form of trusting behaviour in 
working relationships. When superiors share control they demonstrate significant trust in, and 
respect for, their subordinates. Subordinates value being involved in decision making because 
it affirms their standing and worth in the organisation. Despite these positive features of dele-
gating control, the transcripts provided evidence that sometimes such offers are refused, and 
this has also been observed in naturalistic observations conducted for this study. An im-
portant feature of such offers is that they only operate in a downward direction from captain 
to first officer and this is true of most operational favours that are conceivable on the flight 
deck. Whilst favours that cannot be reciprocated have been found to be a particularly effec-
tive ingratiatory tactic, the downside is that they emphasise the unequal power relationship 
omnipresent on the flight deck. This is the type of offer that has potential to pose a threat to 
the self-esteem of the subordinate, particularly if it is a persistent feature of one’s subordinate 
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role. This phenomenon may explain the tendency for first officers to often refuse to make the 
decision, returning it to the captain. Although probably subconscious, this could be interpret-
ed as an indication of the pervasiveness of self-esteem maintenance processes. The extract 
below sees the captain offering the first officer the choice of which leg to fly. The first of-
ficer’s dismissive refusal to choose represents a considerable contrast to the way in which 
offers of kindness are handled in everyday conversation. This may be a subconscious attempt 
to regain some power in the interaction; however, the captain reasserts his power in the ex-
change by insisting that he is not intending to decide.  Ambivalence, such as that expressed 
by the first officer below, can be a useful device in the hands of less powerful participants for 
dealing with those with power; but those with power may respond by enforcing explicitness 
(Fairclough, 1989) as was the case at Lexington: 
 
Captain:  “did you bring it (the aircraft) in the other day or what's the sequence?” 
“...keep on with whatever you're doing 
” First officer:   “it don't matter to me” 
Captain:      “Oh, I'm easy buddy”   (Ibid., p. 139) 
 
Fairclough also notes that powerful participants in an interaction are often in a position to 
specify its content and purposes. He suggests that one way of exercising power in discourse is 
by placing constraints upon the contributions of less powerful participants. Although this was 
not evident in the transcripts, it is conceivable that a subordinate might subconsciously at-
tempt to steer a conversation towards a topic where such power inequality is less likely to be 
manifest. Whilst Fairclough describes such controlling of conversation topics as a conscious 
process enacted to exercise power, in this context it may be used to minimise power inequali-
ty. There were several examples of captains either self-deprecating or emphasising the simi-
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larity between themselves and the first officer, as in this extract from Buffalo accident cap-
tain: 
 
“But it would happen, the exact same thing with me as it would with you”  
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 186) 
 
For a captain, minimising power inequality in this way would seem to be motivated by altru-
ism whereas for a first officer, steering a conversation away from topics that persistently em-
phasise their relative powerlessness might be a subconscious response to autonomic stress so 
induced. This introduces the possibility that a conversation relating to a more equal topic 
such as family life could be enacted for a range of reasons depending on who initiates it. Fur-
thermore the motives may range from self-image maintenance to the exercise of organisa-
tional citizenship. 
 
OTHER ENHANCEMENT 
Other enhancement is really a technical term for flattery; the tactic of expressing laudatory 
appraisals of a target whilst diverting attention from any negative features. Where direct flat-
tery did occur it was usually referring to a preference for colleagues who adopted a relaxed 
approach to the way they operated. There were two clear instances of praise being given in 
response to a conversation about helping a colleague; in both cases the conversation that 
prompted the flattery was unsolicited by the addressee. Although the transcripts contained 
very few instances of direct flattery there were many instances of flattery of a third party. It is 
not clear what purpose this serves except perhaps to indicate that one is the type of person 
who habitually says nice things about others and is therefore unlikely to say anything nega-
tive to others about the addressee.  Less overt flattery was evident in imitation of the exact 
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phrases used by a colleague and in some cases this appeared to support actions that would fall 
outside organisational norms but perhaps satisfy the social norms of the pilot group. The 
flight deck emerged as an environment where individuals who are sometimes only marginally 
acquainted share confidences or express intentions, some of which they would not wish to be 
made public. Although it may seem unusual for marginally acquainted individuals such as the 
FCMs in the Buffalo accident to share confidences or express forthright personal opinions, 
Granovetter (1973) provided a mathematical framework whereby individuals who share ac-
quaintances despite not knowing one another, are likely to readily develop strong relation-
ships. It was evident early in the conversation between the two marginally acquainted FCMs 
at Buffalo that whilst other members of the pilot community could be trusted with certain 
types of information, this would not necessarily be the case for outsiders such as ramp agents, 
cabin attendants or the wider organisation. 
 
“I was gonna tell you something. I didn't want to really say it in front of the ramp guys” 
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 194) 
 
The survey respondents were very clear that they viewed confidence sharing as a manifesta-
tion of normal friendliness first and ingratiation next. In fact, being sociable is an important 
feature of coalition building but it does seem likely that a by-product of such friendships is 
cliquishness that is effective at the level of the individual group (in this case the pilot com-
munity) but less so at an organisational level. This may represent the basis for an explanation 
of the seemingly widespread willingness to view rules like the sterile cockpit rule as amena-
ble to interpretation at the level of the professional group rather than at the organisational 
level. 
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SELF-PRESENTATION 
Self-presentation as an ingratiatory tactic refers to behaviour that emphasises characteristics 
that are known to be approved of by the target audience. Schlenker (1986, p. 23) has provided 
a potentially useful approach to understanding “others as an audience”. He uses the broader 
term “self-identification” to refer to the "process, means, or result of showing oneself to be a 
particular type of person, thereby specifying one's identity". Generally speaking, the motive 
to engage in self-presentation springs from the same motivational source as all behaviour, 
namely to maximize expected rewards and minimize expected punishments (Schlenker, 
1980). Although Schlenker’s view ignores the possibility of altruistic behaviour there is like-
ly to be some truth in his model of human motivation. An important determinant in the inci-
dence of self-presentation is the value of the desired goal, and this is different for different 
individuals and contexts. A first officer nearing upgrade may have a stronger motivation than 
a new hire to self-present as competent and this motivation may be further enhanced if up-
grades are scarce. Even though on routine flights first officers are not evaluated, the tran-
scripts suggest that the maintenance of a competent professional image is important. Refer-
ring back to Goffman (1959) it is important to be seen in a positive light, and for a pilot this 
includes portrayal of competence. Where one’s self-image is under threat, the motivation to 
indulge in self-presentation is likely to be greater. As a result, people often try to make im-
pressions that will elicit esteem enhancing reactions, particularly when they expect feedback 
from others (Schneider, 1969).  At the heart of self-esteem is the discrepancy between one’s 
desired and current images. Individuals have a range of images that they regard as acceptable 
to project. When they believe that the impressions others have of them fall outside this range 
they become motivated to actively manage their impressions. Thus, it is predicted that a pilot 
with a self-esteem issue (such as a history of substandard performance) might be motivated to 
seize any opportunity to self-present as competent to an influential audience. If, as is ex-
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pected, such a tactic elicits compliments or praise, that will serve to enhance self-esteem. 
Self-presentation allows individuals to maximize their reward cost ratio as they deal with 
others (Schlenker, 1980). The tangible reward for an underperforming pilot is the hope that 
one’s current image might be steered in the direction of one’s desired image because under-
performance is a psychologically uncomfortable state. The potential cost is that the attempt is 
obvious to the audience, in which case one’s image might be further damaged. In the aviation 
context there is an assumption of competence that tends to militate against routine aggressive 
self-presentation among pilots who meet accepted standards. This means that a pilot indulg-
ing in self-presentation risks being viewed with suspicion by colleagues because the desired 
identity of many pilots is one where their competence is evident from their actions rather than 
stories about their own qualities. 
 
7.1.15 EXEMPLIFICATION ON THE FLIGHT DECK 
Exemplification occurs when individuals go above and beyond what is necessary or expected 
in order to be perceived as committed or hardworking. Although survey respondents recog-
nised the phenomenon of pilots who talk of rule stretching and acceptance of inconvenience 
in the interests of the organisation, where such talk occurred in the transcripts the beneficiar-
ies tended to be other colleagues. There was also some evidence that pilots preferred to talk 
about situations in which they acted in line with group norms rather than organisation norms. 
 
7.1.16 CREW COHESION ON THE FLIGHT DECK 
The participants’ responses indicated that agreeing was an important factor in conveying the 
sense that there was a common objective on the flight deck. Pilots back-pedalled in discus-
sions and agreed with comments that they had previously appeared to disagree with. This 
type of responsiveness to other team members’ contributions has been shown to have the ef-
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fect of building consensus and a range of other features reflecting the social climate (Bales, 
1976; Rogers & Farace, 1975). Research involving groups as diverse as gangs (Conquergood, 
1994) and rural communities (Heath, 1983) indicate that the adoption of a common lexicon is 
a subtle linguistic device commonly used to promote cohesion within social groups. The lexi-
con of cohesion on the flight deck appeared to centre upon interest in, and support for the in-
group represented by the immediate pilot community. There was also a recurrent unofficial 
lexicon associated with critique of out groups such as other pilots, airlines and support staff. 
Traditionally, cohesion research has emphasised the role of interpersonal attraction (See Lott 
and Lott, 1965) but recurrent features of the transcript conversations, such as the marked ten-
dency towards intra-crew agreement (See Bennett, 2010) and criticism of out-groups of 
whom the speaker had no detailed knowledge, indicate that crew cohesion may be more mul-
ti-faceted in the flight deck context than in more general contexts. For instance, intra-crew 
disagreements were very quickly resolved in the transcripts whereas conversations relating to 
out groups such as managers were longer and more complex. More recent social-cohesion 
research has focused upon how individuals align what they say with the characteristic fea-
tures of the social group for tactical reasons. Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) 
introduced the idea that people categorise themselves as either individuals or group members 
depending on the context pertaining. An important aspect of categorising oneself as a social 
group member is the depersonalising effect this has. In such contexts the speaker speaks not 
as a unique individual but in terms of the social group’s defining features or prototype. In-
group prototypes tend to be positive whilst out-group prototypes tend to be negative (Dion, 
2000, p 19.), an observation which was supported by the transcripts. The transcripts indicated 
that out-groups including managers, pilots from other bases and those not embodying the 
group identity were subject to derogatory comments whereas those who embodied the defin-
ing features of the in-group, such as being “relaxed” and “having fun” were discussed in posi-
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tive terms during flight deck conversations. This orientation towards in-group sociability 
suggests that, in line with existing research (e.g. Fitzgibbons et al., 2004) the pilots in the 
transcripts were extraverts who enjoyed interacting with other members of their social group. 
According to Watson & Clark (2004) extraversion is associated with “positive affect”, in oth-
er words, being upbeat about life, which in turn increases social cohesion. Another common 
strand in flight deck conversations was the expression of interest in a colleague’s personal 
life, a type of person-oriented behaviour that has been associated with the enhancement of 
social cohesiveness (Tjosvold, 1984 and Stogdill, 1974). The current research indicated that 
expressing an interest in a colleague’s personal life was interpreted as normal friendliness and 
cohesive behaviour, a finding that accords well with research such as Rozell & Gundersen 
(2003) whose research supports the notion that group cohesion can be influenced by demon-
strating this type of emotional connection with an addressee. Given that pilots appear to be 
aware of the strategic value in terms of social cohesion of such talk, it is understandable that 
the content should be targeted at maximising its effectiveness. Social cohesion is achieved by 
emphasising similarities; however, the hierarchical structure of the flight deck means that any 
discussion of work related matters has potential to be influenced by the unequal power rela-
tions therein. This is more than just intuition; even in sociable conversations related to work, 
captains were more able to disagree or offer advice to a first officer than vice versa. Notably, 
in two separate transcripts, captains were heard talking about jobs that would have required 
that they fly as a first officer; in neither instance did the captain demonstrate much enthusi-
asm for the idea. This indicates that whilst the first officers in the transcripts tended to be dis-
satisfied with their lot, captains were less so. First officers had two persistent conversation 
topics; their command prospects and their attempts to progress to a major airline. For cap-
tains, the former issue was clearly irrelevant and the latter becomes less of an option as they 
get used to being in command. Nonetheless as this is a persistent topic it is conceivable that 
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captains might choose to “self-present” as being similarly affected in the interests of minimis-
ing the perceived differences between the two colleagues. What is being proposed here is that 
captains not only strategically avoid discussing aspects of their professional situation that 
emphasise their relatively advantaged position but sometimes they actively de-emphasise that 
position. Philips, et al. (2009) theorised that members of demographically diverse work 
groups may strategically disclose personal information at work in order to manage the per-
ceived differences in status associated with demographic categories. They focus upon group 
members’ concerns over increasing the perception of social distance, and theorise that both 
low and high status group members might selectively disclose personal information in work 
settings to minimise status differences and increase group cohesion. However, they also 
acknowledge that the longer group members spend together the more they learn about one 
another and so it becomes more difficult to practice this strategy. Where selective disclosure 
is not possible it is conceivable that social distance between group members could be wid-
ened (Phillips et al., 2009, p. 724). Disclosure of personal information emerges as a tactic to 
be used judiciously, with the potential for differing outcomes depending on a range of factors 
such as the length of time two pilots have known one another and crucially, the sensitivity of 
the speaker. On any given day the members of a flight crew will vary along a continuum be-
tween quite similar to very dissimilar; in the Buffalo accident the captain was a 47 year old 
man and the first officer was a 24 year old woman. It is reasonable to speculate that these two 
pilots had little in common other than their chosen occupation.  This study has discussed the 
implications for cohesion of excessive work related talk but where should the conversation go 
if two people have very little in common? The transcripts indicate that talking about family 
life is an effective way of disclosing important information in a timely fashion; the first of-
ficer above disclosed her city of residence, her marital status and her plans to buy property, 
all in the first significant sentence she contributed. In fact, marital status often emerges as a 
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discussion point quite early in conversation and this probably has to do with the amount of 
information conveyed by that single fact. Theories of cognitive economy propose that human 
beings categorise concepts on the basis of what they already know about them. Being married 
implies that in many, but not all cases there may be some shared experience regarding chil-
dren. The conversation can then spread out in many safe directions because the dominant 
model of what family life means is so clearly defined. The importance of establishing some 
common ground between colleagues cannot be overemphasised because it has been shown 
that introducing a topic in which there is no shared interest often falls flat (Stasser and Titus, 
1985, 1987) and contributes neither positively nor negatively to cohesion. The incidence in 
the transcripts of talk that minimised power differences within the group was so prolific that 
it appeared to represent an essential component of the flight deck group prototype. It was also 
proposed earlier that the influence of a strong group prototype can result in speakers behaving 
in ways that embody the values of the social group but may be counter to their own norms of 
behaviour. If this proposition is accepted, it goes some way to explaining the hitherto unex-
plained reason for uncharacteristically unprofessional behaviour from pilots who had a good 
reputation. On the other hand, this portrayal of pilots is problematic given some of the per-
sonality features mentioned earlier, such as “internal locus of control”, which would seem to 
militate against such influences. The answer to this problem may lie in the strength of the sa-
lient features of the flight deck context which distinguish it from everyday life. For instance, 
pilots exercise a degree of autonomy when “in role” that is unusual for non-management 
grade employees. They also enjoy a high level of respect from the public that probably stems 
from a reliance on the pilots’ professional skills to secure their safety. They wear a uniform; 
they comply with a defined hierarchical structure and they identify with the organisation 
whenever they transmit on the radio or make a passenger announcement. Hogg and Hardie 
(1991) studied the group identity of members of a sports team and found that judgements 
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about those team members were more closely linked to the characteristics of being a team 
member rather than their individual characteristics. The salience of the group identity is cru-
cial in this process; where a group identity is strong enough to result in a noticeable change in 
the way a person acts or is viewed by observers it can justifiably be considered a highly sali-
ent identity. Naturalistic research (e.g. Hogg & Hardie, 1991: Hogg & Hains, 1996) indicates 
that in contexts where the group is highly salient, the most effective way for an individual 
group member to gain a favourable evaluation is to identify strongly with the group proto-
type. Although there were some recurrent characteristics of the flight deck group, such as 
friendliness and interest towards immediate colleagues and occasional cynicism and critique 
towards those outside the immediate group, it was also clear that individuals’ professional 
standards were highly influential in modifying the group identity on any given flight. This 
means that in the face of a captain deciding that a flight will be conducted in a particular fash-
ion it is likely to be difficult for a first officer to adopt an opposing position and still retain a 
cohesive working environment. The transcripts include several examples of first officers go-
ing along with unauthorised conversations seemingly because it fitted with the group proto-
type as modified by a particular captain. Although this represents a cognitive dissonance is-
sue because it is likely that at least one participant would be falling short of their own stand-
ards, the depersonalising effect of behaving in line with the group identity would seem to fa-
cilitate such action. As long as group identity is complied with it will be possible for speakers 
to speak in ways they might not wish to in more public contexts. The extract below features 
the words of the captain who became a national hero after ditching an Airbus in the River 
Hudson. His communication skills were described as “excellent and professional” by investi-
gators: 
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“I'm gonna just call this guy directly because I don't think this ops guy knows what the # he's 
doing” (NTSB, 2010b, p. 156) 
In several transcripts there is at least one sideswipe at a group or individual outside the direct 
group but very restrained criticism of any transgressions within the group. Several common 
strands appear in such conversations, including a narrative suggesting that standards or effi-
ciency outside the social group may not be as high as within the social group. There is also a 
persistent narrative strand related to the perceived inadequacy of management. The fragment 
below is part of a telephone conversation conducted by the captain of the Charleston accident 
immediately after the accident, commenting on the likelihood of being able to contact a man-
ager by phone. 
“I mean obviously neither of them are gonna answer their phone” (NTSB, 2010c, p. 12-30) 
In summary, the transcripts suggest that safe topics such as family life are often used as a 
conversation starter enacted to find some common ground between speakers. Research from 
other contexts suggests that the strategic management of disclosure of personal information 
can reduce social distance and thereby improve group cohesion. The accident literature con-
tains clear instances of pilots strategically withholding personal information. The avoidance 
of work related topics as a tactic to minimise unequal power relations offers a plausible ex-
planation for the incidence of the seemingly mundane conversations in the transcripts. 
Unique features of the pilot group identity make it highly salient, which provides a motiva-
tion to speak in ways that reinforce that identity. The transcripts indicate that embodying the 
characteristics of being a pilot might outweigh the influence of being a part of the organisa-
tional group. This observation is based upon the ease with which pilots discuss their career 
independently of their current employer. This formulation of a cohesive group within the 
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flight deck appears to be strengthened by the notion that those outside the inner circle of the 
pilot group are a legitimate target for criticism. 
 
7.1.17 SELF-JUSTIFICATION ON THE FLIGHT DECK 
Self-justification is a tactic to control the state of psychological tension that occurs whenever 
a person holds two inconsistent cognitions, such as the belief that one can still be considered 
highly professional despite infringing a rule. This situation induces a state of cognitive disso-
nance which is likely to be harmful to an individual’s self-image if not checked. Cognitive 
dissonance reduction is viewed by many experts as an adaptive strategy, or a primary cogni-
tive mechanism which may or may not be engaged in consciously by the individual. The tran-
scripts suggest that there are two broad types of justifications, those that are pre-rehearsed 
and those that are enacted in reaction to a threat to self-concept. It is important to note that 
self-justifications appear to perform two distinct functions, maintaining one’s identity to the 
outside world and matching up to one’s own self-concept.  The former is likely to be highly 
influenced by a schema related to how pilots behave at work, and this will define the types of 
justifications that pilots use in a range of situations. The latter is constrained by an individu-
al’s self-concept such that regardless of what the outside world thinks of one’s behavior, if it 
fails to meet one’s own self-concept a range of adaptive processes are likely to be invoked. In 
practice what appears to occur in such cases is that the individual subconsciously justifies the 
infringement in the interests of confirming that they meet the standards that define their self-
concept. None of the transcripts provided any hint that the pilots were uncomfortable break-
ing the sterile cockpit rule, an observation, which supports the view that these pilots had in-
corporated this type of behaviour into their model of how a professional pilot should behave. 
This is an important observation because it indicates that these pilots did not view this type of 
infringement as a challenge to their self-concept otherwise they would have been motivated 
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to stop. Flight deck conversations represent a challenge to self-image due to several compet-
ing requirements, including the need to communicate effectively, the need to comply with the 
sterile cockpit rule and the need to work as a team member. The founder of cognitive disso-
nance theory, Leon Festinger describes cognitive dissonance reduction as a basic process in 
human beings, which implies that like most motivations it occurs without the conscious effort 
of the individual involved. This means pilots will be motivated to embrace ideas that justify 
their conversations on the flight deck, and these are quite readily found. Potential justifica-
tions could include the fact that pilots are encouraged to make passenger announcements and 
respond to ACARS messages as they prepare to depart. These two phenomena featured in 
serious incidents at Seattle (NTSB, 2008a) and Hong Kong (Civil Aviation Department Hong 
Kong, 2011) respectively. Also most pilots understand that although the sterile cockpit rule 
usually only applies on the ground if the aircraft is moving, it is equally possible to miss a 
crucial clearance or omit an essential action due to distraction whilst the aircraft is stationary, 
as was the case at Dallas (NTSB, 1989). These and other practices provide plenty of scope for 
an individual to justify the occasional conversation during a sterile cockpit period. It should 
be emphasized that these are not necessarily examples of flagrant rule breaking; they repre-
sent behaviour motivated by the human need to meet the standards of one’s own self-image. 
In time the process of cognitive dissonance reduction is likely to find ways to justify the be-
haviour and then the motivation to change is gone. Until cognitive dissonance is controlled, 
such issues are moral problems concerned with weighing what one believes is right against 
what is dictated by the rules. The transcripts indicate that the tension between acceptable 
moral behaviour and professional rules provides much scope for cognitive dissonance issues. 
In the Buffalo accident transcript the captain is heard consenting to fly with a first officer 
who was clearly unwell (NTSB, 2010a, p. 196). In this case his responsibility to ensure that 
all his crew members were fit to fly might have conflicted with his perceived moral obliga-
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tion to avoid getting a colleague into trouble by refusing to fly with her. In cases like this 
where all the options challenge an aspect of one’s self-concept, speakers sometimes down-
play the importance of their actions. In this example the captain emphasized the trivial nature 
of the first officer’s illness by suggesting it could be remedied with orange juice (Ibid., p. 
196). The only justification from the first officer was that she was “pretty tough”, (Ibid., p. 
196) which represented a denial of the true impact of her behaviour. Both denial and triviali-
zation are well documented justification tactics. Retrospective judgments in the literature, of 
this FCM’s actions indicate that neither of these justifications would have gained approval 
from any of the stakeholders in aviation safety so these justifications were almost certainly 
not primarily concerned with how her peers might view her actions. The obvious alternative 
explanation is that these self-justifications were a way of conceptualizing the behaviour to 
make it fit with her self-concepts. Cognitive dissonance reduction usually involves justifica-
tion that reinforces a sense of an ethical or moral justification for the rule infringement. This 
FCM’s justification was mostly that by reporting for duty she would be “on the company’s 
buck” (Ibid., p. 196), meaning that the company would be financially responsible for her wel-
fare. This is an exceptional justification inasmuch as it makes no pretence of an ethical or 
moral justification for the behaviour.  This important and unusual observation suggests that 
no cognitive dissonance existed, which means that although the speaker knew it was wrong, 
the behaviour caused no psychological discomfort. Given that any pilot would be aware that 
flying when unwell was breaking a rule, it is reasonable to suggest that a pilot breaking such 
a rule without any serious attempt to justify it, was acting in accordance with their self-
concept.  This in turn prompts an examination of the factors that might contribute to a pilot’s 
self-concept adapting in such a way as to justify such behaviour. Research into work motiva-
tion (See Leonard et al., 1999 for a review of traditional work-motivation theories) indicates 
that where inequity exists between inputs and rewards, cognitive dissonance will result. This 
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means that an employee who perceives that they are undervalued may be motivated to lower 
their standards to a level where they feel they are achieving equity. Whether justified or not, 
this first officer gave several indications that she thought she was undervalued by the organi-
zation (NTSB, 2010a, pp. 217-220). Where a mismatch exists between what seems to be right 
and what actually occurs, a cognitive dissonance issue is likely. This is an issue that airline 
managements should not turn their back on. Any worker who feels there is inequity between 
what they are expected to give in terms of professionalism and how they are treated is likely 
to be subject to unconscious motivations that result in a reduction in the quality of their self-
concept which could result in a decline in their work performance. Arguably, the most potent 
threat to a pilot’s self-concept is the realisation that he or she is on the borderline in terms of 
the competence required by their role. Although mentioning that a job has been turned down 
is mainly associated with self-promotion it plays an important role for the pilot who cannot 
change jobs because it is just too risky. Any pilot who has failed multiple check rides (as was 
the case with the Buffalo captain) will not only have a documented history but will very like-
ly experience similar difficulties in a new job. However, for many pilots there is a well-
defined career structure that often involves progressively better jobs for the first few years of 
one’s career. If it is clear that this is not happening to an individual, there is potential for this 
to become a matter for discussion. One of the Lexington pilots spoke of the need to blend in 
in the airlines (NTSB, 2007a, p. 131) and this includes progressing at a normal rate. The first 
officer at Buffalo discussed how her peers seemed to be in a hurry to be upgraded whereas 
she was happy to wait to gain more experience (NTSB, 2010a, p. 251). This strategy, known 
as “disassociation” involves distancing oneself from any possible negative outcomes by as-
serting in this case that, for quite honourable reasons one is not seeking an upgrade. This can 
also further enhance self-concept by calling into question the actions of those who behave 
differently. This tactic of justifying an action on moral grounds appears to have been used by 
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the Buffalo captain, who claimed to have rejected an attractive interview because, despite be-
ing able to support himself during the ten week conversion course, he was unwilling to work 
for a company who wouldn’t invest in their pilots: 
 
“I turned down the job because at the time they weren’t paying anything for training…if the 
company can’t invest in their employees as they go through training you know…” 
(Ibid., p. 204) 
 
This type of justification reinforces the individual’s sense of moral worth whilst downplaying 
the fact that they didn’t get the job. For a pilot, the realisation that one lacks the ability to 
progress any further professionally is certain to result in cognitive dissonance given that most 
pilots follow a predictable career path involving routine achievement of professional goals. It 
is conceivable that considerable adaptation follows such a realisation and for this reason the 
rationale behind the justification can be complex and well-rehearsed. If such a justification is 
to fulfill the adaptive objective it must be impervious to any challenge to its truthfulness. An-
other common tactic is to downplay the importance or attractiveness of the promotion or job 
in order to justify why one decided not to take it. The Lexington first officer was musing over 
the possibility of working in the Middle East: 
 
“Maybe to be an expatriate is not a good thing” 
“You can’t buy property there” 
“I wanna start and finish here in the States” (NTSB, 2007a, p. 129) 
 
Justifications in the transcripts were carefully constructed; captains cited lower salaries as a 
plausible justification for not moving, which effectively differentiated them from their audi-
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ence because first officers would probably be moving up in terms of salary. Captains never 
mentioned that they didn’t like the idea of being a first officer but it is certain to have been in 
their mind. Some justifications, although insurmountable, seemed lame: for instance, if one 
wants to start and end their flying in the USA, don’t apply to a Middle East airline. The same 
pilot also commented that the airline in question had standards that some of their competent 
colleagues had failed to meet. The fear of failure represents a serious potential threat to self-
concept and therefore a strong disincentive to even attempt to move to another airline, but is 
another justification that very few pilots would admit to. Justifications involving immutable 
factors such as culture or national identity also appeared to be linked to moral worthiness. By 
highlighting issues such as the relative absence of certain freedoms or a less relaxed attitude 
to airline operations a speaker not only justifies their decision but reinforces the notion that 
the job was not really good enough for them anyway. 
 
“You can’t buy land…they’ll let you buy a condo but you can’t buy property” (Ibid., p. 129) 
 
Justifications such as describing why a favour was done for a colleague often appear to be 
initiated by the speaker with the express intention of eliciting a favourable response, and that 
is just what happened in the transcripts. Leonard et al. (1999) differentiated between deliber-
ate processes like the one just mentioned, from reactive processes where individuals react to a 
perceived threat to their self-concept, sometimes at short notice. In the Buffalo accident tran-
script the captain is heard rapidly defending himself from a suggestion that he might have 
supported unethical behaviour in a property transaction: 
“So he offered them forty or fifty thousand lower than what they had offered him first…” 
“They were trying to get the best they could…just like everyone else does”  
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 211) 
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In this case he made the point that the behaviour described was “just like everyone else 
does”, thereby reducing his personal support for the behaviour. This adaptation process where 
personal responsibility is downplayed offers a plausible explanation for the justification of 
sterile cockpit infringements along the lines “well everyone else is doing it”. This means that 
if this behaviour is to be changed it is necessary to effect changes in the self-concept of those 
pilots concerned. 
 
7.1.18 NORMAL FRIENDLINESS ON THE FLIGHT DECK 
Normal friendliness usually involved an act of kindness such as flattering, sympathising or 
sharing a confidence with a colleague; some of the underpinnings of those behaviours have 
already been outlined in this thesis. The only behaviour type in this category that defied an 
explanation based upon existing literature was that of making random non-operational re-
marks. Informal interviews with pilots indicated that the dominant reason that random con-
versations occurred was the awkwardness associated with long periods of silence between the 
two pilots. Although the awkwardness of extended silence in interactions is well documented, 
few researchers have considered the phenomenon of excessive volubility worthy of detailed 
study because in most contexts volubility is not conceivable as a safety issue. Another mun-
dane but obvious explanation is that because much of what pilots observe during their every-
day  operational lives is novel and interesting  it would seem unusual not to comment upon it. 
There is also a blurred line between what is operationally relevant and what is not; for in-
stance, an accident flight crew at Dallas conducted a conversation about the presence of birds 
near the runway (NTSB, 1989, pp. 121-24) which was considered a likely source of distrac-
tion but it is conceivable that a discussion related to birds near the runway could be legiti-
mately enacted in quite a similar contextual situation to the one that attracted criticism. It is 
also relevant to note that most of the interesting things encountered on a flight occur during 
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the sterile cockpit period whereas cruise flight can be quite unremarkable.  Communicating 
interest may also have strategic objectives; research by Sternberg et al. (1981) indicates that 
lay conceptions of intelligence and competence place considerable emphasis upon clear 
communications, verbal fluency and displaying an interest in the wider world. In a context 
where it has been shown that portraying competence is important, it is to be expected that 
some individuals will seek out ways to achieve that portrayal, and conversation is an obvious 
medium for its expression. It is also plausible to speculate that there may be both cultural and 
gender differences in the propensity to conduct small talk. Research by Endrass et al. (2011) 
comparing Asian speakers with their western counterparts found that Asians tended to speak 
less about their personal lives. When westerners conducted small talk they tended to com-
municate their subject matter more explicitly, whereas Asian speakers expected their audi-
ence to read between the lines in order to decode the meaning of the message. This meant that 
western conversations were more likely to involve clarification whereas Asian conversations 
left much unsaid. Although there were very few Asian transcripts available, in one suitably 
detailed transcript involving a Singaporean crew at Taiwan (ASC, 2002) there was no con-
versation relating to any subjects other than the flight, whereas in others involving Indonesian 
flight crew at Pekanbaru (NTSC, 2003) and Korean flight crew at Guam (NTSB, 2000) there 
was evidence of social small talk; so there was no conclusive evidence of cultural differences. 
The American transcripts that represent the bulk of the qualitative data used in the current 
study contained a considerable amount of social talk. Most Asian countries are high power 
distance cultures, meaning that conversations between subordinates and superiors may be less 
free flowing. More research is needed on the influence of culture on sterile cockpit infringe-
ment. It may be that the tendency in western airlines to reduce the social distance between 
captains and first officers has resulted in the undesirable by product that the flight deck has 
become just another social environment. In terms of gender differences, research by Brescoll 
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(2011) suggests that male leaders who speak a lot tend to be evaluated as more competent 
than those who are quieter, whereas female leaders tend to attract negative evaluations if they 
are excessively voluble. It may also be the case that pilots conducting small talk at inappro-
priate time are attempting to portray an image that embraces group norms such as being re-
laxed and competent. There is some evidence from a few transcripts of pilots who appear to 
be showing off by doing something unnecessarily difficult as was the case in an accident at  
Guantanamo Bay (NTSB, 1994a), or in a very few cases, unauthorized (NTSB, 2007). This 
raises the possibility that pilots sometimes talk in order to demonstrate that they are skillful at 
their job. Research on concurrent task management indicates that talking and performing an-
other task such as driving, uses up cognitive capacity. Steven Davidson (2003) a senior doc-
tor of emergency medicine, commenting upon the multitasking that is a constant feature of 
his specialty, notes that his colleagues “swagger a bit and are proud of pulling it off” when 
they face these challenges daily. This supports the idea that demonstrating that one is capable 
of doing several things at once evokes an impression of competence. A pilot who conducts a 
mundane conversation whilst flying an airliner might well be enacting just the kind of swag-
ger Dr. Davidson outlined above. This may go some way to explain the incomprehensible 
behaviour of two pilots at Charlotte who thought it was appropriate to discuss a fairground 
ride just seventy seconds before crashing into the ground (NTSB, 1975a, p.4). This link be-
tween multitasking and supposed competence has been discussed by several researchers (e.g. 
Glenn, 2010) and is generally thought to be illusory. It may also be relevant that there are 
clearly occasions when a conversation can be conducted without causing distraction and this 
has potential to reduce the perceived validity of a blanket prohibition of such conversations. 
It is also possible that speakers view these conversations as part of their role in promoting 
crew co-operation, because small talk has been linked to improved morale and rapport in or-
ganisational settings (Moutoux and Porte, 1980). Airlines tend to be quite prescriptive about 
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what pilots say and do on the flight deck but research into pilot personality which highlights 
such features as internal locus of control and extraversion goes some way to explain why on 
occasions pilots make their own judgments about when it is safe for them to converse. 
 
In summary, this section has proposed that pilots converse on random subjects for a number 
of reasons. They work in an interesting environment which encourages comment; often there 
is a blurred line between what is operationally pertinent to talk about and what is not. Person-
ality research indicates that pilots tend to share several personality traits, which makes con-
versation flow easily. Cultural and gender differences may influence the inclination to con-
verse. Organizational research indicates that conversation encourages morale and rapport so it 
is easy to convince oneself that conversation is justified. Expressing interest in a wide range 
of subjects portrays an impression that the speaker is intelligent and competent. FCMs appear 
to favour a portrayal of relaxed competence which may be reinforced by demonstrating an 
ability to successfully complete concurrent tasks. The fact that airlines frequently sanction 
and promote equally distracting practices may lessen the perceived need to comply with the 
sterile cockpit rule. 
 
7.1.19. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONVERSATION RESEARCH 
The flight deck emerged as a specific working environment with its own conventions and 
protocols, some of which were sanctioned at a group level rather than an organisational level. 
This makes the flight deck worthy of ethnographic study in its own right. The inductive na-
ture of this research prompted an orientation towards IM as an explanatory framework, which 
in turn led to an examination of the influence of the organisation. The insights gained from 
this study suggest that the influence of organisational factors needs more research. The evi-
dence that group norms are sometimes favoured over organisational norms would seem to 
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warrant examination by both parties. Rules are subject to classification: some rules are pre-
scriptive, while others are proscriptive. Some rules, like those of chess, are constitutive, while 
others, such as speed limits, are regulative (Sidnell, 2003). The transcripts and anecdotal evi-
dence indicate that the sterile cockpit rule fits firmly into the regulative category because pi-
lots seem to be able to infringe it without catastrophe much of the time. The transcripts also 
indicate that FCMs feel autonomous whilst in role and that this results in stress when they 
encounter a rule or some other environmental factor that represents a challenge to that auton-
omy. It may be coincidental that all four pilots involved in the two most serious accidents ex-
amined in this study had considered leaving their current job. This hints at a level of dissatis-
faction within commuter airlines that appears to contribute to sterile cockpit rule infringe-
ments by driving the conversation. This study went one step further than previous commen-
tary on this subject to propose that such conversation might be an autonomic or involuntary 
reaction to environmental factors such as industrial issues. If this is the case, it is futile to call 
for stricter compliance with rules, the working environment needs to change. This study 
found that cynicism towards the organisation was mostly a crew cohesiveness tactic which 
could also explain why group behaviour norms appeared to be more dominant than organisa-
tional norms. Self-promotion emerged as the most identifiable type of verbal behaviour, with 
a large percentage of pilots indicating that they had seen it and they understood its purpose. 
Ingratiation was far more complex than just “sucking up” to the boss; it was broken into six 
subcategories in the literature and was even more abstract in the aviation context. In defence 
of the detailed coverage given to ingratiation in this study it should be noted that although it 
is considered to be a subcategory of IM it has been studied extensively as a construct in its 
own right. 
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Locus of control research was highly relevant to the aviation context and it is surprising that 
so little has been written about this construct as it applies to airline crews. A self-identity 
feedback loop was proposed in response to the observation from the transcripts that the long-
est and most detailed conversations were ones that described situations where pilots felt their 
powerful identity was being threatened. This prompted a discussion about unequal power re-
lations on the flight deck which despite decades of crew resource management (CRM) train-
ing are still evident. FCMs will recognise the feeling of stress experienced when factors out-
side their control result in a five minute delay leaving the gate and wonder why they don’t 
feel the same when they are delayed a few minutes during their everyday life. This study has 
proposed that it is because when in role a pilot expects to be able to control such events and 
when that is impossible, stress is experienced. The feedback loop proposed in this study is 
intuitive and could conceivably explain some of the disproportionate reactions to perceived 
challenges to authority evident in the transcripts. 
 
IM, in particular SP, accounted for more verbal behaviour types than any other factor; this 
does not mean all pilots are excessively egotistical; rather they appear to be attuned to the 
strategic use of certain forms of verbal behaviour. This may be because so much of their 
communication is verbal as a result of the ergonomics of the flight deck. An important factor 
seems to be the limited time that pilots, sometimes meeting for the first time, have available 
to make an impression. 
 
The scarcity of relevant aviation-related literature required imaginative reinterpretation of 
some concepts to fit the aviation context. Despite these difficulties this study found that all of 
the conversation types were explainable by one or more of the seven explanatory categories 
developed for this research.  Many of the observations made in this research required detailed 
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knowledge of social science and the aviation context. Because this research is original, some 
of the ideas are new and will inevitably be subject to revision with time. Examples of original 
areas of research included in this study are: 
 The competing influence of group norms versus organisational norms. 
 The enactment of mundane conversations as a tactic for crew cohesion. 
 The underpinnings of random conversations. 
 The potential influence of organisational pressure as a cause of autonomic stress mitigated 
through conversation. 
 The role of airline managements in the maintenance of the self-concept of employees in-
volved in safety critical occupations such as airline flying. 
 The potential use of defensive or anticipatory IM by underperforming pilots. 
______________________ 
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7.2 UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF UNCLEAR COMMUNICATIONS 
IN SFP RELATED OCCURRENCES 
 
The importance of clear communication in aviation operations is highlighted by a recently 
published study by the UK CAA (CAA, 2017) conducted by an expert in linguistics whose 
previous research has examined how cabin crew use language to construct and project a pro-
fessional identity and community, and the associated impact on inter-crew cohesion with pi-
lots. The current research involves linguistics and was conducted by a pilot who has experi-
enced all of the types of miscommunication outlined in this section. Research into aviation 
related verbal phenomena can on occasions be quite theoretical
x
 but this research examined 
real life instances from the occurrence literature with a direct relevance to the study of SFP. 
The aim of this research was to identify some of the most recurrent instances of unclear 
communication in the aviation occurrence literature and propose some reasons for their oc-
currence. 
 
7.2.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE UNCLEAR COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 
This section reports on a study which examined the characteristics of speech acts that have 
been evident in advance of an aviation safety occurrence in which failed communication was 
a factor. A detailed literature review indicated that in the aviation context, unclear communi-
cation was usually characterised by either excessively mitigated communication, delayed 
communication, or a combination of both. Much of the existing research relating to failed 
communication in other institutional settings is concerned with how individuals communicate 
in contexts such as science, medicine, the law and politics without causing organisational up-
sets, an orientation dominated by the literature relating to linguistic hedging. A detailed re-
view of a carefully selected corpus of miscommunication related aviation safety occurrences 
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resulted in a focus upon hedged expressions of doubt or uncertainty. By examining CVR 
transcripts of verbal interactions conducted in advance of a safety occurrence it was possible 
to identify recurrent instances of hedged communication, many of which have been docu-
mented in the linguistics literature. According to UK Civil Aviation Authority research 
(2014), three of the most recurrent categories of aviation safety occurrence attributable to the 
actions of the FCMs can be paraphrased as follows: 
 Flight below a safe altitude 
 Loss of control of the aircraft 
 Omissions or inappropriate actions by FCMs 
A corpus of CVR transcripts involving each of these categories was examined and hedges 
were identified by using existing taxonomies adapted for the aviation context. 
 
7.2.2. WHY CLEAR COMMUNICATION IS IMPORTANT IN AVIATION OPERATIONS 
Safety systems involving large and complex processes such as airlines rely for their contin-
ued safe operation upon clear communications. For instance, misunderstandings between pi-
lots and air traffic controllers have been implicated in some of the most serious documented 
air accidents. Research involving nuclear power plants (Hirotsu, et al., 2001) found that 25% 
of operator errors were attributable to inappropriate communications. Railway maintenance 
operations were even more susceptible to communication related errors, with 92% of such 
errors being attributed to inappropriate communication (Murphy, 2001). As far as aviation is 
concerned, Grayson and Billings (1981) found that 70% of the reports they surveyed from the 
NASA ASRS database involved inappropriate communication. Although the literature review 
conducted for this study identified extensive research relating to both inter and intra-flight 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       227 
 
 
deck communications, as far as is known this study is the first to identify specific recurrent 
speech acts that have preceded a safety occurrence and to propose explanations for why they 
were used. Although considerable effort has gone into ensuring formal aviation English is 
unambiguous, a particularly persistent feature of non-routine communications, such as those 
frequently heard when things are going wrong, is the tendency towards vagueness and impre-
cision identified by both Chatham and Thomas (2000) and Morrow et al. (1994). Further-
more, the literature indicates that the vagueness and imprecision characteristic of non-routine 
communication between aviation professionals very rarely takes the form of exaggeration; on 
the contrary, there is a marked tendency towards understatement and mitigation. 
 
7.2.3. THE THREAT TO AVIATION OPERATIONS POSED BY UNCLEAR 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Some of the most serious aviation safety occurrences have featured an instance of unclear 
communication that is identifiable with reference to existing research. Throughout this sec-
tion examples will be cited but some of the most important are outlined below: 
 Two Boeing 747s collided on a runway at Tenerife North airport after both first officer and 
engineer expressed uncertainty about receipt of a clearance to take off (Netherlands Aviation 
Safety Board (1978). 
 A Boeing 737 crashed in Washington on takeoff after several expressions of uncertainty from 
the first officer relating to the engine indications he was seeing (NTSB, 1982). 
 A Boeing 727 crashed at Mount Teide, Tenerife after indirect expressions of uncertainty from 
all three FCMs (UK AIB, 1981). 
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 A Convair 600 captain at Arkansas misled his first officer by asserting that the terrain did not 
exceed 1200 feet shortly before hitting a mountain at an elevation of 2900 feet. The first of-
ficer made multiple expressions of doubt throughout the transcript (NTSB, 1974). 
 A Gulfstream crashed short of the runway at Houston after the first officer made a misleading 
assessment of the aircraft state by stating “you’re all squared away now” just before impact. 
The captain expressed doubt about this assessment but continued the approach (NTSB, 
2006b). 
 A Boeing 757 crashed at Cali one minute after the captain told the first officer “You're in 
good shape now”. The first officer had previously expressed doubt about continuing the ap-
proach (ACRC 1996). 
 A Douglas DC 8 crashed on final approach at Guantanamo Bay after repeated mitigated 
directives to the captain indicating that his actions would not be successful. Despite several 
expressions of uncertainty regarding the successful outcome of the flight, the first officer said 
“looking good” just seconds before control was lost (NTSB, 1994a). 
 
The factor that connects these diverse instances is that one or more of the FCMs performed at 
a substandard level of performance that could have been communicated and corrective action 
taken in advance of the occurrence but for some reason was not. This study proposes some 
reasons based upon existing research from a wide range of disciplines. The utility for aviation 
professionals of being able to identify linguistic markers of doubt or uncertainty is that if cor-
rective action had been taken at the first expression of doubt or uncertainty, all of the acci-
dents cited in this section would have been avoided. Whilst it is understandable that a flight 
crew will be influenced by many factors to continue or discontinue a course of action, the oc-
currence literature indicates that there is frequently reluctance of one FCM to communicate 
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unequivocally their doubt or uncertainty to a colleague resulting in no corrective action being 
taken until it is too late. A detailed reading of many occurrence reports (some of which had 
not even considered the influence of unclear communications) indicated that most instances 
could be categorised as follows: 
 The speaker was aware something was amiss and did not communicate it directly 
 The speaker was unaware or not sufficiently certain that something was amiss and this 
inhibited communication 
 The speaker knowingly miscommunicated information 
From this basic categorisation it was determined that the focus of this research would be upon 
communication that tended to underplay, minimise, ignore or misrepresent the level of uncer-
tainty or doubt felt by the speaker. The most complete body of literature relating to under-
statement and mitigation is found in research into the verbal construct known as linguistic 
hedging. 
 
7.2.4. WHAT IS LINGUISTIC HEDGING? 
Hedging is a rhetorical strategy that attenuates either the full semantic value of a particular 
expression, as in: 
 
“I suppose it's alright” spoken by a pilot who was unsure about a holding instruction he had 
received; the Boeing 727 crashed two minutes later. (UK AIB, 1981, p. 22) 
Or the full force of a speech act, as in:  
“do you think you’re gonna make this?” spoken by a first officer who had serious doubts 
about the captain’s conduct of a visual approach at Guantanamo Bay which resulted in a 
crash (NTSB 1994, p. 123). 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       230 
 
 
Earlier in this thesis it was suggested that aviation professionals in general, and pilots in par-
ticular can be considered to be part of a social group with its own rules and conventions so it 
was illuminating to note that of the ten pilots who were interviewed during the development 
of this research, none was familiar with the concept of hedging in relation to communication. 
If pilots are unaware of the ubiquity of hedging in flight deck communication it is almost cer-
tain that those who support them are also unaware. This means that the information in this 
study is likely to be highly relevant to both pilots and to the wider aviation community. Fur-
thermore, although several occurrence reports have commented upon the attenuated commu-
nication that has preceded an occurrence, as far as is known, no attempt has been made to op-
erationalise the construct in the aviation context. There follows a brief review of what is 
known of communicative hedging from research involving a wide range of research popula-
tions. 
 
According to Brown and Levinson (1987) a hedge is a particle, word, or phrase that modifies 
the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase…it says of that membership that it is 
partial, or true only in certain respect; or that it is more true and complete than perhaps might 
be expected. (Ibid., p. 145).Their contention was that during ordinary communication, a 
threat to co-operative communication is posed when a speaker expresses ideas or opinions 
too forcefully in case they are unpalatable or threatening to the addressee. In their view, the 
action of hedging, by avoiding commitment to such ideas and opinions represents a primary 
and fundamental method of disarming routine interactional threats (Ibid., p. 146). Although 
hedging is considered an aspect of pragmatic competence that can express both reinforcement 
and attenuation, in line with Brown and Levinson and others, the description of hedging in 
this section concentrates mainly on its role in attenuating the force of verbal discourse be-
cause that is where the transcripts indicate miscommunication tends to cause most serious 
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problems during aviation operations. There follows a detailed explanation and some real life 
examples of the diverse types of hedged communication that various researchers have identi-
fied. 
 
PROPOSITIONAL AND RELATIONAL HEDGES  
Prince et al. (1982) made a clear distinction between two types of hedging; the first concerns 
the propositional content and expresses the extent to which the speaker believes the infor-
mation they are communicating can be considered true or otherwise (propositional hedging). 
A propositional hedge creates uncertainty in the propositional content by emphasising non 
prototypicality with respect to class characteristics, as in the extract below spoken by the cap-
tain involved in a CFIT accident at Mount Teide, Tenerife: 
 
“Strange hold isn’t it… doesn’t parallel with the runway or anything”  
(UK AIB, 1981, Annex A/2) 
Here the comment that the holding pattern was oriented in an uncommon fashion marked it as 
a non-prototypical example of a holding pattern. A propositional hedge can be clearly identi-
fied if it is possible to insert the prefix “I am sure…it doesn’t parallel the runway or any-
thing” without changing the meaning. In the example above, the propositional hedge per-
forms the function of indirectly communicating that although this is a holding pattern, it is 
not a typical example and perhaps some doubt or uncertainty about its safety exists. The in-
vestigation from which the extract came cited the lack of clarity in the definition of the hold-
ing pattern as a contributory factor in the resultant CFIT accident. The report also commented 
that the first officer’s comment “…that’s an odd sort of one…” was one of three unheeded 
intra cockpit expressions of doubt or uncertainty that immediately preceded the crash. 
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 Prince et al.’s (1982) second type of hedging strategy related to the degree of commitment a 
speaker is willing to commit to the propositional content being the truth; this is known as a 
relational hedge. In the example above, the speaker didn’t express an opinion about the hold-
ing pattern except to indirectly point out that it was unusual. Relational hedging differs inso-
far as it expresses the speaker’s relation to the truthfulness of what is being said. The FCM 
cited in the extract above used a relational hedge later in the same sequence when he used the 
phrase “suppose it’s alright” to express his tentative commitment to the actions he was wit-
nessing. Unlike propositional hedges, relational hedges cannot be prefixed by a phrase such 
as I am sure because of the presence of phrases such as I suppose or the more common (in the 
occurrence literature) I guess. There is one exception to this rule; this is the attributive hedge, 
in which the speaker attributes the information being communicated to some other source to 
emphasise the authority of what is being said. In other words, I am only communicating what 
a particular source said, as was the case just before the accident at Tenerife.  
 
“They want us to keep going more round don’t they?” (UK AIB, 1981, Annex A/2) 
 
Attributions are not limited to human sources; in the Chicago transcript, during a discussion 
about landing on a snow covered runway the first officer emphasised that the book authorises 
an action but with an implicit expression of doubt tagged onto the end: 
 
 “I mean the book says you can as long as it's positive…but man that's whoo”  
(NTSB, 2007b, p. 94) 
 
Attributive hedges can also be used to lessen the force of the information being communicat-
ed by being vague or imprecise about the source of the information, as in: 
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“They say it’s better than we could ever be” spoken by the Chicago first officer as he tried to 
persuade his reluctant captain to use the autobrakes for landing (Ibid., p. 141). In this case the 
speaker appears to be citing information from an unspecified source that he is merely passing 
on and should not be held accountable for any inference gained. 
 
APPROXIMATORS AND SHIELDS  
Prince et al. (1982) subdivided hedges into two distinct types, APPROXIMATORS and 
SHIELDS.  
APPROXIMATORS 
Approximators operate on the propositional content and function to express the extent to 
which the item under discussion is representative of its prototype. These approximators are 
further divided into ADAPTORS and ROUNDERS. 
 
Figure 7.3:  Prince et al.’s subdivision of linguistic hedges 
ROUNDERS 
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Rounders function to modify a numeric value by communicating it with an inappropriate de-
gree of precision as in this comment from the Arkansas captain: 
     …the highest point out here is about twelve hundred feet… (NTSB, 1974, p. 36) 
ADAPTORS 
Prince et al. (1982) coined the term “adaptors” for expressions such as sort of (sorta), kind of 
(kinda), a bit or a little bit, which tone down or decrease the effect of a scale word  (Leech 
and Svartvik, 1975, p. 101) such as, in the aviation context, slow, fast, high or low. In the 
transcript of a flight crew who crashed on landing at La Guardia airport the pilot monitoring 
(PM) is heard to use the adaptor “little” four times in the twenty seconds before the crash 
(NTSB, 1997b, p. 22) A more recent report into an accident at San Francisco reported clear 
evidence of misunderstanding between the FCMs after use of the phrase “this seems a little 
high” by the PM (NTSB, 2014a, p. 176).  When precise language is used it is clear what ac-
tion must be taken but when vague language is used, a context in which a flexible attitude to 
rule infringement can develop. In the extract above, the Arkansas captain communicated in-
formation that required precision, in a highly imprecise way insofar as it did not state an ex-
act terrain elevation and was further hedged by the comment in the extract below that “he be-
lieved” that the terrain was in a different location as well: 
 
“The whole general area…and then we're not even where that is…I don’t believe”  
(NTSB, 1974, p. 36) 
 
At Arkansas the pilots had lost positional awareness which meant that accurate terrain infor-
mation was not known, which probably explains the use of imprecise language.  
Earlier in this section it was suggested that imprecision can be used to facilitate a rule in-
fringement, and this should be explained. By using an adaptor such as “a little” the speaker 
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avoids explicitly quantifying the extent of the deviation, which is always explicitly defined by 
an operator. For instance “a little fast” might not result in corrective action whereas “twenty 
knots fast” would require a missed approach if the specified range was a maximum of fifteen 
knots. It could also be argued that the term “little” indirectly communicates the speaker’s as-
sessment of the situation as being acceptable, thereby tending to support an infringement in a 
way that would not be possible if more explicit language was used. The inappropriate use of 
the downtoner “little” was prolific in the transcripts. 
 
SHIELDS 
The second type of approximator proposed by Prince et al. (1982), the SHIELD is separated 
into two types, the PLAUSIBILITY SHIELD and the ATTRIBUTION SHIELD. 
  
PLAUSIBILITY SHIELDS 
When a speaker uses a plausibility shield the intention is to indicate that they are not com-
pletely sure about the content of the proposition being made. By using phrases such as I 
think…it looks like, probably, as far as I can tell, they signal a tentative or cautious assess-
ment of the truth of what is being said. It has been suggested by Hubler (1983, p. 18) that by 
using a plausibility shield, speakers shield themselves from the degree of liability they might 
face if the proposition was expressed with more force. Prince and her colleagues noted that 
the physicians they observed made extensive use of plausibility shields when diagnosing ill-
nesses and planning courses of treatment that could leave them in a position of legal liability. 
In the aviation context the plausibility shield operates to protect the speaker’s plausibility 
should the proposition turn out to be incorrect, in effect to be able to assert “I didn’t say that 
for certain”. This type of tentativeness also shields a pilot from an admission of a deficit in 
understanding or experience. 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       236 
 
 
 
EXAMPLES OF PLAUSIBILITY SHIELDS AND THEIR SUGGESTED FUNCTION  
“I GUESS” 
I guess was apparent in the transcripts during attempts to persuade a colleague and also dur-
ing periods where inter crew agreement was tentative. It was also used during instances of 
loss of positional awareness, seemingly to disguise the extent of disorientation. I guess was 
also used to indirectly pose a question without the speaker having to reveal their opinion until 
they knew more about the addressee’s point of view. Although I guess is not restricted to 
transcripts from the USA it has been noted that it is most frequently used in American Eng-
lish (Van Bogaert, 2009, p. 421).  I reckon appears to perform a similar function for native 
English speakers and was also evident in transcripts from Australia and New Zealand. Alt-
hough research such as Kaltenbock (2013, p. 6) demonstrates a marked decline in certain 
comment clauses and a rise in others, the aviation context seems more stable with examples 
of I guess performing familiar functions over several decades.  A persistent thread is the fo-
cus upon politeness enacted by avoiding impinging on the other’s freedom to act in a way 
they see fit. This concept is known as face threat avoidance and whilst almost undocumented 
in the aviation literature it is a well understood psychosocial construct.  A response that dis-
misses the speaker’s suggestion poses negative-face threat to the addressee so the least that 
needs to occur is a consideration of an incoming suggestion. The extract below, from the 
Chicago accident is an example of a tentative captain being persuaded by his first officer: 
 
“…well keep talking I guess we could do it let's, let's see what the conditions are up there… 
we'll do it” (NTSB 2007b, p. 142) 
This extract suggests that I guess is used at the conclusion of a decision making process in 
which a range of options of differing acceptability have been considered. It often comes with 
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a sense of reservation, as in the example above, where the speaker still signals tentativeness 
by using “could do it.”  
The extract below was part of a lengthy exchange in which the first officer justifiably at-
tempted to persuade his captain to use the automatic brakes.  
 
“I guess if you use max…it’ll get your attention” (Ibid., p. 82) 
The first officer avoids saying how it might get your attention. The mitigation was likely en-
acted to avoid negative-face threat to the captain. Given that the persuasion was justified, it is 
excessively mitigated. 
In the extract below, the Detroit accident captain was reluctant to admit that he was lost dur-
ing taxiing so he appears to have made a tentative assessment on the off chance that it might 
be correct. In the verbal exchange that followed this he admitted that he wasn't sure. 
 
“I guess we turn left here” (NTSB, 1991b, p. 135) 
The statement below was interpreted as a question by the investigators, who inserted a ques-
tion mark after the tag huh? This supports the notion that a speech act that appears to be a 
statement can also function as a question. The function of such a linguistic device is that it 
avoids directly asking the question, thereby allowing the speaker to assert to himself and to 
others that no uncertainty existed. Although this may seem deceptive, it is possible that such 
a device is used subconsciously to meet the face wants of the speaker. 
 
“…until the yellow line I guess huh?” (Ibid., p. 133) 
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“I SUPPOSE” 
Although I suppose featured far less frequently in the transcripts than I guess, the incidence 
of the former in the close proximity of a catastrophe at Tenerife demands its consideration. 
Only one clear instance of I suppose was found in the corpus transcripts but its positioning as 
the last meaningful verbal input from the speaker suggested that the speaker had given up ex-
pressing his uncertainty.  
“…I suppose it's alright…” (UK AIB, 1981) 
In a search for some supporting evidence for the use of I suppose as a marker of resignation 
the following extract was located in which the first officer at Palmerston North expresses his 
doubt about a clearance and the captain, quite reasonably decides not to challenge it, leaving 
the first officer to signal his tentative agreement with the clearance. 
F/O “That’s not right is it?” 
Captain: “Yeah, we won’t argue” 
F/O: “Oh well, I suppose we can be out here at five thousand anyway” (TAIC, 1995, pp. 121 
122) 
“SHOULD BE” 
 The term should is a member of a hierarchy of modal verbs that express various levels of 
certainty. The modal verb should occupies a position near the top of that hierarchy in that it is 
intended to express a strong likelihood that the proposition being made is correct.  
 
“Mount Erebus should be here” (TAIC, 1979, p. 73) 
 
It is not clear who made the remark above but the transcript suggests that they were involved 
with navigation in proximity to Mount Erebus which the aircraft hit. Although an uncertainty 
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marker, the term should be indicates the speaker’s expectation that the proposition is likely to 
be correct. 
 
“…visibility should pick up closer to the surface…”  (NTSB 1994 p. 109) 
 
The extract above indicates that visibility was not very good at the time of speaking whilst 
crucially implying intent to proceed on the basis of an expected improvement.  If the speaker 
had used might or could a completely different, more tentative message would have resulted. 
Comments including an assessment that implied an expected improvement in the current situ-
ation rarely resulted in corrective action as in this extract from the Detroit runway collision 
accident report: 
 
“…this should be runway nine two seven…” (NTSB, 1991b, p. 145) 
 
This speaker was referring to his position in relation to runway 09/27; the term should signal-
ling that although the speaker was unsure of the proposition he was more certain than if he 
had used might be or could be. Given that it was critically important to know the position ac-
curately a statement including this could be would be an admission of substandard perfor-
mance that would not be a preferred option for the speaker due to positive face threat. 
 
“IT MIGHT” 
The modal verb phrase might is more tentative than should. In the first extract below, from 
the Guantanamo Bay accident, the speaker has no way of knowing the extent of the depth 
perception issues so is understandably vague. In the second extract the Detroit first officer is 
alerting the addressee to the possibility that taxiway “oscar six” may have been missed during 
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taxiing; if in fact it had not been missed, positive face threat had been avoided in a way that 
would not have been possible if an unequivocal statement that the speaker was unsure of his 
position had been made.  
 
“It might give you some depth perception issues” (NTSB, 1994, p. 102) 
 
“We might have missed oscar six” (NTSB, 1991b, p. 139) 
“I THINK” 
It has been suggested that in everyday interaction the term I think has undergone semantic 
bleaching, meaning it has lost its force as an uncertainty marker (Kaltenbock, 2013). The 
transcripts supported this contention insofar as I think had multiple functions depending on its 
positioning within a phrase, the linguistic devices that surround it and who used it. The ex-
ample below, from the Mount Erebus accident used the progressive tense in conjunction with 
the adverbial phrase just thinking, which has been identified as a strong uncertainty marker, 
in this case expressing justifiable tentativeness. 
 
“I'm just thinking about any high ground…that’s all” (TAIC, 1979, p. 70) 
With increased potential for face threat, mitigated communication tends to increase. This ex-
change apparently signalled that the speaker was no longer confident that terrain clearance 
was assured.  A body of research by Bavelas (1985) has examined how when speakers are 
faced with few communicative options they tend to use unclear or equivocal language. The 
speaker above was faced with what Bavelas referred to as avoidance/avoidance conflict 
(hereafter AAC) where failing to speak up was not an option but challenging this senior cap-
tain was face threatening. The softening adverbial just and the tag that’s all both understate 
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the seriousness of what was a legitimate expression of concern. The phrase I think has also 
been identified as a means of expressing confidence or certainty when used by those with 
high status (Holmes, 1990: p 187), which makes I think a very complex phrase given the hi-
erarchical nature of the flight deck. 
 
“I think we’ll start down a little early here” (Ibid., p. 40) 
The extract above (spoken by the Mount Erebus captain) stands in stark contrast to the previ-
ous highly mitigated use of I think spoken by one of his subordinate FCMs; a general obser-
vation from the corpus transcripts and the literature was that subordinate FCMs used more 
attenuated communication than captains. 
 
 Holmes also suggests that in the initial position I think can signal reassurance, whereas in the 
final position it is exclusively associated with tentativeness; she also proposes a role in terms 
of negative-face threat achieved by avoidance of being too rigid in one’s opinions, in meta-
phorical terms, not stepping on others’ toes. It also appears to perform the communicative 
function of attempting to alert an addressee not to rely too heavily on what is being said, pre-
sumably to spread the accountability if an error is being made. In other cases it appears to 
seek to elicit an opinion from an addressee by expressing the speaker’s assessment of the sit-
uation in such a way that does not impede the freedom of action of the addressee.  
 
“I think we need priority” (NTSB, 1991a, p. 177) 
 
This was one of several direct comments made by this flight crew to ATC at New York JFK 
airport, including “we are running out of fuel”, none of which were heeded. In this case, the 
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seriousness of the situation depended upon effective interaction between ATC and the flight 
crew. A flight crew who declare that they have allowed a critically low fuel situation to de-
velop that disrupts a major airport will undoubtedly face consequences so a tendency towards 
understatement and mitigation is understandable so that if the most optimistic outcome occurs 
they can deny their substandard performance to both the outside world and to themselves. 
This type of denial has face-threat avoidance and a self-esteem maintenance functions. 
 The two extracts below came from the Detroit flight crew who became lost in fog almost as 
soon as they commenced taxiing out. The first extract signals that the speaker is uncertain 
about the position of the aircraft; this is certainly how it was interpreted by the addressee. 
 
“I think we are on x ray now” (NTSB, 1991b, p. 144) 
“I think we might have missed Oscar Six” (Ibid., p 139) 
 
The second extract, made to ATC, is an example of a compound hedge; the additive effect of 
think and might makes this a highly hedged communication, nonetheless the controller failed 
to identify this and a runway collision ensued. 
 
“I BELIEVE” 
The linguistic literature makes no clear distinction between thinking and believing but in the 
extract below, the speaker stopped using the term I think and used the term I believe coinci-
dent with becoming uncertain of his position. There is no strong evidence of a clear distinc-
tion between the two linguistic devices but I believe was uncommon in the transcripts. There 
is little doubt that the examples below were mostly enacted to convey uncertainty and elicit 
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assistance when the Detroit flight crew found themselves unsure of their position close to an 
active runway. 
“I believe we are at the intersection of taxiway x ray and runway 9/27” (Ibid., p. 148) 
“I believe we are…we're not sure” (Ibid., p. 151) 
“IT SEEMS” and “IT LOOKS LIKE” 
These introductory verbs are uncommon in the transcripts but where they do occur they have 
been associated with a very serious occurrence. The comment below preceded the crash of a 
Boeing 777 at San Francisco in 2012: 
 
“Seems a little high” (NTSB, 2014a, p. 176) 
This is a highly imprecise comment where it is not clear what is being referred to or even 
whether it is actually high or just seems to be. This comment was considered by the NTSB to 
have confused the pilot flying (PF) contributing to a landing accident. 
The extract below from the Detroit captain referred to the visibility during taxiing out, sug-
gesting that it was almost zero. 
 
“Looks like it's going zero zero out here” (NTSB, 1991b, p. 134) 
This comment expressed the captain’s doubt that the visibility being reported by the tower 
was correct. He was careful not to explicitly state the visibility because that would rule out a 
takeoff. The response from the first officer was also non-committal and appears to shift re-
sponsibility for the decision to ATC. 
 
“Oh yeah I think they’ll tell us” (Ibid., p. 137) 
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ATTRIBUTION SHIELDS 
Prince and her colleagues’ second type of shield, the attribution shield is used to attribute ei-
ther the degree or quality of the knowledge being expressed, to a third party. Examples of an 
attribution shield include phrases like according to or they say… and in common with the 
plausibility shield it performs the function of distancing the speaker from what is being said, 
in this case by attributing the source to someone or something else. 
 
THE ROLE OF ATTRIBUTION SHIELDS IN AVIATION MISCOMMUNICATION 
This section examines how varying the precision expressed in communication can manipulate 
the degree to which a speaker can be held accountable for what is communicated. 
 
PRECISION 
Excessive precision seems an unlikely source of miscommunication and for this reason no 
previous research has addressed the phenomenon. However, two very serious runway safety 
occurrences appear to have resulted from the strategic communication of information that 
was either excessively explicit or excessively precise. It was suggested in the St Kitts report 
(UK AAIB, 2010a. p 24) that the provision of a “broad hint” from the air traffic controller 
relating to the flight crew’s runway entry point length should have been an opportunity for 
the flight crew to identify that they were making an error. In another serious incident at Man-
chester (UK AAIB, 2006b, p. 32) it was noted that the provision by the air traffic controller 
of precise information relating to the available runway distance represented a missed oppor-
tunity for the flight crew to notice that they were lining up for takeoff at the wrong position 
on the runway. This assessment implies that the controller provided this extra information as 
an indirect means of communicating his doubt about the flight crew’s position on the runway. 
If this was the case, the communication did not achieve its objective. The two extracts below 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       245 
 
 
are both abbreviated extracts of communications from ATC to flight crews who were lined up 
at the wrong position on the runway prior to departing. In both these occurrences, the first at 
Manchester and the second at St Kitts, a crash was only avoided by luck. 
 
“If you’re happy with that, that gives you er sixteen seventy metres”  
(UK AAIB 2006b, p. 32) 
 “Speedbird 2156 do you not request err backtrack runway 07?” (UK AAIB 2010a, p. 24) 
 
A detailed knowledge of aviation communications is not necessary to understand the im-
portant features of these examples of miscommunication. Firstly, air traffic controllers never 
normally advise flight crews of the length of the runway as they enter it, and secondly they 
rarely question flight crews about whether they need to backtrack (taxi down the runway in 
the reverse direction to takeoff) a runway unless they are not complying with their cleared 
route to the takeoff position; all pilots know this. Both the exchanges above broke the funda-
mental rule of the cooperative principle of communication outlined by Grice (1975), namely 
that speakers should strive to ensure that what they say furthers the purpose of the conversa-
tion. Grice’s Maxim of Quantity requires that a speaker only include information that is re-
quired for the purpose of the exchange; the information provided by the controllers exceeded 
what was normally required in the prevailing context. Grice also highlighted that the infor-
mation must be true in order to comply with his Maxim of Quality. Although nothing in the 
content of either of the communications above was untrue, in both cases there was evidence 
of doubt in the communication from the air traffic controller. Arguably the most important 
feature of these two instances of miscommunication was that the question being indirectly 
asked by the controller should not have been necessary if nothing was amiss. So whilst the 
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information communicated was not untrue, it failed in its communicative purpose of inform-
ing the flight crew that they appeared to be lining up for takeoff at the wrong position, so it 
did not meet Grice’s Maxim of Relevance.  A more effective strategy would have been to di-
rectly state that the aircraft appeared to be at the wrong position on the runway but both these 
serious occurrences (one at Manchester, UK and one at St Kitts) indicate that for a variety of 
reasons, individuals from a wide range of cultures who provide support to flight crews some-
times feel reluctant to directly inform them when they have doubts that if expressed directly 
might imply they were making an error. The reasons why controllers feel inhibited to correct 
flight crews when they appear to be making a mistake are likely to be complex but the serious 
incident at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 2010a) and the fatal accident at Birmingham, Alabama 
(NTSB, 2014b) suggest that aspects of the hierarchical structure of the aviation system, 
where flight crews tend to be near the top may be a factor affecting the clear communication 
of doubt and uncertainty. A similar phenomenon has been documented in the medical profes-
sion (Srivastava. 2013) where junior doctors have reported withholding critical information 
from a surgeon on the assumption that their more senior colleague would be certain to have 
been aware of the information, only to find out later that the surgeon expected to be told such 
information.  From the insights gained from the two investigation reports into the occurrences 
at Manchester and St Kitts, the need to avoid threats to the negative face of the flight crew 
appears to have been an important influence. In fact, the occurrence literature indicates that 
the addressing of the face wants of a flight crew member who is making an error of judgment 
is one of the main reasons why subordinates attenuate their critique of a colleague’s actions. 
Although a detailed description of the various face-wants of individuals is outside the scope 
of this thesis, it can be deduced from testimony from the reports into the Birmingham, Ala-
bama accident and the serious occurrence at St Kitts that support staff are attuned to the con-
cept of “negative politeness” (See Brown and Levinson, 1987, p. 317 for an explanation) 
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which is founded upon avoidance of interfering with an interactant’s freedom of action.  Sev-
eral recurrent patterns were evident in the transcripts; firstly a reluctance to speak up that per-
sisted far too long, and in some cases even to the point where the situation was irretrievable. 
Secondly, there appeared to be a point in the proceedings where even if attenuated criticism 
was evident, it diminished once it was clear that no corrective action was being taken. There 
were no documented instances of an unequivocal order being given that resulted in corrective 
action. There was also some evidence that once a speaker considered that they had done their 
best to communicate their doubt or concern, there was a point where they appeared to relin-
quish responsibility for the outcome. In the two serious runway occurrences just cited, the 
controllers appeared to use precision as a linguistic deresponsibilizing device thereby trans-
ferring complete responsibility for an action to the flight crew along the lines, I’ve outlined 
the situation as I see it, now it’s up to you. Although this may be rational behaviour it is cer-
tainly not appropriate for a high reliability context such as aviation. Although, as far as is 
known, the notion of using language as a means of denying accountability has never previ-
ously been identified as a phenomenon affecting flight safety, Holmes (1984, p. 61) has iden-
tified the potential for language to be used as a deresponsibilizing device in other contexts, 
citing research by Brown (1980, p. 128). Although Brown’s ethnographic research was far 
removed from the current region of interest, the concept of language use as a deresponsibiliz-
ing device has been applied to a study of aviation manuals, where Sarmento (2005) suggested 
that the use of the modal verbs “may” and “can” perform such a function. The topic of at-
tribution of responsibility is a recurrent strand in the instances of attenuated communication 
in this section. 
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IMPRECISION 
A proposition is imprecise or vague when it is represented as uncertain by a speaker. The use 
of vague language in the aviation discourse examined for this research is so repetitive in na-
ture that its occurrence is unlikely to be attributable to chance. The notion that vagueness can 
be strategically deployed is one that has been examined by Jucker et al. (2003) who proposed 
a variety of reasons, some of which have been applied in this section to specific aviation re-
lated instances from the literature. It is noticeable in various transcripts how pilots make ex-
tensive use of metaphor and quotation to express ideas vaguely. By describing something that 
one has been told by someone else or a metaphor relating to someone else’s experience, some 
distance is placed between the ideas being expressed and the speaker, meaning that the 
speaker is not directly vouching for its veracity. Vague language does not attempt to accu-
rately describe a situation but invites the addressee to interpret what is being offered and 
reach their own conclusion. This notion, proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1991, p.  546) is 
particularly relevant in aviation operations where many of the decisions FCMs make are not 
clear cut but subject to interpretation. This represents a problem, particularly for subordinate 
FCMs or support staff whose primary task is to advise their hierarchical superior when they 
doubt the wisdom or correctness of an action being taken. One strategy evident in the tran-
scripts is to provide a metaphor that supports the perspective the speaker wants the addressee 
to adopt. In line with the cooperative principle outlined above, it may be beneficial to limit 
the amount of specificity to the minimum necessary to achieve the communicative objective. 
The extract below details part of a verbal exchange in which the Chicago first officer ap-
peared to doubt the wisdom of using manual braking in the prevailing conditions but needed 
to convince his reluctant captain to use the automatic braking system (hereafter autobrakes) 
without posing a threat to his negative face. 
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“I guess if you use max…my buddy flew 747s for Atlas and he said when you land it’ll get 
your # attention” (NTSB 2007b, p. 82) 
The getting your attention metaphor 
xi
above is not uncommon in aviation discourse. In this 
case it relates to someone else’s experience on a different type of aircraft at an unspecified 
airport; furthermore no precise comment about the stopping capability is made, merely that it 
will get your # attention. From an experienced pilot’s perspective it can be stated with some 
certainty that what was intended to be communicated was that the brakes would be applied 
with some force by the autobrake system. It is also likely that despite the use of metaphor, 
this is how it would be interpreted by the addressee. Nonetheless, from the speaker’s point of 
view no personal opinion has been voiced so it is up to the addressee to decide. Furthermore, 
it is not at all clear what the “it” that will get you attention is. The use of metaphor allows the 
speaker to avoid committing to an opinion in case it proves to be incorrect or it conflicts with 
the opinion of his superior. Furthermore, it avoids the speaker imposing an opinion whilst 
also protecting them from having a proposal dismissed, which would be face threatening. 
Whatever the reasons, this communication lacked clarity at a time when clarity was essential. 
In a further attempt to convince his captain the exchange below occurred. 
 
“They say it’s better than we could ever be” (Ibid., p. 141) 
At face value this seems a fairly comprehensible assertion that the autobrake system applies 
the brakes better than a human being could, but whose words are these? The use of the ex-
pression “they say” implies that more than one, maybe many sources hold this view. It is 
equivalent to a spoken agentless passive insofar as the term they is not intended to implicate 
any individual or group; what it may seek to do is to de-emphasise the necessity to scrutinise 
this view because it represents the conventional wisdom on the topic.  
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There also appears to be a strategic role underlying the use of vague representations of 
amounts such as fuel quantities, fuel endurances, safety altitudes and others. The three ex-
tracts below were spoken by a DC 8 flight crew at Portland who ran out of fuel after becom-
ing distracted by a minor landing gear indication issue. 
“Give us three or four thousand pounds” (NTSB, 1979, p. 40) 
“We got about three on the fuel and that’s it” (Ibid., p. 49) 
“figure about another fifteen minutes” (Ibid., p. 40) 
The rounder about fifteen minutes was probably an indication that the speaker either didn’t 
know how long it would be before they could land or that he didn’t consider precision a pr i-
ority. In fact precision was critical, evident from the unheeded reply from the engineer. 
 
“Not enough…Fifteen minutes is gonna really run us low on fuel here” (Ibid., p. 40) 
Although the term really would seem to unequivocally signal urgency, the warning from the 
flight engineer went unheeded by the captain. What should have been communicated was that 
the aircraft would be almost out of fuel in fifteen minutes. In fact the use of fifteen minutes in 
the initial communication has some significance; according to Dubois (1987) quantities ex-
pressed as multiples of five tend to be approximations rather than precise estimates, making 
the phrase “figure about fifteen minutes” a highly hedged communication. Although it was 
implausible that the captain’s intention was to run the fuel so low, to explicitly advise him 
would represent a face threating act. This is a further example of AAC (run out of fuel versus 
challenge the captain) as conceptualised by Bavelas (1985). AAC has been linked to instanc-
es of complete withdrawal from communication, which was the outcome in this case. The 
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potency of AAC is evident from the fact that in this case the engineer appears to have al-
lowed the captain to run out of fuel rather than inform him directly of his concerns. 
 
The following extract is from the Arkansas accident in 1973 in which the flight crew were 
avoiding thunderstorms which required them to deviate from their planned route. This type of 
operation requires a dynamic understanding of the spatial environment (See Chapter 8, the 
spatial awareness strand of this research), in particular the elevation of the terrain. Although 
this transcript is old it remains relevant because as this thesis is written, airliners still crash 
into high terrain despite modern technology. 
In response to concerns expressed by his co-pilot the captain asserts: 
 
“The highest point is about twelve hundred feet” (NTSB, 1974, p. 36) 
The imprecision here relates to the means by which terrain height is used during aviation op-
erations. Flight crews can only make very limited use of actual terrain data alone. An analogy 
would be if drivers were allowed to invent their own speed limits based upon the straightness 
of the road or the time of day. By referring to the terrain in this way the speaker avoids the 
necessity of justifying flying below a specific safe height. Notably, just before impact the first 
officer referred to the terrain using precise language.  
 
The extract below relates to a controversial CFIT accident at Mount Erebus, Antarctica. Alt-
hough some of the transcript content has been disputed, the extract presented here is not in 
dispute.  
“We might have to pop down to fifteen hundred here I think” (TAIC 1979, p. 71) 
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This is an unusual exchange inasmuch as the term “pop down” introduces a level of informal-
ity highly inappropriate for a descent in the vicinity of high terrain. It is also highly hedged, 
with the downtoner “we might” at the beginning and at the end the tag “I think” which, as 
was demonstrated earlier, is associated with tentativeness. 
 
The extract below is from a CFIT accident near Jakarta where a Russian test pilot was 
demonstrating and promoting a brand new airliner, the Sukhoi Superjet. 
 
“No problem with terrain at this moment” (KNKT, 2012, p. 32) 
Bald-on-record statements like this captain’s comment on the terrain are uncommon in the 
aviation context but they are known to take little account of the face wants of the addressee. 
In such a case it is likely that the addressee will be inclined to agree with the proposition. 
 
“Ya it’s flat” (Ibid., p. 32) 
Once again it is not clear what it refers to and what flat means. Zhang (2015: p 52) actually 
cites the term flat as an example of vague and imprecise language, noting that although “Hol-
land is flat” there are hills. Sperber and Wilson (1991: p. 182) also point out that this type of 
vague language also has no sharp conceptual boundary but a continuum; so flat could be 
quite flat, very flat or, as was the case here, not very flat at all. Although the Jakarta accident 
is the only example of the use of flat to describe terrain elevation, the Arkansas accident cap-
tain also described the terrain in vague terms before a CFIT accident. 
 
When flight crews become unexpectedly unsure of their position they cannot stop and have a 
think about the problem, it is a dynamic situation that needs to be rectified promptly. This 
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sometimes results in communication that is highly imprecise, probably because the necessary 
information is not available to the speaker at the time. The extract below is from an American 
Airlines flight crew who flew into a mountain in Cali, Columbia after an unexpected route 
and runway change. 
 
Captain: “Let’s press on to…”  
Co-pilot: “Press on to where though?” (ACRC, 1996, p. 33) 
To demonstrate the persistence of this phenomenon, the extract below is from the previously 
cited Arkansas flight crew from 1973: 
 
Captain: “Keep on trucking’, just keep on a trucking”  
Co-pilot “Well we must be somewhere in Oklahoma” (NTSB, 1974, p. 34) 
The slightly sarcastic remark from the co-pilot was the culmination of over fifteen minutes of 
attenuated expressions of doubt, and marked a transition from unclear to more direct commu-
nication but it was far too late to avoid flying into the terrain. The examples above all in-
volved flight crews who had lost positional awareness so it is likely that the speakers did not 
have the necessary information to be more precise. In other cases a speaker may possess in-
complete knowledge or be insufficiently confident in their own assessment of a situation to 
communicate with certainty. Speakers may also communicate an opinion or assessment of a 
situation in such a way that their assessment should be discernible from what is said, whilst 
still leaving the addressee some room to make their own judgment. This is not always effec-
tive, as was demonstrated by the absence of corrective action in response to the sarcastic 
comment cited above. Although the model of flight crew interaction presented in these exam-
ples may seem haphazard, aviation is characterised by situations that are frequently a matter 
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of opinion rather than fact. In the extract below, a first officer involved in the Detroit accident 
was almost certainly intending to communicate to his captain that he did not consider the vis-
ibility to be adequate for the takeoff about to be performed. 
 
“Definitely not quarter of a mile…but at least they’re calling it” (NTSB 1991b, p. 97) 
 
When comments such as this are made by captains they are often a statement of intent where-
as for subordinates they are put out there for consideration. Much is at stake when a subordi-
nate communicates doubt or uncertainty; dismissal of the assessment poses negative-face 
threat to the speaker, whilst being too forceful poses positive-face threat to the addressee. In 
this specific case, an incorrect assessment by a subordinate could impinge significantly on the 
operation if the captain’s assessment was that the visibility was good enough to depart. In this 
case it is understandable why the speaker gave himself a way out by mentioning that ATC 
were assessing the visibility as acceptable. Notably, also the speaker did not explicitly state 
that he thought the visibility was less than a quarter of a mile; merely that it was not a quarter 
of a mile. Although this may seem a small detail, research by Jucker et al. (2003) found that 
addressees usually understand such a communication as representing a symmetrical range 
around the stated value that varies depending on what the information is to be used for. In this 
case the assumption is that the speaker meant to communicate that he assessed the visibility 
to be less than the stated value but he was careful not to say so explicitly. It was speculated 
above that the motivation for the vague language was to avoid impinging upon the captain’s 
freedom of action, but in other cases such as the accident at Arkansas it is likely that impreci-
sion was used to avoid explicitly stating the minimum safe altitude because to do so would 
acknowledge that a rule infringement was occurring or likely to occur. Sometimes merely 
stating that something is better than some arbitrary value is enough to convey that an ad-
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dressee should not worry and just accept what is being proposed.  This type of imprecision 
was rarely expressed in numeric terms in the corpus but more usually by a vague description 
as in the two extracts below from the Arkansas and Chicago flight crews respectively: 
 
“You can quit worrying about the mountains because that’ll clear everything over there” 
(NTSB, 1974, p. 30) 
“I know they work better than we do” (NTSB, 2007b, p. 140) 
 In the first extract, unfortunately the speaker was quite wrong in his assertion about clearing 
the terrain. In the second, the speaker is advocating the use of the automatic braking system 
by communicating that in his opinion it would be more effective than operating the brakes 
manually but without specifying how much more effective. The process of expressing either a 
high or low value is not restricted to explicit terms such as the “sixteen seventy metres” out-
lined earlier in the Manchester incident; the occurrence literature indicates that some of the 
most serious infringements or dangerous situations have featured the most imprecise lan-
guage. In the extract below from the Houston accident transcript, the first officer was proba-
bly intending to communicate that the aircraft was being flown at least sixty knots faster than 
appropriate for the final approach. If this information had been communicated with the ap-
propriate level of precision the pilot flying would have had a strong indication that his actions 
were not acceptable and a DC 9 would not have landed with the landing gear retracted. 
 
“…we’re just smokin’ in here” (NTSB, 1997a, p. 4) 
Reports such as this one and the CFIT accident at Arkansas indicate that when a rule is in the 
process of being infringed the use of imprecise language appears to facilitate the infringement 
in a way that would be difficult if a precise statement of the aircraft state was made. Further-
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more the observation that imprecise language is a recurrent feature of SFP related occurrenc-
es suggests that such language may be interpreted as tacit approval from the other FCM(s). 
 
7.2.5. RESULTS OF THE CONCORDANCING OF UNCLEAR COMMUNICATION  
RELATED TRANSCRIPTS 
This section outlines the taxonomy of verbal communication for the three most recurrent 
types of SFP occurrences outlined in Chapter 7.2.1. 
 
7.2.5.1. THE VERBAL CHARACTERISTICS OF “FLIGHT BELOW A SAFE 
 ALTITUDE” OCCURRENCES 
Accidents at Arkansas and Mount Erebus were both instances where the flight crew thought 
they were somewhere different from their actual position for a variety of reasons. In both 
these cases it was a precondition of the flight they were conducting that they maintain visual 
contact with the terrain. Given that they both crashed into the surface it is reasonable to con-
clude that they did not meet this precondition. Instances of attenuated communication in this 
situation centre upon knowing where the aircraft is and ensuring that the weather is good 
enough. Throughout this section a possible unhedged interpretation is shown in parenthesis. 
 
EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN RELATING TO WEATHER CONDITIONS 
“Doesn’t look very promising, does it?” (TAIC, 1979, p. 42) (I doubt that the weather is good 
enough for what you are intending to do) 
The tag “does it?” invites the addressees to agree or disagree; in this case there was general 
agreement among the flight deck occupants that the weather was marginal. 
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“Actually those conditions don’t look very good at all – do they?” (TAIC, 1979, p. 74) (The 
conditions do not appear suitable; what are you going to do?) The tag “do they?” invites a 
response. The following extract was used by an accident flight crew at Aspen: 
“That’s not good” (NTSB 2002, p. 4) 
“That’s not good” was also used by an accident flight crew at Traverse City, Michigan 
(NTSB, 2008b, p. 173) to describe a forty eight knot tailwind on final approach, which by 
any assessment is understated by the language used.  All three extracts above use a linguistic 
device known as a litote which deploys understatement by stating that something is not good 
rather than saying that it is bad. Flight crews use litotes frequently. 
 
 “Dark cloud ahead” (KNKT, 2012, p. 31) (what are you planning to do about the weather 
ahead?)  
 
According to Grice’s maxim of quantity the comment above, from the Jakarta accident first 
officer, advising his captain that there is dark cloud ahead or that cloud is being flown 
through should not be necessary because it is visible to the addressee. In this case, flouting 
the maxim of quantity appears to be used as an appeal for action. Below is a similar extract 
from the Arkansas first officer: 
 
“We’re going in and out of some scud” (low cloud) (NTSB, 1974, p. 32) 
 
In this extract the speaker states something that should be obvious to the addressee, seeming-
ly in an attempt to prompt some corrective action. Support for this interpretation is found in 
the extract that immediately followed, in which he expressed his concern more directly: 
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“I sure wish I knew where the # we were” (Ibid., p. 32) (I don’t know where we are) 
 
The Gricean maxim of quantity emerges as a useful indicator of the expression of concern; if 
something obvious is being communicated it probably means the addressee should attempt to 
understand why the communication was considered necessary by the speaker. The comments 
below carry more force by emphasising that the assessment being offered relates to the here 
and now and implies that urgent action is needed. 
 
“Here we are…we’re not out of it” (Ibid., p. 35) (we descended to clear cloud and it hasn’t 
worked…now what?) 
“We’re in solid (cloud) now” (Ibid., p. 34) (we should be in visual conditions) 
“You're really a long time on instruments this time are you?” (TAIC, 1979, p .72) (You 
should not be flying in cloud for this long because we are close to high terrain) 
 
EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN RELATING TO TERRAIN CLEARANCE 
Terrain clearance concerns were closely linked to concerns related to the weather. The reason 
that terrain clearance concerns are so highly mitigated in the transcripts is that whilst weather 
conditions are to some extent subjective, there are clear rules related to descent below a safe 
altitude. This means that a PF needs to tread carefully when stating their intention to descend 
in marginal conditions and a PM needs to be sure of their ground before implying that a rule 
is about to be infringed. 
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ATTENUATED EXPRESSION OF INTENTION TO DESCEND BY PF 
In the three examples below, all from the Erebus accident, the speaker retains the right to as-
sert that what was said was only a proposal, thereby avoiding face threat if anyone else were 
to disagree.  
 
“I’ll have to do an orbit here, I think” (TAIC, 1979, p. 51) (an orbit is a very uncommon ma-
noeuvre; I’ll see what my colleagues think before I do it) 
 
“I’ll do an orbit here to get down, I think” (Ibid., p. 54) (I’ll do an orbit but if anyone seri-
ously disagrees I can claim it was only a plan) 
 
“We might have to pop down to fifteen hundred here I think” (Ibid., p. 71) (this is a very unu-
sual manoeuvre in a large airliner, I’ll use informal language to make it sound less unusual) 
 
Notably, the speaker initially avoids saying he is going to do an orbit, just that he is thinking 
about it; then he explains why he thinks it is necessary. Later he uses informal language to 
describe a descent in the vicinity of high terrain. Only twenty seconds later, more direct ex-
pressions of concern were heard. 
 
The extract below is from the Dulles accident and is an example of a category of accidents 
where the flight crew misunderstood the preconditions that need to be met in order to descend 
on final approach for landing. 
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“When he clears you that means you can descend…to your initial approach altitude”  
(NTSB, 1975b, p. 5) (I’m not really certain about this, so I’ll phrase it as a statement and try 
to get the others involved and maybe we can resolve the ambiguity) 
 
Given that all three FCMs entered this discussion it is likely that what appeared to be a state-
ment of intent was presented by the speaker for the approval of the rest of the flight crew. 
Almost twenty years later the flight crew at Cali went through a similar verbal process and 
made the same error: 
 
“OK so were cleared to five (thousand) now?” (Flight Safety Foundation, 1998, p. 9). 
 
(We have been very busy for a few minutes and I’m not completely sure where we are in re-
lation to the published procedure route. If I ask a direct question it reveals that I have tempo-
rarily lost situational awareness. If I pose the question as a statement it looks like I am just 
asking for confirmation of something I already know).  Clearly both the comments in the ex-
tracts above were questions posing as statements so it is important to understand why this 
type of unclear communication is used. By making a statement such as “OK so we’re cleared 
to five now” the speaker gives the impression that he knows the rules and is completely situa-
tionally aware. Endsley (1995) has described what superior situation awareness looks like, 
and for a pilot, knowing one’s relation to the terrain clearance altitudes is an absolute re-
quirement during a descent in proximity to high terrain. Similarly an admission that a captain 
is uncertain about how an instrument approach procedure should be flown carries strong po-
tential for face threat so although the rational choice would be to ask the other FCMs their 
advice directly, it is likely to be avoided. 
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DESCENT BELOW MINIMUM HEIGHT ON AN APPROACH IN MARGINAL 
WEATHER 
This category includes occurrences at Aspen (NTSB, 2002), Houston (NTSB, 2006b) and 
Zurich (SAIB, 2001). A detailed knowledge of the legislation is not necessary to understand 
the rules regarding the latter stages of an approach to land, where the FCMs transition from 
instrument flight to visual flight to perform a landing. The important point is that in the three 
accidents cited above there was a precondition that the flight crew should see the runway or 
its lighting at a specified height and if this was not achieved a missed approach was neces-
sary. In none of these instances was an ability to see the ground a requirement or a justifica-
tion to continue below the minimum height unless the runway or its lighting was visible. The 
extracts below relate to a flight crew who crashed an Avro Regional Jet at Zurich after flying 
below the minimum height without the necessary visual reference. 
 
“We have ground contact” (SAIB, 2001, p. 19) (I can see the ground therefore the weather 
might be suitable for a landing). 
“I have ground contact…we’re continuing at the moment” (Ibid., p. 19) (I have decided to 
infringe a rule but I am only doing it for a moment; if you don’t challenge me I will continue 
with the infringement). 
“It appears we have ground contact…we’re continuing on” (Ibid., p. 107) (I can see the 
ground and that is enough for me to continue towards the runway even though I do not have 
the necessary visual reference and I should be making a missed approach). 
 
As previously stated, the comments about ground contact were irrelevant except that they 
may have signified in advance an intention to infringe the rules. “We are continuing at the 
moment” was probably intended to convey that there was some rationale behind this very 
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dangerous procedure. The contention that a comment relating to ground contact could be an 
advance indication of rule infringement is supported by the transcript below from the Hou-
ston accident (NTSB, 2006b): 
 
“…we're looking for two hundred and forty four on the altimeter and that'll give us two hun-
dred or if we see anything....that'd be, what if I see ground contact, I'll just let you…I'll call it 
out”. (ANN, 2005) (I am aware that the minimum altitude is two hundred and forty four feet 
but I will call it out if I see the ground and you might agree to continue even if we cannot see 
the runway lights). 
 
In this extract the PM apparently seeks to gain approval from the PF to include ground con-
tact as a criterion for continuing the approach in much the same way as the pilot at Zurich. It 
is clear from the transcript that this is how the PF interpreted this comment because he polite-
ly rejected it: 
 
“I’ll probably stay on the gauges all the way down” (ANN, 2005) (you can look at the 
ground; I’m looking at the instruments until I see the runway). The use of probably avoids a 
direct dismissal of the idea as such a rejection would be a threat to the first officer’s positive 
face. 
 
The Aspen accident also required that the runway or its lights be visible. According to the 
report, when the aircraft was 200 feet below the minimum height the captain asked the first 
officer:  
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…whether he could see the highway, and he replied, about one second later, “I see the high-
way” (NTSB, 2002, p. 7) (If you can see the highway I intend to continue despite the fact I 
do not have the necessary visual reference and I shouldn’t be this low in the first place). 
It should be emphasised that seeing the highway was not a required criterion whereas seeing 
the runway was.  
 
EXPRESSION OF UNCERTAINTY OF LATERAL POSITION 
“I’m just thinking of any high ground in the area that's all” (TAIC, 1979, p. 70) (I don’t 
want to be seen to be challenging your authority but I am uncomfortable with our terrain 
clearance). 
 
 “If we keep this up indefinitely we’ll be in Tulsa” (NTSB, 1974, p. 31) (we are a long way 
off course and I am concerned that neither of us knows our position accurately).  
 
“I sure wish I knew where we were” (Ibid., p. 32) (I don’t know where we are). 
 
“I wish I knew where we were so we'd have some idea of the general terrain around this 
place” (Ibid., p. 35) (I don’t know where we are and I don’t think you do either; I am con-
cerned about our terrain clearance). 
 
To ATC: “I can almost see up the canyon from here but I don’t know the terrain well enough 
or I’d take the visual” (NTSB, 2002, p. 36) (I do not have sufficient knowledge of the terrain, 
can you (ATC) offer me some assistance?). 
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“I can’t even get Texarkana any more” (NTSB, 1974, p. 33) (we must be a long way off 
course because I cannot receive a radio beacon that should be in range). 
 
“Well we must be somewhere in Oklahoma” (Ibid., p. 34) (we only know our position at the 
most imprecise level). 
 
“Where we headed?” (Flight Safety Foundation, 1998, p. 11) (We are not going where we 
need to go). 
 
“Keep on trucking” (NTSB, 1974, p. 34) (I don’t have a clear plan, just keep doing what you 
are doing while I think). 
  
“Let’s press on” (Flight Safety Foundation, 1998, p. 11) (I have no plan; I am trying to re-
gain situational awareness). 
 
“The hold’s there isn’t it?” (UK AIB, 1981) (I need someone to confirm my understanding 
of the direction of this holding pattern). 
 
Uncertainty of lateral position was expressed by appeals, usually from subordinate FCMs.  In 
the Arkansas accident the co-pilot made at least ten indirect appeals for the captain to explain 
how he was navigating and where they were; these were usually prefixed by I wish I knew or 
by a statement that highlighted the imprecise nature of the navigation being undertaken. Only 
near the end of the ill-fated flight did he challenge the captain directly and even then the cap-
tain did not take corrective action. The captain generally responded with vague and dis-
missive comments rather than using the precision required of the situation. He referred to a 
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3000 foot mountain as a hill. There was a repetitive tendency to press on despite not knowing 
where the aircraft was; this was particularly evident at Cali (“let’s press on”) and Arkansas 
(“keep on trucking”). The Tenerife transcript included five comments with the tag isn’t it? 
Whenever the Arkansas captain provided position information he communicated it in such a 
way that it was largely incomprehensible to his addressee. In the Cali and Arkansas tran-
scripts the comment we # up (expletive) was used; in both these cases if corrective action had 
been taken at the point that red line had been acknowledged there would have been no acci-
dent. 
 
EXPRESSION OF UNCERTAINTY OF VERTICAL POSITION 
The extract below is from the Dulles CFIT accident where the flight crew misinterpreted the 
approach chart. 
“According to this dumb sheet (referring to the instrument approach chart) it says thirty four 
hundred to Round Hill is our minimum altitude." (NTSB, 1975b, p. 5) (I do not understand 
this chart). 
In the following extract the Arkansas captain plucks a figure out of his head in response to 
concerns about the terrain from the first officer: 
“The highest point out here is about 1200 feet” (NTSB, 1974, p. 36) (I don’t know the terrain 
elevation accurately so I’ll state a value that supports the actions I am currently taking). 
“You can quit worrying about the mountains because that’ll clear everything over there” 
(Ibid., p. 30) (I am tired of you questioning the terrain clearance). 
The Dulles flight engineer expressed doubt about the vertical profile that was being flown: 
“We’re out here quite a ways” (NTSB, 1975b, p. 4) (It looks like we are quite low consider-
ing how far from the airport we are). 
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The first extract above is a clear case of speaker attributing his misunderstanding of the pro-
cedure to the dumb sheet. The use of about 1200 feet in the second extract is an inappropri-
ately vague way of expressing terrain clearance, which usually requires specific margins 
above the terrain that are difficult for a pilot to derive. Flight crews are required to comply 
with specified minimum altitudes, not derive them themselves. The level of imprecision in 
the third extract suggests that the speaker did not know either the aircraft’s exact position or 
the elevation of the terrain. The last comment evaded the investigators but it appears that the 
flight engineer was commenting that the flight crew were flying lower than they needed to be 
at their current distance from the airport; the aircraft crashed 25 miles short of the runway. 
The chart that the pilot described as dumb depicted a far more rational descent profile than 
the very shallow one that resulted in the crash.  
 
7.2.5.2   THE VERBAL CHARACTERISTICS OF “LOSS OF CONTROL 
OCCURRENCES” 
This section examines a specific category of loss of control (LOC) accident namely those 
which occur just after takeoff. This category is also relevant to accidents that occur during a 
missed approach. Although there are other types of LOC accidents, due to a number of recent 
occurrences this type of accident is attracting the aviation community’s scrutiny as this study 
is underway in 2016.  
 
UNCLEAR LANGUAGE CHARACTERISTIC OF “LOSS OF CONTROL AFTER 
TAKEOFF OCCURRENCES” 
Loss of control (LOC) after takeoff is a disturbing recurrent phenomenon in which fully 
serviceable aircraft crash in an extreme attitude, usually within a very few minutes of taking 
off. The accident literature indicates that even minor distraction can trigger such an accident. 
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Although this research could find no instance where failed communication was cited as a 
cause of LOC, it is usually there in the background. The literature indicates that this type of 
accident is characterised by deficiencies in communication between the FCMs. Some of the 
communication was not explicit enough, some was misleading and in all the instances 
outlined in this section, the communication was too late. Although this section examines 
three occurrences involving Boeing 737 aircraft there are similar occurrences involving other 
types. Examining accidents involving one type of aircraft confers an advantage by reducing 
the influence of confounding features of different aircraft systems and procedures. Also the 
three occurrences involved pilots of three different airlines, indicating that the ideas 
suggested here may be generalizable. The three accidents are: 
 Ethiopian Airlines flight 409 near Beirut, Lebanon. 25th January 2010. Airborne 4 minutes 
(Republic of Lebanon, 2012) 
 Flash Airlines flight 604 near Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. 3rd January 2004: Airborne 2 minutes 
30 seconds. (Egyptian Ministry of Civil Aviation, 2004) 
 Kenya Airlines flight 507 near Douala, Cameroon. 5th May 2007: Airborne 1 minute 33 
seconds. (Republic of Cameroon (2007) 
The manual concordancing found that in the approximately eight minutes of flight conducted 
by the three accident flight crews all made non-routine reference to the autopilot. The Flash 
Airlines pilots referred to the autopilot eight times in their short flight. References to 
headings and directions were the next most recurrent type of communication. The Flash 
Airlines flight crew used the term left or right seven times. The Kenyan first officer 
miscommunicated the direction of turn once and corrected himself twice in the same 
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communication. In each case there was miscommunication or absence of communication 
regarding the autopilot status. 
In each of these accidents the aircraft gradually exceeded the normal maximum bank angle of 
30˚ before the PF attempted corrective action. In the Flash Airlines accident it is likely that 
the failure to successfully engage the autopilot precipitated the events that followed. It is 
possible that at least one of the PFs in these three accidents simply forgot that he had been 
unsuccessful in engaging the autopilot and thought that it was flying the aircraft. In the Flash 
Airlines accident the first indication of a problem was when the PM called turning right when 
the intended direction of turn was left. The call turning right made in response to the 
captain’s incorrect direction of turn was ambiguous because simply saying turning right can 
have more than one meaning. In a LOC accident involving a Saab 340 commuter airliner at 
Nassenwil, Switzerland (SAIB, 2004) the controller noticed that the aircraft was turning right 
instead of left after takeoff, which prompted the comment "Crossair 498 confirm you are 
turning left" (Ibid., p. 13) despite the controller knowing that the aircraft was turning right. So 
in the Nassenwil case, the use of turning left was an attenuated warning that the aircraft was 
not turning left, probably enacted in this way to avoid directly pointing out the flight crew’s 
error. Although the Saab subsequently crashed, it was probably also the controller’s intention 
to avoid any further confusion to the flight crew which prompted him to clear them to 
continue turning the wrong way. The comment “turning right” made by the Flash Airlines’ 
PM at Sharm el Sheikh was intended to convey precisely the opposite to the Nassenwil 
instance so it is understandable how such an attenuated comment could be misinterpreted. 
The first officer’s attempt at Sharm el Sheikh to avoid explicitly stating a mistake was being 
made by the captain probably resulted in a delay during which time the bank angle was 
allowed to increase. Given that the first response to the comment turning right resulted in an 
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exclamation of “what?” and a concurrent increase in bank angle it is reasonable to speculate 
that the captain may have interpreted it as being an instruction. The first officer subsequently 
elaborated by saying “aircraft is turning right” to which the captain says “ah, turning right” 
indicating that he had understood what was trying to be conveyed. The accident report 
commented that the subsequent overbank callout was “not directive”, presumably meaning 
that a direct order to turn left should have been issued. In all three instances the PFs’ first 
response to the warning was to increase the bank angle. Although this is a small sample, this 
is a rare phenomenon in which all the pilots involved reacted in the same fashion. It may be 
that a more explicit aural instruction would have been reacted to more effectively. In each of 
the accidents there was a suggestion that either the bank angle warning or the stick shaker 
was not immediately recognised; in any case none of the pilots initiated a stall recovery. The 
contextual-cueing strand of this research provides some explanations for incorrect responses 
to warnings and alerts that are rarely experienced by flight crews. Another common feature of 
all three accidents was a lack of awareness of whether the autopilot was engaged or not. It is 
likely that at some stage in each of these accidents the PF erroneously believed that the 
autopilot was flying the aircraft. In fact at some stage in each accident each PF called for the 
autopilot to be engaged and the request was not complied with; furthermore, none of the PMs 
communicated that fact to the PF. It could be that the request was not carried out due to the 
PM’s workload state; this would help to explain why in one case the PM explicitly stated that 
he had engaged it. The Sharm el Sheikh report suggested that the PM may have simply 
assumed the autopilot had engaged because he had pressed the button. The underpinnings of 
cognitive errors related to misattributions involving system status are examined in more detail 
in the contextual-cueing strand of this research. Another possibility is that these PMs decided 
that the timing of autopilot engagement was inappropriate. Failure to communicate may have 
been a consequence of AAC, the phenomenon where all the communicative options open to a 
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speaker are ones which would normally be avoided. Each of these PFs requested autopilot 
engagement at a stage when the aircraft was already in an extreme attitude that the autopilot 
is not designed to rectify so the PM would probably not want to comply with that command. 
On the other hand, it was probably also evident that the reason it was being requested was in 
a desperate attempt to try and regain control of the aircraft. This is exactly the scenario that 
Bavelas (1985) has observed can result in complete withdrawal from communication. The 
overarching observation relating to LOC just after takeoff is that communication often does 
not occur, and when it does, it is not timely or explicit enough. In all of these cases the PM 
should have taken control, in which case it is likely that the accident would have been 
averted. After an extensive review of LOC accidents no instances could be found of either a 
captain successfully taking over from a first officer or vice versa; this behaviour is likely to 
be to some extent grounded in both positive and negative-face threat avoidance. It is a 
recurrent dilemma for subordinate FCMs knowing how far to allow a situation to develop 
before speaking up. A captain turning the wrong way or any other LOC instance is likely to 
be a one off event that most FCMs have never encountered before. There is almost certain to 
be a short period during which the PM confirms that they are not making a mistake 
themselves because to distract a captain unnecessarily at a critical phase of flight could 
aggravate the situation and would involve face threat for both parties. The most effective 
means of communicating such an error would be to use a bald-on-record statement such as 
you’re turning the wrong way…turn left now but these are very face threatening and were 
almost completely absent from the transcripts reviewed for this section. Although by 
coincidence these three examples involved a PF who was a captain and a PM who was a 
fairly junior co-pilot, it should not be inferred that a similar reluctance to communicate and 
intervene is less likely when the roles are reversed. In the Cali accident cited earlier, the 
aircraft was flown by the first officer and the captain failed to intervene even when he was 
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issuing quite forceful commands such as turn right…right now (Flight Safety Foundation, 
1998, p. 13) and even left the first officer flying during the incorrectly flown terrain 
avoidance manoeuvre. 
 
7.2.5.3. VERBAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCURRENCES INVOLVING OMISSIONS 
OR INAPPROPRIATE FLIGHT CREW ACTIONS 
 
 THE CAPTAIN WHO IS NOT LISTENING 
The concordancing of this category of occurrence was based upon accidents at Portland 
(NTSB, 1979) and Guantanamo Bay (NTSB, 1994a).  As the Portland accident was a fuel 
starvation occurrence the word fuel was searched. In the eighteen minutes before the accident 
fuel was mentioned by the first officer and engineer with increasing urgency no fewer than 
five times. Only once was this acknowledged by the captain and no attempt to get him to en-
gage with the topic was evident. At Guantanamo Bay although the outcome was a LOC acci-
dent the problems started much earlier with a reluctance to explicitly question the captain’s 
decision to make a difficult approach when a comparatively straightforward one was availa-
ble. Because the category “omissions and inappropriate flight crew actions” could encompass 
many different types of occurrence, concordancing was found to be ineffective. It was how-
ever, possible to identify recurrent themes that accompanied situations where FCMs were un-
comfortable about a course of action being taken. The reports indicated that usually the cap-
tain was PF in such cases. The Portland and Guantanamo Bay accidents both featured a cap-
tain who had a clear idea of how they were going to conduct the flight and although the other 
FCMs expressed uncertainty about what was being proposed they probably felt they did not 
have the authority to disagree because nothing being proposed would have violated a rule. 
Both first officers expressed their doubt about the successful outcome of what was proposed 
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but neither obtained a response from their captain. The Guantanamo Bay captain decided that 
he would fly the more difficult approach “just for the heck of it” (NTSB, 1994, p. 100). The 
first officer’s reply “okay” could mean many things, from a simple acknowledgement that the 
intention had been heard, to wholehearted agreement. Given that no discussion had taken 
place and that the rationale given for conducting the more difficult approach was not very 
professional it is likely that it was used in the fashion suggested by Gravano et al. (2009) to 
convey a “satisfactory” assessment rather than enthusiastic agreement with the proposed 
course of action. His subsequent communication of the proposed landing to ATC expressed 
tentativeness about its likelihood of success: 
“We request to land to the east…if we need to we’ll make another approach…but we’d like to 
make the first approach to the east”… (Ibid., p. 100) 
The flight engineer also quipped: 
“Just don’t do no rolls on finals” (Ibid., p. 104) 
Although these might seem insignificant remarks they all signal that the approach carried 
risks that the individual FCMs recognised but at no time discussed in direct language. It was 
noticeable that in both transcripts the first officer and flight engineer provided detailed cri-
tique of the deteriorating situation but never directly challenged their captain’s course of ac-
tion. The main characteristic of these transcripts was that they included information that 
should not have been necessary to convey if the flight was being conducted satisfactorily.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight it is obvious that the captain at Portland lost awareness of the 
fuel state very early on. The captain at Guantanamo Bay was attempting to do something that 
was difficult and, as it transpired, beyond his capabilities. It is very uncommon for instruc-
tions on how to fly the aircraft to come from subordinate FCMs so this might be the most ob-
vious verbal marker that something is amiss. There follows several of the comments made by 
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the Guantanamo Bay first officer and flight engineer with an interpretation of what was prob-
ably intended to be communicated in parenthesis: 
 
“You wanna get dirty and slowed down and everything?” (NTSB, 1974, p. 117) (I think you 
should have the landing gear and flaps extended by now). 
 
“That’s the end of the runway right there….I’d give myself plenty of time to get straight” 
(Ibid., p. 117) (you’re getting too close to make a safe turn to the runway). 
 
“I think you’re getting in close before you start your turn” (Ibid., p. 118) (I’m concerned that 
this is not going to work out). 
 
“The runway is right there…you’re right on it” (Ibid., p. 118) (we’re way too close). 
 
Captain: “Going to really have to honk it…let’s get the gear down” (Ibid., p. 118) (I have 
recognised that I am far too close and I should have configured the gear and flaps earlier; I 
am going to continue with this dangerous approach). 
“Slow airspeed” (Ibid., p. 121)  (you are in danger of stalling). 
“Check the turn” (Ibid., p. 121) (you are overbanking). 
“Do you think you’re gonna make this?” (Ibid., p. 123) (I don’t think you are going to make 
this). 
Five hundred…you’re in good shape (Ibid., p. 123) (you don’t meet any of the criteria for a 
stable approach but you might achieve a successful landing…you’re continuing anyway so I 
had best support you). 
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In an accident at Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) the first officer made a prolonged attempt to dis-
suade his captain from flying into terrain but was still unsuccessful. The problem with both 
the Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) and Guantanamo supporting FCMs is that they didn’t com-
municate their disagreement with the course of action proposed by the PF early enough and 
therefore were implicated in its execution. What is meant here is that at Islamabad it is incon-
ceivable that the first officer did not know that his captain was intending to infringe a rule; 
after all he (the first officer) could see the unofficial route in the aircraft’s flight management 
computer. Once tacit approval has been given it is difficult to subsequently fail to support that 
action. There was no dissent whatsoever from the first officer as the aircraft was deviated 
from its cleared route. When the first officer was asked by air traffic control whether they 
were visual with the airfield he was in a bind: 
 
ATC: Are you visual with the airfield? (PCAA, 2010, p. 24) (I cannot see you so I don’t think 
you can see the airfield). 
F/O to Captain: What should I tell him sir? (Ibid., p. 24) (I don’t think you can see the air-
field; do you want me to lie?). 
This indicated that the airfield was not in sight but it was possible to report that the ground 
was visible although this was not a required criterion for continuance of the approach being 
flown. The first officer told his captain to pull up several times in the minute before impact 
but by this time he (the captain) was spatially disoriented and his performance was seriously 
degraded (See the spatial awareness strand of this research). Given that the first officer was 
situationally aware (he knew where the terrain was and he knew they were too low) he could 
have taken over and recovered the situation; this however, would be very face-threatening. It 
was noticeable in the Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) CVR transcript that the first officer addressed 
his captain using the prefix “sir” even in the seconds before impact. This contrasted starkly 
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with the Guantanamo CVR transcript where informality was far more evident. Hofstede’s 
power distance index (2011) measures the extent to which the less powerful members of or-
ganizations or cultures accept that power is distributed unequally. Although there is insuffi-
cient data in the transcripts to comment upon either the operators’ culture or the culture of 
Pakistan or the USA it can be said that both countries occupy the mid ranks as of 2016, with 
Pakistan rated at 55 and the USA at 40. This means that a first officer should not feel exces-
sively inhibited expressing an opinion in either of those cultures. Research by Fischer & 
Orasanu (1999) involving US airline pilots found that captains generally preferred to use 
commands while first officers predominantly used hints.  Both captains and first officers fa-
voured communications that appealed to the crew concept rather than to any particular status 
based model, a finding supported in the Guantanamo Bay transcript but less evident in the 
Islamabad transcript. They also found that as risk increased, captains became more direct in 
their communications whereas first officers quadrupled their use of attenuated obligation 
statements. The debate over whether the hierarchical structure of a military background or the 
characteristics of certain cultures inhibit clear communication is one that was initiated by an 
accidents involving Korean flight crews in Guam in 1997 (NTSB, 2000 pp. 147-8) and 
Stansted in 1999 (UK AAIB, 2003, p. 50) and has been reignited by a Korean Boeing 777 
crash at San Francisco in 2013 (NTSB, 2014a). There is a persistent but largely unspoken 
narrative suggesting certain cultures are less able to express criticism of a hierarchical superi-
or than others but it would be a mistake to differentiate excessively along cultural lines. Alt-
hough at Islamabad the first officer was criticised for being a “passive bystander” (PCAA, 
2010, p. 32) it is hard to criticise the strength with which he challenged his captain verbally; 
his captain was just not listening. In fact there are examples from almost every culture, of un-
fathomable failures in communication sometimes involving pilots of very high calibre. The 
first officer in the Cali accident had been instructor of the year for the entire US Air Force 
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prior to joining American Airlines and the Russian test pilot at Jakarta was the most experi-
enced pilot on that aircraft in the world. This suggests that no cultural background is immune 
from the risks of failed communication. 
 
 THE COLLEAGUE WHO NEEDS SOME SUPPORT 
There were two clear instances in the transcripts of an under confident captain who was 
paired with a first officer whose actions appeared to be targeted at offering more than usual 
support. In the Detroit accident report (NTSB, 1991b, p. 53) it was hypothesised that a role 
reversal may have taken place in which the first officer had effectively assumed the role of 
captain. Although not mentioned in the Chicago report (NTSB, 2007b), there was some evi-
dence of persuasion from the first officer and there was quite clear evidence that the captain 
interpreted it that way. Although two transcripts represent a small sample, a few common 
characteristics were evident in the reports; firstly, the first officers both had extensive previ-
ous experience as a captain. Secondly, they both presented as very confident. However, the 
most influential aspect of their verbal behaviour was that they both gave an impression that 
they were more knowledgeable than they actually were. At Detroit this narrative centred upon 
the first officer’s distinguished military career whereas at Chicago the narrative was almost 
exclusively related to the first officer’s knowledge about how effective the autobrake system 
was, despite the fact that he had never witnessed it operating either in an aircraft or a simula-
tor. Nothing he said was untrue but it could have given the impression he knew more than he 
actually did. Both first officers offered unsolicited instruction to their captain at some time 
during their respective transcripts. The first officer at Detroit was found to have embellished 
both his military record and his degree of familiarity with the taxiing operation just about to 
be undertaken. How this is related to attenuated communication is that once a speaker has set 
himself up as an authority he has a long way to fall if circumstances indicate that he is not 
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quite the authority he projected. At Detroit this had catastrophic consequences when the 
seemingly knowledgeable first officer became hopelessly lost whilst assisting his captain to 
taxi in fog. On three separate occasions he ignored the captain’s request that he advise ATC 
that they were unsure of their position; had he done this it is likely that the accident could 
have been averted. This is a further instance of an AAC bind along the following lines: admit 
I am lost versus cause an accident. For most of us that would be an easy choice but human 
behaviour is complex and this is not an isolated case of a pilot refusing to ask for help in the 
interests of face threat avoidance. 
 
THE ROLE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
As far as is known, this construct has not been examined before; it refers to situations where a 
speaker is aware that something is wrong but either communicates the fact in attenuated form 
or directly understates the seriousness of the situation. The former case was evident in a seri-
ous occurrence at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 2010a) and the latter at Houston (NTSB, 2006b); in 
both cases the influence of accountability or responsibility appears to be relevant. At St Kitts 
an air traffic controller knowingly allowed a British Airways Boeing 777 flight crew to start 
their takeoff from a position on the runway that they had not intended. The controller had 
asked the pilots whether they were happy to depart from a given position but their reply clear-
ly indicated that they were making a mistake regarding their location on the runway. The con-
troller did not challenge this inconsistency and the aircraft departed from half way along the 
runway. Although it was outside the remit of the associated report to comment upon the rea-
sons why the controller took this action it can reasonably be speculated that he believed that 
once he had advised the flight crew, his responsibility had been discharged. If this is how 
those who support flight crews view their responsibilities it demonstrates a lack of connection 
within the aviation safety system. The second way that responsibility and accountability can 
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influence flight safety is when someone makes an error that impacts safety and then attempts 
to downplay its significance. It is intuitively understandable how a team member who makes 
a mistake is likely to feel accountable for that error; the problem occurs when that individual 
then uses language that downplays the seriousness of the situation that has resulted. This 
completely original construct was prompted by an accident in which a very experienced flight 
crew (effectively two captains) were flying into Houston in bad weather. The PM made an 
incorrect selection of navigation aids at a late stage in the approach, which meant the PF lost 
some of his navigation displays and resulted in an unstable approach, which should have 
prompted a missed approach. The PM repeatedly misrepresented the seriousness of the situa-
tion by encouraging the PF that the approach should be continued; the aircraft crashed short 
of the runway. Although it may seem a weak explanation to the uninitiated, the motivation 
for an experienced FCM to avoid making a missed approach for which he is accountable is 
likely to be much stronger than, for instance, if the missed approach was due to a factor for 
which he was not accountable, such as the weather. This behaviour is likely to be under-
pinned by the face-wants of the individual concerned. Making an incompetent error is unlike-
ly to match one’s own desired self-concept or to be an image that one wants to present to oth-
ers. Negative-face threat may also explain why in this and other instances the other FCM ac-
cedes to the wishes of the speaker. This phenomenon was evident at Cali where the captain, 
who was PM, incorrectly programmed the navigation computer to fly in a completely differ-
ent direction to the intended route (See Figure 8.4). Less than one minute before impacting a 
mountain the captain said OK you’re in good shape now, which was an extreme underrepre-
sentation of the seriousness of the situation. Because relevant instances are few, it is difficult 
to locate evidence to support the contention that for some pilots concealing an error assumes 
a greater importance than rectifying it. An accident at Charleston in which the captain omit-
ted to check the flap setting before taxiing but noticed his error at high speed during the take-
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off, resulting in an almost catastrophic overrun when he rejected the takeoff at high speed. 
Although it is not necessary to understand the details of what is said in the telephone call the 
captain made just minutes after the accident it is relevant that he omits to mention that the 
warnings were caused by his actions. 
 
… “well we're going down the runway here in uh Charleston, West Virginia, and we got a 
config flap config uh spoiler and I rejected and uh well long story short um past the runway 
I'm into that over thing you know where the airplane sinks into the…”  
(NTSB, 2010c, p. 12 28) 
This tendency to use language that downplays personal responsibility is not restricted to 
pilots; at Sochi an Airbus flight crew was making an approach and had been given clearance 
to land. At a late stage of the approach the flight crew was ordered to discontinue the 
approach. To be ordered to discontinue an approach after having been cleared to land is very 
unusual and it is certain that the controller would have known this. Instead of ordering the 
flight crew to go around, the controller described the individual components of a missed 
approach by requesting a climb and a turn. This was clearly an attenuated description of a go 
around. As the aircraft was of French manufacture the French BEA contributed to the 
Russian report. The French BEA was critical of the way the instructions relating to the 
missed approach were communicated to the flight crew. 
“…when the controller aborted the final approach, he gave a series of instructions that 
appear to be piloting instructions rather than a clear instruction for a missed approach. In 
doing this, the controller transformed himself into a decision maker for airplane 
manoeuvring and it should be noted that, in fact, the pilot performs the instructions received 
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in a sequential manner”. (Interstate Aviation Committee Air Accident Investigation 
Commission, 2006) 
 
The pilot carried out the instructions received in succession, but did not appear to have 
immediately adopted the missed approach procedure. The flight crew became confused by 
this less clearly-defined procedure and flew this completely serviceable aircraft into the Black 
Sea. Whilst the confusion that was caused by the specifics of how the instruction was 
communicated is not in question, the underlying reasons for the controller’s departure from 
conventional aviation language are a matter for debate and argument. There is little doubt that 
requesting a climb and a turn sounds like something less serious than a go around to a pilot, 
and this may hold the clue. In such cases, if an actor considers that they may share some 
responsibility for an adverse situation such as a late go around they may be motivated to 
make it sound less serious than it actually is. As was stated earlier, no previous examination 
of this phenomenon could be found but now that it has been operationalised in this research it 
is likely that its effect will be recognisable in future occurrences. 
 
7.2.6 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE VERBAL STRAND RESEARCH 
Because no previous research into the causes of NPCs could be located, it was necessary to 
start the research with a blank sheet. The orientation towards impression management (IM) 
was logical to this researcher but it is conceivable that other research orientations exist. 
Nonetheless, it would be difficult to dismiss IM as an influence given the findings in this 
research. However, this was a preliminary examination of the phenomenon and a stated aim 
of the SFP construct is to be a repository for knowledge as it accumulates, so consideration of 
alternative views will be an essential part of that process in the future. Although the number 
of participants was low, there is no evidence that the responses would have been different 
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with a larger research population. It could be argued that the normal friendliness and crew 
cohesion dimensions were quite loosely defined, but they were identifiable to the pilots who 
participated so they are likely to provide useful knowledge to both pilots and those who 
support them. There was a concern related to socially desirable responding which could have 
been addressed more fully if the responses had been confidential. Experts in critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) might criticise the research for lack of scientific rigour but it was made clear 
at the outset that this was not a formal CDA study, although such a study is conceivable. 
Certain limitations were imposed by being a lone researcher; for instance in thematic analysis 
it is desirable to have more than one assessor when developing the themes that will be used. 
The problem here was that there are very few individuals who possess both the technical and 
psychosocial knowledge to assist in this respect. The unclear communications section was a 
synthesis of peer-reviewed research and subjective opinion. It is difficult to envisage how this 
could have been avoided given some of the jargon in the transcripts. Different researchers 
could have reached different conclusions about what a particular speech act was intended to 
convey but it is unlikely they could validate their assessment any more fully than the 
assessments proposed in this study. So although there is considerable amount of informed 
opinion expressed relating to the unclear communication in the transcripts it is difficult to 
refute what is presented.  Despite these limitations the verbal strand researched phenomena 
that have been identified in the current literature as relevant to aviation safety. The SFP 
construct is dynamic and any limitations evident in this research are likely to stimulate 
critique and contribute to the development of the ideas expressed in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 8  
THE SPATIAL AWARENESS STRAND RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTS 
This chapter describes some of the cognitive limitations that might contribute to the loss of 
positional awareness and consequential SFP evident in the occurrence literature. Although 
this strand may appear very dissimilar to the verbal strand, the flight crew at Lexington 
(NTSB, 2007a) who broke the sterile cockpit rule before an unsuccessful attempted take off 
had lost heading awareness whilst taxiing so the two factors are intertwined.  
 
8.1 THE EFFECT OF ENFORCED ORIENTATION CHANGE ON COGNITIVE LOAD IN 
FLIGHT CREW 
8.1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Flight crews navigating the immediate airport environment whether inflight or on the ground 
usually utilise observer-centred navigation displays (NDs). However, on some occasions 
there is a requirement for flight crews to reorient at short notice to a different reference 
frame, usually a chart or electronic display, invariably aligned with north. It is highly likely 
that the flight crew at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) were using such a chart to taxi to the run-
way. The two experiments described here examined the extent to which transition between 
the observer centred (egocentric) and geographic oriented (allocentric) frames of reference 
invokes cognitive effort. Research conducted by Mousavi et al. (1995) and Frick (1984) has 
demonstrated that during integration of multiple sources of information from a single modali-
ty, considerable deficits in working memory capacity result. In plain language this means that 
a task such as reorienting from an egocentrically oriented map display (or the outside world) 
to a chart, both of which require visual attention, is likely to result in challenges to working 
memory capacity. Evidence supporting a link between working memory deficit and impaired 
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decision making comes from both neuroscientific research (Bechara et al., 1998) and experi-
mentally when working memory is placed under extreme time constraints (Hinson et al., 
2003). Given the link between cognitive load, working-memory deficit and impaired decision 
making just outlined, if it can be demonstrated that flight crew cognitive load is increased 
during reorientation from egocentric orientation to another frame of reference, such reorienta-
tion may be implicated in a range of SFP related behaviours that have preceded a safety oc-
currence. The two experiments outlined in this section used context appropriate stimuli to 
measure cognitive load as a reorientation from egocentric to allocentric reference frame was 
performed. Experiment one measured pilots’ response times (RTs) as they identified depicted 
runway directions of varying angular disparity from north. In experiment two, participants 
identified the location of a feature relative to a runway depicted on a northerly oriented chart 
from a range of orientations. The task required participants to adopt viewing perspectives of 
varying angular disparities from north. In combination, these two experiments addressed the 
most essential components of positional awareness: knowing where one is located, knowing 
where one is heading and knowing where significant features of the spatial environment are 
located. Previous research by Darken & Peterson (2001) suggests that when using a map for 
navigation most people seek to identify their location on the map and their orientation as a 
precursor to navigation. Pilots are likely to adopt a similar process when they need to use a 
map but they may experience the disadvantage of having previously been oriented to an ob-
server oriented map display that obviated the need to know their precise location and orienta-
tion. It is the process of adaptation between the observer oriented (egocentric) display and the 
orientation of the chart (usually oriented north up) that is the subject of this research. Figure 
8.1 illustrates the difference between allocentric and egocentric orientations using a simula-
tion of an aircraft on final approach, its ND and a chart depicting the same scene. 
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Figure 8.1: Egocentric and allocentric representations of the same scene. 
 
The premise of this section of the research is that during readjustment from an egocentric 
display such as that found on most airliners, to a map oriented with north there will be a peri-
 Egocentric    orientation 
Allocentric orientation  
aligned with north 
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od when working memory may be occupied to the extent that other important tasks become 
degraded resulting in SFP. Accidents at Comoros, Cali and several others have been charac-
terised by substandard performance from a pilot whose situation required a prompt transition 
from an electronic egocentrically-oriented navigation display (ND) to features on a chart ori-
ented with north. The outcome of both of the aforementioned accidents was a loss of control 
followed by a crash into the surface. It is important to emphasise that there was nothing in 
these flight crews’ histories to suggest that they were prone to lose control of the aircraft, so 
their substandard performance was probably the result of some aspect of their situational con-
text. There is considerable empirical evidence in the literature to link loss of control occur-
rences with complex unexpected navigation challenges that have required basic skills such as 
using a chart or imagining a future flight path significantly different from that expected. It is 
not being suggested that pilots are unable to make such reorientations; intuitively they should 
be better than the general population at such a task. However, it is possible that they may be 
de-skilled at using a map because it is only required on rare occasions. Ironically, the pilots at 
Cali only needed to use a map when they incorrectly programmed their flight management 
computer after an unexpected runway change, which meant their workload was already sub-
ject to two factors (a change of route and of runway) that, according to ASRS reports 
xii
in-
crease pilots’ workload. Since the accident at Cali, technology has improved and today it is 
less likely that a flight crew whose cognitive load has redlined while trying to become orient-
ed would fly into a mountain as the Cali flight crew did but there is no room for complacency 
because in 2012 a Russian flight crew flying the most sophisticated airliner available at the 
time, lost track of where their aircraft was heading and crashed into a mountain near Jakarta 
whilst trying to mentally calculate the reciprocal track to their point of departure (KNKT, 
2012, p. 33). At Comoros the flight crew were flying a complicated circling approach which 
many pilots would acknowledge is among the most demanding type of approach to fly in a 
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large airliner. Furthermore the approach in question relied upon an egocentrically oriented 
map display for the initial phase of the approach (until the airport was acquired visually) but 
an almost 180˚ mental reorientation to visualise important features required for the landing 
(Union des Comores, 2013). Circling approaches undoubtedly come with inherent risks but 
flying is a risk laden activity; it is however, important that the risks are fully understood not 
just by pilots but by those who design and implement procedures. Although circling ap-
proaches are gradually being superseded by approaches based upon GPS it is likely that some 
of the most complex and potentially hazardous airports will retain circling approaches for the 
foreseeable future. This research examined and highlighted a cognitive limitation that, as far 
as is known, has not previously been considered a contributory factor in aviation safety oc-
currences. 
 
8.1.2 REORIENTATION AND PILOT WORKLOAD: EVIDENCE OF A PROBLEM 
Although the flight crews of modern airliners usually navigate using an observer centred ND, 
on occasions they also need to be able to navigate using charts which traditionally favour 
viewing in a north up orientation. Furthermore, state of the art electronic flight bag (EFB) 
applications such as those fitted to the Boeing 787 permit only limited orientation of the nav-
igation chart resulting in a requirement for the user to mentally reorient during chart based 
navigation. For the purposes of this study the term enforced change of orientation refers to 
the action of transitioning from the information depicted on the electronic ND and the actual 
spatial environment, to depictions on a chart or EFB application presented in a north up ori-
entation. The fact that this research could locate no instances where this phenomenon had 
been cited as a contributory factor in a safety occurrence does not detract from its relevance 
but indicates that it is probably a human factor that has been overlooked, possibly due to a 
belief that the risk has been mitigated by observer oriented displays. Whilst the accident at 
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Cali is the only definitive example of a disoriented flight crew using a chart (the CVR record-
ed the rustling of pages), the Comoros accident flight crew faced a particularly challenging 
approach in which they would need to align with the runway without all of the lighting the 
approach would normally require. It is highly likely that a chart would be needed in order to 
achieve this successfully. At Jakarta the flight crew were unable for some time to decide what 
heading they needed to fly and eventually just decided to fly the approximate reciprocal of 
their previous track; such a determination would almost certainly have involved chart usage. 
At Islamabad it was clear that once the aircraft deviated from the route the pilot was expect-
ing he had very little awareness of what his heading was; it took just under three minutes for 
control to be lost. This research hypothesises that the sudden decrease in flight crew perfor-
mance may be related to the cognitive load invoked during the transition from the routine and 
relatively simple egocentrically oriented navigation of the ND to the more complex naviga-
tion based upon the north-up oriented chart. It is noteworthy that some of the most complex 
circling approaches require a comprehensive understanding of features that are often not visi-
ble on the ND, as was the case at Islamabad, where the pilots were avoiding a restricted area 
only depicted on charts. A particular challenge for this research was the potential for the rapid 
rate of technological advances to reduce the relevance of this research, which it is acknowl-
edged challenges some of the safety related mitigations afforded by such advances. In de-
fence of this research, recent occurrences involving FCMs flying state of the art airliners in-
dicates that there will be an ongoing requirement to understand the processes involved in in-
tegrating egocentric information from the aircraft’s instrumentation with  features shown on a 
chart, particularly during unexpected route changes, circling approaches and whilst navi-
gating on the ground at complex airports. Whilst most landing approaches utilise an egocen-
tric orientation based upon information on the ND, on all but the most modern aircraft almost 
all taxying operations are conducted using a chart or display oriented with north, which re-
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quires the pilot to make a rapid mental reorientation just after landing when workload is at a 
peak. Furthermore, airline accidents involving completely serviceable aircraft at Cali, Islam-
abad, Lexington and recently at Beirut serve as a reminder that despite sophisticated aids to 
navigation, loss of spatial awareness continues to be a contributory factor in some of the most 
serious airline accidents occurring in the vicinity of the airport, both in flight and on the 
ground. Hart and Hauser (1987) note that even during normal operations, workload and stress 
is highest in flight phases such as takeoff and landing. Longitudinal studies of British airline 
pilots by Ellis and Roscoe (1982, 1990) found that flight crews thought of their workload 
state in terms of the availability or otherwise of spare mental capacity. A further premise of 
this research was that some of the navigation tasks routinely performed by pilots are made 
more difficult by the way that information is presented and that the cognitive load invoked 
occupies working memory that would otherwise be employed operating the aircraft safely. 
This research examined the cognitive load experienced by pilots as they reorient to a chart 
and judge their relationship to important features of the spatial environment. 
 
8.1.3 RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH  
This research is part of a wider examination of an original construct, substandard flight crew 
performance (SFP). A detailed review of the aviation accident literature revealed an empirical 
link between confusion relating to the aircraft’s heading and major errors including complete 
loss of control, controlled flight into terrain and gross navigation errors such as the use of an 
incorrect runway. A range of factors can induce cognitive overload but the area of interest in 
this research concerned the cognitive load invoked when pilots need to reorient themselves at 
short notice during either normal or non-normal operations. This study outlined situations in 
which a pilot might need to alternate between the egocentric orientation of the ND and the 
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‘north up’ orientation of a chart and examined the magnitude of cognitive load that such reor-
ientation might invoke. 
 
8.1.4 NAVIGATING A MODERN AIRLINER 
Much research has been conducted into how humans navigate but much less so about how 
pilots navigate. Observer centred NDs represent an essential component of modern aircraft 
navigation with only very few older airliners relying upon analogue instrumentation for navi-
gation. Evidence suggests that observer centred NDs improve situational awareness when 
compared with the displays of previous generation airliners. A growing body of research sug-
gests that larger screens improve situational awareness (Parish et al., 1994, Prinzel et al., 
2005), but it would be unwise to allow this perspective to downplay the importance of main-
taining an appreciation of the real world spatial environment in the form of a cognitive map 
(Tolman, 1948) given the recent re-emergence of CFIT and LOC accidents involving aircraft 
with large NDs. Sohn and Carlson (2003) support this alternative perspective by suggesting 
that the constant availability of an observer centred viewpoint such as that on an ND might 
represent a constraining factor in spatial cognition given the frequent requirement to adopt an 
allocentric viewpoint, that is one that is centred on an external object or location (Klatzky, 
1998). 
 
8.1.5 NAVIGATION VERSUS WAYFINDING 
Whilst all aviation professionals will be aware of what is being referred to when the term 
navigation is used, the term wayfinding is well known in the spatial ability literature but, as 
far as is known, has not previously been operationalised in the aviation context. According to 
Darken and Peterson (2001) wayfinding is the cognitive element of navigation whereas in 
this aviation related study it is more useful to consider wayfinding and navigation as separate 
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constructs. This is because for most modern day pilots, navigation involves following a pre-
planned route on an electronic ND which does not require a detailed mental representation of 
the environment or cognitive map as described by Darken and Peterson. However, the occur-
rence literature indicates loss of positional awareness accidents rarely occur when the flight 
crew are coupled to a pre-programmed route. Accidents like the ones at Cali (ACRC, 1996), 
Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) and Jakarta (KNKT, 2012) have all occurred in a context where for 
a variety of reasons the flight crew had departed from their planned route and were simply 
flying a compass heading. It is believed that this is the first research to differentiate between 
these two very distinct means of directing an aircraft through the spatial environment. For the 
purposes of this study, wayfinding refers to the process just described where a pilot derives 
the aircraft’s position and directs its progress using features of the spatial environment. A cir-
cling approach represents a good example of the difference between navigation and wayfind-
ing used in this study, where the initial phase of the approach is probably achieved by follow-
ing a magenta line on the ND whereas the latter part involves a detailed interaction with visu-
al features of the spatial environment, which in this study is wayfinding. At its most basic 
level, even in the most advanced aircraft, wayfinding may consist of dead reckoning (flying a 
heading for a given time) but in reality, some of the most complex circling approaches re-
quire a pilot to integrate ND, chart-based and actual spatial information on a dynamic basis as 
the approach progresses. In most of the accidents where pilots were wayfinding it was not 
through choice and their performance was very haphazard in comparison with their perfor-
mance when they had been navigating. This observed decrement in pilot performance during 
wayfinding was one of the motivations for conducting this research. 
 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis, statistical data relating to accidents can be misleading but 
it can be stated with certainty that two of the most recent CFIT accidents, one at Jakarta 
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(KNKT, 2012) and one at Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) both involved pilots who had intentional-
ly selected an autopilot mode that indicated they intended to proceed on a route that was dif-
ferent from that they had programmed into their flight management computer. This means 
that they met the definition of wayfinding used in this study. It was not possible to locate any 
documented instances of CFIT involving an aircraft whose autopilot was coupled to a 
planned route and thus met the criterion for navigation used in this study. During navigation a 
pilot utilises stimulus responses to support the safe operation of the aircraft such as extending 
the flaps at a given sequential point whereas during wayfinding the pilot derives such infor-
mation from knowledge of the spatial environment; for instance, when following a pre-
programmed route, many modern aircraft provide a pictorial cue indicating to the pilot the 
point at which flaps should be extended during the approach; during wayfinding this type of 
decision is based upon cognitions such as how much height there is to lose and how far from 
the runway the aircraft is. The important point is that during wayfinding these judgments are 
the pilot’s alone and therefore contribute to cognitive load. Navigation can proceed without 
recruiting spatial representations of the environment, relying more upon a memorised se-
quence of procedures. Navigation is more passive than wayfinding in that the pilot follows a 
prescribed route without the need to directly derive any of the information being utilised. 
This means that navigation is less cognitively complex than wayfinding.  Cognitive neurosci-
ence has elaborated upon the distinction between navigation and wayfinding by demonstrat-
ing that differential brain activation occurs during route following (navigation) and wayfind-
ing. During route following, the caudate nucleus region of the brain is activated whereas dur-
ing wayfinding the right posterior hippocampus is active (See Hartley et al., 2003; Packard & 
McGaugh, 1996; Spiers & Maguire, 2006). The caudate nucleus is involved in motor control 
(Wilson, 1912) in addition to learning and applying voluntary movements (Packard & 
Knowlton, 2002) whilst the right posterior hippocampus is involved in storing and using 
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complex spatial information (Maguire et al., 2000; Moser, Moser, & Anderson, 1993; 
O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978). This body of research supports the notion that wayfinding repre-
sents a researchable phenomenon distinct from more routine navigation. 
 
Most flights include a certain amount of wayfinding such as when a controller directs the 
flight crew towards the final approach track. Although the controller provides a heading to fly 
during this intercept phase, the pilot integrates information from the ND, radio beacons, dis-
tance measuring equipment (DME) and other sources to ensure a safe flight path. This type of 
wayfinding is well practiced by flight crews but the occurrence literature suggests that when 
less well-defined instances of wayfinding such as flying an unauthorised circling approach 
(as was the case at Islamabad, PCAA, 2010) or a holding pattern flown by sequential heading 
selections (as was the case at Jakarta) or during the unexpected loss of navigation capability 
(as was the case at Cali) flight crews can quickly become hopelessly lost. The accidents just 
cited span a twenty year period during which remarkable technological advances have oc-
curred but the 2012 accident at Jakarta is not very dissimilar from the 1995 accident at Cali 
inasmuch as the electronic map was not providing the information needed by the flight crew 
so they needed to revert to wayfinding. Notably each of the three aforementioned accidents 
involved aircraft with observer centred (egocentric) navigation displays (NDs) as is the norm. 
Furthermore, in each case the pilots were misaligned with either the intended direction of 
landing or the direction in which they needed to fly. In the Jakarta accident CVR transcript 
(KNKT, 2012, p. 32) the pilots were heard trying to derive what their heading should be. At 
Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) the pilots knew that they were not where they should have been but 
lacked the cognitive capacity to remedy a very minor incorrect autopilot mode selection. At 
Cali the pilots incorrectly programmed their flight management computer with the result that 
they needed to use paper charts and wayfinding to reach the airport. In the Cali instance this 
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required a mental transformation from the egocentric orientation of the ND to the allocentric 
“north up” orientation of the chart. It is not being suggested here that pilots cannot make this 
type of transformation but this study contends that such transformations use valuable cogni-
tive resources that may have contributed to the SFP evident in each of these instances. Opin-
ion is divided regarding the role of reference frame transformation in the construction of a 
cognitive map of the environment. A body of research by Wickens and colleagues (Haskell & 
Wickens, 1993; Olmos, Wickens, & Chudy, 2000; Wickens & Prevett, 1995) represents the 
dominant view that egocentrically oriented displays represent the optimum configuration for 
safe and efficient navigation. This view however, does not address the issue of adapting to a 
different reference frame when wayfinding is required. It should be noted that in each of the 
instances outlined so far, the pilots needed to adapt to a changed reference frame both quickly 
and at short notice, a practice which has been acknowledged by Olmos et al. (2000) can lead 
to disorientation. It has been suggested that the provision of large displays that can represent 
a broad visual field may be beneficial (Tan, Gergle, Scupelli, & Pausch, 2003, 2004) but the 
flight crew of an Air India Boeing 787 equipped with the largest screens currently available 
commenced an approach to Essendon Airport instead of their intended destination of Mel-
bourne in January 2014 (Read, 2014); this flight crew must have been wayfinding when they 
made their error. Given that the majority of aviation operations involve navigation rather than 
wayfinding it is to be expected that the topic of how pilots will conduct the comparatively 
rudimentary but more cognitively demanding type of procedures that have resulted in acci-
dents is low on the list of priorities of those involved with ensuring aviation is safe. There 
have been very few technical innovations in recent years that would have prevented the pilot 
at Islamabad (PCAA, 2010) from suffering cognitive overload or the pilot at Jakarta (KNKT, 
2012) from forgetting to turn because he was thinking about how to get to his destination; 
anyway, both these aircraft were equipped with all of the latest technology. The most effec-
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tive way of mitigating these threats would seem to be to understand them rather than ignore 
their existence. For instance, the use of observer centred displays in wider contexts, such as 
GPS displays in cars, indicates that they probably inhibit the construction of a mental cogni-
tive map of the spatial environment (Wessel et al., 2010). So whilst an egocentric display 
may be optimal for navigation it may contribute to disorientation if wayfinding becomes nec-
essary. The wayfinding literature provides a considerable amount of information relevant to 
the types of tasks pilots undertake when they depart from their planned route. Pilots frequent-
ly need to imagine the future location of their aircraft, a point emphasised by Endsley (1995) 
who defined the highest level of situational awareness as “the perception of the elements in 
the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and 
the projection of their status in the near future”. Pilots not only need to imagine themselves in 
future locations but also in different orientations, and research indicates these processes are 
quite dissimilar. Imagining the aircraft on its current heading but two minutes later is the type 
of task required during a circling approach and is known as a translation. In the image at Fig-
ure 8.2 the aircraft is flying downwind and will in around two minutes turn right through 180˚ 
to align with the runway furthest from the aircraft (highlighted by an arrow)in the image. Un-
til the turn commences, features such as the relative location of the taxiways and airport envi-
ronment remain constant. However, in line with Endsley’s model of situation awareness the 
pilot should be thinking about how this scene will look when aligned with the runway. This is 
particularly relevant at airports where there are parallel runways or taxiways as in the image. 
Pilots also need to prepare for a missed approach, and the literature indicates that cognitive 
load associated with unexpected changes during this phase can result in serious consequenc-
es. This may not seem a difficult task but it occurs at a time when flight crews are busy and 
rarely in the excellent visibility simulated in Figure 8.2 
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Figure 8.2:  A simulation of an aircraft proceeding downwind 
It can be seen in Figure 8.3 that once the 180˚ turn has been completed, features that were on 
the right are now on the left. In this case, the intended runway is on the extreme right but this 
would be a more cognitively challenging task if the intended runway was embedded in sever-
al potential landing surfaces. Although consideration of this type of human limitation may 
seem superfluous given the available technology on the modern flight deck it should be em-
phasised that vacating a runway in the wrong direction after landing or landing on a taxiway 
instead of the intended runway represents a very serious incident. See Appendix D for an ex-
ample of a pilot confusing left and right in the context described.  
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Figure 8.3:  The pilot’s view when aligned with the runway 
The notion that imagining an object from a different perspective from one’s own invokes 
cognitive effort is supported by influential research by Rieser (1989) who found that partici-
pants made accurate spatial judgments when they retained their egocentric orientation despite 
imagining a remote location. When participants were required to imagine the relative position 
of an object from a different orientation, both errors and RTs increased in line with the angu-
lar difference between actual heading and the imagined direction. These changes are thought 
to be the result of mental rotation. The probable reason that translations appear to be less 
cognitively demanding than mental rotations is that in translation the objects retain their rela-
tive positions whereas in mental rotation they change. Although Rieser’s research has been 
challenged in terms of the magnitude of the effects of both translation and mental rotation 
there is widespread acceptance of the general principle that imagining a different orientation 
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from one’s own heading requires cognitive effort. Darken & Peterson, (2001) emphasise that 
map usage as a precursor to navigation is different from map usage  concurrent with naviga-
tion; if the map is used as a precursor to navigation, it is used only for planning and familiari-
zation and no perspective transformation is required. By contrast, map use concurrent with 
navigation involves the placement of oneself on the map as a preliminary step. Interviews 
with pilots supported Darken and Peterson’s ideas, with pilots reporting that when using a 
chart their preliminary task involved asking where am I in relation to important features of 
the spatial environment and what direction am I facing? Although the technology exists to 
depict the aircraft and its orientation on an electronic chart this is only currently envisaged for 
ground based or enroute operations not for airborne navigation in the airport environment. As 
far as is known, there are currently no applications that present an approach chart with all the 
necessary navigation text in an egocentric orientation. The accident literature indicates that it 
is during the approach phase that loss of positional awareness poses the greatest threat. 
Whereas the egocentric oriented ND always shows the spatial environment as it would appear 
from the cockpit, tracking the aircraft’s position in relation to features of the spatial environ-
ment on a north up chart is likely to involve some degree of mental rotation.  To illustrate the 
point being made, consider two juxtaposed examples in which the initial route is either 
aligned or misaligned with the egocentric reference frame required by navigation using an 
egocentric ND. Consider approaching an airport on a northerly track; in this case, the features 
appearing on the ND are arranged in a manner congruent with the northerly oriented chart’s 
coordinates; landmarks to your east appear on your right and those to the left are to the west 
on both the chart and the ND.  During routine navigation using an ND much of the compass 
rose is not visible because the ND is designed such that attention is focused on the arc either 
side of the egocentric path. Prior research results suggest that by adopting a navigation strate-
gy in which canonical coordinates such as north or east are largely redundant it is likely that 
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a viewer will establish their path through the spatial environment as the principal reference 
vector defining the environment’s intrinsic layout (Shelton & McNamara, 2004) in other 
words, allocentric and egocentric reference frames will gradually coincide resulting in a re-
duced appreciation of, for instance where north is located. This can become a problem if a 
flight crew is called upon to locate a feature or geographical location referred to by a canoni-
cal reference, as illustrated by this actual fragment of a clearance which was misunderstood 
by a Boeing 757 flight crew in the USA: 
 
“Hold at teddy, northwest 10 mile legs” 
 
Although this incident (NASA, 2003) and other similar incidents (NASA, 2004) that resulted 
from the type of late communication above did not result in an accident, a very similar mis-
understanding resulted in a CFIT accident at Mount Teide, Tenerife (UK AIB, 1981). The 
previously discussed example of a northerly bound aircraft represented an instance of low 
angular disparity between egocentric and allocentric reference frames. The second scenario 
involves situations where the egocentric and allocentric reference frames are misaligned. 
Consider now approaching the same airport from the north, heading south; in this case, spa-
tial features to your left are now to the east (and vice versa). Because the nature of ND navi-
gation is to align the allocentric and egocentric references, in this case the geocentric and al-
locentric frames of reference would be misaligned by 180 degrees. This poses no serious 
problem for ND navigation because, as has already been noted, geocentric references are 
largely redundant during egocentric navigation. However, potential problems do arise if it is 
necessary to revert to geocentric navigation at short notice because whilst in the first example 
the ND and the chart present a congruent representation with the aircraft proceeding north-
bound up the chart with features such as terrain, runways and landmarks in their correct posi-
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tion, the southbound pilot who needs to revert to a chart oriented with north will be navi-
gating from the top of the chart to the bottom with all the relevant features outlined above, in 
reverse orientation. The process of visualising these changed spatial relationships is likely to 
involve mental rotation with an attendant increase in cognitive load. It is important to note 
that such mental rotations only become necessary in ND navigation in instances where the 
flight crew needs to reference alternative means of navigation such as the EFB or a chart, 
which implies that an increase in cognitive load is likely to be occurring in parallel with the 
mental rotation. For instance the flight crew at Cali who were involved in a CFIT accident 
(ACRC, 1996) had been conducting southbound ND based navigation prior to a runway 
change. Evidence from the accident report clearly indicated that they referred to paper charts 
whilst adapting to the new route (Flight Safety Foundation, 1998, p. 23). Having previously 
been accustomed to an egocentric cognitive map they now needed to forget about the orienta-
tion they were accustomed to and start thinking of their progress from the top of the chart 
heading towards the bottom (See Figure 8.4 below). 
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Chart Courtesy of Flight Safety Foundation (1998) 
Figure 8.4 
Egocentric versus allocentric representa-
tions of the approach at Cali 
 
The image above is a simulation of an air-
craft on approach to the runway involved 
in the Cali accident. The ND shows an 
egocentric orientation with the runway 
ahead of the aircraft (yellow arrows). 
The allocentrically-oriented chart on the 
left is of the same approach but aligned 
with north. The Cali flight crew needed to 
reorient at short notice and became spatial-
ly-disoriented. Control of the aircraft was 
lost, resulting in CFIT. The intended route 
to the runway (red line) and the accident 
site are depicted. 
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If it can be demonstrated that such reorientation invokes cognitive load it becomes easier to 
understand how a crew might become disoriented to the extent they did. It could be argued 
that all such a crew needed to do to re-establish an egocentric orientation was to orient the 
chart with their direction of travel. Ethnographic observations of flight crews conducted for 
this study indicated that during briefing, taxying and inflight they rarely oriented paper charts 
to the direction of travel; furthermore, the design of most EFB applications does not permit 
unlimited rotation of the navigation charts in flight. The observations suggest that pilots are 
well practiced at making such reorientations but little is known about how much cognitive 
load is invoked whilst this occurs. In the Cali accident the pilots were faced at short notice 
with a very large angular disparity between the orientation they were accustomed to and the 
orientation they were forced to adopt. Intuitively, a flight crew flying north who need to re-
vert to a chart oriented upon north should experience low cognitive demand compared to re-
version from various other orientations. How cognitive load varies with angular disparity be-
tween the two orientations is the subject of one of the experiments described in this thesis.  
There are several theories relating to the detailed nature of how such reorientations may be 
handled by the cognitive system. According to Shepard & Metzler’s, (1971) model both ac-
curacy and RT would be a linear function of the angular disparity via the shortest path be-
tween the orientation acquired from the ND and the orientation of the chart. This model has 
intuitive appeal due to the relative ease of performing small orientation changes in everyday 
life. Loftus (1978) suggested an alternative model of direction comprehension involving two 
steps: first, computing the nearest cardinal point to the target direction, and then "rotating" 
from the cardinal to the target direction. Reorientation could be performed equally well 
clockwise or counter clockwise. Although Loftus found that RTs were lower at the cardinal 
points and higher at diagonals, overall there was a monotonic increase in RTs clockwise 
around the compass. Explanations are further complicated by the finding from several studies 
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that RTs for north/south cardinals were faster than for east/west cardinals. Research by Far-
rell (1979) involving a wide range of research populations found that up/down judgments 
were made quicker than left/right judgments, whereas Maki (1979) only found this effect 
when the spatial codes left/right were used. This could indicate that the mental association 
between, for instance the association between up and north is stronger than the association 
between left and west. Darken & Peterson, (2001) point out that that for egocentric navigation 
the preferred display depicts forward as up; given that this is the display orientation that pi-
lots are accustomed to using due to the way the ND is fitted to the instrument panel, the 
above research may underpin any preference pilots show for fore/aft direction judgments over 
left/right judgments. In addition to the ability to locate oneself on the chart, pilots need to be 
able to imagine their future location and orientation. There are recent documented instances 
of wrong runway landings, landings on taxiways and gross navigational errors after landing 
which suggest deficiencies in the ability to imagine the relative positions of parallel run-
ways/taxiways prior to being aligned with them or to plan in advance which direction the 
runway will be vacated after landing. Although some of the processes involved are similar to 
those just outlined, this process involves mental rotation rather than straightforward judgment 
of angular disparity. It is important to acknowledge the likelihood that pilots’ brains may be-
come specialised for complex navigational tasks in a similar way to that observed in London 
taxi drivers relative to pedestrians and bus drivers. Taxi drivers’ development, storage, and 
use of complex spatial representations is thought to be linked to corresponding posterior hip-
pocampal neurogenesis (Maguire et al., 2000, 2003; Maguire, Woollett, & Spiers, 2006), in 
other words the generation of neurons in the brain as a consequence of regularly performing 
complex spatial tasks. Militating against this proposition is the finding of Loftus (1978) that 
general populations performed at a similar level to pilots in compass direction comprehension 
experiments. Even if pilots are more skilled at spatial tasks than the general population, re-
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search by Thorndyke & Stasz, (1980) suggests that there are likely to be considerable indi-
vidual variations. Also particularly relevant to pilots is the possibility that they might become 
accustomed to a certain orientation of runway simply because they usually operate from, for 
instance, westerly oriented runways in Western Europe or easterly oriented runways in the 
Caribbean. Loftus (1978) mentioned this as a possible influence but substantiating research is 
sparse. Jolicoeur (1985) found that as images of natural objects were rotated from a familiar 
orientation participants’ recognition RTs increased in a way comparable to those obtained in 
classic mental rotation tasks. Tarr and Pinker (1989) suggest that with increasing familiarity 
the reliance upon mental rotation might decrease. Takano (1989) introduced the possibility 
that certain familiar configurations might be stored in memory and a direct match made. This 
speculative idea would mean that a pilot orienting to a familiar runway orientation would in-
voke less cognitive demand than when orienting to one less frequently experienced. During 
post experiment interviews with flight crews several commented that they thought they ori-
ented to charts relating to familiar runway orientations more easily than ones they rarely ex-
perienced. 
 
8.1.6. WORKING MEMORY, ATTENTION AND TASK DEMAND 
Baddeley’s (1986) influential model of the nature of working memory (WM) proposes the 
operation of a central executive or distributor that helps maintain and manipulate information 
in the mind, involved in most cognitive tasks. Although the precise detail of how attention 
might be allocated during the types of task examined in this study are outside the scope of 
this thesis it is useful to consider some theoretical concepts detailed by Pashler and Johnston 
(2003) that have been widely applied in trying to understand attentional limitations. The first 
concept is that of a strict processing bottleneck regulating workload by restricting the flow of 
tasks. This refers to the idea that certain critical mental operations can only be carried out se-
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quentially. The verbal strand of this thesis provided examples of pilots who were able to per-
form concurrent tasks such as talking and operating the controls without difficulty much of 
the time so at first look it seems unlikely that the sequential processing model is appropriate 
for the current context. An alternative view is that there may be one or more pools of pro-
cessing resources that can be divided up among different tasks or stimuli in a graded fashion. 
According to this account, a pilot flying the aircraft can accept a concurrent cognitive load 
but the remaining processing resources are spread between tasks; processing for different 
tasks proceeds in parallel but the rate or efficiency of the processing depends on the capacity 
available to the task. Exactly how this limited capacity is shared is unclear but the likely out-
come of capacity sharing is a reduction in speed and efficiency in one or both tasks due to the 
reduction in available resources. Research spanning over a century beginning with Paulhan 
(1887) indicates that tasks using a similar modality tend to have an additive interference ef-
fect; more recent research by Navon & Miller (1987) reached a similar conclusion. The sim-
plest models for predicting concurrent task and workload assess the extent to which a certain 
task of a known duration can be accommodated by the time available. Such models have been 
criticised by NASA (2010) on the basis of oversimplification for failing to consider the de-
tailed nature and context of the dual tasks being performed. For example, it has already been 
stated that pilots have little difficulty monitoring and controlling their flight path while con-
tinuously conversing; in this case the conversation and the flying both fill the available time 
so theoretically this amount of activity would not be possible unless these two activities can 
be accommodated separately. Ethnographic observations indicate that workload is not as high 
during such activity as would be predicted by such a time occupancy model and this appears 
to be the result of task sharing. Although simple time occupancy models are suited to routine 
operations where the use of standard operating procedures provide a reliable timeline which 
enables pilots to predict if and when task sharing is appropriate, they represent a poor model 
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for task management under high cognitive load. According to expert opinion (NASA, 2010) 
the Multiple Resource Model (Horrey &Wickens, 2003; Sarno & Wickens, 1995; Wickens, 
1991, 2002, 2005) generates workload predictions that are better tailored to the potential 
overload experienced in dual task situations. The model’s resource sharing (or resource over-
lap) component considers the extent to which concurrent tasks demand resources along sev-
eral dimensions, a detailed knowledge of which is outside the scope of this thesis. In relation 
to this research Wickens’ model would see the process of locating a runway visually and then 
accurately tracking the aircraft parallel to it as two similar visual tasks whose effect upon 
workload is additive. The concurrent auditory task of listening and correctly responding to a 
checklist would have no adverse effect upon the visual task just mentioned except for the fact 
that there is a requirement to base the verbal checklist response upon the cognition of visual 
information. This could explain why pilots under high workload sometimes respond to chal-
lenge and response checklists without actually checking an item has been completed
xiii
. If the 
pilot checks the item this now becomes a cognitive or perceptive task or both, which overlaps 
with the visual task demands adding to the total task demand of the visual modality. Task 
demand can be conceptually associated with one of two “regions” of task demand level 
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000). The first is one in which task demand is less than the capacity 
of resources available and therefore residual capacity exists. In this state the pilot has some 
spare mental capacity in the event of unforeseen circumstances. When task demand exceeds 
available capacity the performance of any of the tasks in progress may break down. This 
study is concerned with cognitive load that pushes pilots towards what Grier (2008) has re-
ferred to as the red line of workload. 
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8.1.7 COGNITIVE LOAD IN FLIGHT CREW 
Cognitive load theory proposes that during the process of learning, three categories of cogni-
tive load are experienced, intrinsic, germane and extraneous. Intrinsic cognitive load refers to 
information that by its nature is complex and difficult to understand; this type of cognitive 
load is often well defined and can be predicted and managed. Germane load refers to de-
mands placed on the capacity of working memory during mental activities that contribute di-
rectly to learning, whereas extraneous load is caused by mental activities that do not contrib-
ute directly to learning. In the context of this research, learning about one’s environment from 
a map aligned with the direction of travel represents a germane load whereas the research cit-
ed in the previous paragraph indicates that navigating from a map that is not oriented with the 
direction of travel requires cognitive effort in addition to that required for learning about the 
environment. Where two sources of information need to be integrated the extraneous load 
invoked during the process of establishing some degree of coherence between the two infor-
mation sources may use up much of the pilot’s available cognitive capacity.  Renkl and At-
kinson (2003) point out that when text and graphics are difficult to integrate with one another, 
such as in the case of a map display aligned with south and a chart aligned with north, little or 
no working memory capacity may remain for germane load, particularly if there is also sub-
stantial intrinsic load due to the complexity of the overall task; in such situations, learning 
about the spatial environment is likely to be minimal. Lansman and Hunt (1982) found that 
RT (the dependent variable in the experiments described here) to a secondary task was an in-
dicator of the amount of spare capacity available whilst engaged on an easy primary task, 
which in turn could be used to predict performance on a subsequent more difficult task. 
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8.2 THE SPATIAL AWARENESS STUDY AND EXPERIMENTS 
This study examined two important but distinct aspects of spatial awareness; firstly the cogni-
tive load associated with reorienting from the egocentric orientation to geocentric orientation 
was examined. The second part of the study examined the extent to which cognitive load was 
invoked by the mental rotation required when imagining the aircraft’s future trajectory. 
 
8.2.1 EXPERIMENT ONE: ORIENTATION JUDGMENTS VERSUS COGNITIVE LOAD 
The motivation for this experiment was the observation from the accident literature that con-
fusion relating to heading information had preceded several accidents involving serviceable 
aircraft equipped with moving map displays
xiv
. Examples are usually characterised by inap-
propriate actions from the flight crew that would not have been predicted on the basis of their 
previous performance. An Airbus flight crew stalled their aircraft into the sea whilst visually 
manoeuvring to land at night near the Comoros Islands in 2009.  In a similar loss of situation-
al awareness accident the previously cited Boeing 757 flight crew at Cali also made unchar-
acteristic errors in a situation involving a requirement to transition from navigation based up-
on an electronic map oriented upon their direction of travel to a paper map oriented upon 
north. There are several other instances in the occurrence literature where confusion related to 
heading information has immediately preceded a loss of control. This research contends that 
if mental reorientation is required at a period of pre-existing high workload, the added cogni-
tive load required may occupy working memory to the extent that overall performance defi-
cits occur. The Comoros accident investigation report noted that the flight crew’s “attention 
was focused on the management of the aircraft trajectory and tracking, and probably did not 
have the sufficient mental resources available in this stressful situation, to react adequately to 
different alarms”. Similarly, the Cali investigation found that the flight crew had become sub-
ject to task overload and failed to react appropriately when it was evident they were disori-
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ented. Neither of these reports elaborated upon the source of the cognitive overload experi-
enced by the flight crews. The aim of the spatial awareness strand research was to learn more 
about how flight crews’ cognitive load is affected when they face a spatial awareness task so 
that they can be better prepared to manage their workload, thereby reducing the likelihood 
that they will perform at a substandard level. 
 
The premise of this research was that the requirement to mentally reorient occupies working 
memory resources that would otherwise be available for decision making and other mental 
tasks required by the flight crew. The literature indicates that when a requirement arises for a 
crew to locate the aircraft’s position and orientation on a chart it is usually when the flight 
crew is already experiencing high workload such as when manoeuvring for an approach to 
landing or after takeoff or missed approach. If it can be shown that mental reorientation re-
sults in elevated cognitive load, this is an important factor that all the stakeholders in flight 
safety identified earlier (not just pilots) need to understand. Informal interviews with pilots 
indicated that orienting from the ND to a chart was a routine task that took a few seconds to 
achieve but usually occurred during high workload phases. When asked how they would tran-
sition to a chart, many spoke of mentally projecting the aircraft and its orientation onto the 
chart so as to achieve a starting point for their navigation. The research objective of experi-
ment one was to explore the cognitive load that pilots experience while orienting to the chart. 
Simply superimposing an array of bearings on a chart would have been lacking in ecological 
validity because this bears no resemblance to any task required of pilots. Pilots frequently 
need to make angular judgments relating to runways such as when they derive an intercept 
heading for a final approach, so a runway orientation judgment task was considered to be a 
reasonable alternative task. The real life task under scrutiny is the process by which a pilot 
locates the aircraft position and orientation on a map as a precursor to navigation. An exact 
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analogue experiment would involve multiple stimuli in a variety of positions and orientations, 
which would result in a very complicated set of stimuli and the possibility of introducing con-
founding variables. Both locating the aircraft on the chart and judging one’s orientation re-
quire a judgement to be made regarding orientation. To locate the aircraft on the chart, one 
needs to determine a bearing from some feature on the chart and to make a judgment regard-
ing orientation one needs to judge the angular disparity between the reference frame of the 
chart and the aircraft’s heading. As both these tasks require angular judgments which cannot 
be made without knowledge of the reference frame of the chart it was decided that an exper-
iment measuring cognitive load versus angular disparity would be undertaken. Experiment 
One was designed in such a way that participants were presented with successive images of 
runways in various orientations; this required them to locate the approach path on the chart 
and then judge the orientation. Clearly in the real world this process could occur when the 
aircraft is at any location or orientation in which case the pilot has two options, either orient 
the chart or orient their mental cognitive map. In the interests of experimental control the 
charts were presented in portrait orientation and “north up” (as is usually the case in real life) 
which meant that the only option for the participants was to reorient their cognitive map by 
making their judgments in relation to the geocentric reference frame of the chart, due north. 
The stimuli consisted of thirty six realistic approach charts each with a depiction of a runway. 
The depictions were oriented at ten degree intervals representing the three hundred and sixty 
degree compass rose. Although this was a compromise, Loftus (1978) examined similar phe-
nomena using this type of stimuli to good effect. 
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8.2.2 EXPERIMENT ONE RESULTS 
For each of thirty six runway directions RT was measured using SuperLab 5 ™ software. The 
results were transferred to SPSS 22 ™ for analysis. For the purpose of this research a re-
sponse was considered correct if within ten degrees either side of the correct orientation. Alt-
hough most responses were within this tolerance, those that were not, were usually within 
twenty degrees. Such responses were treated as if they had been correctly answered as the 
tolerance chosen for the experiment was arbitrary. Gross errors were few but each one was 
considered individually. It is customary to either trim or winsorize such outliers. In order to 
reduce the loss of data involved in trimming, any outlying response that differed from the 
mean by an excess of two standard deviations was allotted the closest valid value in the da-
taset. In cases where outliers may be an issue, Whelan (2008) recommends the reporting of 
median as the central tendency parameter because it is less susceptible to departures from 
normality. Whelan’s paper makes no mention of winsorizing the data but after examination of 
the raw data it was considered that winsorizing would be the most appropriate means of ad-
dressing any outliers in the dataset. The graph in Figure 8.5 shows the winsorized mean RTs 
for each runway. 
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Figure 8.5: Response time in milliseconds versus runway direction 
 
It can be clearly observed from Figure 8.5 that the east, south and west cardinal points are 
identified significantly faster than their adjacent orientations. Counter to expectations the nor-
therly cardinal point exhibited a moderate increase in RT over its adjacent orientations. 
Significant correlations at the 0.05 or better significance level between angular disparity from 
the cardinals and their intercardinal points (the 45˚ point between cardinals) were obtained in 
all cases except the two intercardinal points immediately adjacent to the north cardinal point. 
This finding suggests that with the exception of northerly judgments the participants oriented 
upon the closest cardinal point before refining their judgment. The RTs exhibited around the 
northerly cardinal point suggest that judgments in this region are handled differently by the 
cognitive system. Post-test interviews indicated that eighteen participants were aware of ori-
enting to the cardinal points as a preliminary step in identifying the runway orientations in the 
experiment. Two participants said they mentally rotated around the compass in a clockwise 
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direction. The results above militate against this hypothesis and as all results were de identi-
fied it was not possible to confirm whether these participants’ introspections were founded. 
Five participants said they identified familiar orientations; if this were the case, it would be 
expected that the participant group, who were all based at airports with either westerly or 
south westerly oriented runways, might identify such runways quicker. There was no evi-
dence of this; in fact the south westerly oriented experimental depiction yielded among the 
slowest RTs. Nevertheless the familiarity hypothesis was mentioned by a quarter of the par-
ticipants in the interviews so it should not be dismissed. Four participants commented that 
they needed to think about whether a northerly runway should be typed on the keyboard as 36 
or 00, a factor that might account for the small spike in RT at north. This effect should not be 
minimised because a runway aligned exactly with due north is unique inasmuch as that alt-
hough it is referred to as runway 36 neither the aircraft instrumentation nor the approach 
chart will depict the runway orientation as 360˚ but as 000˚. Contrary to expectations, RTs for 
northerly oriented runways were slightly slower than for southerly oriented runways. Due to 
the design of the experimental stimuli, in order to identify a northerly facing runway a viewer 
would need to look at the bottom of the chart where the final approach track is displayed by 
an arrow flight; a linear search commencing at the top of the chart might account for the al-
most one second increase to identify a northerly oriented runway over a southerly oriented 
one. 
 
8.2.3 EXPERIMENT ONE DISCUSSION 
Experiment one replicated and elaborated upon research by Loftus (1978) which examined 
the processes by which information corresponding to a particular direction is comprehended 
and utilised. Whereas Loftus’s participants were university students and military pilots, this 
research involved current airline pilots who were well acquainted with the type of navigation 
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being performed. Furthermore, to ensure ecological validity the stimuli consisted of charts 
that closely resembled the ones used during actual operations. The results indicate that, in line 
with Loftus (1978), pilots utilise the cardinal points of the compass when making spatial 
judgments. This experiment examined the process of locating one’s position on a chart as a 
precursor to wayfinding. The process of identifying a runway direction on a chart was chosen 
because it required the observer to locate the runway centreline extension and to make a 
judgment regarding its orientation. This was considered a reasonable analogue of the prelimi-
nary process involved in chart based wayfinding reported by many of the participants. The 
experiment indicated that all the cardinal compass points except due north were associated 
with low levels of cognitive load, whilst judgments relating to their inter cardinal points were 
most cognitively challenging. This means that the first part of the task (locating the aircraft’s 
position on the chart) is made easier if it is situated close to either the 90º, 180º or 270º bear-
ing from whichever point on the chart the observer chooses. As a precursor to wayfinding, 
the pilot needs to determine by whatever means available, a bearing from some feature 
whether from the ND or more basic cues. In the Cali CVR transcript the captain was clearly 
heard trying to select radio beacons to locate the aircraft’s position when the aircraft’s FMC 
and electronic map display became unusable so the likely process of establishing position un-
der such circumstances can be substantiated on the basis of evidence (Flight Safety Founda-
tion, 1998, p. 23). The second part of the experimental task involved mental rotation (which 
is examined in experiment two) because once a bearing had been established by participants 
there was a requirement to judge its orientation. In experiment one this was probably made 
easier because the orientation was always the reciprocal of the bearing, which pilots are easi-
ly able to derive; in real life the aircraft could be oriented in any direction but this would have 
resulted in a very complex experiment. Despite this experimental limitation several partici-
pants (n=9) described mentally orienting to the direction of the runway depiction in order to 
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derive the runway direction and commented that this process was more difficult if there was a 
large angular disparity between their viewpoint and the imagined viewpoint. The reason this 
is important is that in almost all cases where the pilot takes responsibility for leaving the 
planned route in the vicinity of the airport, whether to save time or because it is the only prac-
ticable means of landing on a particular runway, reference will need to be made to a chart (or 
its electronic equivalent). There are very few instances where wayfinding in limited visibility 
can be safely achieved by using the ND and visual reference alone. Even if a chart is not 
used, the pilot will need to form a mental appreciation of the spatial environment in order to 
remain clear of obstacles. The results of experiment one indicate that the overall angular dis-
parity between the pilot’s egocentric orientation and the orientation of a chart aligned with 
north is less of a factor in the elevation of flight crew cognitive load than is suggested by 
Shepard and Metzler (1971) but is more closely related to angular disparity from three of the 
four cardinal points of the compass. This suggests that what is being observed is not a process 
of mental rotation but one of identification of a more or less familiar orientation. Such famili-
arity for cardinal points may have its foundations in the referents of orthogonality provided 
by the human body; for instance, when the arms are extended in the plane of the shoulders 
they describe a right angle to an observer’s egocentric orientation, which might facilitate the 
recognition of cardinal points based on their biological reference frame over orientations with 
less obvious relationship to their body’s natural reference frame. Likewise, the earth’s gravi-
tational field provides an omnipresent vertical reference with a largely invariant relationship 
to the horizon. Overall, there is no clear explanation for the counter-intuitive finding that the 
northerly orientation did not yield the fastest RTs, particularly as this was not evident in other 
similar research. It could be relevant that north/ south aligned runways are much scarcer than 
east/west aligned runways in the UK where all these pilots were based; also when north/south 
aligned runways are used, the prevailing wind in the UK usually results in a southerly orient-
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ed landing, so a northerly oriented runway may represent a less familiar spatial configuration 
to the pilots who participated. The longer RT for the northerly cardinal suggests that pilots 
probably commence their search at the top of the chart (where the 180˚ oriented extended 
centreline was situated) and search down the chart until they locate the stimulus they are 
looking for. During ND navigation the focus of attention is usually at the top of the ND 
where most of the important information is located so this might underpin the results with 
reference to north/south judgments. 
 
Wayfinding is a dynamic process; once the location and orientation is known there is an on-
going requirement to mentally plot the aircraft’s present and future progress, a process that is 
likely to involve mental rotation. Some of the most complex circling approaches cannot be 
flown without reference to terrain and obstacle information that is only available on a chart, 
not the ND. Furthermore some circling approaches are so complex that intrinsic cognitive 
load is high already; also in some cases extraneous cognitive load may inadvertently be intro-
duced, as was the case at Cali and Comoros where communication problems were also evi-
dent. Germane cognitive load in the form of essential activities such as configuring the air-
craft for landing also contributes to the overall workload. Due to the task sharing required 
during wayfinding it would probably not be possible to continuously follow the aircraft’s 
progress on the chart so it is likely that the process of fixing position and orientation on the 
chart would need to be repeated several times. Given that each repetition would occur in a 
different location on the chart with a different angular disparity from the chart orientation, 
and that the pilot would be likely to retain some spatial knowledge from previous judgments 
it is very difficult to attempt to quantify the effects. What can be said with some certainty is 
that in cases where a pilot either chooses, or is forced by circumstances to revert to wayfind-
ing rather than conventional navigation there will be a requirement to integrate spatial 
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knowledge from the real world and ND with a representation of position and orientation on a 
chart or its electronic equivalent, which is likely to be oriented with north at the top. The pro-
cess of locating the aircraft position on the chart is subject to considerable variability; if, as is 
often the case in circling approaches, the aircraft position is known with a high degree of pre-
cision immediately in advance of wayfinding it may only be necessary for the pilot to mental-
ly rotate in order to follow the aircraft’s progress. If, as was the case at Cali and Islamabad 
(PCAA, 2010) the pilot has to unexpectedly revert from navigation to wayfinding, and does 
not know accurately where the aircraft is located, the priority will be to identify where the 
aircraft is before attending to where it is going. As highlighted by Wessel et al. (2010) the 
egocentric orientation of the ND is not optimal in terms of forming and maintaining a cogni-
tive map of the spatial environment based upon a geocentric reference frame such as a nor-
therly oriented chart so it is unlikely that a pilot unexpectedly faced with transitioning from 
an ND to a chart will immediately be aware of the aircraft’s precise location on a chart. In 
both the Cali and Islamabad occurrences a rapid decrease in pilot performance was sympto-
matic of a sudden increase in cognitive load. It is also noteworthy that the phenomenon of a 
sudden decrease in piloting performance during unexpected tasks that require reorientation is 
apparently resistant to technological advances such as EGPWS, having been evident at 
Mount Teide, Tenerife in 1979, Cali in 1995, Comoros in 2009 and Jakarta in 2012. 
 
Although the statistical patterns identified in experiment one strengthen the case for reorien-
tation as a factor in cognitive load elevation and consequential pilot performance deficits, the 
important lesson from this part of the study is that pilots need to consider carefully the threats 
posed by wayfinding and at least understand the human limitations involved. Of the 40 pilots 
who participated in the two experiments none had heard the term “mental rotation” although 
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most recognised the phenomenon after the experiments. As expected, none had considered 
the distinction between navigation and wayfinding. 
 
8.2.4 EXPERIMENT TWO: REMOTE PERSPECTIVE JUDGMENTS VERSUS 
COGNITIVE LOAD 
The motivation for this experiment was to explore why flight crews sometimes exhibit SFP in 
situations where navigation tasks require a mental rotation. Instances of flight crews turning 
the wrong way, proceeding in the wrong direction during taxying, lining up on a misaligned 
runway, and others provide empirical evidence that flight crews can find it cognitively chal-
lenging to imagine the relative locations of significant features of the spatial environment 
when viewed from a remote perspective. As previously mentioned, Endsley (1995) highlight-
ed the necessity for pilots to imagine the aircraft’s future progress including its location and 
orientation in order to retain situational awareness. Although documented instances of flight 
crews who land on a runway or taxiway parallel to their intended landing runway or turn the 
wrong way during a missed approach or after landing indicate that those involved did not ad-
equately visualise their future orientation, this was only a side issue in this research. This re-
search was concerned with the sudden decrease in piloting performance that appears to occur 
when an unexpected or sudden requirement to transition from ND based navigation to way-
finding is required.  Whereas experiment one was concerned with the initial process of locat-
ing oneself in a spatial environment by orienting to a feature on a chart, experiment two ex-
amined the cognitive load invoked when a pilot needs to imagine the spatial environment 
from a remote perspective. This is the type of task that the pilots at Cali were attempting in 
the minutes before they crashed into terrain. More specifically they were faced with the need 
to transition from the egocentric orientation of the ND to information on a chart geocentrical-
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ly aligned with north. This experiment examined the nature of cognitive load experienced by 
flight crews when they make this type of reorientation. 
 
As with experiment one, this experiment forced participants who were accustomed to an ego-
centric orientation to make spatial judgments based upon a geocentric reference frame. This 
was achieved by presenting all the stimuli in a “north up” geocentric reference frame. The 
experiment was designed to measure the cognitive load that pilots experience when changing 
their reference frame from egocentric to geocentric. Although there was no hypothesis, previ-
ous research suggested that cognitive load would increase with increased angular disparity 
between the egocentric perspective of the pilot and the orientation to be imagined. As in ex-
periment one, it was impracticable to present stimuli from a wide range of aircraft orienta-
tions so the pilot’s orientation was fixed by presenting the charts used as stimuli in a “north 
up” orientation. By rotating the runway depiction in 45º stages it was possible to create eight 
different angular disparities. The choice of 45º stages was based on the experience of experi-
ment one, which indicated the importance of both cardinal and diagonal angles. Another les-
son from experiment one was that participants thought 36 stimuli made the experiment overly 
long. For this reason, experiment two was limited to one block of 16 trials. Participants 
viewed 16 approach charts on a laptop screen. Two charts were prepared for each of eight 
orientations, separated by 45º. Each pair of charts included one depicting terrain left of the 
final approach course and one depicting it on the right. In addition to forcing the participants 
to make a judgment from the perspective of the depicted runway direction, the provision of 
two randomly presented depictions of terrain increased the amount of data from what was a 
quite small participant pool by requiring two responses for each orientation. The experi-
mental task was to judge as quickly as possible whether the terrain was located to the left or 
right of the final approach track depicted on each chart when viewed from that perspective.  
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8.2.5 EXPERIMENT TWO RESULTS 
The error rate was low, with only four errors in the dataset of three hundred and twenty re-
sponses. This low error rate was predictable partly because the task was one that pilots would 
be practiced at performing but also because they would be motivated to respond with a cor-
rect response out of professional pride. Although the focus of experiment two was the meas-
urement of RT, if pilots’ main focus was upon accuracy, the ecological validity of the exper-
iment would likely be enhanced because the experiment would be measuring how pilots be-
have in the real world. To address the four incorrect responses, each one was replaced by the 
closest correct response in the dataset, though this had very little effect on the mean RTs. A 
Shapiro-Wilk test found that the data from experiment two were not normally distributed and 
there were also several outlying scores. Nonetheless there was a moderate overall increase in 
median RT with angular disparity from north both clockwise and counter clockwise. Figure 
8.6 is a boxplot showing the RTs for each runway direction. Due to the non-normal distribu-
tion of the data a Kruskal-Wallis anova test was used to determine significance levels. 
The Kruskal-Wallis anova test only determines if there are statistically significant differences 
between groups of an independent variable on a continuous or ordinal dependent variable (in 
this case RT) so it is not possible to claim a significant linear effect due to angular disparity 
from north to south although the median RTs in Figure 8.6 show a trend in that direction. 
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Figure 8.6 Runway direction versus response time 
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The Kruskal-Wallis anova showed a statistically significant difference in RTs between 
groups = 16.088, p = 0.003, with a mean rank RT of 80.76 for runway 36, 82.34 for runway 
04, 109.28 for runway 09, 107.10 for runway 13 and 123.03 for runway 18. Table 8.1 shows 
the test statistics. 
 
Table 8.1 Response times and test statistics for runway directions 36 to 18 clockwise 
Ranks 
                                 Runway N Mean Rank 
Response time 36 40 80.76 
04 40 82.34 
09 40 109.28 
13 40 107.10 
18 40 123.03 
Total 200  
 
Test Statistics
a,b
 
 Response time 
Chi-Square 16.088 
  
Df 4 
Asymp. Sig. .003 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: runway 
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The Kruskal Wallis test showed a statistically significant difference in RTs between groups = 
17,669 p = 0.001, with a mean rank RT of 133.79 for runway 18, 99.45 for runway 22, 91.78 
for runway 27, 85.74 for runway 31 and 91.75 for runway 36. Table 8.2 shows the test statis-
tics. 
Table 8.2 Response times and test statistics for runway directions 18 to 36 clockwise.  
Ranks 
          Runway N Mean Rank 
Response time 18 40 133.79 
22 40 99.45 
27 40 91.78 
31 40 85.74 
36 40 91.75 
Total 200  
 
Test Statistics
a,b
 
 Response time 
Chi-Square 17.669 
Df 4 
Asymp. Sig. .001 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: runway 
 
Several conclusion follow from these results; firstly the general finding of experiment one 
that RT varies with angular disparity from a chosen reference frame is supported although the 
effect in experiment two was more random than in experiment one. It can however, be con-
cluded that the shortest RTs were in the quadrant centred on the chosen reference frame (in 
this case north). Also the longest RTs occurred at an angular disparity of 180º from the refer-
ence frame. The remainder of orientations showed no clear pattern except that unlike experi-
ment one there was no preference for orientations close to the cardinal points.  
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8.2.6 EXPERIMENT TWO DISCUSSION 
 
Experiment two elaborated upon the findings of experiment one, extending beyond the initial 
task of reorienting to a misaligned chart into the domain of imagining oneself in a remote lo-
cation and reporting the location of an object from that perspective. Unlike the experimental 
task in experiment one, experiment two did not require participants to specify the runway ori-
entation, which appears to have resulted in participants making no reference to the cardinal 
points. The shortest median RTs were between runway 31 and runway 04, an area where it is 
unlikely that a mental rotation was necessary to make the left/right judgment needed in this 
experiment. Overall, the shorter RTs were in the northerly quadrants and the longer were in 
the southerly quadrants, supporting the mental-rotation hypothesis (Shepard & Metzler, 
1971). RTs for runway 09 were almost two seconds longer than for runway 27 which could 
suggest a clockwise search  was performed in order to mentally face east by searching for the 
nine o’clock position on the compass. RTs for runway 13 were over a second slower than for 
runway 22 which have equal angular disparity from the northerly reference frame, which 
could also suggest a preference for a clockwise visual search during mental rotation. These 
results suggest that this task is handled in a complex fashion which only involves mental rota-
tion when a scene cannot be visualised without rotating to align with it. Angular disparity be-
tween runway orientation and reference frame influenced RT less than the distance in a 
clockwise direction between the reference frame and the orientation to be imagined. This 
finding is in line with research by Kosslyn et al. (1978) who found that response  latency to 
transfer covert attention from one mentally represented location to another was a function of 
the distance between the two locations. Loftus (1978) also found a monotonic increase in RTs 
in a clockwise direction around the compass. In combination these results indicate that work-
ing memory capacity will be occupied to a low level when it is possible to visualise a scene 
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without performing a mental rotation and to a higher level when a mental rotation is required. 
Whether or not a mental rotation is not required, the results indicate that cognitive load may 
be influenced by the distance it is necessary to search in a clockwise direction for the required 
orientation. The longer RTs for runway 13 compared to runway 22, both of which probably 
required a mental rotation, suggest that the two effects may be additive. These results indicate 
that the effect of spatial judgement tasks on WM and cognitive load is multifactorial and 
therefore difficult to predict. Hinson et al. (2002) are among those who have demonstrated 
that increased WM load produced by secondary tasks leads to decrements in decision making 
ability.  
 
8.2.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE SPATIAL AWARENESS STRAND STUDIES  
Casting a critical eye on the utility of the experimental results it is important to note that in all 
the gross navigation error accidents cited in this thesis the pilots’ situation was worsened by 
the fact that the aircraft was turning at or around the time the flight crew became spatially 
disoriented.  From an experimental standpoint this is a confounding factor because it could be 
argued that the dynamic nature of their situation made it much more difficult to make judg-
ments because of the rate of orientation change. Although experiment two did not provide 
strong statistical support for mental rotation as factor in cognitive load elevation, there was a 
statistically significant variation in RT for different runway orientations. This finding may be 
even more important than the mental rotation hypothesis because if the effect upon cognitive 
load is more random that at first expected, it is reasonable to conclude that almost any task 
that requires reorientation could raise cognitive load demand in an unpredictable fashion. The 
actual position prior to this research is that as far as is known, no previous research has at-
tempted to understand why pilots flying up to date aircraft continue to lose positional aware-
ness and as a consequence lose control or crash into terrain when faced with a seemingly 
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simple navigation task at short notice. Even if all that can be concluded from experiments one 
and two is that if it is necessary for a flight crew to fix their position on a chart and make a 
judgment at short notice regarding their direction of travel or their relationship to features of 
the spatial environment, required cognitive resources might exceed available cognitive re-
sources, it represents considerably more evidence-based knowledge than could be located in 
the existing literature. So although the claim that pilots can become disoriented when they 
need to adapt to a changed reference frame is probably not news to those involved, this may 
be the first study to operationalise some of the factors involved. Furthermore, although pilots 
are likely to be aware that they feel under pressure when they need to make these judgments, 
it is doubtful whether support workers who have never been exposed to such a situation 
would possess the same insight. 
 
From a methodological standpoint both experiments involved fewer participants than would 
have been desired. However, they were high quality participants who had an interest in par-
ticipating. Based upon existing research into similar phenomena with many more participants 
(e.g. Wohlschlager & Wohlschlager, 1998), experiment one is likely to have arrived at a simi-
lar conclusion if a larger participant pool was recruited. Experiment two was completely orig-
inal and although the participant pool was small, it provided statistically significant results.  
However, the results did not provide irrefutable support for the mental rotation hypothesis 
although there was evidence of increased RTs where mental rotation was likely to have oc-
curred.  
Although RT is an established method for measuring cognitive load, it emerged during the 
research that pilots are more concerned with accuracy than with speed. Whilst this is to be 
expected in safety critical activities such as flying, it does call into question the ecological-
validity of RT measurement in this context. Finally, the absence of measures of validity sta-
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tistics should be addressed; firstly, the research by Loftus (1978) which inspired this study 
also included no validity statistics, probably because Loftus considered his research to be 
“preliminary and exploratory”. The research outlined here should be viewed in the same con-
text because where statistics were provided, no claim as to causation was made and therefore 
internal predictive validity was not an issue. Although the stimuli used were realistic, it is al-
most certain that a simulated scenario would increase the realism; it is debatable whether the 
expense of such an experiment would be justified given that the relatively simple experiments 
outlined here provided experimental evidence relating to the very specific constructs being 
examined. In terms of construct validity, the constructs were straightforward and the experi-
ments measured those constructs; determining whether these are the processes that pilots use 
would involve far more complex methods, some of which are outlined in the next section. 
 
8.2.8 FUTURE RESEARCH  
Although this was a small scale study, it addressed a big and important safety issue. Howev-
er, the researcher’s intuition is that more extensive research would only support the general 
finding of this study that adapting to a chart from an ND appears to require cognitive effort. It 
is important to acknowledge that there are many methods of measuring cognitive load such as 
Nygren, (1991) who researched psychometric techniques, and Beatty and Lucero Wagoner 
(2000) who identified three task-evoked pupillary responses in response to cognitive load. 
Although RT measurement was effective in the current relatively small scale study, it is pos-
sible that there are more robust methods of cognitive load measurement. However, it should 
be remembered that many of these methods such as those used by Ellis and Roscoe (1982, 
1990) cited earlier involved attaching sensors to operating pilots which might have influenced 
the data obtained. If it were possible to routinely monitor pilots’ workload state via neurobio-
logical means without altering their behaviour the data obtained would probably be an effec-
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tive predictor of impending performance decrements given the empirical link between the 
two. Earlier it was asserted, on the basis of literature review that when pilots deviate from 
their programmed route, they are wayfinding. This was a bold claim given that this research 
was unable to find any existing reference in the aviation literature to a similar construct to 
wayfinding as defined in this thesis. On the basis of informal interviews with pilots there is 
little doubt that many recognise the distinction between navigation and wayfinding and it is 
likely that given the technology that exists today a more scientific claim regarding the differ-
ence between the two phenomena in the aviation context could be established. It was outlined 
earlier how brain neurogenesis has been identified in individuals who have to make frequent 
spatial judgments; it would be interesting to examine the pattern of brain neurogenesis of air-
line pilots who developed their navigation skills before the widespread use of observer ori-
ented electronic map displays and those who have experienced nothing else. If it could be 
demonstrated that pilots are losing or have lost the capacity to navigate safely without mod-
ern technology then two options exist, either train them or prohibit them from navigating 
without suitable technology;  neither of these options is likely. Modern simulators are capable 
of replicating realistic scenarios, and the technology exists to identify differential brain activi-
ty that could indicate wayfinding was being undertaken. However, referring back to section 
4.4 of this thesis on stakeholders, someone has to pay for such research and it is hardly likely 
to be the developers of the technology the general premise of this research challenges. Simi-
larly, in the commercial world it is unlikely that the airlines would allocate resources to iden-
tify a phenomenon for which they would then have to devise mitigations. Although the phe-
nomena described in this section have a particular relevance at present due to the current nar-
rative regarding airline pilot skill levels highlighted in the appendix to the Buffalo report 
(NTSB, 2010a), it is unlikely that pilots being trained today are going to be coached in the 
navigation skills of yesteryear, despite the fact that the flight crew at Jakarta in 2012 and 
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more recently an errant Airbus flight crew at Bristol, UK (UK AAIB, 2015) were engaged in 
just that type of process. The best that can be hoped for is that this research will alert pilots 
who only rarely navigate without the aid of an observer-centred ND to the possibility that 
they may have become de-skilled in the type of navigation being undertaken above.  
 
Finally, given that the unstructured interviews conducted for this research indicated that at 
least ten of the twenty participants in each experiment had never previously considered orien-
tation tasks like those in the experiments to be a risk factor, it is likely that those who support 
them are also unaware. Accidents at Mount Teide, Tenerife in 1979 and at Sochi in 2006 
highlighted how quickly pilots can become confused when instructions are communicated 
poorly (this was examined in detail in Section 7.2). The utility of the SFP research outlined in 
this thesis is in its potential to ensure that support workers like the two air traffic controllers 
cited above, understand their role in ensuring aviation is safe. Research relevant to this aim 
falls under the research umbrella of emotional intelligence (EI) and is broadly concerned with 
metaphorically putting oneself in the other’s shoes by understanding and empathising with 
their situation. Clearly in order to empathise, it is necessary to understand the implications of 
one’s actions. EI is taught in several military contexts including the Royal Air Force and the 
USAF (See Livingstone et al., 2002 for a paper prepared for the Canadian Air Force), so the 
importance is beginning to be acknowledged. EI research might examine to what extent the 
agency that designs a complicated circling approach or a confusing taxiway layout has con-
sidered the cognitive implications of their actions, or whether they even understood that there 
were cognitive implications. Section 4.4 on stakeholders outlines some of the factors that 
might militate against a transformation that was not supported by strong evidence. Both this 
thesis and CAA research (2017, p, 24) identified a persistent disconnect between pilots and 
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those who support them. The following narrative from a pilot commenting on his view of the 
attitude of some air traffic controllers to pilots is illustrative: 
 
“Why can’t you chaps on the other side of the radio just do as you are told?’ 
(CAA, 2017, p. 24). 
 The CAA research commented that the tension between controllers and pilots “may be worth 
further investigation”. This research provides evidence that on occasions flight crews find it 
very difficult to “just do what they are told” and the research outlined in this thesis represents 
the type of “further investigation” suggested by the CAA.  
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CHAPTER 9   
THE CONTEXTUAL CUEING STRAND AND EXPERIMENTS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
A recurrent feature of the SFP related accidents and incidents examined in this research was 
that the flight crews involved had frequently formed in incorrect perception of their current or 
future situation. This observation is supported by research by Jones and Endsley (1996) 
which reported that 76% of situational awareness (SA) errors made by pilots could be traced 
to misperception of necessary information.  The current study set out to identify repetitive 
instances of SFP in which the flight crew’s behaviour suggests that they misperceived their 
situation due to the influence of contextual cues. Existing research into the contextual-cueing 
paradigm has mainly examined how visual attention is affected by context but careful reading 
of the relevant literature indicated that similar processes might underpin some of the 
behaviour exhibited by flight crews who experience repetitive contexts. So whilst this 
research was loosely based upon the contextual-cueing paradigm, the ideas proposed and the 
methods used were original. Based upon evidence from official accident and incident reports, 
three specific sources of misleading contextual information were proposed and 
conceptualised. Although the experiments outlined here examined specific phenomena such 
as response to TCAS advisories and repetitive system configurations, this section set out to 
demonstrate how contextual cueing offers a plausible explanatory framework for many of the 
diverse instances of SFP contained in the literature. 
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9.1.1 WHAT IS CONTEXTUAL CUEING? 
Contextual cueing describes the proposal made by Chun and Jiang (1998) that visual context 
guides the deployment of attention, critical for processing complex visual inputs. Global 
properties of a scene are thought to affect behaviour by prioritizing attention to contextually 
salient regions. Although Chun and Jiang were exclusively concerned with the effect of 
visual context, the principle that context can influence behaviour is one that can be applied 
more generally. This study elaborated upon the basic concept of contextual cueing to 
encompass a range of issues that may be relevant to the occurrence of SFP. 
9.1.2 WHY IS CONTEXTUAL CUEING RELEVANT TO SFP? 
This study was inspired by ethnographic observations of flight crews’ reactions to contextual-
ly specific alerts which suggested that they were frequently able to predict the meaning of an 
alert before they had actually allocated time to look at it. For instance, on early Boeing 737 
aircraft a landing gear warning horn occurs in flight when a particular combination of thrust, 
landing gear and flap configuration are used. Because this combination occurs on a regular 
basis during normal deceleration, flight crews appear to have become accustomed to hearing 
the warning in that contextual situation. Ethnographic observations indicate that the warning 
horn has become so associated with those particular contextual conditions that it is frequently 
cancelled with no analysis whatsoever. Although the role of positive predictive value (PPV) 
in decision making has received little attention in relation to aviation it has been examined by 
Lee and Mark (2010) in intensive care units as a predictor of risk. PPV has also been tested 
experimentally by Getty et al. (1995) who found that high PPV was related to increased la-
tency in human response to alerts. In support of this finding, the aviation related literature 
contains several instances of flight crews ignoring alerts that could be considered to possess 
high PPV. The example of the Boeing 737 landing gear warning horn above suggests that 
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PPV varies with context because in contexts other than the precise one described, it is im-
probable that a landing gear warning would be cancelled without analysis. The instance just 
outlined was specific to a certain phase of flight (decelerating) but the occurrence literature 
also suggests that certain system configurations are associated with repetitive instances of 
error, particularly related to misattribution. For instance, there are repetitive instances in the 
occurrence literature of landing gear retracted landings occurring in a systems-status context 
which includes a non-normal landing flap configuration. These occurrences are usually char-
acterised by the flight crew’s failure to react to warnings related to the retracted status of the 
landing gear. It appears that the prior knowledge of the altered system status cues the flight 
crew to expect warnings, and as a consequence they misattribute unrelated warnings to the 
system status. Even when system status is normal, there is some evidence that flight crews 
possess precognitions relating to some alerts. A captain at Jakarta (KNKT, 2012) took just 11 
seconds to conclude that his EGPWS terrain database was incorrect and that this justified ig-
noring it. Terrain databases are very rarely wrong so it is highly unlikely that he would have 
made such an assessment if he had not been operating in a geographical area in which the air-
craft was not usually flown. A similar phenomenon was evident at Cali where the captain 
wasted time doubting the indications on his navigation instruments. Expert analysis (Flight 
Safety Foundation, 1998, p. 13) speculated that he may have been influenced by his 
knowledge that radio beacons in that area had been the subject of sabotage in the past. In a 
similar vein, when a flight crew is familiar with a certain type of alert or indication there is 
some evidence (See UK Airprox 2014 & 2015) that they default to the response they are most 
used to performing, which may not be optimal for the prevailing context. The underpinnings 
of this type of misperception have been described by Gibson and Spelke (1983) who suggest 
that the key to perceptual learning is the education of attention, learning which variables to 
attend to and which to ignore. Through practice and experience, attention becomes fine-tuned 
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toward the relevant information. More importantly though, the more perceivers know what is 
wanted and where and how to look for it, the less they bother with irrelevant and unhelpful 
information in performing a task. So if a pilot’s previous experience of for instance, setting 
the flaps as the aircraft leaves the gate is that they usually extend correctly it is conceivable 
that the pilot will not be motivated to check the indication. Although alternative explanations 
have been proposed for omitting to extend the flaps in this contextual situation, explanations 
such as resumption lag and post-completion error underplay the clear role of repetitive con-
texts in this type of error. The process whereby knowledge of the type just described is ac-
quired without conscious awareness has been defined by Reber (1989) as implicit learning 
(IL). He notes that this type of knowledge is often tacit in nature, in other words it defies ver-
bal or written description. In straightforward language, tacit knowledge represents what indi-
viduals unconsciously believe they know about the prevailing contextual situation. For in-
stance a pilot who plans an approach and landing with the flaps retracted due to a system 
malfunction knows to expect some unusual alerts associated with that system configuration 
but the report relating to an accident involving exactly this context at Barcelona in 2007 
(CIAIC, 2007) indicated that a range of other completely unrelated alerts such as enhanced 
ground proximity warnings (EGPWS) and landing gear warnings were also ignored. Given 
that flight crews are not trained to respond to contextual information in this way, the empiri-
cal evidence suggests that this learning occurs without their knowledge. Furthermore, where-
as in most contexts IL could be seen as conferring a cognitive advantage, this example sug-
gests that in the aviation context it represents a potential threat. An important question is why 
having made a mistake due to contextual influences and IL, the flight crew often fails to re-
spond to multiple cues that should alert them to their error or omission. The literature relating 
to the allocation of attention in such cases is extensive but there is wide agreement that cer-
tain stimuli are filtered when concurrent tasks are undertaken. Early theoretical models pro-
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posed that the first stimulus that attracted attention would result in later stimuli being com-
pletely ignored (Broadbent, 1958) but as knowledge improved it became widely accepted that 
multiple stimuli could be attended to at once (Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963) but at a less deep 
level. Current thinking broadly reflects the views of Duncan (1980) that even stimuli that are 
not consciously attended to are probably processed without the individual knowing. Treisman 
(1964) proposed a model in which the first attended stimulus received more complete pro-
cessing than subsequent stimuli. She also emphasised the role of context by highlighting the 
importance of the relevance of a stimulus in determining whether it is attracts the attention. 
This is particularly pertinent to this study because, for instance, engine noise or the sound of 
the extended landing gear may not be recognised as relevant to a pilot concentrating on flying 
a complicated approach because these stimuli are usually taken for granted. The important 
aspect of Treisman’s model is that relevance must be identified and addressed, and this is one 
of the areas where the accident literature indicates that some pilots become adversely influ-
enced by context. The current study examined the extent to which pilots assume that certain 
conditions are met on the basis of their previous experience of similar contextual condit ions. 
The extract below is from the report into a landing gear retracted landing at Houston airport: 
 
“The landing checklist was not performed, and the flight crew did not confirm that the gear 
was down and locked. The gear warning horn sounded during the approach, indicating that 
the landing gear was not extended, but it was ignored. The GPWS sounded an alert 19 sec-
onds before impact and was ignored. Unaware that the gear was not down, the captain as-
sumed control of the airplane and made a wheels up landing”. (NTSB, 1997a, p. 38) 
 
This research contends that three distinct categories of context appear to contribute to 
instances of SFP in the literature. Flight crews have been observed to make false assumptions 
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related to alerts and warnings based upon previous knowledge gained in similar contextual 
conditions. There is also evidence that in certain phases of flight some flight crews assume 
that certain actions have been completed. Finally, it is proposed that if an unusual system 
configuration applies, there is an expectation that alerts that appear will be related to that 
system configuration. Three experimental hypotheses relating to these contexts were 
subjected to experimental research, the details of which are outlined in the following sections. 
9.2 THE EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES 
9.2.1 THE ALERT/INDICATION CONTEXT HYPOTHESIS 
The Alert/Indication Context Hypothesis proposes that in cases where a particular alert 
(which can be visual, verbal or system generated) or indication usually requires a particular 
response there will be a tendency to respond in the usual way even when a different response 
or no response is appropriate. This phenomenon was evident in the Charleston take off 
accident (NTSB, 2010c), where despite the captain requesting the flaps to be extended to the 
20˚ setting, the first officer mistakenly set the flaps to the more frequently used 8˚setting. 
Whilst in the Charleston accident it appears neither pilot checked that the correct 
configuration had been achieved, in other instances pilots have actually made a verbal 
response stating they have seen the correct configuration despite evidence that the correct 
configuration was never set (See NASA ASRS Report 438691 at Appendix E). It is also 
evident from the literature that pilots become accustomed to performing the most usual 
response to an alert or indication, which has caused errors and omissions during instances 
requiring a less usual response (See the Charleston accident, NTSB, 2010c). This 
phenomenon has featured in several incidents involving TCAS manoeuvres required to avoid 
an inflight collision. The most usual category of TCAS alert and the one requiring the most 
urgent response is a corrective resolution advisory (RA) and always involves a modification 
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to the aircraft’s flightpath. The category of RA simulated in the alert/indication hypothesis 
experiment is an example of the less common preventive resolution advisory. Of the nine 
categories of RA outlined by Eurocontrol (2016) the preventive RA is the only category 
which requires no change of flight path. Although at low altitude and in high density 
airspace, preventive RAs are almost as common as corrective RAs, in less dense airspace 
above 5000 feet they are reported to be a very rare occurrence (Eurocontrol, 2010). Although 
technical advances may change this situation, it is likely that preventive RAs will retain a 
similar occurrence pattern. For the current research, the two important characteristics of 
preventive RAs are that they are comparatively rare occurrences and they require an 
untypical response. It is important to emphasise that this research was not intended to 
contribute specifically to existing knowledge related to TCAS, which is the subject of 
extensive ongoing research. In this study, the typicality of the alert and its response are the 
variables that provided experimental data, with corrective RAs and their required response 
being considered typical and preventive RAs and their required response as less typical.  
 The experimental hypothesis outlined below in paragraph 9.3.1 was that certain 
alerts/indications result in increased instances of incorrect responses. To test this hypothesis a 
comparison of pilots’ reactions to simulated TCAS RAs that required a change of flight path 
with those requiring the current flight path to be maintained was conducted. This example 
was chosen because it was amenable to observational research with minimal experimental 
intervention. Because the flight crew procedure is one that is not normally varied by different 
airlines it was also possible to recruit participants from a wide range of backgrounds. In 
addition, the procedure is very prescriptive so a judgment as to whether it has been performed 
correctly is free of researcher subjectivity. 
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 9.2.2 THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT HYPOTHESIS 
The situational context hypothesis proposes that certain situational contexts are predictive of 
certain related actions having been completed. This hypothesis addresses the type of SFP 
incident where for instance, a pilot forgets to extend the landing gear because the prevailing 
contextual cues predict that the landing gear would normally have been extended at that stage 
of the flight. The hypothesis is loosely based upon the Rescorla Wagner (1972) mathematical 
model of classical conditioning which states that individuals learn from the discrepancy 
between what they expect to happen and what actually happens, so if the landing gear is 
usually in an extended position when the flaps are at a particular position, the flap position is 
likely to achieve the status of a conditioned stimulus, with the landing gear position its 
conditioned response. Furthermore, the more frequently this association is made, the stronger 
the relationship between the two stimuli will become despite there being no actual association 
between the two. The current research examined how on occasions, repetitive situational 
contexts appear to provide the conditioned stimulus that predicts the status of a critical 
aircraft system such as the landing gear. Because pilots need to check that the landing gear is 
extended before landing, all aircraft have indicator lights to display the landing gear position; 
however, this research cites multiple instances of flight crews who have assumed the landing 
gear was extended when it was retracted. The landing gear down indication is designed to 
have a high level of associative strength with the landing gear position, and in most cases 
they are effective in ensuring the landing gear is extended. However, the reports examined for 
this study indicate that when flight crews forget to extend the landing gear it often occurs in a 
contextual situation involving an unusual flap and speed combination, which suggests that 
flap configuration also acts as a conditioned stimulus predictive of landing gear position. 
According to Rescorla and Wagner (1972) when two conditional stimuli (in this case, flap 
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position and landing gear down indicators) simultaneously predict an outcome (in this case 
landing gear position) they compete to gain association with the outcome. Mackintosh (1975) 
presented research suggesting that in the situation described, the better predictor of the 
landing gear position would attract increased attention whilst the less perfect predictor would 
attract less attention. What if both stimuli were equally good predictors of landing gear 
position? In this case the salience of the stimulus appears to be relevant; however, the flaps 
and landing gear may vary in salience depending on the stage of the final approach. Final 
approaches can be diverse in nature but if ATC require accurate speeds to be flown, the flap 
position assumes far more salience than the landing gear position whereas if no speed control 
is in force, landing gear extension is likely to be the determinant of the deceleration point. It 
is not necessary to understand the complexities of energy management on final approach to 
understand that the salience of either the landing gear or the flaps can vary with contextual 
conditions. Multiple reports examined for this research indicate that the use of unusual flap/ 
landing gear configurations usually occur when pilots are required to fly a landing approach 
either faster or slower than they normally would
 
or when they are displaced from their ideal 
descent profile close to the airport but at a distance where landing gear extension is 
inappropriate. The same reports also indicate that when flight crews fly with the landing gear 
retracted but with a flap configuration that is usually associated with the landing gear having 
previously been extended they may miss the cue to extend the landing gear.  
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The ASRS report below is from an Airbus A 319 captain: 
While flying Bridge Visual to runway 28R in San Francisco approaching the bridge ATC 
assigned us to slow to 160 knots. I levelled off and slowed, concentrating on calling flaps as 
soon as they were available as we slowed. I did not call for the landing gear, I don't know 
why; I somehow just got focused on the flaps. We ended up in a flaps full configuration, on 
speed and glide path when we got the gear not down warning at 750 feet. (NASA, 2015a) 
The reason that pilots in this contextual situation may fail to notice the inappropriate landing 
indication is probably a feature of their elevated workload in such contexts or due to Kamin 
Blocking, (Kamin, 1969) a phenomenon in which the first experienced stimulus in a 
compound of two or more conditioned stimuli tends to interfere with the second. It should not 
be forgotten that the manufacturer provides an indicator that is intended to provide the 
conditioned stimulus indicating that the landing gear is extended; however, if flying at a 
given speed or flap configuration becomes a more dominant predictor, then according to the 
Kamin Blocking paradigm it is to some extent predictable that the indicator or any warnings 
will be ignored. 
9.2.3 THE SYSTEM CONFIGURATION CONTEXT HYPOTHESIS 
The system configuration context hypothesis proposes that in instances where an unusual sys-
tem configuration exists there will be a tendency for the flight crew to misattribute unrelated 
alerts to that unusual system configuration. One of the most recurrent manifestations of this 
phenomenon relates to flight crews who land with the landing gear retracted in a context in-
volving an unusual flap configuration. This category of accident has involved large airliners 
including a Comet at Newcastle, a BAC One Eleven at Stansted (UK AIB, 1978), a DC9 at 
Houston (NTSB, 1997a), a Canadair Regional Jet at Barcelona (CIAIC, 2007), a Boeing 737 
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at Kaliningrad (Interstate Aviation Committee, 2009) and others, so there is extensive empiri-
cal evidence to support the hypothesis. As far as is known, no previous research has elaborat-
ed upon this phenomenon despite the evidence above spanning almost five decades. Other 
examples of misattribution errors include unsafe abbreviation of a checklist at Palmerston 
North, New Zealand (TAIC, 1995) and failure to perform a terrain warning escape manoeu-
vre at Jakarta (KNKT, 2012) both of which resulted in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) 
accidents. The abbreviated checklist accident at Palmerston North occurred in the context of a 
previous defect with the landing gear that may have prompted the flight crew to continue an 
approach when according to the accident report it should have been discontinued. The ig-
nored terrain warning at Jakarta which resulted in CFIT occurred in a context where the Rus-
sian captain possessed limited knowledge of the local Indonesian terrain and was receiving 
verbal guidance from someone with local knowledge which conflicted with the correct in-
formation in the terrain database. The report speculated that the reason the pilot failed to re-
spond to numerous terrain warnings was that he perceived a problem with the terrain data-
base, which was a clear case of misattribution. Another example of misattribution involved a 
DC9 flight crew who landed with the landing gear retracted at Houston Airport because the 
captain misattributed the associated warning horn to the late configuration change they were 
making rather than to the retracted status of the gear. 
“The captain stated that he heard the horn sound momentarily and thought that it sounded 
because he put the flaps to 25 before the gear was down and locked.” (NTSB, 1997a, p. 4) 
The foregoing examples of the system configuration context hypothesis indicate that when 
flight crews adopt an unusual system configuration, whether as a consequence of a non-
normal procedure or because a normal situation calls for it, there may be an increased 
likelihood of misattributing unrelated alerts to that system configuration. 
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9.3 THE CONTEXTUAL CUEING EXPERIMENTS 
9.3.1 THE ALERT/INDICATION HYPOTHESIS EXPERIMENT  
9.3.1.1 EXPERIMENT THREE RESULTS 
Analysis of experiment three focussed upon the accuracy of the forty participants’ responses 
to two categories of TCAS alerts, one of which was considered to be more typical than the 
other. The independent variable was represented by two levels of typicality. Because the oc-
currence literature indicated that corrective RAs were more frequent and required a less typi-
cal response than predictive RAs it was hypothesised that the former would result in more 
accurate responses than the latter; therefore the corrective RA was the control condition. The 
experimental condition was represented by the preventive RA. Accuracy data were collected 
for each participant and analysed in SPSS. Due to the low response values in some of the ex-
perimental conditions a Fisher’s exact test of independence was chosen for this experiment. 
The results were very conclusive insofar as in the control condition, accuracy was 100% 
among the twenty participants. In the experimental condition eighteen of the twenty partici-
pants made one or more procedural error. This finding was so conclusive that it did not re-
quire statistical analysis but in the interest of completeness a more rigorous criterion for de-
fining accuracy was chosen. The revised criterion for accuracy was that the pilot should have 
accurately followed the required TCAS flight path. In this revised experimental condition the 
aircraft was manoeuvred incorrectly in seven of the twenty instances, whereas in the control 
condition the flight path was flown correctly in all instances. A Fisher’s exact test of inde-
pendence was performed to examine the relationship between alert typicality and accuracy of 
response (Table 9.1). The relationship between these variables was significant p<0.1 single 
sided, indicating that the null hypothesis could be rejected; this means that the observed rela-
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tionship between response accuracy and typicality of alert was not the result of chance. The 
bar chart at Figure 9.1 illustrates the results. 
Table 9.1:  Fisher’s exact test of independence between alert typicality and accuracy of        
response 
Chi Square Tests 
 Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
 (2 sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2 sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1 sided) 
Pearson Chi Square 8.485
a
 1 .004   
Continuity  
Correction
b
 
6.234 1 .013 
  
Likelihood  
Ratio 
11.200 1 .001 
  
Fisher's Exact Test    .008 .004 
Linear by Linear  
Association 
8.273 1 .004 
  
N of Valid  
Cases 
40 
    
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.50. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Typicality of alert versus accuracy of response. 
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9.3.1.2 EXPERIMENT THREE DISCUSSION 
Experiment three provided experimental support for the hypothesis that an alert or warning 
that requires a response that is untypical of other similar alerts and warnings is more likely to 
attract an inaccurate response. Although the specifics of TCAS manoeuvres are interesting, it 
should once again be emphasised that this experiment was intended to test the more general 
hypothesis that some pilots subconsciously possess cognitions relating to certain categories of 
alert or indication that tend to favour the most typical category of alert or indication and the 
most usual response. Indications and alerts can take many forms; for instance the response to 
a verbal call to extend the flaps before taxiing is an alert that should not only result in select-
ing the required flap setting but checking that the flaps extend to that position. A search of the 
ASRS database for instances of incorrect flap settings was performed. Search terms included 
“wrong” and “flap(s)” and “incorrect”. The search included all heavy public transport aircraft 
(referred to as Part 121 aircraft in ASRS) and was restricted to taxiing, takeoff and initial 
climb. Depending on the search term used, instances ranged from 95 to 52 of which 20 were 
directly relevant to this research. Of those 20 it was determined that 7 instances involved 
flight crews who had used a flap setting that they considered more usual than the one they 
should have used; this represents further support for the alert/indication hypothesis. Another 
repetitive instance of flight crews failing to perform a less typical response to an alert is dur-
ing missed approaches in response to windshear on final approach; this topic is discussed lat-
er. 
Cognitive psychology has long understood the role of prototypes in cognition. As early as the 
1950s Eleanor Rosch highlighted the role that prototypicality can have upon cognitive judg-
ments. Rosch (1975) found that members of a clearly recognisable prototype elicited faster 
RTs than for less prototypical examples. Also when participants were primed to expect a cer-
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tain category they identified items from that category quicker than if priming had not taken 
place. She also found that when asked to name exemplars of various categories, her partici-
pants usually responded with highly prototypical ones. In just the same way that Rosch found 
that a robin and a penguin, although both birds, varied considerably in their prototypicality, 
so a TCAS manoeuvre that requires no actions other than to monitor what is happening, rep-
resents a poor prototype of such an alert. It is not difficult to identify other alerts or indica-
tions that are more or less prototypical; for instance, the occurrence literature included no in-
stances of flight crews incorrectly responding to highly prototypical alert such as a fire warn-
ing or engine failure at low speed during takeoff, because all pilots know that such a warning 
requires a rejected takeoff (RTO) if it happens before decision speed. However, both abnor-
mal acceleration and system failures on takeoff are among the criteria that Boeing and other 
aircraft manufacturers stipulate for a low speed (below 80 knots) RTO. The report relating to 
a serious takeoff occurrence at Melbourne (ATSB, 2009a) indicates that abnormal accelera-
tion on takeoff is difficult to detect and a serious incident at Manchester UK (UK AAIB, 
2008) suggests that even if it is detected, pilots are ill-equipped to make safe judgments in the 
face of such indications. Another particularly repetitive non-prototypical system failure is the 
failure of the autothrottle system to engage at the commencement of the takeoff roll. Cata-
strophic takeoff accidents at Romulus in 1987 (NTSB, 1988) and in Madrid in 2008(CIAIC, 
2008) both involved flight crews who were unable to engage the autothrottle at the com-
mencement of the takeoff and did not analyse the cause but continued the takeoff. An Air 
France Boeing 777 flight crew at Lagos were also unable to engage their autothrottle at the 
commencement of the takeoff and continued the take off to high speed until they realised that 
the aircraft would not fly (BEA, 2010). This very serious accident occurred because the flight 
crew had engaged the autopilot rather than the autothrottle. Whereas a competent flight crew 
would never choose to continue a takeoff whilst at low speed with, for example an engine 
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fire, there are occasions when it is permissible to fly without a functioning autothrottle sys-
tem because the throttles can be positioned manually, thus the latter’s categorisation as a sys-
tem failure becomes less clearly defined and therefore less prototypical. It may also be rele-
vant that the less prototypical an indication or alert is, the less likely it is to be taught to flight 
crews in the simulator. The Buffalo accident report noted that it could not be determined 
whether the captain had seen a demonstration of the stall protection system (known as a stick 
pusher) on the type of aircraft he was flying (NTSB, 2010a, p. 88). A stall which results in 
the stick pusher activating, as was the case at Buffalo, is an extreme case and according to the 
report, instructors who would have taught the pilot in question had some discretion regarding 
the stall scenarios they needed to teach. There is a long history of pilots responding incorrect-
ly to stick pusher events, including an accident involving a Trident at Staines in 1972 (UK 
AIB, 1973) so this is not a new problem. In both these accidents, separated by over three dec-
ades, it was likely that the pilots had not been trained for the unusual precise combination of 
indications they experienced; what is certain is that in neither case was a correct recovery 
performed. In fact in some cases a flight simulator is incapable of reproducing some exam-
ples of extreme mishandling, a factor noted in the Buffalo accident report (ibid., p. 38). It is 
also possible that the way pilots are taught in the simulator may influence their decisions. In 
flapless takeoff accidents at Madrid in 2008 (CIAIC, 2008) and Dallas in 1988 (NTSB, 1989) 
there is verbal evidence from the CVR that the pilots initially thought they were experiencing 
an engine failure despite the presence of an aural stall warning. This may be because when-
ever handling difficulties are experienced just after takeoff in the simulator it is usually the 
result of a simulated failed engine. Therefore the prototypical response to uncontrollability 
after takeoff is to initially assume an engine has failed. A recent accident at Bedford, Massa-
chusetts (NTSB, 2015) involving a Gulfstream flight crew who unsuccessfully attempted a 
takeoff with the control locks engaged was an example of a very non-prototypical combina-
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tion of indications (difficulty moving the throttles and an unusual indication relating to the 
rudder). Although either of these indications would qualify as a system failure, and would 
cast doubt over the ability to complete a safe takeoff, this flight crew’s cognition of the situa-
tion permitted them to commence a takeoff in this unsafe condition. Another example of a 
very clearly defined category of manoeuvre is the go around, a procedure where the pilot dis-
continues an approach to landing, sometimes at low height. On almost all airliners this proce-
dure calls for application of full power, the retraction of the flaps to an intermediate position, 
a check that the aircraft is climbing, followed by the retraction of the landing gear. This rep-
resents the prototype for a go around but in the case of windshear neither the flaps nor the 
landing gear should be retracted during the go around. So although the windshear go around 
is a go around, it lacks several of the defining features of a prototypical go around and so may 
be prone to be incorrectly performed, particularly if unexpected.  Incidents and accidents in-
volving flight crews who performed the prototypical go around procedure when a windshear 
escape go around manoeuvre was called for include the following: a DC 9 at Charlotte 
(NTSB, 1995), an Airbus in the USA (NASA, 2007), and a Boeing 737 at Melbourne (ATSB, 
2010b). The Buffalo accident also highlights how pilots’ behaviour can reflect the prototypes 
they hold in their cognitive system. The first officer at Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) was responsi-
ble for a number of actions that certainly did not help the captain to recover the aircraft from 
the stall it had encountered. It was hypothesised in the accident report that she may have re-
tracted the flaps because that represented the prototypical stall recovery she had been trained 
for in the weather conditions that had been experienced earlier in the flight (Ibid., p. 90). An-
other hypothesis was that she may have reverted to prototypical behaviour she had learnt on 
light aircraft prior to becoming an airline pilot (Ibid., p. 90). Less clear is the reason why the 
captain applied back pressure on the control column when stall recoveries prototypically re-
quire the nose to be lowered. On a normally flown final approach, if the approach has to be 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       347 
 
 
discontinued for most conceivable reasons the prototypical response is to climb the aircraft 
by raising the aircraft’s nose. A stall warning on final approach is highly non-prototypical 
alert and the required response (lowering the aircraft nose) is very far removed from any pro-
totypical response a pilot would expect to need to perform at that phase of the flight. The no-
tion that the phase of flight might act as a cue for behaviour such as just described is elabo-
rated upon in section 9.2.2 above and the subject of experimental research in section 9.3.9. 
 
9.3.2 THE SYSTEM CONFIGURATION STATUS HYPOTHESIS  
9.3.2.1 EXPERIMENT FOUR RESULTS 
Analysis of experiment four focussed upon the accuracy of twenty four flight crews each 
consisting of two participants. Twelve flight crews were observed in the control condition 
which involved the introduction of a minor alert whilst taxiing. The control condition flight 
crews had no knowledge of any pre-existing condition that would cause an alert that could be 
ignored. In the experimental condition twelve flight crews were aware that their system con-
figuration was predictive of the occurrence of an alert that could be ignored. The one tailed 
hypothesis was that the experimental condition participants would ignore an unrelated alert 
without analysis whilst those in the control condition would analyse any alert that occurred. 
The results were conclusive for the control group, who analysed the alert in all cases. Of the 
experimental group, eight flight crews ignored the alert and four correctly analysed the alert. 
Correct responses were identified as accurate and an incorrect response was identified as in-
accurate for the purposes of analysis. For the purpose of analysis the control group was 
named “context unaware” and the experimental group was named “context aware”. Accuracy 
data were collected for each flight crew and analysed in SPSS. Due to the low response val-
ues in some of the experimental conditions a Fisher’s exact test of independence was chosen 
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for this experiment. The Fisher’s exact test of independence examined the relationship be-
tween context awareness/unawareness and accuracy of response. The relationship between 
these variables was significant p<0.5 one tailed, indicating that the null hypothesis could be 
rejected and therefore the observed relationship between response accuracy and context 
awareness was not the result of chance. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 9.2 be-
low and graphically in Figure 9.2.  
Table 9.2: Descriptive statistics for accuracy of response versus context awareness 
Chi Square Tests 
 Value Df 
Asymp. Sig. 
 (2 sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(2 sided) 
Exact Sig.  
(1 sided) 
Pearson Chi Square 4.800
a
 1 .028   
Continuity Correction
b
 2.700 1 .100   
Likelihood Ratio 6.351 1 .012   
Fisher's Exact Test    .093 .047 
Linear by Linear  
Association 
4.600 1 .032 
  
N of Valid Cases 24     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Context aware versus context unaware accuracy count. 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       349 
 
 
9.3.2.2 EXPERIMENT FOUR DISCUSSION 
The results of experiment four supported the hypothesis that knowledge of a pre-existing sys-
tem status has the potential to significantly influence the accuracy of flight crew attributions. 
This finding has wide-ranging implications for aviation safety, for instance in the weighing of 
risk when implementing procedures that require the use of an untypical system status. The 
finding that so many of the participants made the error they did was not a surprise given evi-
dence from accidents cited in this research in which the flight crew were aware of a pre-
existing defect which may have affected their decisions. Of more interest is why they fail to 
predict and prepare for the risk in advance. This redirects the focus to risk perception, not on-
ly for pilots but also for those who design and implement procedures. Research into how air-
line managers perceive risk is very hard to find but as far as pilots are concerned it is unlikely 
that when they do something risky like abbreviating a checklist or ignoring a terrain warning 
that they are simply taking a chance; it is more likely that they have misperceived the risk 
associated with their prevailing context. Research by Hunter (2002) found only a weak rela-
tionship between risk tolerance and risk perception in pilots, supporting the notion that pilots 
sometimes fail to consider some of the more abstract consequences of operating in an unusual 
system configuration. Unusual system configurations come in many forms; in an accident at 
Palmerston North, New Zealand (TAIC, 1995)  there was nothing unusual about the aircraft’s 
systems prior to attempting to extend the landing gear but there was knowledge of previous 
problems with the landing gear and this is likely to have influenced the pilots’ actions. Alt-
hough it cannot be claimed with certainty that flight crew awareness of a pre-existing unusual 
configuration affecting the aircraft has resulted in poor decision making, there is evidence 
that they co-occur. Flapless takeoffs involving loss of control at Madrid (CIAIC, 2008) and 
Lanzarote (CIAIC, 2007b, p.85)  both involved flight crews who were aware of an existing 
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defect on their aircraft that may have made them more willing to accept an unusual indica-
tion. The current research contends that if they had not known about the existing defect it is 
inconceivable that they would not have attempted to diagnose what was causing the incon-
sistent systems indications they were experiencing. Serious safety occurrences also cluster 
around certain aircraft types; a disproportionate number of flapless takeoffs involve the type 
of airliner in the two occurrences cited above, whilst a disproportionate number of mishan-
dled pressurisation occurrences affect another very common airliner. This suggests that both 
the design of both aircraft and their procedures may play a part in these types of errors. In 
some cases a non-normal checklist may direct a flight crew to adopt an unusual configura-
tion, such as a non-normal flap configuration for landing, as was the case in the previously 
cited landing gear retracted accidents at Barcelona and Kaliningrad, whilst in other cases the 
unusual configuration may be linked to a company policy such as taxiing on one engine to 
save fuel (See NASA, 2015b). Although these are both legitimate reasons, it is important to 
emphasise that both these procedures carry risks. Evidence that even minor departures from a 
standard system configuration introduces risk is demonstrated in the extract below involving 
a flight crew flying a Boeing 737 over the Irish Sea who misattributed their high rate of cabin 
climb to the thrust setting they were using rather than the actual cause, which was that they 
had not configured the pressurisation system correctly: 
 
ATC informed the aircraft that there was no speed restriction in effect… and as a result the 
flight crew increased the thrust…causing the aircraft to climb rapidly. They stated that the 
pressurization panel indications may have appeared normal to them because the aircraft was 
climbing rapidly. (AAIU, 2014) 
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This extract suggests that had the system configuration not been characterised by the use of 
the high thrust setting the flight crew might have completed a more thorough analysis of an 
unusual indication related to their cabin altitude. It should also be emphasised that this flight 
crew’s hypothesis was not without foundation but what they did not appear to appreciate is 
that a minor change in system configuration could influence their decision making, probably 
without their conscious awareness. It is also noteworthy that this flight crew was able to de-
scribe contextual cueing in retrospect but did not consider it at the time; this highlights the 
utility of this research.  
 
A recent fatal accident over the Java Sea (NTSC, 2014) involved an Airbus captain who disa-
bled an essential system in flight resulting in a loss of control. During the investigation it 
emerged that the same captain had previously observed the same system configuration being 
legitimately used by an engineer during a rectification on the ground three days before the 
accident. On the accident flight the captain experienced the same malfunction that he had 
seen on the ground three days earlier and apparently assumed that the rectification process he 
had observed before was worth trying in the air. 
The report concluded: 
“The experience of the pilot in command witnessing problem solving by resetting the flight 
augmentation computer circuit breakers on 25 December 2014 might have influenced him to 
adopt the same procedure when confronted with the same problem” 
(NTSC, 2015, p. 119) 
The role of contextual cueing is that if this pilot had not been exposed previously to this sys-
tem configuration he would not have had any reason to deviate from the approved procedure 
for the malfunction he experienced, and the flight could have continued safely albeit in a 
slightly degraded condition. Unusual configurations are not confined to aircraft systems; they 
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can also apply to the wider aspects of the aviation safety system such as airport layouts. Dis-
cussions between the FCMs involved in a wrong runway takeoff at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a, 
p. 3) indicated that they were aware that the lighting on the airport was not in a standard con-
figuration. Although there was a verbal expression of uncertainty from one of the pilots as the 
takeoff was commenced, their knowledge of the status of the lighting may have resulted in 
them being more tolerant of the unusual visual scene as they commenced their takeoff. Simi-
larly, there is evidence in the report of the serious takeoff incident at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 
2010a, p. 8) that the pilots were uneasy about the visual configuration that confronted them 
before they commenced their takeoff. Once again, it is conceivable that their tolerance of the 
unusual was cued by the knowledge that they were using a high flap setting that they associ-
ated with shorter than usual runways and therefore expected to be confronted with a runway 
which appeared shorter than usual. An expectation of a shorter runway surface than usual was 
also offered as an explanation by the captain involved in an attempted taxiway takeoff at Oslo 
(AIBN, 2006, p. 3) cited earlier in this thesis. The contention is that in each of these instances 
the flight crew were influenced by an unusual system configuration unrelated directly to the 
aircraft. The general premise of the system status context hypothesis is that there is a signifi-
cant chance that flight crews might be influenced to misattribute causes of relevant factors 
affecting flight safety because of preconceptions they hold, some of which may be the result 
of implicit learning. 
 
9.3.3 THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT CUEING RESEARCH 
This research elaborated upon the theme of prototypicality by examining the extent to which 
repetitive situational contexts might influence flight crews to make errors and omissions. Un-
like the previous two hypotheses relating to contextual cueing, the experimental method was 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       353 
 
 
not appropriate. In this research a detailed literature review provided qualitative data.  Be-
cause aviation has a well-developed occurrence reporting system in many countries, it is pos-
sible to identify from reports, repetitive contextual situations that have prevailed in advance 
of an incident or accident. However, because these instances are usually few in numbers it is 
difficult to draw conclusions from much of the data. For instance, there are several docu-
mented instances of flight crews attempting (and in some cases succeeding) to take off from a 
taxiway or closed runway in a situational context involving earlier than usual receipt of take-
off clearance (e.g. AIBN, 2006:2010). Although this represents a recurrent pattern, this re-
search could only locate very few documented cases worldwide, so the sample size would be 
too small to claim more than a suspicion that the situational context was implicated. In order 
to examine the role of situational context, a larger sample was needed but thankfully most 
relevant phenomena are similarly affected with very small numbers of instances. A detailed 
review of the occurrence literature revealed that in addition to the instances of landing gear 
retracted landings outlined in previous sections, there were a significant number of instances 
where a flight crew had apparently forgotten to extend the landing gear and the error was on-
ly mitigated by the aircraft’s warning systems. This was the category of occurrence examined 
in this research. Although the data relating to such occurrences are interesting, the primary 
objective of this section was to establish whether a more general relationship existed between 
situational context and errors and omissions. 
9.3.3.1 RESULTS OF THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT CUEING RESEARCH 
 This research found twenty five documented instances of Boeing and Airbus airliners de-
scending on final approach to between 1000 feet and as low as 200 feet with the landing gear 
retracted. No normal operations require flight crews to fly a final approach with the landing 
gear retracted below 1000 feet so it is reasonable to assume that during normal operations any 
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flight crew descending an aircraft below 1000 feet with the landing gear retracted falsely be-
lieved that the landing gear had been previously extended. The next section describes the 
contextual cues that were available to the flight crews just before their omission was noticed. 
PREVAILING CUES BELOW 1000 FEET 
This section outlines the features of the flight crews’ situational environment that might be 
implicated in their omission. There were a few dominant features; firstly, all except two of 
the dataset flight crews were flying visually, meaning they could either see the runway or had 
good general visibility and an expectation that they would continue visually. None of the da-
taset flight crews had completed the necessary checklists. They were all appropriately posi-
tioned vertically and horizontally. Two instances involved pilots who intentionally flew 
slightly above the glideslope to avoid wake from a preceding aircraft. All of the flight crews 
had been cleared by ATC for their current phase of flight. 
SPEED AT 1000 FEET 
This research found that 90% of the dataset were at or close to their target speed. This proba-
bly indicates that the pilot believed that the aircraft was in the landing configuration. If the 
pilot knew there was further deceleration required it is unlikely that the speed would be con-
stant at this late stage of the approach. 
 
THRUST SETTING AT 1000 FEET 
This research found that 75% of the dataset aircraft were likely using more than idle thrust at 
1000 feet. This statistic is a conservative estimate because there is considerable evidence that 
up to 90% of the dataset flight crews may have been using thrust at 1000 feet.  All of the 
Boeings would have required more than idle thrust to fly at the speed and flap configuration 
that prevailed. In the case of the Airbuses it was more difficult to determine because Boeings 
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always use either of two landing flap setting for normal landings (which require significant 
thrust to be used) whereas Airbus flight crews are more likely to use an intermediate flap set-
ting for landing (usually Configuration 3) which requires a low thrust setting even with the 
landing gear extended. Nonetheless, there was sufficient evidence in the reports to suggest 
that at least 75% were not at idle thrust at 1000 feet. 
FLAP CONFIGURATION AT 1000 FEET 
This research found that 60% of the dataset flight crews were not at their intended landing 
flap setting at 1000 feet. None of the Boeing flight crews in the dataset were configured at 
their planned landing flap configuration at 1000 feet.  Five of the eight Boeing flight crews 
who were not at their landing flap configuration at 1000 feet were complying with a speed 
restriction imposed by ATC and one was flying in accordance with a company noise abate-
ment procedure. It was unclear why the other two flight crews had not selected their landing 
flap configuration.  Although three Airbus flight crews mentioned that planning to land with 
Configuration 3 rather than Configuration Full may have been implicated in their failure to 
configure the aircraft in time, there was no supporting evidence in the data. 
After detailed reading of the relevant reports it can be concluded that if the landing gear is not 
extended by 1000 feet the absence of a landing gear down indication is not sufficient stimulus 
to alert the pilots to their error.  Given that the criteria for continuing an approach below 1000 
feet in most airlines centre upon the thrust setting, the flap setting and the speed, these were 
the focus of this study. An incorrect speed did not appear to provide a reliable cue that some-
thing was amiss. All but two of the dataset flight crews were very likely to have been stabi-
lised (not accelerating or decelerating) at the speed they had intended to fly, which was not 
necessarily the planned final approach speed. This supports the notion that they had forgotten 
that their speed was incorrect until alerted by a warning. Thrust was rarely at idle, so there 
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might have been some aural stimulus from engine noise that approximated a normal approach 
noise level.  
Although there was an equal distribution of flight crews who had selected their planned flap 
setting by 1000 feet and those who had not, it was evident that the majority of flight crews 
who had not selected their planned landing flap setting were flying Boeings. This is likely to 
be partly because some Airbus flight crews fly their intermediate approach at Configuration 3 
and continue to a landing in this configuration. Boeings are unable to do this and as a conse-
quence, their intermediate approach flap setting always needs to be increased for landing. The 
problem for Boeing pilots appears to be related to the use of Flaps 20 (or in one case Flaps 
15) with the landing gear retracted. Although the sample size was small, if Boeing flight 
crews were considered in isolation, the effect of using Flaps 20 with gear retracted would be 
very significant. In none of the dataset instances had the checklists been completed; this is 
particularly surprising because some of the aircraft in the dataset (Boeing 777s) have elec-
tronic checklists that will not allow such an omission. Two pilots reported that they remem-
bered starting a checklist but not completing it.  
 
9.3.3.2 DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATIONAL CONTEXT CUEING RESEARCH 
This section offers some explanations for the flight crews’ failure to notice their omission, 
WHY WAS THE ABSENCE OF THE LANDING GEAR INDICATION MISSED? 
There are several potential reasons why a visual stimulus like the landing gear indicator 
might not attract the flight crew’s attention. Firstly, it may be that it is not considered salient 
at 1000 feet because in the normal course of events it is unnecessary to check it because the 
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landing gear is almost without exception, extended. Research by Raymond & O’Brien (2009) 
indicates that allocation of attention varies with motivational salience in conditions of both 
high and low attentional demands. Their research also indicated that the decision to attend or 
otherwise to a visual stimulus was not only influenced by current demands upon attention but 
also by a prediction of the value of attending to that stimulus, in other words the probability 
of achieving a positive outcome by allocating attention to the stimulus. Neurobiological sup-
port for this finding is found in studies indicating that value prediction influences visual cor-
tex activity in rats (Shuler & Bear, 2006) and in lateral intraparietal cortex in monkeys, an 
area associated with eye movements (Bendiksby & Platt, 2006). More recent research indi-
cates that a neural mechanism in the basal forebrain of rats is selectively activated by motiva-
tionally salient stimuli independently and is capable of affecting the activity of widespread 
cortical circuits (Lin & Nicolelis, 2008); this mechanism appears to be akin to mechanisms 
thought to mediate top down control in humans (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009). In addition to 
its salience, to capture attention it would seem to be a prerequisite that the stimulus be visible. 
In fact, even absent stimuli are processed by the brain; according to Chun and Marois (2002), 
even when a visual stimulus is absent, neural mechanisms prepare for upcoming visual 
events, so the brain is already predicting what will be seen and where it will be located. It 
might be expected that the brain would identify that the stimulus was absent and that this in-
formation would contribute to top down processing. Rensink et al., (1996) examined change 
blindness and found that introducing a blank stimulus between alternating displays of an orig-
inal and a modified scene resulted in a failure of perception whereby changes to the scene 
were not noticed so readily. Rensink’s research although different from the attentional task in 
the flight deck, does provide support for the idea that an absent stimulus can be attended to 
and its absence ignored in certain conditions.  
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WHY WAS THE ABSENCE OF NOISE NOT NOTICED? 
Just before a normal landing there are two sources of increased noise on the flight deck, 
namely that from the increased engine thrust and that from the airflow over the landing gear. 
Both these sources of noise are noticeable from the flight deck, as is the sound of landing 
gear extension, and there is little doubt that flight crews become accustomed to such auditory 
stimuli. For many flight crews the ability to react to auditory stimuli of the type just outlined 
may be restricted by the specifics of the equipment in use. Active noise reduction (ANR) 
headsets are designed to reduce the influence of external noise on the flight deck and are typ-
ically used on both ears in conjunction with the intercom, in which case it is very unlikely 
that engine or landing gear noise would capture the attention. Another common practice is to 
use one headset earpiece (usually the outboard) to listen to ATC and the other ear to listen to 
the other pilot and noises in the flight deck. This process of using individual ears for different 
stimuli is known as dichotic listening. A dichotic listening experiment by Cherry et al. (1953) 
found that although his participants could alternate their listening between ears, when they 
needed to concentrate upon one particular channel very little information processing of the 
unattended channel took place. A phenomenon known as the phonemic restoration effect may 
also play a part in the failure to notice absent auditory stimuli; in this perceptual phenomenon 
under certain conditions, sounds actually missing from a speech signal can be restored by the 
brain and may appear to be heard. Numerous studies have also shown strong effects of top-
down attention on auditory processing in active listening; for example, studies that have 
shown that human auditory cortex is activated in the complete absence of any real world 
acoustic stimulation, when there is simply an inner expectation of sound (Hughes, et al., 
2001: Raij, et al., 1997: Wu, et al., 2007). Experimental research which monitored brain ac-
tivity during the short, quiet interlude of musical transitions identified activity in a ventral 
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fronto temporal network associated with detecting salient events. Particularly relevant is re-
search by Haslinger et al. (2005) who found that professional pianists who viewed sequences 
of silent piano playing were subject to activation of auditory areas of the brain in a way not 
present in naïve participants. These results were interpreted as an indication of specialization 
of a fronto-temporal network in the brain due to frequent observation which, it has been sug-
gested, is implicated in the linking of visual and auditory perception to motor performance. 
These studies provide considerable evidence that an auditory stimulus associated with a sali-
ent visual stimulus can be imagined even when absent, so the absence of sounds related to 
landing gear extension is unlikely to be a reliable cue that the landing gear remains retracted.   
WHY WAS THE INCORRECT SPEED NOT NOTICED? 
It is not unreasonable to question the emphasis in this research, on speed as a factor in these 
occurrences given that there is no obvious link between flying at the wrong speed and forget-
ting to extend the landing gear. The link is quite complex but is caused by the relationship 
between speed and flap setting; unusual flap settings have been a recurrent feature of landing 
gear retracted landing accidents for decades and unusual flap settings are usually a conse-
quence of flying at an unusual speed for the phase of flight. To support this contention Figure 
9.3 shows the flight parameters of a US Air Boeing 767 which came very close to landing 
with the landing gear retracted at Gatwick in 2006 (UK AAIB, 2006a). The pilot’s testimony 
was critical of the “unnecessary speed assignments” he had experienced during the approach. 
The traces at the top of the graph show that the aircraft was properly aligned both vertically 
and laterally for the intended landing and that some thrust was applied. At the bottom of the 
graph the red trace labelled “A” shows that the aircraft was flown at a constant 160 knots 
with flaps position 20 until the gear doors open in response to a “gear disagree” warning at 
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approximately 500 feet; this is illustrated by the intersection between the warnings (labelled 
B) and the radio altitude trace (labelled C) and highlighted with yellow arrows. 
 
Figure 9.3: The flight parameters of a Boeing 767 which was the subject of a serious incident 
report (source UK AAIB, 2006a) 
Compelling evidence that flight crews do not monitor their speed as much as they should was 
presented in the report into a stalling accident involving a Turkish Boeing 737 at Amsterdam. 
The associated report highlighted the role of the speed tape on the primary flight display 
(PFD). The report noted (Dutch Safety Board, 2010, p .64-65) that “although the speedtape 
A 
 
C 
B 
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on the PFD has a couple of built in indicators to accentuate speed, research in the past has 
demonstrated that the speedtape is not a good basis for speed observations at a glance”. The 
round format of earlier speed instruments gave crews the ability to distinguish speed devia-
tions and to immediately recognize them from the position of the indicator, without a digital 
value first having to be read and processed mentally. Thus speed awareness has become a 
mental processing task rather than a visual recognition task as it was on previous round dial 
instruments. The Dutch report concluded that even in the presence of readily visible speed 
cues the flight crew did not recognize the unintentional decrease in airspeed.  
The research cited in the previous paragraphs describes why the contextual cues present at 
1000 feet are unlikely to be a reliable predictor of landing gear status. Given the evidence that 
if a flight crew reach 1000 feet with the landing gear retracted they are relying on their last 
line of defence (the aircraft’s warning systems) it is essential to consider the contextual con-
ditions that give rise to omitting to extend the landing gear at the appropriate position. 
WHAT CONDITIONS FAVOUR OMITTING TO EXTEND THE LANDING GEAR? 
THE ROLE OF NON NORMAL OPERATIONS 
Although non-normal operations were excluded from the dataset, the analysis of the ASRS 
database included several occurrences that bore some of the hallmarks of accidents at Barce-
lona in 2007, Kaliningrad in 2008 and Houston in 1996. In particular, each of the accident 
flight crews had experienced difficulty extending their aircraft’s flaps but had no problem 
that would have affected landing gear extension. In all of these accidents the flight crews also 
ignored warnings that the landing gear was retracted. Training flights or flights where the 
flight crew had chosen to use an unusual flap configuration for landing were also empirically 
linked to landing gear retracted accidents (See UK AAIB, 2010d). 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       362 
 
 
SLOWING DOWN EARLY AND DELAYING LANDING GEAR EXTENSION 
Being requested to slow down early by ATC or slowing down early because of a non-normal 
procedure appears to expose flight crews to the risk of forgetting the landing gear. On many 
heavy airliners it is necessary to progressively increase the flap extension with decreasing 
speed in order to maintain a safe margin above a stall. If such a deceleration is called for (for 
instance by ATC) when the aircraft is still a long way from the airport an unusually high flap 
setting may be needed. During training, the point at which the landing gear is extended is 
clearly defined but in the real world flight crews may choose to delay landing gear extension. 
This can result in the aircraft being flown with a flap setting which is predictive of the land-
ing gear having been extended. On many of the Boeings in the dataset an early deceleration 
on approach often results in flying at flaps 20 with the landing gear retracted. Although there 
is no technical objection to flying at flaps 20 with the landing gear retracted, during initial 
and recurrent training, flaps 20 is usually associated with the landing gear being in the ex-
tended position. The flight crew cited earlier who nearly landed with the landing gear up at 
Gatwick were using this landing gear and flap combination, as were all but one of the Boeing 
flight crews in the dataset, so there is supporting evidence for this risk factor. The data indi-
cated that the relationship between flap position and landing gear status was less predictive 
on the Airbus than on the Boeing, although there was evidence in the narratives (See page 
371)  that some  pilots  attributed their omission in part to flying at configuration 3 with the 
landing gear retracted. This means that for some pilots configuration 3 is predictive of the 
landing gear being extended; it does however, appear to be a weaker effect than the flaps 
20/gear up configuration on the Boeing.  
The effect of delaying landing gear extension could not be ignored in the dataset. At least 
seven flight crews had consciously chosen to delay landing gear extension because they were 
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slowing down further from touchdown than usual. It appears that once flaps are extended to 
flaps 20 on a Boeing or configuration 3 on an Airbus some flight crews lose their cue to ex-
tend the landing gear. For these flight crews landing gear extension has become a prospective 
memory task, meaning they need to recall their intention to complete the action at some fu-
ture point. Research by Anderson & Douglass (2001) indicated that their participants ap-
peared not to engage in cognitively costly advance preparation when they suspended a goal, 
and that their retrieval was slow and in some cases completely ineffective if the goal had been 
suspended for an extended period. This may explain instances where a flight crew extended 
the flaps early and sometime later forgot to extend the landing gear. Notably, several of the 
flight crews involved were able to identify the precursor conditions in retrospect but failed to 
mitigate the risk in advance.  Several instances in the dataset involved a distraction occurring 
after the goal of extending the landing gear had been suspended to some point in the future. 
Distractions vary in the level to which they displace memory of a suspended activity; avoid-
ing wake turbulence by flying a higher than usual descent path, decisions related to weather 
and fuel and  late runway changes were all distractions in the dataset that were able to  dis-
place memory of the suspended action. There were very few instances in the dataset where no 
distraction was present. According to Altmann and Trafton (2002) there is a window of op-
portunity just before the current goal is suspended when it is possible to strengthen the goals 
and encoding cues. However, the narratives examined in this study indicated that flap exten-
sion often occurred concurrently with a requirement to reduce speed so the opportunity to ex-
pend time and cognitive effort was probably limited. When the time comes to retrieve the 
suspended goal from memory it must receive priming from contextual cues in order to boost 
its activation level above that of other competing goals. Associative priming relies upon links 
being formed between the target goal and cues that would have been associated with the con-
text when the goal was suspended. In this case the primary retrieval cue is drawn from long 
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term knowledge about the task and is thus part of the internal mental context held by the pi-
lot. Information from previous associations will only be an effective retrieval strategy if the 
associative links are reliable, that is if the flap setting is always a predictor of the landing gear 
position. From the dataset it can be speculated that the associative linkage between flap set-
ting and landing gear position vary in their strength between the two types of aircraft. Select-
ing flaps 20 early with the landing gear retracted represented the context for error in Boeing 
flight crews. For Airbus flight crews although configuration 3 was not a reliable predictor of 
landing gear position, it is possible that because it can be used for both approach or landing, 
seeing the flaps at configuration 3 could cue a pilot to believe the aircraft was configured for 
landing. It is clear from the dataset that the contextual cues available to these pilots at 1000 
feet were not sufficient to alert them to the fact that the landing gear remained retracted. 
PLANNING TO USE A REDUCED FLAP SETTING FOR LANDING 
Using a reduced flap setting for landing reduces noise, saves fuel and increases traffic flow, 
so it has become common practice in recent years. The Boeing and Airbus differ slightly in 
the detail in this respect. During normal procedure landings Boeings always land with a flap 
setting that is exclusively intended for landing whereas the Airbus can make normal landings 
with a flap setting exclusively intended for landing (configuration full) or with a setting that 
is used as an intermediate position but can also be used for landing (configuration 3). There 
were four documented instances (2 Airbuses and 2 Boeings) of flight crews who were using a 
reduced flap setting as a consequence of a non-normal procedure who forgot to extend the 
landing gear. Because there was such a low incidence of such occurrences they were exclud-
ed from the statistical analysis but there is considerable evidence from previously cited acci-
dents that landing gear retracted occurrences are empirically related to non-normal situations 
unrelated to the landing gear. On the Airbus it is conceivable that utilising configuration 3 for 
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both intermediate approach and for landing may make this setting more prone to be accepted 
as a landing setting in instances where this is not the case; this was mentioned by three pilots 
in the dataset. Of the thirteen aircraft in the dataset that were still at an intermediate flap set-
ting at 1000 feet, five were Airbuses and eight were Boeings. Of the five Airbuses, three had 
planned to use configuration 3 for landing and were therefore at their intended landing flap 
configuration. None of the Boeings were at their planned flap configuration for landing. Six 
of the eight Boeings were in a Flaps 20/ gear up configuration, making this the most common 
configuration associated with forgetting to extend the landing gear. 
THE ROLE OF RESTRICTIONS ON SPEED  
Few of the documented cases of pilots failing to extend the landing gear occurred in situa-
tions where the pilots were free from some constraint upon their flap configuration. The most 
common error involved unintentionally remaining in an intermediate flap configuration be-
low 1000 feet after some kind of distraction. This co-occurred with one or more of the fol-
lowing contextual conditions: 
 A request from ATC to maintain a higher than normal speed to a late stage in the approach. 
 A standing procedure to retain a higher than normal speed until a late stage in the approach. 
 A company procedure that called for delayed flap extension in the interests of fuel saving. 
 A company procedure that called for a reduced flap setting for landing. 
 A requirement to slow down at a distance from touchdown where landing gear extension 
would be unusual. 
 A non-normal procedure requiring an unusual flap configuration. 
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 Flying faster or slower than normal on final approach emerged as the most recurrent factor in 
the dataset. Defining normal is difficult because there are differing perspectives.  It would be 
reasonable to define any procedure that conflicts with the initial and recurrent training pilots 
receive as a departure from normal but many would disagree. Pilots do not receive simulator 
training in the types of approaches that featured in the dataset such as delaying landing gear 
extension during a non-normal approach or joining a glideslope from above, but they are ex-
pected to do all these manoeuvres without any formal training. So this research contends that 
any procedure that invokes a context that has resulted in error should be highlighted. Flying 
at an ad hoc speed on final approach is just one such precursor to the contexts that have been 
found to promote error.  The cross-tabulation statistics in Table 9.3 indicate that based upon 
the dataset instances, the relationship between speed control being applied on final approach 
and arriving at 1000 feet in the wrong configuration is statistically significant p<0.05 one-
tailed.  
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Table 9.3: Speed Constraint * Flap Configuration at 1000 feet Cross tabulation 
Count   
 
Flap Configuration at 1000 feet 
Total 
Planned Landing 
Flap 
Intermediate 
Flap 
Speed Constraint Speed Control 
Applied 
3 9 12 
No Speed Control 
Applied 
6 2 8 
Total 9 11 20 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (2-
sided) 
Exact Sig. (1-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 4.848
a
 1 .028   
Continuity Correc-
tion
b
 
3.039 1 .081   
Likelihood Ratio 5.032 1 .025   
Fisher's Exact Test    .065 .040 
Linear-by-Linear  
Association 
4.606 1 .032   
N of Valid Cases 20     
a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.60. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Figure 9.4 is the gear up approach taxonomy developed from the situational context hypothe-
sis research. This is followed by a description of the characteristics of each factor. 
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Figure 9.4: The gear up approach taxonomy
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FLIGHT DECK MANAGEMENT  
 CLEARANCE: All the FCMs in the dataset were complying with their ATC clear-
ance. 
 WEATHER: Most of the FCMs in the dataset were flying visually. 
 CHECKLISTS: None of the FCMs in the dataset had completed the landing checklist. 
HUMAN LIMITATIONS  
 AMBIENT NOISE: The absence of noise from the extended gear did not alert the da-
taset FCMs to their omission. 
 THRUST SETTING: The reduced thrust required in the gear up configuration did not 
alert the dataset FCMs to their omission. 
 DISTRACTION: Where FCMs deferred the decision to extend the gear the presence 
of a distraction could cause them to forget they had deferred gear extension. FCMs 
did not appear to take steps to mitigate the risk of deferring gear extension in advance 
despite recognising the risk in retrospect. 
 KNOWLEDGE: Interviews with pilots suggest they are generally uninformed about 
the risks of prospective-memory tasks. 
TRAINING  
 MISMATCH WITH OPERATIONS MANUALS: The types of flap/gear configura-
tions evident in some of the dataset occurrences are not outlined in the aircraft train-
ing manuals. For instance, low drag non-normal or non-precision approaches are not 
outlined.  Manufacturers and operators should ensure their documented procedures re-
flect the procedures that actually occur in real life. 
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 MISMATCH WITH PROFILES TAUGHT DURING TRAINING: The classic flight 
profiles taught during initial conversion bear little resemblance to some of the profiles 
pilots need to fly in everyday operations. During initial and recurrent training an asso-
ciation between large flap settings and gear extension is forged. Training should re-
flect the needs of the real world better than is currently the case. 
NON NORMAL PROCEDURES 
 UNFAMILIAR SPEEDS: Non-normal procedures require pilots to slow down early 
in some cases and to fly faster than usual in others. 
 MODIFICATION OF PROCEDURE BY FCMs: No non-normal flap procedures rec-
ommend delaying gear extension but there is evidence in the reports that some pilots 
choose to do so. 
 UNFAMILIAR WARNINGS: Non-normal procedures involving flaps frequently 
generate warnings that pilots rarely encounter. 
 MISATTRIBUTION OF WARNINGS: In the past, during both revenue and training 
flights, pilots have misattributed the warnings mentioned above and landed with the 
gear retracted. 
ATC PROCEDURES 
 SLOWING DOWN EARLY: ATC sometimes require pilots to slow down earlier than 
normal; on some aircraft this requires a higher than normal flap setting for that posi-
tion in space. During training, higher flap settings are associated with the gear down 
configuration. 
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 OVERREPRESENTED CONFIGURATIONS: Boeing 757/767/777 pilots use gear 
up/flaps 20 when they need to slow down early; this configuration has been evident in 
several gear up incidents (See UK AAIB, 2006a). Several Airbus pilots commented in 
ASRS reports that aspects of procedures involving landing with configuration 3 rather 
than full flaps had provided the context for an error, although this was not a highly re-
current narrative. The extracts below are all pilot narratives relating to unstable ap-
proaches in Airbus aircraft: 
Do not go beyond flaps two before the gear is down when landing flaps three. (NASA, 2014) 
 “Even though we had briefed using flaps full for landing, the aircraft can be landed at flaps 
three” (NASA, 2003a) 
 “Usually I select gear down with flaps three” (NASA, 1993) 
 MAINTAINING HIGH SPEED: ATC sometimes require pilots to maintain a higher 
than desirable speed to a position close to the runway. This may require pilots to stay 
at a lower than normal flap setting later than is normal for that position in space. 
Some heavier aircraft will require a higher than normal flap setting early in the ap-
proach and a lower than normal setting as they approach the runway. 
 RELUCTANCE TO EXTEND THE GEAR AT DISTANCE: Pilots are reluctant to 
extend the landing gear when they are considerable distance from the runway, result-
ing in unusual flap/gear configurations if they need to slow down earlier than usual. 
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 EMPATHY BETWEEN ATC AND PILOTS: Operators and airport authorities favour 
high speed on final approach whereas pilots are constrained by stable approach crite-
ria which may be incompatible with ATC requirements. At Heathrow Airport there is 
a plan to reduce spacing between aircraft on final approach when the headwind is 
strongest; these are just the conditions when many pilots would prefer more spacing 
in order to avoid a potential last-minute go around in turbulent conditions. It is unlike-
ly that air traffic controllers understand the intricacies of final approach energy man-
agement on the various different aircraft they control. 
9.3.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE CONTEXTUAL CUEING RESEARCH 
The system status and alert/indication experiments were complicated and expensive to run so 
they inevitably involved fewer participants than would have been desirable. Also the oppor-
tunities to approach participants were fewer so their recruitment was less random than would 
have been desired. Ethical considerations meant that almost no personal information about 
the participants was collected; however, these data were irrelevant to the research objective. 
The two simulated scenarios were highly simplified and effective but the statistical tests only 
measured independence so it is not possible to claim that causation exists on the basis of the 
results. It could be argued that the control conditions in both the experiments represented sit-
uations where it would be very unusual for a flight crew not to behave in the way they did. 
The experimental condition was examining very untypical flight crew behaviour so it would 
have been unrealistic to use a control condition that did not reflect the difference between 
control and experimental conditions. The statically significant results also align with some of 
the evidence from the occurrence literature. 
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The situational-context study was originally intended to be an experimental study as well but 
it proved methodologically impossible. An alternative approach was to use self-reports as 
qualitative data. Self-reports, although widely used in the aviation context and elsewhere, do 
have their limitations; for example people often respond in such a way that presents them in a 
more favourable light even if these responses do not reflect how they actually behaved, this is 
known as “socially desirable responding” (Paulhus, 1991). In general terms, if there was any 
doubt about the relevance or precision of a report it was excluded. There were also some very 
significant incidents for which no data were available, including a fully serviceable Boeing 
747 which landed with the landing gear retracted at Islamabad in 1986. Sometimes there was 
clear evidence that an accident had occurred but no official report, as in the case of a Comet 
that landed with the landing gear up in Newcastle in 1970. Inevitably there were confounding 
factors such as fatigue, air traffic control requirements and substandard technique. Training 
flights were disproportionately represented in flapless/gear up landing reports
xv
, probably be-
cause flapless landings, whilst often practiced during training, are a rare occurrence in day to 
day operations. This dataset, whilst not claiming to include all instances of approaches flown 
with the landing gear retracted near the ground worldwide, is considered representative of the 
phenomenon in general. In common with the ASRS database from which much of the data 
originated, the data presented in this thesis probably represent a low estimate of instances, 
with the true incidence worldwide probably considerably higher. Identifying the point in the 
approach at which it could be stated with some certainty that the landing gear extension had 
been forgotten was a subjective decision. On the basis that most airlines require the landing 
configuration to be achieved by 1000 feet, this was the figure chosen for this study. The con-
ditions that prevailed at that point were not always explicitly stated in the reports so it was 
necessary to identify the important contextual features present in the most detailed reports 
and attempt to deduce missing data from the less detailed ones. For instance, it emerged quite 
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early on that the role of air traffic control speed constraints was frequently mentioned in the 
more detailed reports. In cases where it was suspected that speed constraints might have been 
a factor but were not mentioned, reference was made to the published procedures for the air-
port concerned. For instance, it is highly improbable that an aircraft inbound to a busy airport 
like Heathrow would have no speed restriction on final approach even if it was not mentioned 
in the report. In the final dataset it was not necessary to make such inferences so the data 
therein are considered to be as accurate as possible. Several reporters commented that they 
had been distracted at the point in the approach where they normally extend the landing gear 
but none clearly defined that point. It was clearly before 1000 feet (approximately four miles 
from the runway) but it was not clear how the decision was usually made. One Australian air-
line defined a position in terms of radio altitude but as this information came from a report in 
the dataset, it had clearly not been an effective prompt to extend the landing gear in that case. 
What appears to distinguish the instances in the dataset is that the flight crew reach a point in 
the approach at which if the landing gear has not been extended, the prevailing contextual 
cues either fail to alert them to the fact or maybe even reinforce the belief that the landing 
gear is extended. Although it could not be determined this exact point, it was clear that if the 
landing gear remained retracted at 1000 feet it was unlikely that this was intentional. In sum-
mary, the situational context study was slightly more subjective than the other two contextual 
cueing studies but represent the best data available. 
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PART IV IMPLICATIONS OF THE ENTIRE RESEARCH  
Chapter 10 outlines some of the human limitations and behaviours that have been examined 
and researched in this study. The chapter then critically examines this research’s contribution 
to flight safety by citing its relevance to some of the safety occurrences in the literature. Fi-
nally, the chapter outlines how similar research could be deployed in other safety critical con-
texts.  
CHAPTER 10 
 
 FINAL CONCLUSIONS, RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
 IMPLICATIONS FOR AVIATION SAFETY 
10.1 FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
The primary aim of this research was to propose a new construct called substandard flight 
crew performance and to demonstrate how it could be used as a repository for knowledge re-
lating to specific categories of safety occurrence. No existing reference source for the 
knowledge outlined in this research was found during the extensive literature review under-
taken for this research. The fact that this thesis has applied the SFP construct to some acci-
dents that had not even occurred at the time of its inception indicates that it has potential for 
both the investigation of current accidents and their mitigation. The LOC accident near Sum-
burgh (UK AAIB, 2016) occurred whilst this research was underway but as soon as the report 
was examined it was evident to this research that contextual cueing was probably a factor. 
This thesis has highlighted several instances where context appears to have adversely influ-
enced the flight crew; such as the Buffalo accident flight crew’s actions during the failed stall 
recovery  (NTSB, 2010a, p. 90) and the actions of the Air Asia Airbus captain which led to a 
loss of control accident (KNKT, 2015).  However, most of the research that enabled the oper-
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ationalising of the aviation-related phenomena for all three research strands was from non-
aviation sources. The process of accumulating knowledge from such a wide range of sources 
is one of the strengths of the SFP construct given that aviation’ s stakeholders would not 
normally be drawn to those sources when seeking knowledge about aviation-related phenom-
ena. By drawing these diverse knowledge sources together in one repository the SFP con-
struct achieved its primary aim. 
Detailed research into NPCs was long overdue given that they have featured in many of the 
most serious accidents in recent history. The Buffalo accident report (NTSB, 2010a, p.103) 
included a recommendation from the NTSB that the FAA develop, and distribute to all pilots, 
multimedia guidance materials including “a detailed review of accidents involving break-
downs in sterile cockpit and other procedures”. The literature review undertaken during de-
velopment of this research found no detailed examination of the underlying causes of NPCs. 
One of the aims of this research was to determine whether NPCs were researchable and if so, 
to conduct that research. The two taxonomies presented in this thesis confirm that the NPC is 
a researchable phenomenon and furthermore that there are behavioural and institutional un-
derpinnings that appear to be unique to the aviation context. The objective of developing a 
taxonomy of flight deck conversation was effective inasmuch as the pilots who participated 
contributed their views and more is now known about the underpinnings of NPCs than was 
before. By developing a taxonomy of flight deck conversation types and their motives this 
research has achieved its aim of providing a repository for such knowledge that can be ac-
cessed by a range of aviation practitioners. Furthermore, by researching the possible causes 
of NPCs this research broke new ground and exceeded the FAA and NTSB’s recommenda-
tion.  In terms of the utility for aviation professionals of an increased knowledge of the un-
derpinnings of flight deck conversation, there are a few possibilities. An example is found in 
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this research’s statistic that 25.6% of participants found narratives about a speaker’s rapid 
progression within the organisation to be intimidating. It is unlikely that speakers like the 
NTSB vice-chairman or the captain of the Buffalo accident aircraft set out to make them-
selves unpopular by intimidating their colleague but the NPC research suggests that some pi-
lots interpret that behaviour negatively. Given the orientation towards sociability and the 
links between group-cohesion and likeability outlined in chapter 7 of this thesis, it is conceiv-
able that if it was clear that this behaviour is interpreted negatively by some co-workers, 
those who engage in it would be motivated to stop.  Also if pilots knew that the strategic na-
ture of flight deck conversation was transparent to their addressee they might be discouraged 
from engaging in it and the flight deck would revert to a less social but more business-like 
and safe place. 
 Although unclear communication is a recurrent feature of SFP-related occurrences, as far as 
is known, no previous research has referenced the general linguistics literature in the way this 
research did. Serious occurrences such as that at St Kitts (UK AAIB, 2010a) provide evi-
dence that the strategic use of unclear language poses a threat to aviation safety so this re-
search addressed a current and urgent aviation safety-related phenomenon. The St Kitts inci-
dent and other similar occurrences suggest that it is unsafe to assume that all those involved 
in aviation safety possess the insight or knowledge to make safe decisions regarding what to 
communicate and when to communicate it. The air traffic controller at St Kitts appears to 
have been strongly influenced by hierarchical structures and face–threat avoidance but it is 
unlikely a newly recruited air traffic controller, dispatcher or pilot would know where to 
begin to look for information on those subjects without conducting extensive research of a 
very wide range of literature, mostly unconnected to aviation. Narratives concerning factors 
such as hierarchy or face threat are rarely evident in aviation-related discourse but hierar-
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chical influence and face threat avoidance were probably at the core of much of the unclear 
communication examined in this thesis. Some new concepts have been introduced, such as 
the idea that a sense of accountability/responsibility might lead to intentional miscommunica-
tion. It is very unlikely that this idea has been operationalised before but the explanations in 
this research provide plausible underpinnings for unexplained verbal behaviour evident in 
advance of an accident at Houston (NTSB, 1997a, p. 20) and other similar instances in the 
literature. In line with its stated aim, this thesis has identified some recurrent types of unclear 
communication by citing real-life instances. Almost all of the explanations offered for un-
clear communications outlined in this thesis were based upon peer-reviewed research and 
many are likely to be unfamiliar to pilots and support workers alike. Concepts that are proba-
bly new to aviation discourse such as “avoidance/avoidance conflict” and “locus of control” 
were introduced. From the foregoing it can be concluded that the unclear communication re-
search outlined in this thesis achieved its research aim of explaining some of the reasons that 
unclear communication is such a recurrent feature of SFP-related safety occurrences. In terms 
of mitigating the effects of unclear communication, this research has outlined some very spe-
cific linguistic characteristics of unclear language that now they have been explained, should 
be more readily recognisable by flight crews thereby mitigating the risk of incidents like the 
near catastrophe at St Kitts occurring. 
The aim of the spatial awareness research was to examine how flight crews’ cognitive load is 
affected when they face a spatial awareness task. The evidence for a proposed link between 
cognitive load and human error was outlined and the experiments demonstrated that cognitive 
load varied depending upon the type of task required. Although the experimental results were 
broadly as expected, the detail was less important than the general finding that spatial aware-
ness tasks invoke cognitive load. The experiments provided a focus for the literature review-
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based explanations, all of which are relevant to the safe operation of aircraft in the contexts 
described. This thesis cited instances at Tenerife in the 1970s (UK AIB, 1981) and more re-
cently at Cali (ACRC, 1996) and Jakarta (KNKT, 2012) where pilots have underestimated the 
influence of a spatial task and have failed to adjust their concurrent tasks accordingly. Nota-
bly, each of these flight crews mishandled the terrain escape manoeuvre they were attempt-
ing, so the link between spatial awareness tasks, cognitive load and SFP is empirically sound. 
The aim of the contextual-cueing strand was to operationalise the concept of contextual cue-
ing by placing it into an aviation context and to conduct research that reflected real life safety 
occurrences. To achieve the aim of operationalising contextual cueing in the aviation context, 
three hypotheses were developed and tested. Error rates were examined and it was found that 
certain identifiable contextual conditions did result in increased error rates. The notion of im-
plicit learning (IL) was introduced and applied to a range of documented occurrences. The 
implicit nature of IL means that it is unlikely that the pilots affected would be aware of its 
influence, so the value of imparting this knowledge is its role in threat mitigation. If the cap-
tain involved in the previously cited runway collision at Tenerife had been aware of the pos-
sibility that his experience as a simulator instructor might expose him to increased risk of er-
ror he might have been more prepared for the cognitive error he made. 
The situational-context research was operationalised using the example from occurrence re-
ports of flight crews who forgot to extend their landing gear before landing. This was a diffi-
cult type of occurrence to research because the instances are few and pilots are very reluctant 
to own up to such a careless omission.  It was evident from anecdotal and confidential ac-
counts that could not be included in the research that similar errors and omissions are even 
more common than this study found. Despite this limitation, the research highlighted contex-
tual conditions that have co-occurred with such occurrences. By providing theory-based ex-
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planations for phenomena such as failing to respond to flight deck noise or not noticing a 
warning light, this research achieved its aim of operationalising a range of realistic situational 
contexts that have preceded an aviation safety occurrence. 
Development of the SFP construct was inspired by the reports into two seminal accidents, 
one at Lexington (NTSB, 2007a) and one at Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a), which acknowledged 
the shortcomings of the flight crew but admitted that the underlying reasons for those short-
comings were unclear. It was evident from the reports that verbal communication, loss of sit-
uational and positional awareness and contextual influences were highly instrumental in both 
these accidents. This research commenced from the premise that the flight crews’ perfor-
mance was substandard and examined some of the influences that may have contributed to 
that performance. For instance, Hersman (2010, p. 6)  highlighted a persistent narrative relat-
ed to employment terms and conditions that young and inexperienced pilots encounter early 
in their careers; as far as is known, no previous research has suggested that this might provide 
a context for the kind of rule infringement evident in the Buffalo report. So although the first 
part of the verbal strand was about NPCs it was also, to some extent, a treatise on the role of 
the institutional features of the aviation system that contribute to SFP. The section on avia-
tion’s stakeholders highlighted that even those on the periphery of aviation can be implicated 
in an accident; the longest conversation in the transcripts related to an administrator who was 
perceived by the FCM speaking to have been treating her unfairly. Abstract topics such as 
this do not receive much attention in aviation related research but the conversation section of 
this research did not shrink from this topic. The verbal strand also attempted to explain why 
previously inexplicable communication failures like the one that almost caused a catastrophe 
at St Kitts occurred. The influence of hierarchy was examined in more depth than could be 
located in previous research. This is important because, in common with the St Kitts occur-
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rence, a recent CFIT accident at Birmingham, Alabama featured behaviour that may have 
been underpinned by hierarchical structures that exist in the aviation system. The verbal 
strand included controversial research into flight deck conversation that some pilots might 
find uncomfortable to read but the taxonomies developed for this research were validated by 
pilots and explain narratives very similar to those heard from the flight crews at Lexington 
(NTSB, 2007a), Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) and in other reports. It is not being suggested that 
most pilots behave in this fashion, but some clearly do, so it is important to understand why. 
NPCs are a persistent factor in aviation accidents so the relevance of this research is clear. 
 Unclear communications have been examined in a range of institutional contexts but this was 
among the most complete examinations of the potential underpinnings of failed communica-
tion in aviation operations. The linguistic literature reviewed for this section of the study was 
characterised by an absence of hard science so inevitably in this section soft science and sub-
jectivity predominated. The research aim of identifying and explaining some of the most re-
current instances of unclear communication was achieved insofar as theory-based explana-
tions were proposed for several real life occurrences. It should be noted that the research aim 
was not to identify all such unclear communication so if this research attracts critique and 
alternative assessments, the overall aim of the SFP construct, to provide a repository for such 
knowledge, will also have been advanced. 
Whilst the spatial awareness strand may have appeared to be about why pilots get lost despite 
having excellent map displays, it was in fact about identifying, validating and explaining one 
of the reasons why their cognitive load gets out of control. The research aim was to examine 
how flight crew cognitive load is affected when it is necessary to reorient from an observer-
centred ND to a chart of a different reference frame. Although reorientation was found to in-
fluence cognitive load, at the conclusion of this research it was not possible to clearly identify 
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the type of spatial task that pilots find most cognitively challenging. However, the insights 
gained provided a springboard to discuss some of the factors that might cause these peaks in 
cognitive load. By providing a repository for the type of knowledge outlined in the spatial 
awareness strand the SFP construct has potential to cause those who support flight crews to 
reflect upon the effect that their actions have upon the cognitive load of the flight crew. The 
air traffic controller at Tenerife (UK AIB, 1981) who instructed a Boeing 727 flight crew to 
enter a holding pattern with almost no time to prepare was one of several examples of a fail-
ure to empathise. When searching for an explanation for this type of behaviour, the closest 
existing construct is emotional intelligence (EI); however, this is not a perfect fit for the phe-
nomena identified in this research. In informal discussions with pilots there was a tendency to 
dismiss the EI construct just because of its name, which would be disappointing because this 
research indicated there is a requirement to develop a similar construct that more accurately 
reflects the type of behaviour experienced at Tenerife. This would enable the necessary skills 
to be taught and more importantly, to be checked in just the same way as technical skills are 
checked. 
Although the contextual cueing strand examined an original construct, there was evidence for 
its existence in the reports. This research is thought to be the first to attempt to operationalise 
the construct and conduct experimental research. This research confirmed that three catego-
ries of implicit knowledge influence flight crews to make errors; these were knowledge 
gained from their situational context, the status of their systems, and the typicality of an alert 
or indication. By conducting experiments and literature-review based analysis this research 
achieved the research aim of operationalising contextual cueing in an aviation setting. 
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This preliminary study of contextual cueing has implications that spread way beyond the avi-
ation context. An example of system-status contextual cueing was evident in a 1988 fatal rail 
accident at Le Gare de Lyon in Paris (world heritage.org). The train’s driver and guard disa-
bled the train’s brakes after making an incorrect assumption relating to the system status after 
a passenger had deployed the emergency braking system. 
The alert/indication contextual cueing experiment confirmed that there is a significant prefer-
ence for the most typical response to an alert even if this is the wrong response. This has im-
plications for aircraft design; manufacturers should ensure that their aircraft do not have am-
biguous warning systems. The report into a depressurisation accident near Athens (AAIASB, 
2006, p. 110) provided several examples of flight crews confusing the cabin altitude warning 
for a takeoff configuration warning that was only possible on the ground.  
 
10.2 CONTRIBUTION TO AVIATION SAFETY 
1. Development of a taxonomy of flight deck conversation. 
In addition to developing and validating two original taxonomies of flight deck conversation, 
this research introduced several well-documented concepts from more general research to the 
aviation context, such as locus of control, work-motivation theory, powerlessness and power-
fulness, organisational citizenship and others. Furthermore they were each proposed as an 
explanation for a real life extract of verbal interaction from the reports. An example of this 
contribution is found in the detailed explanation in sections 7.1.12 and 7.1.17 of the verbal 
behaviour of the first officer in the Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) accident, one of the most serious 
SFP-related occurrences in recent history. No detailed explanation for this behaviour could be 
located in the existing literature. 
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2. A detailed examination of unclear communication and its function in the aviation context. 
In much the same way, the unclear communications research identified recurrent instances of 
unclear communication and sought explanations from the wider literature. The research ori-
entation was towards linguistic hedging; no existing research relating to concepts such as 
hedging could be located in the aviation related literature. The underpinnings of hedged 
communications as outlined by Bavelas (1985) provided a plausible explanation for the reluc-
tance to speak up when things are going wrong. No previous research could be found that has 
attempted to demonstrate and explain the language used when, for instance a rule is about to 
be infringed (See section 7.2.6.1) or a mistake has been made (See section 7.2.6.3), despite 
there being a recurrent pattern to the language used in such instances. Serious runway inci-
dents at St Kitts and Manchester outlined in section 7.2.4 demonstrate that whilst attenuated 
language can often be identified in hindsight, it frequently fails in its communicative objec-
tive at the point of use. As far as is known, aspects of general linguistics such as Grice’s 
(1975) co-operative principle of conversation have never been considered in an aviation con-
text before but if the speakers in the incidents above had applied Grice’s maxims (outlined in 
section 7.2.4.) it is unlikely that the misunderstandings that resulted in the incident would 
have occurred. By accessing the very considerable linguistics-related literature, this research 
has broadened the study of aviation communications from a largely technical discipline to 
one concerned with getting the message across and securing aviation safety. 
3. A detailed explanation of the relationship between spatial awareness tasks, cognitive load 
and human performance supported by experimental evidence. 
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There is a long history of pilots losing control and crashing whilst dealing with a spatial 
awareness challenge. These are highly avoidable accidents which can develop from a com-
pletely routine flight to a crash in two or three minutes. Although the link between cognitive 
load and human performance is intuitive, it was not possible to locate any aviation research 
linking cognitive load to working-memory capacity despite quite an extensive literature on 
the subject (e.g. Hinson et al., 2002, 2003). There is also very little aviation-related research 
into mental reorientation and spatial ability so this research adds to a very sparse knowledge 
bank. This research has challenged the notion that providing a moving map necessarily im-
proves spatial awareness (Prinzel et al., 2005). A particularly important contribution to the 
field is the distinction between wayfinding and navigation, which is original to this research. 
During the literature review conducted for this research no literature was found which de-
scribed the cognitive processes that have resulted in loss of spatial-awareness accidents so the 
contribution of this research is clear. 
4. The introduction of contextual cueing as an aviation related human factor supported by ex-
perimental evidence 
The operationalising of contextual cueing in the aviation context was long overdue given that 
it had been described in accident reports dating back to 1970s (Ministerio de Transportes y 
Communicaciones Subsecretaria de Aviacion Civil, 1978) and as recently as 2016 (UK 
AAIB, 2016) but is virtually unresearched as an aviation related human factor. This meant 
that until the research outlined in this thesis there was no repository for knowledge relating to 
the construct. By operationalising contextual cueing on the basis of experimental evidence 
this strand of the research outlined how the SFP construct could be used in the future when it 
is suspected that a flight crew may have been influenced by contextual cues. 
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5. The introduction and validation of a more effective method of categorising specific types 
of human limitations and behaviour than currently exists  
The overall contribution of this research was to define what substandard flight crew perfor-
mance is and to illustrate how SFP research is conducted. Aviation safety is a dynamic sub-
ject and the types of accidents that occur seem to go in cycles. As this is written there is an 
increase in pilots who lose awareness of the status of their autopilot and this has resulted in 
one recent fatal accident and two near catastrophes
xvi
. Some of the human limitations in-
volved in this type of occurrence have by coincidence been outlined in this thesis. Mishan-
dling of the autopilot could readily be a subcategory of system-status contextual cueing 
thereby providing access to a very substantial amount of data relating to these accidents. 
These data could be used for accident analysis or more optimistically, to help prevent such 
occurrences in the first place. 
10.3 WIDER IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISATIONS 
 Outside aviation, accidents at Three Mile Island and Ladbroke Grove were instances of 
alert/indication contextual cueing. At a nuclear plant at Three Mile Island the operators had 
become so accustomed to a particular warning light providing accurate system status that 
when it started to provide indications that did not match their expectations they dismissed the 
conflicting information and a serious nuclear accident resulted. Detailed research by Stanton 
& Walker (2011) into the rail collision at Ladbroke Grove noted that the inexperienced driver 
had always previously experienced a green proceed signal at the gantry which he passed at 
red on the day of the accident. Stanton & Walker (2011) speculated that the driver may have 
started forming his belief about the upcoming signal before sighting it. A recent rail accident 
at Santiago in Spain occurred in a context in which a malfunctioning warning system had 
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been disabled due to false alerts, so this was the converse case, in which it is conceivable that 
the driver would have become habituated to an alert that would now be absent.  
This thesis also outlined how flight crews sometimes forget to extend the landing gear be-
cause their situational context, or where they are in space, predicts that it should already be 
extended. The situational context hypothesis can also be applied to rail accidents. One hy-
pothesis offered in the case of a tube train accident at Moorgate in 1975 was that the driver 
simply got two stations with several common contextual features, mixed up and didn’t notice 
that he was entering a terminus. Two drivers interviewed by the BBC (2010) commented that 
they had become confused between stations on this line due to the similarity of some of the 
features of the stations. The report into a 2004 derailment at Berajondo, Queensland, Austral-
ia (ATSB, 2005) involving a tilt train which took a bend at too high a speed commented that 
there was “a real possibility that the driver suffered an initial lapse of concentration and 
thought that he was on the section of track…some 5 km further on, where a similar left hand 
curve is 110 km/h for the tilt train and 90 km/h for freight trains”. Notably, the report (Minis-
terio de Fomento, 2013) into a very similar derailment accident at Santiago, Spain in 2013 
did not even consider the possibility that the driver might have been influenced by contextual 
features of his spatial environment, preferring to attribute the accident solely to driver error. 
Although Section 4.4 on stakeholders proposed some reasons why an operator might choose 
to adopt such a position, it is also possible that contextual cueing was simply not understood 
by investigators, so the contextual-cueing hypotheses can be seen to contribute to safety at 
many levels.  
Although the former two examples involved speculation, the previously cited rail accident at 
Ladbroke Grove in 1999 bore some irrefutable features of situational contextual cueing. On 
the day of the accident, the inexperienced driver experienced a signalling arrangement that he 
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had never before experienced before in his total of nineteen journeys from Paddington (Stan-
ton and Walker, 2011, p. 1122) so his situational context would likely cue him to pass the 
signal he ignored on the accident journey. Learned Counsel pointed out that in the prevailing 
contextual conditions the driver could have been under the impression that the red signal he 
passed was not there or did not apply to his line (Cullen, 2001, p. 73). In the marine context, 
the highly publicised sinking of the Costa Concordia cruise liner near the island of Giglio al-
so featured a repetitive situational context. The errant ship’s master was repeating a manoeu-
vre that he had successfully completed several times before; however, according to the report 
(MIT, 2012) he may have formed a “false hypothesis” (Ibid., p. 162) based upon his previous 
experience. Unfortunately on the day of the accident his situational context was different in 
two crucial respects. He had used a different turning point and was using a higher speed, so 
whilst his previous success probably gave him confidence to complete the planned manoeu-
vre, he was in a slightly altered situational context. The Costa Concordia accident represents 
an example of the interconnectedness of the three research strands chosen for this research. In 
addition to the contextual factors outlined above, the report commented on the “overall pas-
sive attitude of the bridge staff; nobody seemed to have urged the master to accelerate the 
turn or to give warning of the looming danger” (Ibid., p. 6). This unwillingness of subordi-
nates to speak up clearly permeates marine safety just as with aviation. The master of the 
Costa Concordia waited a very long time before he admitted to emergency services that his 
actions had resulted in the grounding of his craft, having previously referred only to having 
an electrical black out. The report comments that he described “a scenario less serious than 
reality” to the crisis centre and even told them the situation was under control despite the ship 
being mortally damaged. This tendency to understatement during a crisis of one’s own mak-
ing is reminiscent of the actions of the first officers at Detroit (NTSB, 1991b) and Houston 
(1997a) and the captain at Charleston (NTSB, 2010c). 
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These and many other examples indicate that the SFP construct and the types of research out-
lined in this thesis have the potential to be adapted to a range of safety-critical contexts. As a 
pilot, the researcher found that although marine and rail accident reports were similar in lay-
out to aviation reports, the vocabulary was as bewildering to him as the aviation vocabulary 
would be to experts in those other disciplines. However, this research was able to incorporate 
knowledge from rail and marine safety quite readily in this research so it is likely that the 
principles outlined in this thesis would be comprehensible enough to be applied to a wide 
range of safety-critical disciplines. The stakeholders who are involved in rail or marine acci-
dents are just the same as the stakeholders in aviation outlined in Section 4.4 of this thesis 
and the knowledge outlined in this thesis is relevant to them all. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A  
 
THE OCCURRENCES CITED IN THIS THESIS IN ALPHABETIC ORDER OF  
LOCATION. 
 
Amsterdam Boeing 737: Loss of control and collision with terrain on final ap-
proach. Aircraft stalled due to substandard monitoring of speed. 
 
ARKANSAS Convair 600: Controlled flight into terrain whilst avoiding weather. 
(1973) 
 
ASPEN,  
COLORADO 
Gulfstream business jet: Controlled flight into terrain whilst approach-
ing a mountainous airport. Flight crew knowingly flew below the min-
imum altitude for the approach.  (2001) 
 
 
Athens Boeing 737: Loss of control after flight crew incapacitation. The flight 
crew misconfigured the cabin pressurisation resulting in loss of con-
sciousness. (2005) 
 
Atlanta Boeing 767-300: Taxiway landing at night after late runway change. 
(2009) 
 
Auckland  Boeing 747-412: Tail Strike during takeoff due to incorrect speeds set 
and flown. (2003) 
 
Photo courtesy of International Air Safety Association 
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Barcelona Bombardier CRJ: landing gear remained retracted for landing whilst 
performing a planned flapless landing. (2007) 
 
Photo courtesy of CIAIC. 
 
Basle Airbus A320: Controlled flight into terrain during a low flypast at an 
air show. (1988) 
 
Bedford,  
Massachusetts 
Gulfstream business jet: Runway overrun during rejected takeoff due to 
attempting to depart with the control locks engaged. (2014) 
 
 
BEIRUT B737: Loss of control after takeoff due to loss of aircraft state aware-
ness. (2010) 
  
Berajondo, 
Queensland 
Derailment of a tilt train whilst entering a bend at high speed.(2004) 
 
 
 
Birmingham,  
Alabama 
Airbus A 300: Crash during a night time non-precision instrument ap-
proach. Rushed approach after a late runway change. (2013).  
 
 
Bristol Airbus A319: Disorientation during a night visual approach. (2015)  
 
Buffalo  Bombardier, DHC 8-Q400: Loss of control on approach due to distrac-
tion.  Captain had a history of substandard performance; first officer 
was relatively inexperienced. (2009) 
 
CALI Boeing 757:  Controlled flight into terrain and Loss of control after loss 
of position awareness following a runway change. (1995) 
 
CAMEROON Boeing 737-800: Loss of control after takeoff. (2007)  
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CHARLESTON Bombardier CL600: Runway overrun after late rejected takeoff. Cap-
tain attempted to select the flaps during the takeoff run after noticing 
they were incorrectly set. (2010) 
 
 
Photo courtesy of Charleston Airport. 
 
 
Charlotte Douglas DC 9: Controlled flight into terrain due to distraction caused 
by conversation. (1974) 
 
CHICAGO Boeing 737: Runway overrun and collision. Mishandling of braking 
and reverse thrust during landing on a snow covered runway. (2005) 
  
Comoros Airbus A 310: Controlled flight into terrain and loss of control during a 
circling approach. (2009)  
 
Dallas Boeing 727-232: Flapless takeoff and loss of control.(1988)  
 
Denver McDonnell Douglas DC 9-14: Loss of control. Inexperienced captain 
and first officer. Mishandling by first officer and procedural omissions 
by captain. (1987) 
 
DETROIT Douglas DC 9/Boeing 727: Runway incursion and collision. The DC9 
flight crew became disoriented during taxi out. The captain was out of 
practice and the first officer exaggerated his knowledge. (1990) 
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Photo NTSB© 
 
 
Dryden Fokker F 28:  Loss of control due to airframe icing (1989) 
 
Dubrovnik Boeing CT 43: Controlled flight into terrain. VIP military flight crew at 
an unfamiliar airport. (1996) 
 
DULLES Boeing 727: Controlled flight into terrain after expressions of uncer-
tainty relating to the lowest safe altitude. The aircraft was diverting 
from its intended destination. (1974)  
 
 
Gatwick Boeing 767: Approach to low altitude with landing gear retracted. Air 
traffic control at Gatwick requested a high speed on final approach and 
the flight crew omitted to extend the landing gear until they received a 
warning. (2005) 
 
Guam  Boeing 747: Controlled flight into terrain. Flight crew appeared to be 
unsure of the status of the electronic glideslope and flew into the 
ground.  (1997)  
 
GUANTANAMO 
BAY 
Douglas DC 8: Loss of control during a difficult approach. There was 
no need to fly the difficult approach. The aircraft crashed in an extreme 
attitude just short of the runway. (1993)  
 
 
Heathrow Boeing 777: Stalled onto runway after both engines failed. This dual 
engine failure was probably the result of fuel icing. The flight crew did 
well to make the runway. (2009) 
 
HOUSTON  
HOBBY 
Gulfstream: Crash during approach to landing. The PM made a mistake 
setting the navigation displays which distracted the PF. The aircraft 
crashed several miles short of the runway.  (2004) 
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Houston  Douglas DC 9: Wheels up landing. New captain misinterpreted several 
warnings which resulted from a system configuration error. He contin-
ued the approach despite the warnings and landed with the gear retract-
ed. (1996) 
 
 
 
Photo B Correira © 
 
Irish Sea Boeing 737: Mishandled cabin pressurisation. The flight crew omitted 
to pressurise the aircraft cabin and failed to respond to indications that 
should have alerted them to that fact. ( 2011) 
 
ISLAMABAD  Airbus A 321: Controlled flight into terrain and loss of control. Captain 
attempted to fly an unauthorised approach in bad weather. He became 
overloaded and made multiple errors. (2010) 
 
 
JAKARTA Sukhoi RRJ95B: Controlled flight into terrain. The captain was a test 
pilot demonstrating a new airliner to customers. He flew the aircraft 
into a mountain when he became distracted. (2012) 
 
Java Sea Airbus A320: Loss of control after inflight troubleshooting.  (2014) 
 
Johannesburg Boeing 747: Taxied into a building. Aircraft scrapped (2013) 
 
Kaliningrad  Boeing 737: Landing gear retracted landing after problems with the 
flaps. (2008) 
 
Kansai Boeing 777 300: Approach to a closed runway whilst flying a night 
time visual approach which neither pilot had flown before. (2011) 
 
Kegworth  Boeing 737: Shut down the wrong engine after a fire warning.(1989) 
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Ketchican De Havilland DHC 3: Controlled flight into terrain during a sightseeing 
flight. (2015)  
 
Kirksville,  
Missouri  
BAE Jetstream: Controlled flight into terrain during a night time non-
precision approach. (2004) 
 
  
La Guardia  McDonnell Douglas MD 88: Descent below visual glidepath and colli-
sion with terrain. (1996) 
 
Ladbroke Grove The Ladbroke Grove rail enquiry: Collision between two trains. (2000) 
 
Lanzarote McDonnell Douglas MD 83: Flapless takeoff and loss of control. The 
aircraft had existing defects which may have influenced the flight crew. 
Landed safely.(2007) 
 
 
LEXINGTON  Bombardier CL 600: Attempted takeoff from wrong runway at night. 
The runway the flight crew used was about half the required length and 
misaligned by 40˚. The aircraft hit trees and an earth mound. (2006) 
 
Lulea Boeing 737: Wrong runway takeoff in fog. This flight crew took off on 
the reciprocal runway to that intended; only noticed after takeoff. 
(2007) 
 
Madrid DC9 82: Flapless takeoff and loss of control. Taxiing out for the second 
time after experiencing a defect earlier, the flight crew omitted to ex-
tend the flaps for takeoff. The aircraft stalled just after takeoff. (2008) 
 
Manchester Boeing 737: Took off with crew unaware that runway was reduced in 
effective length. Misunderstanding related to the entry point on the 
runway. (2003) 
 
Melbourne Boeing 737: Incorrect go around procedure after windshear event.  
(2010) 
 
Miami Boeing 777: Took off from wrong runway intersection and hit lighting 
gantry. (2015) 
 
Milan Boeing MD 87/Cessna 525: Runway collision in fog. The Cessna pilot 
became lost on the airport and taxied into the path of the MD 87. 
(2001) 
 
Moorgate London Underground train crashed into buffers at high speed.(1975)  
 
MOUNT EREBUS  Douglas DC 10: Controlled flight into terrain. Sightseeing flight in 
marginal weather. Incorrect navigation coordinates provided to flight 
crew. Multiple expressions of concern from FCMs preceded flight into 
the mountain. (1979) 
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MOUNT TEIDE, 
TENERIFE 
Boeing 727: Controlled flight into terrain. Late change to clearance re-
quiring flight crew to enter an unpublished holding pattern. This com-
bined with the aircraft being flown faster than normal resulted in the 
flight crew becoming hopelessly lost and flying into the mountain. 
(1980)  
 
 
Nassenwil Austria Saab 340B: Loss of control after takeoff.  Captain became confused 
after turning the wrong way on departure. (2000) 
  
Newcastle U.K. Boeing 757: Loss of control after go-around. Procedural errors resulted 
in a loss of control and a low fuel emergency landing. The aircraft was 
completely serviceable. (2013)  
 
New York JFK Boeing 707, Ran out of fuel. Flight crew did not manage fuel state dur-
ing poor weather conditions. (1990) 
 
Palmerston North, 
New Zealand  
De Havilland Dash Eight: Controlled flight into terrain. Captain be-
came distracted whilst a problem with the landing gear was being ad-
dressed. (1995)  
 
 
Paris Shorts SD 330/ McDonnell Douglas MD 83: Runway collision. The 
Shorts entered the runway in front of the departing MD 83 after misin-
terpreting a clearance. This was a line training flight with a new co-
pilot.(2000) 
  
Pekanbaru,  
Indonesia  
Boeing 737: Failed flapless takeoff and runway overrun. (2002) 
 
 
Photo NTSC © 
 
  
PORTLAND McDonnell Douglas, DC 8 61: Fuel Exhaustion  whilst troubleshooting 
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       423 
 
 
a landing gear problem.(1978) 
 
Providence Boeing 757/ Boeing 727: Near runway collision in fog. The air traffic 
controller lost situational awareness after the 757 flight crew reported 
being lost in the vicinity of the active runway. (1999) 
 
River Hudson Airbus A320: Loss of thrust in both engines due to multiple bird strikes 
resulting in ditching. (2009) 
 
Romulus Douglas DC 9: Flapless takeoff and loss of control. Flight crew omitted 
to extend flaps for takeoff.(1987) 
 
Roselawn,  
Indiana 
ATR 72: Loss of control after icing encounter. Flight crew distracted 
and failed to notice low speed whilst holding. (1994) 
 
 
San Francisco   Boeing 777: Descent below visual glidepath and impact with seawall. 
Captain under training mishandled the thrust on approach and the train-
ing captain and third pilot did not notice. (2013) 
 
Santiago Crash of high speed train which entered a bend at too high a speed. The 
driver was distracted by his mobile phone in the period preceding the 
crash. (2013) 
 
Sharjah Ilyushin Il 76: Approached an under construction Runway. Multiple 
expressions of uncertainty during the approach. (2014) 
  
  
SHARM EL 
SHEIKH 
Boeing 737: Loss of control after takeoff.  Reason unclear.(2004) 
 
  
Smolensk Tupolev TU-154: Controlled flight into terrain. Military VIP flight with 
pressure to land from superiors. (2010) 
 
SOCHI Airbus A320: Loss of control and collision with the surface. Confusing 
missed approach instruction and substandard operation by flight crew. 
(2006) 
 
ST KITTS Boeing 777-236: Takeoff from wrong position on runway. No taxi 
briefing by flight crew because this was considered a simple airport. 
Flight crew took the wrong intersection for takeoff and despite being 
aware of this error the air traffic controller did not alert them. Nearly 
ran out of runway. (2009) 
 
St Louis McDonnell Douglas DC 9-82: In flight left engine fire. Multiple proce-
dural infringements made a difficult situation even worse. (2007) 
 
Staines, UK Hawker Siddeley Trident 1: Loss of control after takeoff. Two inexpe-
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rienced co-pilots and a senior captain. Aircraft stalled after flaps were 
retracted at too low a speed. (1972) 
 
 
Sydney Bombardier DHC 8-315, Stall warning device event. Training flight; 
rushed approach resulting in failure to monitor system configuration.  
(2011) 
 
Taiwan Boeing 747: Crashed into equipment on partially closed runway during 
takeoff. Flight crew lined up on a closed runway despite disconfirming 
indications inside and outside the flight deck. Crashed into heavy 
equipment at high speed.(2000) 
 
TENERIFE 
NORTH 
Boeing 747/Boeing 747: Collided on the runway during fog. A Dutch 
flight crew commenced takeoff on an occupied runway after the cap-
tain misinterpreted a clearance. (1977) 
 
 
Three Mile Island Nuclear meltdown accident after incorrect assessment of system status.  
(1979)  
 
WASHINGTON  Boeing 737-222: Stalled after takeoff due to incorrect thrust setting re-
sulting from erroneous engine indications due to ice accretion. (1982) 
 
ZURICH Avro 146-RJ 100: Controlled flight into terrain after an unexpected 
runway change. The flight crew knowingly flew below the altitude 
minima for the approach. (2001)  
___________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX B: THE ONLINE CONVERSATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
 
 
Flight deck Conversation Survey 
Explaining flight deck conversation: The pilot's perspective 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. This questionnaire is part of a human 
factors research programme including a study of the types of conversations that occur on the 
flight deck. Existing research into conversations in institutional settings suggests that such 
conversations are often carefully constructed, and deployed with a particular objective in 
mind. 
You are being asked to identify what you consider your colleague was trying to achieve by 
conducting certain types of conversation that you may have experienced on the flight deck. It 
is unimportant whether the conversation in question occurred during a sterile cockpit period 
or not. 
 
The Explanation List below is derived from existing organisational and social science re-
search, adapted to reflect the airline context. Both the conversation types and the explanation 
list have been subjected to extensive critique by pilots from several airlines in order to make 
them recognisable to you. Any alternative explanations you offer are also very important to 
this research, so please provide your personal insights. 
EXPLANATION LIST 
The following list describes some possible explanations for the conversation types you will 
be assessing. Hit the 'More Info' button to get a pop up window with these explanations when 
you are filling in the survey. 
SELF-PROMOTION 
Where individuals point out or allude to their abilities or accomplishments in order to be seen 
as competent, successful and autonomous (self-governing). 
INGRATIATION 
Where individuals use flattery or excessive self-deprecation to appear likeable to colleagues 
EXEMPLIFICATION 
Where individuals describe self-sacrificing or going above and beyond the call of duty in or-
der to appear dedicated to their work 
CREW COHESION 
Where conversation is enacted to reinforce the impression that the speaker belongs to a like-
minded group to the listener 
SELF-JUSTIFICATION 
Where conversation is enacted to explain and justify some aspect of the speaker's situation or 
actions; this can involve selective omission or inclusion of relevant information 
INTIMIDATION 
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Where conversation tends to overawe, unsettle or invoke a sense of inferiority or inadequa-
cy in you, either personally or professionally 
NORMAL FRIENDLINESS 
Where conversation is enacted in the interests of normal social interaction, characterised by 
co-operation and agreeableness; speakers are neither excessively introverted nor extraverted 
in such interactions 
ANY OTHER EXPLANATION 
Below is an extract from the flight deck conversation questionnaire illustrating one of the 28 
conversation type categories. 
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3.  Flight deck Conversation types 
 
For each conversation type listed below choose your first and second choice explanation from 
the dropdown list.  
 
If you do not recognise the conversation type, leave the box blank. If you do not have a sec-
ond choice explanation, leave that box blank, although few conversations are likely to have a 
single explanation.  
 
If none of the explanations offered in the dropdown list is appropriate, please offer your al-
ternative explanation(s) in plain language in the "other" boxes. These alternative explanations 
are a very important component of this research. 
   Choose your primary ex-
planation for this behav-
iour.   
 Choose your secondary explanation 
for this behaviour. 
  (please select)  Other                        
(please speci-
fy)  
(please select)  Other (please specify)  
Mentioning an 
occasion when 
a favour was 
done for a col-
league or the 
organisation  
Other...
 
 Select an answ er
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APPENDIX C: CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA 
Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, 
and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like 
events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This 
number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a 
small fraction of total occurrences. 
Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other partici-
pants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to re-
port. Thus, the data can reflect reporting biases. These biases, which are not fully known or 
measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near mid air colli-
sions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply 
because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and more 
inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will 
have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis. 
One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concern-
ing specific event types represents the lower measure of the true number of such events that 
are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this 
number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 
such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that 
the real power of ASRS data is the qualitative information contained in report narratives. The 
pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations 
in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, why it happened. Using report 
narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well 
worth the added effort. 
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APPENDIX D: AN EXTRACT OF COMMUNICATIONS DEMONSTRATING LOSS OF 
SPATIAL AWARENESS 
This is an extract of communications between a Korean flight crew proceeding downwind on 
a circling approach and Busan ATC. APP is the approach controller and ABL8108 is com-
munication from the flight crew. At time 14:19:54 the first officer is clearly confused be-
tween left and right. Also note how the reply at 14:20:06 omits the word right and the ac-
knowledgment of clearance to land at 14:22:26 doesn’t mention the runway at all. The air-
craft was landed on a runway parallel to that intended. 
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 APPENDIX E  
EXTRACT OF NASA ASRS REPORT 438691, MAY 1999 
 
A Boeing 747 flight crew realized an incorrect flap setting after the before takeoff checklist 
was run on taxi out of JFK. 
Narrative: Crew of 3 (captain, first officer, flight engineer) on a cargo flight from JFK to At-
lanta and then on to Anchorage.  Initial departure had been delayed about 2 hours due to the 
late arrival of aircraft to JFK. After engine starts and taxi clearance received, captain called 
for 'flaps 10 degrees. First officer moved the flap handle and called “flaps 10 degrees”. While 
taxiing to hold short, taxi checklist was accomplished. At the checklist step for “flaps and 
runway” (for which the captain has no response), I happened to glance at the airport diagram 
to check on a taxi routing instruction which we had just received. At “flaps and runway” on 
the checklist, the first officer called out “10, 10, green light” (indicating that the inboard and 
outboard flap indicators actually show flaps at 10 degrees and the flap position light is green). 
The flight engineer then called out “10, 10, 8 green lights”, which acknowledged his confir-
mation of flap position. Through it all, the flaps were at 5 degrees.  
  
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       431 
 
 
APPENDIX F 
 ILLUSTRATIONS OF SOME OF THE EQUIPMENT REFERRED TO IN THIS THESIS 
 
This illustration shows the instrument layout on a Boeing 787. The ND is on the extreme left 
and is aligned with an egocentric heading of 047°or northeast at the top of the instrument. 
The EFB is on the right and is fitted at an angle to the viewer. The EFB image is oriented 
with north at the top and the aircraft’s position and orientation on the apron can be seen in 
amber on the map. Below is an enlarged image of the same EFB with its allocentric orienta-
tion. 
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An EFB showing the aircraft parked on the gate heading north east. 
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The image below shows a modern flight management computer (FMC) on the left and an 
ACARS display on the right.
 
 
  
Substandard Flight Crew Performance                                                                       434 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
i
 The term substandard in relation to flight crew performance is used in NTSB reports AAR 
94/05, 88/05, 93/03 and 89/04. 
 
ii
 A Boeing 737 took off in fog at Lulea, Sweden using the reciprocal runway to the one in-
tended. This suggests that the flight crew were completely disoriented when they commenced 
their takeoff. An identical type of aircraft to the Buffalo (NTSB, 2010a) accident aircraft was 
involved in a very similar occurrence at Sydney in 2011. The report into an Airbus crash at 
Birmingham Alabama in 2011 commented that the flight crew’s conversation regarding non-
pertinent operational issues distracted them. 
 
iii
 The fatal accident involved a Piper PA 46 and the two serious incidents involved a Boeing 
757 and a Saab 2000.  
 
iv
 The report into an accident at Roselawn omitted some CVR transcript data and the Russian 
report into the Airbus crash at Sochi failed to acknowledge human factors in relation to 
communication that the French BEA considered pertinent to the cause. 
 
v
 The SACAA report (2014, p. 93) into a Boeing 747 taxiing accident cited a similar previous 
BA 747 incident that had not been reported. 
 
vi
 FAA to boost pilot professional development (FAA, 2016) 
Following the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident, air carriers and unions responded to the 
FAA’s Call to Action and pledged support for professional standards and ethics committees, 
a code of ethics, and safety risk management meetings.  
 
vii
 Both the Buffalo and Kirksville reports include positive testimony related to the captains 
conducting a relaxed operation. 
 
viii
 Remarks of Robert Sumwalt, Vice Chairman National Transportation Safety Board to 
SMU Air Law Symposium February 21, 2008 Dallas, TX 
 
ix
 The Buffalo first officer spoke of going to Alaska Airlines. The Buffalo captain had turned 
down a jet job. The Lexington first officer spoke of going to Southwest and to a Middle East 
carrier.  The Detroit first officer had three job offers and this was not his first choice. 
  
x
 Maurice Nevile (2006) researched the reasons that pilot preface some of their talk with the 
word “and”. Although this is a legitimate linguistic study it has little practical value to avia-
tion operations. 
 
xi
 Astronaut Alan Shepard used the term when commenting on a rocket explosion he wit-
nessed in 1959. Shuttle astronaut Robert Gibson also used it in relation to a cabin leak warn-
ing. 
 
xii
 See ASRS reports 1042772,1307627 and 1277512 
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xiii
 The NTSB accident database details accidents at Detroit, Charleston and Dallas in which 
pilots responded to a checklist item without checking the item.  
 
xiv
 An Ethiopian crew departing from Beirut misinterpreted multiple heading instructions pri-
or to losing control of the Boeing 737. An Armenian Airbus crew failed to fly the correct 
heading on a missed approach and crashed into the sea shortly after. A Boeing 757 crew 
crashed into a mountain near Cali just four minutes after an incorrect modification to the 
route caused navigation confusion. 
 
xv
 Since 2014 there have been gear retracted landings involving training flights in Taiwan 
(ASC, 2015), Canada (Transport Canada, 2016) and Spain (CIAIC, 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
